TTABlog Test: Is CELEBRITY PITCH TANK Confusable with SHARK TANK for Business-Themed Entertainment Services?

Sony Pictures opposed an application to register the mark CELEBRITY PITCH TANK for "Entertainment, namely, a continuing reality show broadcast over the internet during which participants give away cash for scholarships and startup businesses" [CELEBRITY PITCH disclaimed], claiming likley confusion with the registered mark SHARK TANK for "entertainment services in the nature of an ongoing reality television series, involving presentation of business concepts." What to you think? Did David conquer Goliath? Sony Pictures Television Inc. v. Tim Lynch, Opposition No. 91289684 (June 9, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Cheryl S. Goodman).

The Board found the inolved services to be closely related because both involve business-themed entertainment services. It found some overlap between channels of trade and classes of consumers because television shows may be offered via the internet through streaming services and YouTube.

As to the conditions of purchase, "[o]rdinary consumers who watch Applicant’s and Opposer’s reality programs are likely to exercise only ordinary care, especially given that Applicant’s internet shows may be available for free and at least the first run shows of Opposer’s television program are broadcast on the ABC network and 'free.'"

Turning to the strengh of Opposer Sony's mark, based on a raft of evidence and on pro se Applicant Lynch's own admissions, the Board found that the SHARK TANK mark "falls on the higher end of the fame spectrum, and is entitled to broad protection." As to conceptual strength, the Board concluded that "SHARK TANK (i.e., a natural or artificial pool, pond or lake or liquid receptacle containing elongate elasmobranch mostly marine fishes) is arbitrary when used in connection with reality shows."

As to the marks, the Board acknowledged that the first words in a mark can make the biggest impact, but here "this impact is blunted in Applicant’s mark because the disclaimed terms CELEBRITY PITCH are at least descriptive, in that they identify a feature of the reality program Applicant offers." The Board concluded that "consumers are likely to focus on the TANK portion of Applicant’s mark."

The Board found that the "overall commercial impression conveyed by the marks is similar and likely to be the same for many consumers." It concluded that the marks are "sufficiently similar in their entireties such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection between the parties."

Finally, Applicant Lynch admitted that he “selected [his Mark] in order to make reference to, or call to mind, Opposer’s SHARK TANK Television Program." Based on this admission, the Board found "sufficient evidence in the record to support a finding of bad faith intent to confuse."

And so, the Board sustained the opposition.

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TTABlogger comment: The Board struggled a bit to find the marks confusingly similar. Do you agree with the result?

BTW: Should intent be a factor in the DuPont calculus? How does the applicant's intent have anything to do with consumer perception? Thomas L. Casagrande (now a TTAB judge) said it didn't in this article: "A Verdict for Your Thoughts? Why an Accused Trademark Infringer’s Intent Has No Place in Likelihood of Confusion Analysis." [pdf here].

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Upholds Section 2(b) Refusal: PROSCIUTTO DI CARPEGNA Mark Includes Italian Flag or Simulation Thereof

The Board affirmed a refusal to register the mark PROSCIUTTO DI CARPEGNA & Design (shown below) for "Prosciutto from the Carpegna region of Italy made in accordance with specific standards," finding that the mark comprises the Italian flag, in violation of Section 2(b). In re Consorzio Prosciutto di Carpegna, Serial No. 87811048 (June 12, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande).

Section 2(b) requires refusal of any mark that "[c]onsists of or comprises the flag … of any foreign nation, or any simulation thereof." "[T]he word 'comprises' in the clause '[c]onsists of or comprises' means 'includes.'" "Whether matter included in a mark is, or includes, a flag 'is determined by a visual comparison of the matter and the actual flag.' (citation omitted). As with most things trademark (except, notably, functionality), our comparison focuses on the perception of the relevant consumers."

The Italian flag (shown immediately above) is rectangular, wider than it is tall, with equal vertical parallel stripes of green, white, and red. The relevant matter in applicant's mark includes green, white, and red parallel stripes arrayed almost vertically. "It is not depicted as a rectangle, but, depending on one's perspective, looks either like a tilted rectangle (i.e., parallelogram) or, more likely, like a rectangle as seen from an angle, rather than head-on."

The Board found that "consumers will perceive the matter as the Italian flag or a close simulation—i.e., something that gives the appearance or effect of the Italian flag."

Applicant originally described this feature as the Italian flag, but then insisted that consumers would not recognize it as the flag because the mark "merely includes only stylized flag elements, red and green vertical stripes, and is incomplete. There is no border around it and the middle section is merely a gap." Moreover, according to applicant, the mark is dominated by the words PROSCIUTTO and CARPEGNA.

The Board, however, observed that whether other elements of the mark are dominant is irrelevant. "We’re determining whether the mark includes a flag, or a simulation of a flag. Period. Unless the matter is so small or obscured that consumers wouldn’t even notice that it was included—which is not the case here—size does not matter."

The Board noted that the mark has a white background, thus explaining the "gap" in the middle. Furthermore, the relevant consumers "are consumers of 'Prosciutto from the Carpegna region of Italy,' which predisposes them to viewing the mark through an Italian lens."

Applicant pointed to the TMEP, which states that "if the flag design is used to form a letter, number, or design,” examining attorneys will not refuse registration. The Board noted, however, that the TMEP does not state "as part of a design." Reviewing the examples in the TMEP, the Board found most relevant this mark that the TMEP advised should be refused registration under Section 2(b):

In sum, the Board found that Examining Attorney Lisa Papale "correctly found that the mark includes an Italian flag, or simulation of an Italian flag, and correctly determined that the application must be refused under Section 2(b)."

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Looking through an Irish lens, it still looks like the flag of Italy.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Is FOODANALYZER Generic for Food Sensitivity Testing Services?

The USPTO refused to register the proposed mark FOODANALYZER (on the Supplemental Register) for “Diagnostic testing and analysis services for medical diagnostic and treatment purposes, namely, for food sensitivity testing" on the ground of genericness under Sections 23(c) and 45 of the Trademark Act. Applicant Access Medical contended that because food itself is not analyzed, FOODANALYZER cannot be generic. The Board gave that argument limited weight: "Our analysis must focus on the broader record of how the relevant public actually perceives the term FOODANALYZER as a whole." How do you think this appeal came out? In re Access Medical Laboratories, Inc., Serial No. 97708719 (June 9, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Lawrence T. Stanley, Jr.).

There was no dispute that the relevant genus was co-extensive with applicant's recitation of services, and the Board found the relevant consumers to be ordinary purchasers, users, or providers of such services. The question, then, was whether the relevant public understands FOODANALYZER "as the name of the category of services."

Applicant argued that the Office must prove genericness by "clear evidence," but the CAFC in PT Medisafe, clarified that it has “never held that the examining attorney must find genericness by clear and convincing evidence.” The court explained that “[a] potentially confusing reference to ‘clear evidence’ in the TMEP . . . has recently been clarified and no longer suggests a clear and convincing evidence burden. . . .” The correct standard is a preponderance of the evidence.

The Board found the record evidence to be "mixed." FOODANALYZER is not a dictionary term, nor is it found in in industry glossaries, trade publications, or media articles. There were some third-party references to applicant's branded services, and several third-party uses that appeared to be source-identifying. Applicant itself used the term in a trademark manner.

On the other hand, there was evidence of use of FOODANALYZER appearing in service lists alongside other apparently generic terms. But the "total volume of third-party evidence − approximately fifteen references, some of which describe a test with specifications identical to Applicant's own offering and using the same formatting ('foodAnalyzer') − does not establish that the relevant consuming public understands FOODANALYZER as the generic name for a class of food sensitivity testing services."

We acknowledge that FOODANALYZER bears a close descriptive relationship to the identified services and that “food” and “analyzer” individually have descriptive significance for those services. But descriptiveness, even high descriptiveness, is not tantamount to genericness. Applicant has conceded descriptiveness by seeking a registration on the Supplemental Register. The Examining Attorney must establish something beyond that, namely that the relevant public perceives FOODANALYZER primarily as a category name rather than as a source identifier, even a weak one. On this record, that additional showing has not been made.

The Board found that the limited record evidence "create[s] doubt about whether consumers would perceive [FOODANALYZER] as generic, or rather as capable of indicating source and thus eligible for registration on the Supplemental Register." Resolving that doubt in applicant's favor, the Board reversed the refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: The "mixed record" approach is probably the best get-out-of-jail-free card for genericness refusals.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Affirms Bifusal of THE OHIO IPA for Beer: Geographically Descriptive and Confusable with OHIO PALE ALE for Beer

The Board affirmed two refusals to register the mark THE OHIO IPA for beer [OHIO disclaimed], finding the mark to be primarily geographically descriptive of the goods and likely to cause confusion with the registered mark OHIO PALE ALE, also for beer [ALE disclaimed]. Applicant TBK argued, among other things, that young people perceive an alternate meaning of “Ohio:” a slang for “weird, bizarre, or foolish.” The Board didn't buy it. In re TBK Operating Company, LLC, Serial No. 98551577 (June 9, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande).

Geographical Descriptiveness:  Section 2(e)(2) prohibits registration of a “mark which … when used on or in connection with the goods of the applicant is primarily geographically descriptive of them . . . .” The test for determining whether a mark is primarily geographically descriptive is whether: 1. the mark sought to be registered (or a portion thereof) is the name of a place generally known to the public; 2. the source of the goods or services is the geographic region named in the mark; and 3. the public would make an association between the goods or services and the place named in the mark, that is, believe that the goods or services for which the mark is sought to be registered originate in that place.

Applicant TBK did not argue that Ohio is not a well-known geographic location. It asserted that “[c]onsumers will see the wording ‘THE’ as a source identifying term that changes the primary significance of the mark from the word ‘OHIO.’” However, there was no evidence to support that argument. As to the purported slang meaning of OHIO, again there was no evidence to support the attorney's argument.

Likewise, the inclusion of the term IPA did not overcome the refusal. "Generally, 'the presence of generic or highly descriptive terms in a mark which also contains a primarily geographically descriptive term does not serve to detract from the primary geographical significance of the mark as a whole.'" The Board found that the primary significance of THE OHIO IPA is geographic.

As the second and third elements of the Section 2(e)(2) test, the evidence from TBK’s website showed that its "production facility" for its beers and ales is in Middleburg Heights, Ohio. Therefore, the Board applied the presumption that consumers will make a goods/place association when the goods come from the place named. It concluded that the mark is primarily geographically descriptive, and affirmed the refusal to register on that ground.

Likelihood of Confusion: The goods are identical and therefore presumably travel through the same trade channels to the same classes of consumers. As to the marks, THE OHIO IPA and OHIO PALE ALE "look and sound alike only to the extent they contain the term OHIO. But, . . . in the beer context, there is evidence that 'IPA' signifies a sub-type of pale ale: India pale ale. So the respective marks have very similar meanings."

TBK argued that the Board gave too much weight to the word OHIO and not enough to THE. According to TBK, the word THE signifies that its “Ohio IPA” is "unique and the most outstanding or prominent choice for beer." The Board was unconvinced:

We fail to see how this essentially laudatory use of “THE” in Applicant’s mark, which points to the words that follow (Applicant’s “OHIO IPA” beer) distinguishes source from the seller of “OHIO PALE ALE” beer, which is essentially the same thing (an Ohio beer or pale ale). * * * In short, we find the marks, overall, to be similar, especially in meaning.

With all the relevant DuPont factors pointing one way, the Board had "no difficulty, on the record here, concluding that confusion is likely." And so it affirmed the Section 2(d) refusal.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Is this a WYHA? a half-WYHA?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Affirms Reexamination Decision Ordering Cancellation of BAIA Registration for Non-use, Rejects Residual Goodwill Argument

The Board affirmed the USPTO's decision on reexamination, ordering cancellation of a registration for the mark BAIA & Design (shown below) for " Boats; Ships; Yachts" because Registrant Hanako failed to demonstrate use of the mark in commerce by the critical date (the date of filing its statement of use, or the last date for filing same). The petition for reexamination presented a prima facie case, shifting the burden to Hanako to show use of the mark. In re Hanako design SA, Reexamination No. 2024-101552R for Registration No. 7220244 (June 5, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande).

Registrant Hanako failed to submit a "verified statement signed by someone with firsthand knowledge of the facts to be proved, setting forth … factual information … about the use of the mark in commerce … and how the evidence demonstrates use of the mark in commerce as of any relevant date” as required by Rule 2.93(b)(7). That failure alone justified affirmance of the reexamination decision.

Nonetheless, in the interest of completeness, the Board addressed Hanako's arguments. Hanako did not contend that it ever sold any goods under the mark. Instead, it argued that it succeeded to rights in the mark tracing back to the owner of a prior BAIA registration that was cancelled in 2012. However, the Board found four missing links in the chain-of-title.

Hanako also argued that, although it lacked evidence that it or its purported predecessors-in-interest used the registered mark, there were "multiple active U.S. listings for BAIA yachts" that "advertise the yachts for purchase." According to Hanako, this "secondary market" preserved "trademark significance" and "demonstrates that the … Mark remains visible to consumers and retains its goodwill." The Board rejected that argument.

While evidence of residual goodwill can serve to negate a charge of abandonment based on a mark having become the generic name for the goods, see Adamson Sys. Eng’g, Inc. v. Peavey Elecs. Corp., No. 92076586, 2023 TTAB LEXIS 454, at *18, the problem here is different: Registrant’s nonuse (and the lack of evidence that Registrant’s alleged predecessor-in-interest, Italproperties, ever used the mark). Alleged residual goodwill does not defeat nonuse. See, e.g., id. at *43-44; see also Azeka Bldg. Corp. v. Azeka, No. 91218679, 2017 TTAB LEXIS 123, at *29-32; Gen. Motors Corp. v. Aristide & Co., No. 91167007, 2008 TTAB LEXIS 18, at *14-15 (TTAB 2008). Nonuse remains nonuse.

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TTABlogger comment: For a discussion of the significance of residual goodwill, see Jerome Gilson and Anne Gilson LaLonde, The Zombie Trademark: A Windfall and A Pitfall, 98 TMR 1280 (November - December 2008).

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Grants Two Cancellation Petitions Based on Registrant's Deemed Admissions of Non-use

In this consolidated cancellation proceeding, the Board granted petitions to cancel two registrations for the mark SUPERKING for bags, bath towels, and various other goods in classes 18 and 24, on the ground of non-use as of the filing dates of the underlying use-based applications. Respondent did not respond to discovery, submit any evidence or testimony, or file a brief. Its attorney told petitioner that his client was not responding to his communications.  Super Kings International, Inc. v. Shenzhen BMX Network Technology Ltd., Cancellation Nos. 92085356 and 92085358 (Consolidated) (June 5, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christopher C. Larkin).

Specimen of Use

Petitioner argued that respondent's failure to defend was sufficient to warrant judgment, but the Board disagreed:

The plaintiff always bears the burden of proving that the defendant is not entitled to obtain or maintain a registration “even in the absence of contrary evidence or argument.” DC Comics v. Cellular Nerd LLC, No. 91246950, 2022 WL 17832492, at *9 (TTAB 2022) (citation omitted). Defendants thus are not required to “defend” a case by submitting evidence or a brief, and there are no adverse consequences flowing simply from a defendant’s failure to do either.

The Board observed that “[a]n application based on use of the mark in commerce under Section 1(a) . . . is void ab initio if the mark was not in use in commerce in connection with the goods identified in the application at the time the application was filed.”

Petitioner relied on respondent’s deemed admissions of non-use resulting from its failure to respond to requests for admission served by petitioner under Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil, which provides that "[a] matter is admitted, unless within 30 days after being served, the party to whom the request is directed serves on the requesting party a written answer or objection addressed to the matter and signed by the party or its attorney.” “The effect of such admissions is that the subject matter of the requests is ‘conclusively established" . . . . 

Respondent thus admitted that its marks had “never been used in commerce in the United States," that “none of the goods or services listed under Registrant’s Mark[s] have ever been sold, offered for sale, or distributed under Registrant’s Mark[s] in the United States,” and that “the specimens of use submitted in registering Registrant’s Mark[s] were not of products in commerce in the United States at the time of registration or at any time before or after registration, but instead fraudulent fabricated specimens.”

Consequently, the Board found that the two registrations at issue were void ab initio, and so it granted the petitions for cancellation.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: The underlying applications were filed by attorney Nyall Engfield. In March 2025, while these proceedings were pending, Mr. Engfield was publicly reprimanded and put on probation for six months by the USPTO’s Office of Enrollment and Discipline (“OED”) for misconduct in the representation of numerous Chinese applicants before the USPTO. Note also that registrant's attorney in these proceedings, Jonathan G. Morton, was suspended from practice before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for a period of twenty-four months, commencing on April 24, 2022, as stated in a Final Order of suspension (pdf here). Mr. Morton had acknowledged that did not conduct reasonable inquiries regarding the specimens of use that he submitted on behalf of his clients.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

Second Circuit Vacates Peju Summary Judgment: Lower Court Misapplied Issue Preclusion and Misread B&B Hardware

A mere three weeks after hearing oral argument, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit vacated and remanded the July 12, 2024 judgment of the district court in Cesari S.R.L. v. Peju Province Winery L.P., Civil Action No. 17 Civ. 873 (NRB) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2017) [pdf here], in which the court granted Plaintiff Cesari's motion for partial summary judgment on its trademark infringement claim, ruling that preclusion applied to the issue of likelihood of confusion based on a 2004 TTAB decision. The Second Circuit's non-precedential order may be downloaded here.

In the TTAB opposition, Cesari contended that Peju’s LIANA mark was likely to cause confusion with its LIANO mark. The TTAB conducted its Section 2(d) analysis exclusively “on the basis of the identification of goods set forth in [Peju’s] application,” without considering “the particular nature of [Peju’s] goods, the particular channels of trade[,] or the class of purchasers to which the sales of goods are directed.”

Ten years later, Cesari sued Peju for trademark infringement, and then moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of whether Peju was precluded from relitigating the “likelihood of confusion” element of the trademark-infringement claim. The district court granted the motion, ruling that Peju was “precluded from relitigating the likelihood of confusion between the parties’ marks” – an element of Cesari’s trademark infringement claim – because the TTAB’s 2004 trademark registration decision had settled the matter once and for all."

The Second Circuit, however, found that "the TTAB decision – on its face – did not consider the parties’ 'actual usage in the marketplace.'" "Importantly, the TTAB never considered the merits of Peju’s principal defense to Cesari’s infringement claim: “that its wine [wa]s distinguishable [from Cesari’s] because it is a dessert wine” and therefore not likely to confuse consumers.

Therefore, because the issues before the TTAB and the district court were not the same, the district court should not have given preclusive effect to the TTAB’s ruling on the likelihood of confusion.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: TTABlog hat tip to Joel MacMull (who argued the case) and Marty Schwimmer. If you listened to the oral argument, you are not surprised by the swiftness of this ruling.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Case Update: New York IP Law Assn - June 24th at Noon

The TTABlogger will present a TTAB Case Update at the New York Intellectual Property Law Association's Seminar entitled "Hot Topics in Trademark and Copyright Law," on June 24th. Details here.

Read comments and post your comment here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Is THRESHER WORM for Fishing Lures Confusable with THRASHER RODS for Fishing Rods?

The USPTO refused to register the mark THRESHER WORM for “Artificial fishing bait; fishing lures” [WORM disclaimed], concluding that confusion is likely with the registered mark THRASHER RODS for “Fishing rod blanks; Fishing rod handles; Fishing rods; Rods for fishing; Fishing gaffs; Structural parts of fishing rods, namely, Grips, Rings, Reel seats” [RODS disclaimed]. Applicant Good Sportsman argued, unsurprisingly, that the marks differ in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression, and also that the goods are completely unrelated. How do you think this appeal came out? In re Good Sportsman Marketing, L.L.C., Serial No. 98897724 (June 3, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Angela Lykos).

The Marks: In addition to the differences in appearance and sound, Good Sportsman contended that the marks differ in connotation and commercial impression because "thresher" is a species of shark or a type of agriculture machinery used to separate grains from stalk or husks, whereas "thrasher" is a bird species or a moniker for an avid skateboarder.

The Board noted that each mark is comprised of two words and ends with a single, monosyllabic word, making them similar in structure and cadence. They begin with THRESHER or THRASHER, which is the portion of the mark consumers are most likely to recall. The record showed the "thresher" and "thrasher" may be synonyms: "When used as an intransitive verb, the word 'thrash' is defined as 'to move or stir about violently: toss about' or 'thresh.'"

The second words in each mark, WORM and RODS, are different in sound and appearance, but each is associated with fishing. "Considered within that context, THRESHER WORM and THRASHER RODS convey the same imagery of a fish splashing in the water or resisting being reeled in by a rod after being lured by bait."

Overall, the marks are similar in appearance and sound, and project a similar connotation and commercial impression. Consumers “have but dim recollections from having previously seen or heard one or the other of the involved marks.” Neutrogena Corp. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 410 F.2d 1391, 1393 (CCPA 1969).

The Goods: Examining Attorney Heather Kennedy established that the goods are related via three third-party registrations covering both lures and rods and three third-party websites offering these goods under the same mark. The Board also observed that lures and rods "are complementary goods since they are used together for fishing."

Other factors: The evidence demonstrated that the normal trade channels for the involved goods are the same, namely, online retail websites specializing in fishing equipment, and that the consumer classes overlap. Although some rods may be expensive and some purchasers sophisticated, there were no restrictions in the cited registration as to classes of purchasers and price.

We must therefore assume that Applicant’s and Registrant’s fishing equipment products are available to all members of the general public, including ordinary consumers of such products at all price points. This would include not only avid fishing enthusiasts and expert professionals, but also the novice hobbyist. While some of these consumers might be highly sophisticated and knowledgeable about fishing, others may be new to the activity. Basing our analysis “on the least sophisticated potential purchasers,” Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1325, this DuPont factor is neutral.

Conclusion: Weighing the relevant DuPont factors and finding that none favored the applicant, the Board affirmed the refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: I think the connotation discussion is a stretch. In the real world, do you think confusion is likely?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Upholds Refusal of LACONIA MOTORCYCLE WEEK for Clothing and Patches - Merely Ornamental and not a Source Indicator

The Board affirmed a refusal to register the mark LACONIA MOTORCYCLE WEEK for various clothing items and for cloth and fabric patches for clothing, finding that, as used on the specimens of use [shown below], the phrase would be perceived by consumers as merely ornamental and not as a source indicator. Applicant City of Laconia claimed acquired distinctiveness based on more than 100 years of use but it failed to provide any probative evidence in support of that claim. In re City of Laconia, New Hampshire, Serial No. 98201363 (May 28, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas. W. Wellington).

The "critical question" for the Board was how consumers perceive the proposed mark as displayed on the specimens of use: will they perceive LACONIA MOTORCYCLE WEEK as source indicator or as merely ornamental wording on the shirt and patch? Examining Attorney Bianca Allen argued that:

the applicant’s submitted specimen shows the applied-for mark, “LACONIA MOTORCYCLE WEEK”, located directly on the upper-center area of the front of the shirt and the middle of the cloth patch, where ornamental elements often appear. … Furthermore, the design element that contains the mark is displayed in a relatively large size on the clothing such that it dominates the overall appearance of the goods. Lastly, the applied-for mark appears to be a design and slogan that is used in a merely decorative manner that would be perceived by consumers as having little or no particular source-identifying significance.

Applicant City of Laconia contended that its use of the phrase serves as an identifier of secondary source because "[t]he consuming public recognizes LACONIA MOTORCYCLE WEEK as the name of a specific, municipally controlled event" and that the City" exercises quality control" such that "[m]erchandise bearing the wording is widely understood to be officially licensed goods." That argument failed, however, because there was no evidence to support it. "[W]e are left only with the unverified statements of Applicant’s counsel, which are not evidence."

The Board agreed with the Examining Attorney: "the proposed mark appears among other wording and designs and, in this context, the overall commercial impression is that the proposed mark is merely part of a larger ornamental design containing information about a motorcycle rally, e.g., held in 'June 2023' in 'New Hampshire.' Put simply, the consumers will not pull out the proposed mark as a source identifier."

And so, the Board affirmed the refusal.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Well, what would you do next? File a new application? Seek review by way of civil action, which would allow the submission of the missing evidence, e.g., a declaration by somenone with knowledge of the facts?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.