TTAB Affirms 2(e)(4) Refusal, Finding MANN BAGS for Cornhole Bags to be Primarily Merely a Surname

The Board affirmed a refusal to register the mark MANN BAGS for "Cornhole bags; Cornhole game boards; Cornhole game sets" [BAGS disclaimed], finding the mark to be primarily merely a surname. Applicant claimed that "cornhole players would understand Applicant’s proposed mark MANN BAGS for cornhole bags to be an off-color allusion to hangovers, parts of the male genitalia, contraception, and men’s handbags," but the Board found that argument "implausible." In re Mann Bags LLC, Serial No. 99144855 (November 10, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christopher C. Larkin).

The Board applied the well-known Benthin factors, first noting that the application at issue was signed by applicant's owner, Desmond Mann [Stike one!]. Examining Attorney Octavia Green provided website pages referencing educator Horace Mann, jazz musician Herbie Mann, professional basketball player Terance Mann, professional football player Charles Mann, Olympic hurdler Ralph Mann, the director Michael Mann, the singer Aimee Mann, the actor Gabriel Mann, the actress Leslie Mann, the professional football player Charles Mann, the professional basketball player Tre Mann, U.S. Congressman Tracey Mann, the German author Thomas Mann, and the stage actor Terrence Mann. [Strike two!]. Applicant acknowledged that the surname Mann appears about 80,000 times in the 2010 U.S. Census, and that Mann is "the 378th most common surname in the United States." [Strike three!]. MANN has the structure and pronunciation of a surname. [Strike four!]. And MANN BAGS for cornhole bags does not have any recognized meaning other than as a surname. [Five!].

Applicant argued that the surname significance of MANN is not the primary significance of the mark MANN BAGS, citing pages from the Urban Dictionary defining the noun “MANbag” as follows: “1. Puffy swelling under the eye after a boozy night 2. Slang: testicles 3. Small handbag for a man made from leather, fabric or other substance displaying a brand name such as Gucci, Prada, Adidas or Game 4. Slang: condom 5. (Biblical): David kept his sling and stones in a MANbag (if he’d thought to, he could have kept his iPod in there as well).”

The Board had two problems with that argument: first applicant's mark is MANN BAGS, not "man-bag," "man bag" or MANbag. "We must consider the MANN BAGS mark that Applicant seeks to register for the goods identified in the application as “Cornhole bags,” not what Applicant describes as a “homophone of the surname Mann."

Second, "what applicant describes as 'the creation of a pun,' or a 'double entendre' is nowhere mentioned or even implied on Applicant’s website, which instead explains the origin of the Mann family’s cornhole bag business": "the sensitivity of the Manns’ daughter Miriam to the 'materials used on the slick and stick bags,' which caused the Manns to 'search[ ] for different materials that she could be comfortable with.'"

Against the backdrop of the explanation of how “the idea of Mann Bags was born” on Applicant’s website, Applicant’s claim that cornhole players would understand Applicant’s proposed mark MANN BAGS for cornhole bags to be an off-color allusion to hangovers, parts of the male genitalia, contraception, and men’s handbags is utterly implausible.

Finally, the Board observed that the combination of MANN with the generic term BAGS does not avoid the Section 2(e)(4) bar: "Where, as here, incapable wording is appended to a surname, the combination when viewed as a whole in the context of the Applicant’s goods will be considered to be primarily merely a surname under Section 2(e)(4). Weiss Watch, 2017 WL 2876824, at *6."

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TTABlogger comment: Applicant offers "professional cornhole bags." Are there professional cornholers? Amateur bags? P.S., on second thought, I don't think the double entendre argument was that bad. Why does it matter what the website says? It's a question of consumer perception, not what applicant intended.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Finds NO SHAVE FUE to be Generic for . . . . Guess What?

The Board upheld a refusal to register the proposed mark NO SHAVE FUE for "Performing non invasive cosmetic medical procedures; Medical services rendered in relation to hair restoration, hair treatments and hair transplants" [FUE disclaimed] on the ground of genericness. Applicant argued that third party uses of NO SHAVE FUE were infringements of its mark, and that there are other names for this procedure. The Board said "phooey." In re Advanced Hair Restoration LLC, Serial No. 97676476 (November 9, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark A. Thurmon).

FUE is an acronym for "follicular unit extraction," a hair restoration procedure that involves harvesting hair follicles from an area where they remain healthy, and then transplanting those healthy follicles in an area where the patient has few or no healthy follicles. "The 'no shave' or 'unshaven' FUE procedure does not require shaving a patient’s head, and therefore, enables patients to return to normal activities sooner."

The Board found the genus of the services to be defined by applicant's recitation of services. The relevant consumers are "individuals seeking cosmetic medical procedures or hair restoration services of the type identified in the application."

The third-party website evidence submitted by Trademark Examiner Amy E. Thomas was "compelling." It established that both providers and patients understand No Shave FUE as the generic name of a widely-available medical procedure. Moreover, applicant used the term generically at its own website.

The evidence shows that the No Shave FUE procedure falls within both services identified in the application. No Shave FUE is a non-invasive cosmetic medical procedure. It is used to treat hair loss, which is a cosmetic issue. No Shave FUE is also a medical service rendered in relation to hair restoration, hair treatments and hair transplants. The applied-for mark is generic for a specific procedure that falls within the scope of the genus.

Applicant's assertion that the third-party users are infringers got short shrift from the Board: "our inquiry does not depend upon what legal actions Applicant takes against third parties."

The Board agreed that there are other names for this procedure: unshaven FUE, nonshaven FUE, long-hair FUE, shave-less FUE, or hair transplantation without shaving. "[T]hat fact is of no consequence. The sole question before us is whether No Shave FUE is generic. The existence of other generic terms for the same service is both unsurprising and irrelevant."

Observing that "a term is generic and cannot be protected as a trademark if the term is the generic name of a subcategory of the full genus," the Board conclude that "No Shave FUE is a particular medical procedure performed by hair restoration clinics throughout the United States. This phrase is generic for a subgenus of the services identified in the application."

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: You don't have to be a sub-genius to reach the same conclusion as the Board.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Is KINETIK for Pipeline Laying Services Confusable with QINETIQ for Construction Management Services?

The USPTO refused to register the mark KINETIK, in standard character and stylized form, for, inter alia, “oil, gas and water pipeline laying," deeming confusion likely with the registered mark QINETIQ for, inter alia, "construction management services," "advisory services relating to the construction, repair and maintenance of building structures,” and “advisory services in the field of the construction, repair and maintenance of civil engineering structures." The Board found that the services do not overlap, that they inherently require some deliberation in the purchasing process, and that the word "kinetic" is somewhat conceptually weak. But what about the marks? Are they too close anyway? In re Kinetik Holdings Inc., Serial Nos. 97457836 and 97457861 (November 6, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Lawrence T. Stanley, Jr.).

The Services: The broadly recited services in the cited registration encompass applicant's management and advisory services in the field of pipeline construction. "The question, then, is whether managing or advising on pipeline construction is related to performing a step in that construction — namely, Applicant’s oil, gas and water pipeline laying." The Board answered in the affirmative.

The relationship is not one of encompassment; we do not suggest that Registrant’s management and advisory services include performing Applicant’s pipeline-laying work. Rather, the services are intrinsically complementary: one covers the management of, and advice concerning, the pipeline-construction process, and the other covers a step that must be performed within that very process.

The website evidence submitted by Examining Attorney Maureen Dall Lott confirmed the relatedness of the services, demonstrating that "numerous entities offer both oil, gas and/or water pipeline construction/pipeline laying services and construction management or advisory services under the same mark." Furthermore, a bunch of use-based third-party registrations showed that the same entity has registered a single mark identifying both pipeline construction/pipeline laying services and construction management, project management, or construction advisory services.

The Board therefore found that the second DuPont factor supported the refusal. The website evidence also established that the services are offered in overlapping trade channels, and so the third DuPont factor supported the refusal as well.

The Marks: "Although the first and last letters in Applicant’s marks and the Cited Mark are not the same, each of the marks presents a degree of visual symmetry by virtue of using the same letter at the beginning and end of the word." [rather weak tea - ed.]. As to the stylized mark, the cited mark is in standard character form and could be used in a style like that of applicant.

The Board found most significant the fact that the marks could be pronounced the same way. "There is no correct pronunciation of a mark that is not a recognized word, and consumers may pronounce a coined term in various ways."

The record establishes that the letter “Q,” when not followed by a “U,” is often pronounced with a hard “k” sound, as in “qwerty,” “Qatari,” “qadi,” “sheqel,” and “Iraqi.” Because the only differences between the words of the respective marks are the substitution of the letter “K” for the letter “Q” at the beginning and end, and because the letter “Q” in the Cited Mark may readily be voiced as a hard “k,” the marks are likely to be pronounced identically. “Similarity in sound alone may be sufficient for a finding of likelihood of confusion.”

The Board also found that the marks "share significantly similar connotations and commercial impressions. Each mark would likely be perceived by consumers as a misspelling of the English word 'kinetic.'" [doubtful - ed.].

Applicant argued, of course, that its mark KINETIC differs in appearance and pronunciation from the cited mark, but the Board was unmoved.

The possibility that some consumers might voice the Cited Mark differently does not diminish the likelihood that many consumers would pronounce the two marks identically. Finally, even accepting that some consumers would notice the spelling difference, the marks nonetheless share the identical dominant sound and a similar underlying meaning as misspellings of “kinetic.” The visual difference of substituting “K” for “Q” at the beginning and end of the marks does not overcome the marks’ identical pronunciation and significantly similar connotation.

And so, the first DuPont factor supported the refusal.

Purchasing conditions: Per Stone Lion, the Board must look to the least sophisticated potential purchasers under the fourth DuPont factor. However, "even less sophisticated individual consumers of Registrant’s services are likely to exercise care in purchasing given the nature of the services."

Weighing these considerations, and because the relevant services inherently involve some deliberation while the cited registration’s breadth precludes assuming uniformly sophisticated purchasers, the fourth DuPont factor weighs somewhat — but not heavily — against a finding of likelihood of confusion.

Strength of the Cited Mark: The Board agreed with applicant that the word "kinetic" — which denotes "a type of energy produced by motion" — "is somewhat conceptually weak as applied to services in the energy and pipeline fields." [I think "kinetic" is too vague to suggestive anything about the services - ed.]. "The evidence establishes only modest weakness, however."

Whatever modest conceptual weakness the term “kinetic” carries does not extend so far as to permit registration of a phonetically identical mark for related services. 

And so, the sixth DuPont factor weighed "only slightly" against a conclusion of likelihood of confusion.

On balance, the factors favoring a likelihood of confusion — the marks’ similarity (especially their phonetic identity), the relatedness of the services, and overlapping trade channels — outweigh the factors weighing against it — purchaser sophistication and the conceptual weakness of the Cited Mark. Neither counterweight alters the result.

Conclusion: "To the extent that any doubts might exist as to the correctness of this conclusion, we resolve such doubts in favor of the prior registrant."

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: I have quite a bit of doubt. I would have reversed the refusal.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Celebrates 22nd Anniversary !

Actually it was yesterday. The TTABlog was hatched on November 8, 2004, with a post entitled "Leo Stoller Loses Again." Remember him? Here we are, more than 6.000 blog posts later. Thank you all for reading!

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Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Is WORLDLE Confusable with WORDLE for Game Software?

The New York Times opposed an application to register the mark WORLDLE for "Providing online non-downloadable game software," claiming a likelihood of confusion with its registered mark WORDLE for "Downloadable computer application software for social networking, namely, for posting, showing, or displaying information in the field of electronic gaming via the Internet, namely, software for playing word puzzle games." The Board found Applicant’s non-downloadable game software to be "very closely related" to NYT’s downloadable software for playing word puzzle games. But what about the marks? Does that extra "L" make a difference? The New York Times Company v. Worldle LLC, Opposition No. 91291631 (November 4, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande).

Beginning with the marks, the Board found that the first DuPont weighed in favor of Opposer NYT.

[W]hile the marks aren’t identical, we find that they look very similar and that many consumers will pronounce them similarly. As to meaning, we find, based on the limited record before us, that to the extent that some consumers derive any meaning from them (as opposed to viewing them as made-up words) both marks are suggestive of puzzle games, one involving words and the other involving geography. Overall, the marks, viewed in their entireties, are quite similar.

The Board noted that the opposed application is not limited to any particular type(s) of game, so the identification of goods encompassed NYT's "word puzzle games." The Board found "a close intrinsic relationship between the respective goods and services." NYT provided evidence that four other companies own active registrations that identify both downloadable game software and the service of offering nondownloadable game software. "This constitutes a bit more evidence that consumers view the respective software products and services to be related."

As to the third DuPont factor, "where, as here, the goods and services are very closely related, we presume that they’re distributed through the same channels to the same types of customers." Moreover, the game software is offered to the general public, and so the customer classes "plainly overlap."

The fourth factor, puchaser care, favored NYT: "The general public includes a substantial proportion of unsophisticated consumers. And because the game software is free and therefore subject to impulse downloading, the degree of care in choosing game software is likely to be low."

Applicant argued that the mark WORDLE is weak, but its evidence was deemed to "move the needle little." The Board found the WORDLE mark to be suggestive and thus inherently distinctive, "possessing a degree of conceptual strength on par with the average mark that has been registered without a showing of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f)." As to commercial strength, WORDLE is "strong and well-known." In sum, the Board deemed the sixth DuPont factor to be neutral, while the fifth factor weighed in favor of the NYT.

Applicant pointed to the lack of actual confusion despite four years of concurrent use, but the Board was unimpressed: "When the goods and services are very inexpensive (or, here, free) consumers are less apt to spend the time and effort to report instances of confusion." Furthermore, as Applicant itself pointed out, any instances of actual confusion can quickly be corrected "at zero cost" by simply closing the browser tab for Applicant’s game. "This further saps consumers’ incentive to report any instances of actual confusion and, thus, the probative value of the lack of such evidence."

In these market circumstances, we find the lack of actual confusion evidence neutral or, at best, to weigh only very slightly in Applicant’s favor.

The Board found factors 9 through 13 to be neutral. "It is clear to us that, on balance, the relevant factors overwhelmingly weigh in favor of a conclusion that Applicant’s mark is likely to cause confusion in view of Opposer’s registered mark." And so, the Board sustained the opposition.

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TTABlogger comment: If one noticed the different spellings, one might think that WORLDLE is a variant of, or a brand extension of, the WORDLE game.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Is "PILATES 80/20" Merely Descriptive of Pilates Instruction?

The USPTO refused to register the proposed mark PILATES 80/20 for "Providing fitness and exercise studio services, namely, pilates instruction and training" [PILATES disclaimed], deeming the mark to be merely descriptive of the services. "But what does 80/20 mean? That is the primary question in this appeal." Applicant Ross described her "fitness model" as "grounded in Pilates practice but also includes sports medicine techniques, combined in an approximate ratio of 80:20, i.e., 80% Pilates and 20% personal training." How do you think this appeal came out. In re Patrice Edmonds Ross, Serial No. 99088802 (November 3, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christopher C. Larkin).

The Examining Attorney claimed that the "Pareto principle" - "the idea that 80% of your results come from 20% of your efforts" - "is commonly applied to Pilates which indicates that 80% of your results will come from focusing 20% of your efforts on the fundamental Pilates moves with correct form, which will yield better results than just performing a high quantity of exercises." However, there was no mention of the "Pareto principle" on applicant's website, nor did the website establish the meaning of 80/20.

The Examining Attorney made of record multiple third-party websites and other Internet materials displaying 80/20 in connection with pilates instruction and training. Five of the websites were foreign-based. "Foreign websites may have probative value on the meaning of a term in the United States under certain circumstances if it is likely that ‘U.S. consumers will encounter foreign websites in the field in question.’” Here, however, the Board found the foreign websites not probative.

[W]e find that it is unlikely that U.S. consumers of pilates instruction and training services would review foreign websites to learn about and purchase such services where the record indicates that there are numerous U.S. providers of the services.

The Examining Attorney’s Internet evidence from domestic sources was not helpful. "[T]he fitness company websites do not discuss the 80/20 rule or principle in the context of pilates instruction and training, and we find that they do not establish a descriptive meaning of the term in that context, and there are different meanings of '80/20' on the websites of pilates studios or exercise studios that offer pilates."

We cannot discern a clear, consistent meaning of “80/20” in connection with pilates instruction and training from these four websites. The vague notions of “quality over quantity” discussed on the ebodypilates.com and tonal.com websites, of “doing a few things really well” discussed on the sportswestathleticclub.com website, and of “prioritizing foundational movement (80%) before layering in complexity (20%)” discussed on the glowfox.com website, do not establish an understood meaning of “80/20” that would immediately tell consumers about a feature, attribute, or characteristic of the PILATES 80/20 pilates instruction and training services that they will receive at Applicant’s studio.

The Board had doubt that the Examining Attorney "established that the proposed mark PILATES 80/20 as a whole is merely descriptive of a feature, attribute, or characteristic of the pilates instruction and training services identified in the application, requiring us to reverse the refusal to register."

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TTABlogger comment: Evidence. It's all about the evidence.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

Chicago Brothers Best San Antonio Brothers in FADED CULTURE STUDIO Barbering Services Priority Battle

In an exhaustive and exhausting 76-page opinion, the Board awarded priority to applicant (Chicago) over opposer (San Antonio) in a battle over the mark FADED CULTURE STUDIO for barbering services. Opposer claimed priority based on common law rights in the mark FADED CULTURE for the same services, but its evidence fell short. "In the terms of the Federal Circuit’s puzzle metaphor in W. Fla. Seafood, there are a large number of pieces here, but they simply do not fit together to form a discernible picture of prior use of FADED CULTURE for barbering services." FVDED, LLC v. Faded Culture Studio, LLC, Opposition No. 91286343 (November 2, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christopher C. Larkin).

The Board first found that applicant established June 19, 2019, as its date of first use of the FADED CULTURE STUDIO mark in connection with barbering services, the date claimed in its application.

To beat that date, opposer attempted to rely on tacking, an issue that it had not raised in the pleadings, but the Board found that the issue was tried by implied consent. However, the marks that opposer relied on for tacking - FADED, FΛDED, FVDED CULTURE, FXDED CULTURE, F∀DED CULTURE, and FΛDED CULTURE - were used for clothing, not barbering services, and so they were irrelevant to the priority issue.

By definition, clothing and barbering services are not “substantially identical” and thus the use of any prior mark for clothing per se cannot be tacked onto Opposer’s current use of FADED CULTURE for barbering services to establish priority of use of FADED CULTURE for those services.

Opposer claimed that it began using the mark FADED CULTURE for barbering services in 2016, relying on the testimony of a barber's baker's dozen of "friends and longtime customers." However ,the testimony was inconsistent as to the date of first use of the mark, as to which mark opposer used, and as to how the mark was used.  

On this record, we find that it is more likely than not that the Barron brothers were not giving “haircuts to customers using the FADED CULTURE mark,” 48 TTABVUE 7, before June 19, 2019. [emphasis supplied)

Opposer also claimed prior use of the FADED CULTURE mark on clothing. However, it had asserted a 2020 date in a trademark application, and so the Board ruled that it must provide clear and convincing evidence to go behind that date. Again, its testimony fell short.

conspicuously absent from Opposer’s evidence that the Barron brothers “gave customers haircuts using the FADED CULTURE mark” prior to June 19, 2019 are any of the normal trappings of the use of a mark for barbering services, such as the signage shown and discussed above that established Applicant’s first use of its FADED CULTURE STUDIO mark, or even the type of circumstantial evidence credited in W. Fla. Seafood as establishing prior use of a mark for restaurant services, such as the “advertisements placed in local newspapers,” regulatory licenses, and inspection reports.

And so, the Board dismissed the opposition.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: A typically thorough and instructive opinion by Judge Larkin.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Is MIZUNARA WOODS Merely Descriptive of Engineered Hardwood Flooring?

The USPTO refused to register the proposed mark MIZUNARA WOODS for “Engineered hardwood flooring featuring wooden veneer of mizunara oak sold integrally therewith" [MIZUNARA disclaimed], finding the mark to be merely descriptive of the goods. Applicant AHF argued that “the term WOODS may be used in plural to indicate a variety of ‘woods’, i.e., different types of wood, but not to indicate a plural set of pieces of the same type of wood." How do you think this appeal came out? In re AHF, LLC, Serial No. 98366353 (October 30, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Robert Lavache).

Examining Attorney Gillian Brown provided evidence that the term MIZUNARA refers to a variety of oak tree from Japan and the wood therefrom. AHF's identified its goods as "featuring wood veneer of mizunara oak." "Thus, there is no dispute that MIZUNARA is merely descriptive as applied to the identified goods."

As to the word WOODS, the Examining Attorney relied on dictionary definitions and encyclopedia entries that included examples of use of the plural "woods" to refer to various types of woods or a collection of woods. Third-party websites showed the term “woods” being used to refer to wood types utilized for flooring. The Board agreed with the Examining Attorney that:

in this case, both the individual components [of the proposed mark] and the composite result are descriptive of Applicant’s goods and do not create a unique, incongruous, or nondescriptive meaning in relation to the goods. Specifically, the combination of MIZUNARA and WOODS does not create a new or nondescriptive meaning. Rather, consumers will understand the composite phrase as describing a characteristic of Applicant's hardwood flooring, in that the flooring has the characteristic of being a collection of WOODS featuring MIZUNARA oak.

Applicant AHF argued that "Mizunara oak is referenced as a singular type of wood” and thus “[a] consumer will look at the [proposed mark], in its entirety, and interpret the mark to be ‘a variety or collection of different WOODS’ and then, will need to make a connection to mizunara oak in the singular and try to understand how this represents a ‘variety or collection.’” Therefore “an incongruity is present” in the proposed mark and a “consumer will certainly need a mental pause to reconcile these incongruous concepts, a hallmark of a mark being suggestive.” The Board was unimpressed, pointing to evidence that, "in the context of flooring, 'woods' is used to refer to a particular type of wood or a collection featuring a particular type of wood."

while Applicant is correct that “woods” can refer to different types of wood, as some of the evidence previously discussed shows, that is not the only potential meaning of the term when used in connection with flooring. * * * [W]e concur with the Examining Attorney’s finding that consumers viewing the proposed mark will immediately understand it as referring to a feature or characteristic of Applicant’s flooring in that the flooring contains mizunara oak woods.

The Board pooh-poohed AHF's risible argument that consumers "may recognize the term MIZUNARA as Japanese, but may consider it coined, e.g., consider it as relating to anime or video-game genres, which are highly associated with Japanese culture” and thus “MIZUNARA WOODS may be perceived as a fantasy or made up place with no connection to an actual species of oak.” The Board pointed out once again that a mark must be considered in the context of the goods, not in the abstract.

Two significant reasons for not registering merely descriptive marks are: “(1) to prevent the owner of a mark from inhibiting competition in the sale of particular goods; and (2) to maintain freedom of the public to use the language involved, thus avoiding the possibility of harassing infringement suits by the registrant against others who use the mark when advertising or describing their own products.” *** [O]ther entities in the marketplace who choose to offer these goods should be free to use MIZUNARA WOODS in advertising such goods.

And so, the Board affirmed the refusal.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Is this a WYHA?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Is HIBOU BLANC Confusable with THE WHITE OWL CANDLE COMPANY for Candles?

The USPTO refused to register the mark HIBOU BLANC for "candles; scented candles; scented soy candles; melt tarts, namely, scented wax to be melted slowly with a warmer," deeming confusion likely with the registered mark THE WHITE OWL CANDLE COMPANY for “candles; candle contained in a clamshell; scented candles; soy candles" [CANDLE COMPANY disclaimed]. Applicant Leo G. Bressette conceded that goods are identical in-part. Examining Attorney Claudia A. Kopenski, maintained that HIBOU BLANC is French for “WHITE OWL," but Bressette argued that HIBOU "is not a common English loanword, is absent from standard English usage, and is unlikely to be recognized or translated by ordinary purchasers" and so "consumers will perceive HIBOU BLANC as a foreign-language brand name, not as the literal equivalent of 'white owl.'" How do you think this appeal came out? In re Leo G Bressette, Serial No. 99020217 (October 28, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Catherine Dugan O'Connor).

The Federal Circuit held in Vetements that "words from modern languages are generally translated into English," and "unless it is unlikely that the ordinary American purchaser would stop and translate the word into its English equivalent, the doctrine of foreign equivalents applies."

French is a modern foreign language spoken by more than 1.2 million Americans. Various dictionaries translate HIBOU as OWL and BLANC as WHITE. The Board concluded that an "appreciable number" of U.S. consumers would know that HIBOU BLANC translates to WHITE OWL in English. 

[Note: the number of French speakers who will "stop and translate" HIBOU BLANC pales in comparison to the number of consumers who would have no clue regarding its meaning. In an infringement action, if the plaintiff showed that such a small percentage of US consumers would be confused, what do you think would be the outcome? - ed.]

The Board brushed aside Bressette's assertion that HIBOU is not a common word and would not be translated, pointing out that Bressette's argument was topsy-turvy: if HIBOU were a word commonly known in English (like croissant or fiesta), there would be no need to translate it. "[T]he threshold inquiry is not whether the non-English wording is common or present in English as a 'loanword,' but rather whether an ordinary American purchaser would stop and translate it."

Bressette cited the Palm Bay decision, which declined to translate VEUVE ROYALE when considering confusing similarity with the opposer’s mark THE WIDOW because "it [was] improbable that the average American purchaser would stop and translate 'VEUVE' into 'widow.'" 396 F.3d at 1377. The Board, however, found the cases distinguishable: 

The evidence here supports a finding that an appreciable number of Americans are capable of translating the wording HIBOU BLANC into WHITE OWL in English. Contrary to Applicant’s suggestion, there is no evidence that the words in his mark are "obscure or not widely recognized" or that they would be considered "as a distinctive foreign expression rather than as a translatable phrase."

Turning to the marks, the Board unsurprisingly found that WHITE OWL is the dominant term in the cited mark. "Comparing the marks in their entireties in view of the applicable legal principles, including that a lesser degree of similarity of the marks is needed for confusion to be likely when the goods are literally or legally identical, we find that the marks are similar in connotation and overall commercial impression and the first DuPont factor favors a likelihood of confusion."

The Board found the fourth, fifth, and eighth DuPont factors to be neutral, and none of the factors favored applicant.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Take a look at applicant's brief [pdf here]. Do you think it was a creation of AI? Do you think it matters to the Board that it had to plow through 16 pages of argument that was largely off-base?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Posts November 2026 Hearing Schedule

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Tee-Tee-Ā-Bee) has scheduled four oral hearings for the month of November 2026. The second-listed hearing will held in-person at the Madison East Building 600 Dulany Street, 9th Floor (Hearing Room C), Alexandria, VA. The others will be held virtually. Briefs and other papers for each case may be found at TTABVUE via the links provided.

November 5, 2026 - 2 PM [Virtual]: In re Entertainment Content, Inc., Serial No. 97022351 [Refusal to register the proposed mark SPORTS.TV on the Supplemental Register, for downloadable software for accessing information about sports, news, and entertainment, internet broadcasting, and entertainment services in the fields of sports, news, and entertainment, on the ground of genericness.].

November 12, 2026 - 1 PM [In-Person]: Lara Kajajian v. Larisa Love, LLC dba Larisa Love, Cancellation No. 92071241 [Petition for cancellation of a registration for the mark LARISA LOVE for "Hair salon services" on the ground of likelihood of confusion with petitioner's common law mark LARISSA LOVE for cosmetics and personal care products.]

November 12, 2026 - 2:30 PM [Virtual]: Encyclopaedia Iranica Foundation Inc. v. Persian Heritage Foundation, Opposition No. 91245273 [Opposition to registration of the mark PERSIAN HERITAGE FOUNDATION and Design shown below left, for "Charitable foundation services, namely, providing fundraising activities, funding, scholarships and/or financial assistance for the furthering of Persian heritage and culture in academia" [PERSIAN HERITAGE FOUNDATION disclaimed] on the grounds of lack of bona fide intent and likelihood of confusion with the common mark "flower" design mark shown below right, for a variety of goods and services, including books and other printed or online publications, publication services, services consisting in promoting preservation and awareness of Iranian culture and heritage, charitable services, namely, providing fundraising activities and granting funds to support preservation and awareness of Iranian culture and heritage.]

November 19, 2026 - 11:00 AM [Virtual]: In re Granite Hoback Ranch LLC, Serial No. 98964493 [Refusal to register the mark THE HAWKEN for retail store services, resort and recreational services, resort lodging services, and health spa services, on the ground that the mark is primarily merely a surname under Section 2(e)(4).

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Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.