Wednesday, September 30, 2009

TTABlog Quarterly Index: July - September 2009

Thank you, readers, for all your comments! For newbies, please note that you may follow The TTABlog on Twitter (here). E-mail subscriptions to the TTABlog are available: just enter your e-mail address in the box on the right to receive a daily update via Feedblitz. Please report any broken or inoperative links, as well as any errors and omissions, to the TTABlogger.

Eastham, MA

Section 2(a) - suggesting a false association:

Section 2(b) - US Flag, Coat of Arms, or Insignia:

Section 2(d) - likelihood of confusion:

Section 2(e)(1) - mere descriptiveness:

Section 2(e)(2) - primarily geographically descriptive:

Section 2(e)(4) - primarily merely a surname:

Section 2(e)(5) - Functionality:

Section 2(f) - Acquired Distinctiveness:



Bona Fide Intent:

Concurrent Use:

Drawing Requirement:

Failure to Function/Non-distinctiveness:

Fraud:



Procedural issues:

Recitation of Services:

Rule 2.61(b) Request for Information:

Single Artistic Work:

Specimen of Use/Mutilation::

Standing:

Courts of Appeal:

Recommended Reading:

Other:

Text and photos ©John L. Welch 2009.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/30/2009   0 comments

Tuesday, September 29, 2009

WYHA? TTAB Finds "LUCA'S CHOPHOUSE" Confusingly Similar to "LUCA PIZZA"

In this enervating Section 2(d) appeal, the Board affirmed a refusal to register the mark LUCA'S CHOPHOUSE & Design for "restaurant and bar services," finding it likely to cause confusion with the registered marks LUCA PIZZA and LUCA PIZZA DI ROMA for restaurant services. Applicant trotted out several feeble arguments, which the Board promptly chopped down. In re Luca’s Chophouse LLC, Serial No. 77335047 (September 15, 2009) [not precedential].


The Board first noted that the involved services overlap. Applicant argued, irrelevantly, that Registrant's restaurants are "casual style eateries specializing in pizza that are frequently located in shopping malls," while applicant operates "a single restaurant that is 'an upscale fine dining establishment' offering 'a full service bar and live dinner entertainment such as small jazz/singing groups' and providing table service by wait staff." Of course, the Board pointed out that it must look to the services as recited in the involved application and registration, regardless of what the evidence shows the services to be.

Because the recited services are in part identical, the Board must presume that they are offered offered in the same channels of trade to the same classes of consumers.

As to the marks, the names LUCA'S and LUCA are clearly the dominant elements of the respective marks, since CHOPHOUSE, PIZZA, and PIZZA DI ROMA are "generic terms for the goods sold in the restaurant."

The registered marks are in standard character form (not in "standardized font," as Applicant alleged), and therefore the Board must consider each registered mark "in all reasonable manners in which it may be displayed." Applicant did not argue that the oval background in its mark is a distinguishing feature.


Applicant asserted that "Luca" is a "fairly common name for individuals from the Mediterranean Area," but it provided no evidence to support that statement and no evidence that others use the mark LUCA in the restaurant or food service field. In fact, Applicant stated that it “is unaware of any other restaurant [than its own] with the name Luca contained in it.”

Finally, Applicant claimed a lack of any actual confusion, but the Board noted that Applicant's restaurants are in Michigan, where Registrant does not have restaurants. Thus there has been no opportunity for confusion to occur.

Considering the relevant du Pont factors, the Board found confusion likely, and it affirmed the Section 2(d) refusal.

TTABlog comment: Do you think there was a snowball's chance in Hell, Michigan, that this refusal would be overturned?

PS: Registrant operates in Indiana, Ohio, and Texas.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/29/2009   1 comments

Monday, September 28, 2009

TTAB Reverses 2(d) Refusal of "COMMUNITY TRUST BANK & Design" Over "COMMUNITY TRUST"

Apparently a registration for the mark COMMUNITY TRUST for banking services is hardly worth the paper it's printed on. The Board reversed a Section 2(d) refusal to register COMMUNITY TRUST BANK & Design for banking services [TRUST BANK disclaimed], finding it not likely to cause confusion with the registered mark COMMUNITY TRUST for the same services [TRUST disclaimed]. It concluded that "community" and "trust" are common and weak formatives, and therefore that the design portion of the applied-for mark must be given more weight. In re Community Trust Bank, Serial No. 76685026 (September 25, 2009) [not precedential].


The Board noted the differences in the marks at issue, observing that "[w]ords are more likely to be more significant than the design in a mark." But the Board then considered the strength - or lack thereof - regarding the cited mark.

Applicant submitted two registrations for marks that include the words "Community" and "Trust" for banking services: SOUTHERN COMMUNITY BANK AND TRUST ("Bank and Trust" disclaimed) and NORTH SHORE COMMUNITY BANK & TRUST ("Community Bank & Trust" disclaimed). It also proffered Internet evidence of nine other entities using the words "Community" and "Trust" in connection with banking

That limited evidence alone was not sufficient to put a dent in the strength of the cited mark, but the Board then took notice of two dictionary definitions of "community bank" [basically, a local bank]. In addition, the Comptroller of the Currency published a notice in the Federal Register referring to "community banks" and provided a definition of the term in a subsequent handbook. And several federal court decisions have used the term "community bank" at least descriptively.


The Board therefore concluded that the word "community" is an "extraordinarily weak term when applied to banks," one that can be given only "a very narrow scope of protection."

Finally, the Board noted that "bank patrons have been held to be careful purchasers," and that "there is no evidence that consumers of banking services are impulse or careless purchasers."

The Board therefore concluded that "there is no likelihood of confusion here," and it reversed the refusal.

TTABlog comment: I think the notion that banking customers exercise more than ordinary care is, to a large extent, a myth. Moreover, doesn't the Board often say that, when two marks are virtually identical, even sophisticated consumers may be confused?

Much of the blame for the "banking customer are careful" myth stems from a dubious reading of the Amalgamated Bank case, which did not say that banking consumers are careful consumers. What it did say is that, when considering a consent agreement between two banks, in which the bankers agree that there is no likelihood of confusion between the involved marks, the Board should accept their judgment. And it also says that some bank customers "do not even know they will be customers of a bank until they discover that they are, i.e ., when paper they have signed, payable to someone else, is assigned to a bank."

It appears to me that the Board simply did not like the fact that COMMUNITY TRUST made its way onto the Principal Register. Although the Board could not, sua sponte, cancel that registration, it did the next best thing: it effectively ignored the registration.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/28/2009   1 comments

Friday, September 25, 2009

TTAB Finds "E-LEX" Merely Descriptive of Litigation Support Services

Finding that "e" means electronic or Internet-based, and that "lex" means law, the Board affirmed a refusal to register the mark E-LEX for "litigation support services for attorneys provided via an electronic network with court-specific consultation on the rules and implementation of procedures for filing electronically." In re The Lex Group VA, Serial No. 76665046 (August 28, 2009) [not precedential].


Applicant Lex Group feebly argued that "neither the applied-for service nor the intended customer base is 'law'" and that none of the definitions offered by Examining Attorney David E. Tooley, Jr. "included any mention of electronic filing, submission assistance, or rule compliance...." Moreover, Applicant urged that "[t]he applied-for services are not solely electronic; rather, there is a human element to the filing services."

The Board relied on dictionary definitions and Internet excerpts to conclude that "[t]he letter 'e-' would inform prospective consumers its services are provided electronically through the internet. Also, inasmuch as its services are directed to attorneys for litigation support services, the term 'lex' would describe the fact that applicant is providing a type of legal or law-related services."

And so the Board affirmed the refusal to register.

TTABlog comment: I don't agree with this decision. [Who cares? - ed.] I just don't think that LEX is descriptive of these services. It's too vague. It's too Latin. Do others need to use the term LEX or e-Lex to describe these services? I think not. To paraphrase Dickens, "If this is the lex, then the lex is a ass." Or something like that.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/25/2009   5 comments

Thursday, September 24, 2009

"MEDITERRANEAN MELT" Not Merely Descriptive of Sandwiches, Says TTAB

Applicant Dikran M. Iskenderian came up a winner in his TTABattle to register the mark MEDITERRANEAN MELT for "sandwiches, panini," convincing the Board to reverse a Section 2(e)(1) mere descriptiveness refusal. Although the Board agreed that MELT must be disclaimed, it found the word MEDITERRANEAN, as applied to food, to be too ambiguous to be descriptive. In re Dikran M. Iskenderian, Serial No. 77266353 (September 22, 2009) [not precedential].


Applicant Iskenderian described the MEDITERRANEAN MELT as his sandwich as "a pressed sandwich which consists of cheese and basturma. Basturma is a highly seasoned air-dried cured beef. Beef and preferably veal is the most common meat used for basturma and it is prepared by pressing the meat to squeeze out its water, then covering it with a cumin paste prepared with crushed cumin, garlic, hot paprika and air-drying it. It can be served as a mezze in thin slices, usually uncooked."

Dictionary definitions established "melt" to mean a sandwich with melted cheese. Iskenderian did not contest the matter, and so the Board required a disclaimer of MELT.

As to MEDITERRANEAN, the Examining Attorney provided a definition of the term, as well as three Internet excerpts showing use of "mediterranean melt" or variations thereof for sandwiches. However, the sandwiches described were "vastly different," leading the Board to conclude that MEDITERRANEAN is "ambiguous" as applied to food.

The evidence of record indicates that the term “MEDITERRANEAN” refers to the large geographic region surrounding the Mediterranean Sea and encompassing many countries and cultures. Indeed, as applied to food, the term is ambiguous, as there are at least three distinct cuisines, each employing many different ingredients and cooking techniques. www.cuisinenet.com/glossary/med.html (Dec. 5, 2007). At most, MEDITERRANEAN can be said to be broadly suggestive of certain types of ingredients and cooking styles, but as the application of the term "MEDITERRANEAN MELT” to vastly different sandwiches demonstrates, the term MEDITERRANEAN is in no way immediately descriptive of the features of sandwiches in general or of a particular sandwich....

And so the Board reversed the refusal, subject to the disclaimer of MELT.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/24/2009   5 comments

Wednesday, September 23, 2009

TTAB Requires Amendment of Fraud Counterclaim in Light of Bose

[Re-posting: I'm traveling to New Orleans.] Hat tip to DW, who pointed me to a recently-issued order in Societe Cooperative Vigneronne Des Grandes Caves Richon-Lezion and Zicron-Jacob Ltd. v. Albrecht-Piazza, LLC, Opposition No. 91190040, in which the Board required the applicant-counterclaimant to amend its fraud-based petition for cancellation in light of the CAFC's decision in In re Bose Corporation, Appeal No. 2008-1448 (Fed. Cir., Aug. 31, 2009). The Board would not accept a "knew of should have known" allegation, and pointed out that "pleadings of fraud made 'on information and belief' where there is no separate indication that the pleader has actual knowledge of the facts supporting a claim of fraud also are insufficient."


FRAUD COUNTERCLAIM MUST BE AMENDED

On review of the pleadings the Board notes that applicant’s counterclaim to cancel opposer’s pleaded Registration No. 1362300 does not state a legally sufficient claim of fraud. The counterclaim alleges that opposer filed a registration renewal declaration asserting continued use with all the existing goods but, based on information and belief, at the time the declaration was filed, applicant was no longer selling some of the goods listed in the registration.

Fraud in procuring a trademark registration or renewal occurs when an applicant knowingly makes false, material representations of fact in connection with his application. Torres v. Cantine Torresella S.r.l., 808 F.2d 46, 48 (Fed. Cir. 1986). There is no fraud if a false misrepresentation is occasioned by an honest misunderstanding or inadvertence without a willful intent to deceive. Smith Int'l, Inc. v. Olin Corp., 209 USPQ 1033, 1044 (TTAB 1981). The standard for finding intent to deceive requires more than proof that the trademark applicant should have known of the falsity of its material representations of fact. See In re Bose Corp., __ F.3d __, __ USPQ2d __ (Fed. Cir., August 31, 2009).

Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b) requires that the pleadings contain explicit rather than implied expression of the circumstances constituting fraud. King Auto., Inc. v. Speedy Muffler King, Inc., 667 F.2d 1008, 212 USPQ 801, 803 (CCPA 1981). The Board will not approve pleadings of fraud which rest solely on allegations that the trademark applicant made material representations of fact in its declaration which it "knew or should have known" to be false or misleading. In re Bose Corp., __ F.3d __, __ USPQ2d __ (Fed. Cir., August 31, 2009). Pleadings of fraud made "on information and belief" where there is no separate indication that the pleader has actual knowledge of the facts supporting a claim of fraud also are insufficient. Id.

Applicant is allowed until thirty days from the mailing date of this order to file an amended counterclaim with a legally sufficient pleading of fraud, failing which the counterclaim will be dismissed and a new schedule will issue.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/23/2009   4 comments

Tuesday, September 22, 2009

Finding "COTT" and "COtea" For Soft Drinks Too Different, TTAB Dismisses 2(d) Opposition

In a rare victory for a pro se Applicant, the Board dismissed a Section 2(d) opposition to registration of the mark shown below, for "soft drinks flavored with tea," finding the mark not likely to cause confusion with the mark COTT, registered in standard character and stylized form for maltless soft drinks. The Board found the marks "substantially different in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression," and in particular saw "no basis ... to conclude that consumers would pronounce applicant’s mark 'as COT-TEA, the phonetic equivalent of COTT Tea.'" Cott Beverages Inc. v. Travis Ryan Barbieri, Opposition No. 91181911 (September 17, 2009) [not precedential].


Opposer Cott claimed that its mark is famous, but the proofs fell short. It did not submit evidence to show "how its sales figures compare to the three largest shareholders of the non-alcoholic beverage market, or to the brands of beverages sold by those companies." Sales figures alone "may be misleading and must be placed in some context in determining the fame of a mark." Therefore the Board concluded that the strength of the COTT mark "does not reach the level of playing a 'dominant' role in the process of balancing the du Pont factors."

The goods of the parties are considered to be legally identical and the channels of trade and classes of customers are presumed to be the same.Moreover, the goods are inexpensive items often purchased on impulse.

The variety of beverages sold under the COTT brand also favored Opposer: "Although its products are confined to soft drinks, consumers would not find it surprising if opposer were to use its mark for soft drinks flavored with tea, particularly since opposer already uses its mark for teas and for soft drinks."

It was during the comparison of the marks that the fizz went out of Cott's opposition. The Board found Applicant Barbieri’s mark to be "substantially different in appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression from opposers mark."

Opposer’s mark is COTT, while applicant’s mark depicts CO in large letters, with the word tea, the flavor and major ingredient of the goods, written in smaller letters below it. The effect of this depiction is that CO appears to be the source-indicating portion of the mark, with tea indicating the contents of the drink. As for pronunciation, while it is true that there is no correct pronunciation of a mark, the manner in which applicant's mark is depicted suggests that consumers would refer to it as CO or possibly as the individual letters 'CO,' followed by the word TEA. Contrary to opposer’s argument, there is no basis for us to conclude that consumers would pronounce applicant's mark "as COT-TEA, the phonetic equivalent of COTT Tea."

As to the connotations of the marks, the Board found that COTT "does not evoke any particular meaning other than possibly a surname." Applicant’s mark, however, emphasizes the CO portion, "thereby suggesting the connotation of perhaps an abbreviation for 'company,' or of the initials C.O., plus the word 'tea' to describe the flavor of the soft drinks." Or consumers may understand Applicant's mark "to be a play on the chemical formula for carbon dioxide, CO2."

Thus, the overall commercial impression of the marks is distinctly different and any similarities in appearance, based on the presence of the letters C, O and T, are vastly outweighed by the dissimilarities in the marks.

The Board concluded that the marks are so different that the first du Pont factor the other relevant factors, and so it dismissed the opposition.

TTABlog comment: Most pro se Applicants sooner or later get run off the TTAB court by the big-guy Opposer. Most of the time they deserve it. This time, I think not.

Note that this time, the pronunciation of the marks made a difference, despite the old saw that "there is no correct pronunciation of a mark." Had the Board strictly applied the old saw, would it have found that COTT might be pronounced like "COAT"? Then what?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/22/2009   1 comments

Monday, September 21, 2009

TTABlog in the Trenches: a Farrago of TTAB Interlocutory Papers

I was poking around on TTAB Across the Board, looking at the "uncategorized" documents from last week, and decided to post a few of them. None of them is earth-shaking, but then what do you expect? Here's a half-dozen.


Phone Number, Please: "The Board attempted to reach applicant, who is acting pro se in this matter, by phone but no phone number was listed in the opposition or application papers, and the Board was unable to obtain a phone number in an Internet search." Comite Interprofessionel du Vin de Champagne v. David Dayan, Opposition No. 91188614.

No Double Correspondence: "[T]he Board will not undertake double correspondence, that is, sending correspondence to two addresses on behalf of a single party." Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Semiconductor Manufacturing International (Shanghai) Corporation, Opposition Nos. 91171146 and 91171147.

Board Participation in Discovery Conference?: Do you ever wonder whether to ask for Board participation in a discovery conference? Here's a report from an interlocutory attorney who conducted a conference, this one involving a pro se applicant. Do you think it's better to have Board participation, or not, when your adversary appears pro se? Tamara Racin v. Barbara Bailey Chapman, Opposition No. 91191285.

Don't File Those Initial Disclosures: "Written disclosures ... should not be filed with the Board except under limited circumstances not presently at issue." Deer Valley Resort Company v. Jamison Frost and Al Barbosa, Opposition No. 91189694 and Cancellation No. 92051018.

Don't File Those Notices of Deposition: "Petitioner is advised that discovery materials, including notices of deposition, should only be filed with the Board in certain situations." The Clarion-Ledger, a division of Gannett River States Publishing Corporation v. Curtis Lyons, Cancellation No. 92049745.

Include Proof of Service with Motion Paper: The Board was forgiving, this time. David J. Deacy v. Pet Yellow Pages, Cancellation No. 92051046.

TTABlog query: Was this posting useful? boring? the latter but not the former? vice-versa? both?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/21/2009   5 comments

Friday, September 18, 2009

ABA Webinar Sept. 30: "Trademark Fraud on the USPTO - A New Landscape"

The ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law will host a webinar entitled "Trademark Fraud on the USPTO - A New Landscape" on Wednesday, September 30, 2009, 3:00 PM to 4:30 PM (EST). Details may be found here.


At the end of August, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in In re Bose, overturned an ever-growing line of Trademark Trial and Appeal Board decisions enabling challengers to invalidate pending trademark applications and issued registrations on grounds of fraud - resulting from circumstances of simple inadvertence or misunderstanding. The Federal Circuit's Bose decision clarified the standard for alleging and establishing that fraud had occurred before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, making the litigation of these claims before the Board more challenging. However, even after Bose, many questions remain unanswered.

This teleconference will feature a distinguished panel of trademark experts who will discuss their views on litigating fraud claims and on best practices for trademark portfolios that may be still vulnerable to fraud claims after Bose.


For some background on the issue, see the TTABlog posting here, with comments and commentary.

The panel will include former TTAB Judge Beth A. Chapman of Oblon Spivak in Alexandria, Virginia; Charles Hieken of Fish & Richardson P.C. in Boston, who represented Bose at the TTAB and the CAFC (.mp3 of CAFC oral argument here); and Bill Barber of Pirkey Barber LLP in Austin, Texas, co-author of the AIPLA amicus brief before the CAFC. Yours truly will serve as panel moderator.

If you have a question you would like answered, please leave a comment.
.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/18/2009   1 comments

Precedential No. 38: Expert Testimony Alone Not Sufficient to Prove Mere Descriptiveness of "BEER 1" Marks

The Board dismissed this opposition to registration of the marks BEER 1; ONE BEER, BEER 1; and BEER 1 & Design (shown below) for beer [BEER and MMVII disclaimed], finding these marks to be neither merely descriptive nor deceptively misdescriptive under Section 2(e)(1). Opposer Anheuser-Busch relied primarily on the testimony of a linguistics expert [transcript here], but the Board found the testimony to be insufficient, absent evidence as to how consumers perceive the marks. Anheuser-Busch, Incorporated v. Kelly J. Holt, 92 USPQ2d 1101 (TTAB 2009) [precedential].


A-B's expert asserted that he had familiarized himself with the meaning of "descriptive" in a legal context, and stated that he used "standard analytic techniques" in the linguistic field in concluding that Applicant Holt's marks would be understood as being descriptive of the goods.

As to BEER 1, he opined that Americans would immediately understand that term "to identify a ranking of beers, i.e., that the product in question is ranked number 1."

As to ONE BEER, BEER 1, the expert further relied on his "intuitions as a native speaker" in concluding that the phrase "means there is only one brand ... and this beer is ranked #1."

As to the logo mark, the expert concluded that the design "leads to the overall impression of the Alleged Mark being a medal or award or some type of ranked representation" and, according to Opposer, it therefore describes "a characteristic, quality, feature or attribute of the beer."

Applicant Holt argued that the word "one" and the number "1" have many different interpretations. Thus BEER 1 is susceptible to many meanings. As to ONE BEER, BEER 1, Holt contended that the expert failed to identify any specific message that the mark delivers about the goods. And as to the logo, Holt pointed out that even A-B's expert used the terms "suggests" and "evokes" in discussing the mark.

The Board observed that "although an opinion of an asserted expert in linguistics may have some probative value, it is not dispositive on the ultimate determination of descriptiveness."

the opinion offered by Professor Ward as to the descriptiveness of applicant's "BEER 1," "ONE BEER, BEER 1" and "BEER 1 MMVII and design" marks, as opposed to any factual matters within his area of linguistic expertise or personal knowledge, is of virtually no probative value in this case.

Moreover, the Board pointed out, "conspicuously absent from the record is any empirical evidence, such as surveys, excerpts from newspapers, magazines, trade journals, the internet and the like, showing that consumers perceive the marks as descriptive."

And it noted that the word "one" has twenty-four different meanings in the Random House Webster's College Dictionary.

several of the meanings of "one" listed above are equally plausible in the context of applicant's goods. For example, a consumer is just as likely to perceive the number "1" in the mark as meaning "unique" or "only" as he or she is to perceive the number as "a ranking."

In short, the Board found that "the record is devoid of credible evidence that established that BEER 1 would be perceived by the purchasing public as meaning 'beer that is ranked #1' and thus merely descriptive of beer."

As to the mark ONE BEER, BEER 1, the Board found the expert testimony alone to be unpersuasive, and it noted the lack of "objective evidence" to show that this mark is descriptive of beer.

As to the logo mark, "[h]ere, too, the expert linguist has gone far beyond his claimed area of expertise." A-B's dissection of the logo is "an inappropriate attempt to ascribe descriptive significance to its individual elements."

In sum, the Board found that Opposer had failed to carry its burden of proof:

there is simply nothing that persuades us that the lone opinion of opposer's asserted linguistics expert should substitute for evidence of the perception of the consuming public of the involved marks, or substitute for the Board's ultimate determination of the issue of mere descriptiveness in the matters before us.

As to the merely descriptiveness claim, the Board found that none of the three marks immediately conveys the idea that Applicant Holt's beer is "ranked number one." Therefore there was no misdescription.

And so the Board dismissed the opposition.

TTABlog comment: Mr. Holt, this one's for you!

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/18/2009   2 comments

Thursday, September 17, 2009

WYHA? "INVENTION REGISTRY" Merely Descriptive of Invention Document Storage, Says TTAB

Would You Have Appealed this one? The TTAB affirmed a Section 2(e)(1) refusal to register the mark INVENTION REGISTRY, finding it merely descriptive of "electronic storage of archival documents related to invention conception dates" [REGISTRY disclaimed]. The Board agreed with Examining Attorney Sani Khouri that the mark "immediately describes, without any kind of mental reasoning," the purpose of applicant's services. In re Krasik, Serial No. 77381912 (September 11, 2009) [not precedential].

U.S. Patent No. 6,647,892
Calibrated Angle and Depth Scissors

The Examining Attorney relied on dictionary definitions of "register" and "registry," and on a website excerpt referring to the ability of the government to maintain an "invention registry." [The Board understandably found irrelevant the Examining Attorney's reference to a certain website excerpt labeled "grossly obsolete," to an item at the Trademark and Intellectual Property Office of the Republic of Yemen, and to an excerpt from the Vietnam Investment Review.]

Applicant Michael Krasik lamely argued that his services "are clearly not for patent registrations or invention registrations," but are intended for "maintenance of an electronic document repository and services associated therewith.... No 'registration' ... of anything is accomplished."

The Board, however, found the mark to be descriptive of the services. The combination of INVENTION and REGISTRY "fails to create a new and distinct commercial impression." And Mr. Krasik did not help his own cause:

Applicant’s own use of the term “invention” in the identification of goods shows that INVENTION directly describes an attribute of applicant’s services. Additionally, as previously indicated, the term “registry” means “an official record of names or events or transactions” and the term “register,” a variation of the term “registry,” means “a written record” The term “registry” thus clearly describes the purpose of applicant’s electronic storage of archival documents, i.e., to provide a written record of invention conception dates. We note, too, that applicant confirms in his brief that "Applicant’s services relate to an electronic repository for archival documents related to dates of conceptions for inventions."

And so the Board affirmed the Section 2(e)(1) refusal.

TTABlog comment: Well, WYHA?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/17/2009   0 comments

Wednesday, September 16, 2009

Petition for Certiorari filed in Harjo v. Pro-Football, Inc.

Susan S. Harjo et al. have filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, seeking review of the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in Pro-Football, Inc. v. Harjo, 90 USPQ2d 1593 (D.C. Cir. 2009). [copy of Petition here (431 pages)].

Susan S. Harjo

In its May 15, 2009, the Court of Appeals focused on a single issue, affirming the ruling of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia that laches barred the attempt of Native American Mateo Romero to cancel six registrations for the mark REDSKINS (or variations thereof) owned by the Washington Redskins for football entertainment services. [A summary of the various proceeding may be found here at the TTABlog].

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/16/2009   3 comments

ABA Webinar Sept. 30: "Trademark Fraud on the USPTO - A New Landscape"

The ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law will host a webinar entitled "Trademark Fraud on the USPTO - A New Landscape" on Wednesday, September 30, 2009, 3:00 PM to 4:30 PM (EST). Of course, the catalyst for the webinar is the CAFC's recent decision in In re Bose Corporation, Appeal No. 2008-1448 (Fed. Cir., Aug. 31, 2009). The CAFC ruled that the Board, "[b]y equating 'should have known' with a subjective intent," had "erroneously lowered the fraud standard to a simple negligence standard." The court made it clear that proof of intent to deceive is required to establish fraud: "Thus, we hold that a trademark is obtained fraudulently under the Lanham Act only if the applicant or registrant knowingly makes a false, material representation with the intent to deceive the PTO." [TTABlogged here, with comments and commentary].


The panel will include former TTAB Judge Beth A. Chapman of Oblon Spivak in Alexandria, Virginia; Charles Hieken of Fish & Richardson P.C. in Boston, who represented Bose at the TTAB and the CAFC (.mp3 of CAFC oral argument here); and Bill Barber of Pirkey Barber LLP in Austin, Texas, co-author of the AIPLA amicus brief before the CAFC. Yours truly will serve as panel moderator.

Further details will follow as soon as available.
.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/16/2009   0 comments

Tuesday, September 15, 2009

Finding Autos and Tires Not Closely Related, TTAB Reverses 2(d) Refusal of "ECHELON"

In this rather strange case, both Applicant Hyundai and the Trademark Examining Attorney urged the Board to reverse a Section 2(d) refusal of the mark ECHELON for automobiles that was based on the identical mark registered for "automotive tires." The Examining Attorney had considered himself bound by In re Jeep Corporation, 223 USPQ 333 (TTAB 1984), and along with Hyundai argued that Jeep should be overturned. The Board, however, distinguished Jeep on its facts, finding no per se rule in Jeep that needed overturning. In re Hyundai Motor America, Serial No. 78889340 (September 14, 2009) [not precedential].


The Examining Attorney maintained his final refusal based on Jeep, but he also submitted website evidence supporting Applicant's position. At the oral hearing, both he and Applicant Hyundai argued for reversal of the refusal.

The Board rejected the notion that Jeep creates a per se rule that automobiles and tires are always related goods. Instead, the Board pointed out that it must look at the record evidence "to determine whether these goods are related as closely under trademark law as tires are when securely mounted on auto wheels." [That's pretty darn close - ed.] It found that they are not.

[M]erely because two products are attached or used together does not necessarily mean they are closely related. Consumers do not purchase an automobile without tires, and then later go looking for tires. Nothing in this record points to a single source for automobiles and tires. Accordingly, there is no reason to presume such a perception on the part of consumers of automobiles. We find nothing in the record to support a conclusion that automobiles and their tires are “closely related,” as that term is used in the jurisprudence developed around likelihood of confusion.

The evidence showed "the virtual separation of these channels of trade." Moreover, even unsophisticated tire buyers "would not be able to purchase tires without the assistance of expert, trained store personnel." "[A] capable sales person would not agree to sell and mount tires that do not fit the auto's wheels."

Moreover, Hyundai provided "real-world, online" examples to show that "some of the largest auto manufacturers and the most well-known tire manufacturers readily permit the same mark to coexist for automobiles and automobile tires." The existence of numerous third-party registrations for similar marks owned by different entities for tires and automobiles was consistent with the conclusion that owners in these industries do not believe that there is a likelihood of confusion.

Hyundai also pointed to current tire industry practice by which the source of a tire is listed on the sidewall, further reducing the likelihood of confusion.

The Board therefore found that autos and automobile tires "are not closely related goods given the current marketing conditions for the replacement tire industry and the totally disparate channels of trade between tires and automobiles."

With the possible exception of automobile marks of demonstrated renown - a fact pattern not shown to be the case herein - the chances for likelihood of confusion in the real world are de minimis under these circumstances.

Finally, the Board noted that "[w]hen it comes to likelihood of confusion, trademark practitioners and jurists know that there are no per se rules as to the relatedness of goods."

Therefore, contrary to the positions of both applicant and the Trademark Examining Attorney, we cannot discern a rule of law from In re Jeep Corp. in need of being overturned. Furthermore, although the briefing and oral arguments urge us to do so, we do not find it necessary to take a position herein on whether precedential cases decided decades ago were then supported by the realities of the marketplace or their respective factual records.

Judge Zervas concurred in a separate opinion, opining that the refusal should be reversed, but not for the reasons stated by the panel majority. He would reverse on the ground that the Examining Attorney did not make out a prima facie case.

Judge Zervas pointed to Section 1207.01 of the TMEP, which requires the Examining Attorney to provide evidence "showing that the goods and services are related to support a finding of likelihood of confusion." Since the Examining Attorney did not provide such evidence, the mark should not have been refused registration.

TTABlog comment: I agree with the concurrence. How does an Examining Attorney or a USPTO law office have the authority to decide that he, she, or it will side with an applicant to try to get the TTAB to overturn a Board precedent?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/15/2009   5 comments

Monday, September 14, 2009

Canadian Concurrent Use Applicant Gets USA Minus MN, Says TTAB

British Columbia-based Overwaitea marched across the border and grabbed 49 states via its concurrent use application for registration of the mark URBAN FARE for "retail grocery store services." Overwaitea listed Urban Fare, LLC as an exception to its right to exclusive use. Urban Fare, LLC uses the same mark in Minnesota for "soups, chicken and vegetable stocks and broths." Overwaitea Food Group Limited Partnership v. Urban Fare, LLC, Concurrent Use No. 94002254 (September 9, 2009).


The Minnesota company did not answer the order setting forth the rights claimed by Overwaitea, and so the Board entered judgment by default against Urban Fare, LLC and allowed Overwaitea time to prove its entitlement to the registration sought.

Overwaitea's evidence satisfied the "touchstone" requirement for a concurrent use registration: that there is no likelihood that confusion will arise from the concurrent use of the marks in the defined geographical areas.

Overwaitea submitted the declaration of its director of merchandising, stating that it operares two stores (with a third on the way) in Vancouver, British Columbia, and has used the URBAN FARE mark since 2002; that Vancouver is a mere 24 miles from the U.S. border ; that Overwaitea's stores have customers who are U.S. citizens and residents; that its print, tv, and radio advertisements reach the USA, but that Minnesota is not part of the "expected distribution, viewing or listening area for those advertisements."


He also declared that, prior to its Overwaitea's filing date, the Minnesota company had used the mark URBAN FARE in Minnesota, for soups and broths; that Overwaitea is unaware of any sales of those goods outside Minnesota; that Overwaitea has no intention of opening an URBAN FARE grocery store in or near Minnesota; and that Overwaitea is not aware of any actual confusion; and that confusion is not likely.

The Board found that Overwaitea had established a prima facie case that the concurrent use of the involved marks is not likely to cause confusion, and so the Board ruled that Overwaitea is entitled to the requested concurrent registration.

TTABlog comment: I note that one may order gift baskets online at Applicant's website. What impact does the Internet have on the concurrent use issue? The Board addressed that question in CDS, Inc. v. I.C.E.D. Management, Inc., 80 USPQ2d 1572 (TTAB 2006) [precedential].

There, I.C.E.D. argued that there would still be confusion because both parties advertise on the Internet, but the Board rejected that argument: "We do not believe that the creation of the Internet has rendered the concurrent use provision of the Trademark Act moot." "[T]he presence of advertising on the Internet does not automatically preclude concurrent use registration." Noting that CDS includes a disclaimer on its website stating that it does business under its mark only in the seven identified states, the Board ruled that the specific record evidence "does not require us to find that there is a likelihood of confusion."

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/14/2009   0 comments

Friday, September 11, 2009

Jane Coleman's Treatise on Secondary Liability for Trademark Infringement

Jane Coleman provides a useful treatise on the increasingly important issues of contributory and vicarious liability for trademark infringement at her new website (here). Apparently good writing runs in the Coleman family. We know that her husband Ron is an amazing writer (witness his Likelihood of Confusion blog here). But enough about Ron, and more about this new website:

This website is dedicated to an examination of the law of secondary liability for trademark infringement – the idea that someone other than a direct infringer can be liable for infringing another's trademark. Secondary liability for trademark infringement is a relatively recent development in the law, and it has evolved entirely in the courts. . . .

Of all the contexts in which secondary liability has been raised, whether contributory or vicarious, the Internet has by far generated the most interest and attention. The advent of Internet commerce has created new problems for the law to address. On the Internet, buying and selling take place among a seemingly infinite number of parties at lightning speed, making it difficult both to police and remediate infringement. These issues came to light in Tiffany v. eBay, where the court observed that "more than six million new listings are posted on eBay daily, and at any given time, some 100 million listings appear on the website."
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posted by John L. Welch @ 9/11/2009   0 comments

Finding Wine and Beer Related, TTAB Affirms 2(d) Refusal of "BEAR REPUBLIC" over "BEAR REPUBLIC RICARDO'S RED ROCKET ALE & Design"

E. & J. Gallo's attempt to register the mark BEAR REPUBLIC for wine was stymied by the USPTO's Section 2(d) refusal based upon the registered mark RED ROCKET RICARDO'S BEAR REPUBLIC ALE & Design for beer and ale [ALE disclaimed]. The Board affirmed, finding the marks similar and, based on third-party registration evidence, the goods related. In re E. & J. Gallo Winery, Serial No. 77458162 (August 13, 2009) [not precedential].


As to the goods, Examining Attorney Dayna J. Browne submitted "eleven third-party use-based registrations that include in their identification of goods both wine and beer (and/or ale)." The Board cited In re Mucky Duck Mustard Co., 6 USPQ2d 1467 (TTAB 1988) and In re Albert Trostel & Sons, Co., 29 USPQ2d 1783 (TTAB 1993), in finding that these registrations "have probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the goods listed therein are of a kind which may emanate from a single source under a single mark." In addition, two third-party websites showed that there are wineries that also produce beer.

From this evidence, the Board found that the second du Pont factor supported the refusal.

The Board also noted that it has found in "numerous cases" that different alcoholic beverages "are related products which are sold in the same trade channels to the same classes of purchasers, including to ordinary consumers, and that confusion is likely to result if the goods were to be sold under similar marks."

Turning to the marks, Gallo contended that they are “dramatically” different in appearance, given the presence in registrant’s mark of "a prominent drawing of a rocket in take-off, handwritten script, three different text sizes, a drawing of a star, a banner, and a box enclosing the primary elements of the mark." Gallo also argued that the words "Bear Republic" are weak because they suggest the state of California. [I'm not saying that California is weak, although .... ed.]

The Board, however, found that the dominant portion of the registered mark is the literal portion. Moreover, "[e]ven assuming that the term 'RED ROCKET ALE' is the dominant portion of the registered mark, as applicant argues, we find that the marks are similar because they share the words 'BEAR REPUBLIC.'" As to the weakness of the latter phrase:

Although the words “Bear Republic” may suggest the state of California, the TESS summary indicates the absence of any third-party registrations of the same or similar mark for any goods (or services), let alone for alcoholic beverages. Thus, contrary to applicant’s contention, we do not view these words as “weak.”

Noting that Registrant is named "Bear Republic Brewing Company, Inc.," the Board pointed out that "Bear Republic" appears as registrant’s house mark on its website. Moreover, the evidence revealed that "other brewers use their house mark or trade
name at the top of a label or mark, followed by an additional product mark below, as is the case with registrant’s mark. This would appear to be a common practice in the industry, and serves to buttress the notion that the 'BEAR REPUBLIC' portion of registrant’s mark cannot be ignored when comparing the marks."

And so, the Board found the marks to be similar in appearance, sound, meaning and overall commercial impression.

While registrant’s mark includes other words and design features, this first portion of registrant’s mark is identical to the entirety of applicant’s mark, and thus may lead consumers to mistakenly believe that applicant's BEAR REPUBLIC wine is an expansion of the BEAR REPUBLIC product line and somehow is associated or affiliated with the source of the product sold under the mark BEAR REPUBLIC RICARDO’S RED ROCKET ALE and design.

Resolving any doubt in favor of the prior registrant, the Board affirmed the Section 2(d) refusal.

TTABlog comment: It is my observation that, based on third-party registrations, one can prove any beverage related to any other beverage. In the real world, however, do you think that people would be confused by these marks for these goods? Maybe after a few drinks. But totally sober? I have my doubts.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/11/2009   7 comments

Thursday, September 10, 2009

WYHA? TTAB Affirms Failure-to-Function Refusal of "STRENGTH IN DATA" for Brochures

ImClone Systems sought to register the mark STRENGTH IN DATA for advertising and promotional publications in the health care field. Its specimens of use are shown below. Examining Attorney Fred Carl III refused registration on the ground that the phrase did not function as a trademark for these goods. Would you have appealed? In re ImClone Systems Incorporated, Serial No. 76659576 (September 8, 2009) [not precedential].

(Click on picture for larger view)

The question was whether the phrase, as it appeared on the specimens, "would be recognized/perceived in and of itself, by the cancer specialists, as an indication of origin for these brochures/informational newsletters."

The Board analogized this situation to one involving ornamentation on a t-shirt, where the criteria of "size, location and dominance" are applied to determine the issue.

"Putting ourselves in the position of these brochures' targeted oncologists, we find that visually these brochures uniformly present a nearly imperceptible usage of this tagline, and are clearly not a readily perceived source-indicator for these promotional brochures touting ERBITUX medications."

And so the Board affirmed the refusal.

TTABlog comment: I think this one falls below the WYHA line. What do you think?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/10/2009   3 comments

Wednesday, September 09, 2009

Finding Double Entendre, TTAB Reverses 2(e)(2) Refusal of "PROFUMO DE FIRENZE" for Perfume

Reversing a Section 2(e)(2) refusal, the Board found the mark shown below to be not primarily geographically descriptive of perfumes and cosmetics. It ruled that although the mark may be understood as describing that Applicant's goods are made in Florence, it could also have a non-geographical meaning as "the scent (or sweet smell) of Florence." In re Atelier Profumo Artistico Firenze S.r.L., Serial No. 77212553 (August 26, 2009) [not precedential].


The first requirement for a Section 2(e)(2) refusal is that the primary significance of the mark be the name of a place generally known to the public. The Board pointed out that words in a modern foreign language like Italian are translated into English in order to determine their descriptiveness.

There was no dispute that "de Firenze" translates into English as "of Florence." The record established that Florence is a well-known city and province, the capital city of the Italian region of Tuscany, and is a commercial, industrial, and tourist center.


Applicant argued that "when the term 'profumo' is followed by 'di' and a noun such as a 'rose' (or in this particular case, the city of Florence) ... the term 'profumo' will take on the more 'sensory-related' translation of the word as opposed to the 'product-related' translation of the word." In other words, consumers will perceive the mark "in a manner that is consistent with the 'scent of Florence' as opposed to 'bottles of perfume originating from Florence." The Board found that Applicant's argument passed the olfactory test:

[t]he evidence shows that ... one meaning of the mark as a whole is the sensory connotation. This sensory connotation is nebulous inasmuch as it remains unclear whether the “scent” or “sweet smell” of Florence is to be taken literally, i.e., the goods may actually attempt to replicate odors of the city, in the manner of “the scent of the sea,” or to be interpreted as giving a “flavor” of the city, i.e., suggesting the goods will conjure images or “the aura” of the historic city of Florence. In either instance, we find this connotation takes the mark out of the geographically descriptive realm.

The Board found that "at the very least the mark must be viewed as having a double entendre, and is therefore registrable." Of course, any doubt as to the primary meaning of the mark must be resolved in Applicant's favor.

The Board therefore reversed the refusal to register.



TTABlog comment: I've never been to Florence, so I can only imagine what the "odors of the city" might smell like. If Applicant's goods did replicate the odors of the city, wouldn't the mark, alternatively, be merely descriptive under Section 2(e)(1)? The Examining Attorney, however, did not make that alternative refusal.

It seems unlikely to me that a purchaser of a bottle of perfume bearing the mark PROFUMO DI FIORENZE would not translate the phrase as "perfume of Florence." But then, I'm not a TTAB judge.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/09/2009   1 comments

Tuesday, September 08, 2009

Motion to Strike Bogus Affirmative Defenses: Worth the Effort?

When I receive an answer to a notice of opposition or a petition for cancellation that contains boilerplate "affirmative defenses," I usually don't bother to move to strike because it's not worth the time and expense. Once in a while I do make a motion, depending on how ornery I feel at the time. Here's a case that I noticed yesterday via TTAB Across the Board, in which the Opposer brought such a motion. Castro v. Cartwright, Opposition No. 91188477 (September 5, 2009) [not precedential].


Applicant Rick Cartwright asserted six "affirmative defenses": (1) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; (2) waiver; (3) estoppel; (4) abandonment; (5) failure to police and enforce; and (6) no trademark use by Opposer. Carlos A. Castro moved to strike all six defenses, and the Board agreed as to four of them. [Can you guess which ones? ed.]

"Motions to strike are not favored," said the Board, further noting that it "may decline to strike even objectionable pleadings where their inclusion will not prejudice the adverse party, but rather will provide fuller notice of the basis for a claim or defense." See FRCP 12(f) and TBMP Section 506.

As to defense (1), the Board noted that "failure to state a claim" is not really an affirmative defense "because it relates to an assertion of the insufficiency of the pleading of opposer’s claim rather than a statement of a defense to a properly pleaded claim."

In determining the sufficiency of the notice of opposition, the Board examines the notice to see if (1) the plaintiff has standing to maintain the proceeding, and (2) a valid ground exists for opposing the mark. Opposer pleaded standing (prior use) and alleged a valid claim (likelihood of confusion). Therefore the Board granted the motion to strike the first "affirmative defense."

As to Applicant Cartwrights’s second defense, that opposer’s claim is barred by the doctrine of waiver, "this assertion is insufficient on its face inasmuch as it fails to give opposer or the Board any factual basis for the defense." And so the Board granted the motion to strike defense (2).

The third asserted defense, estoppel, "may be invoked only by one who has been prejudiced by the conduct relied upon to create the estoppel." Here, Cartwright did not allege that "he was induced to select his mark because of the conduct of opposer or that applicant is in privity with ... third parties who have assertedly used similar marks for similar goods with opposer’s acquiescence thereto," and therefore his third defense was also stricken as insufficient.

Likewise, the Board construed defense (5) "to essentially restate that applicant has acquiesced to or not asserted its trademark rights, if any, against third parties." However, Cartwright made no allegations that he is in privity with any third party who relied on opposer’s conduct. And so the fifth defense was stricken.

Cartwright's fourth and sixth affirmative defenses (abandonment and lack of trademark use) involved an absence of proprietary rights in Opposer's alleged mark. The allegations "provide opposer with notice of applicant’s position with respect to opposer’s claim of priority and, thus, primarily function to amplify applicant’s denial of opposer’s claim of likelihood of confusion and do not prejudice opposer." Therefore, the Board denied Castro's motion to strike those two defenses.

The Board then re-set the various discovery and trial dates and gave Cartwright thirty days to file an amended answer "that states a proper affirmative defense of estoppel, as discussed supra, assuming applicant can make the factual allegations that support such a defense."

TTABlog comment: Well, do you think it's worth the time and effort to move to strike those defenses? If so, why? Presumably, the defendant will not be able to prove these defenses anyway, so why bother to strike them (other than to cause the other side some grief)?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/08/2009   3 comments

Friday, September 04, 2009

Follow Your TTAB Cases on TTAB Across The Board

Trademark attorney Chris Shiplett has launched a useful new website called TTAB Across The Board, which provides a searchable database of TTAB case status information and TTAB filings.


At TTAB Across The Board, one may search for case information on TTAB proceedings and appeals, and may also search the full text of TTAB filings. Chris has thus far indexed most TTAB documents issued since March 2009, including board orders, motions, pleadings, and evidentiary submissions.

After a simple registration process, the user may create a "watch list" of TTAB cases and then get daily updates for the listed cases, either by e-mail or RSS feed, or both.

I registered at the website about two weeks ago, and every morning I check my watch list for new developments. I also check each day's "orders" to keep on top of new TTAB decisions worthy of posting on the TTABlog.

This is an excellent companion to the Feathers software program (which I have been using for more than 10 years), whereby one may monitor trademark filings at the USPTO.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/04/2009   0 comments

Precedential No. 37: Board Grants Motion to Introduce at Trial, Discovery Deposition of Nonparty Taiwanese Witness

In a somewhat interesting decision, the Board granted Opposer's motion under Rule 2.120(j)(3)(i) to allow introduction of a nonparty discovery deposition by way of notice of reliance. The witness, Momo Chen, a Taiwanese citizen who resides outside the U.S.A., voluntarily appeared in the United States for her discovery deposition, but stated that she had no plans to return to the United States and agreed to appear only for the discovery deposition. Galaxy Metal Gear, Inc. v. Direct Access Technology, Inc., 91 USPQ2d 1859 (TTAB 2009) [precedential].


Rule 2.120(j)(2) states in pertinent part that discovery depositions (of a party or a nonparty) shall not be offered into evidence unless the witness is out of the country during the trial period (except if the party offering the deposition procured the absence of the witness) or cannot be served with a subpoena to compel attendance at a deposition. Rule 2.120(j)(3)(i) provides that the offering party must make a motion for leave to file the deposition at the time it is offered into evidence.

Here, the Board found that Ms. Chen is not willing to appear voluntarily for trial and her attendance cannot be compelled. Therefore it granted Opposer's motion. It found no evidence to suggest that that Opposer had procured an agreement with Ms. Chen that would stay out of the country, and it noted that Applicant attended the discovery deposition and cross-examined the witness, and learned at that time that Ms. Chen did not plan to be in the United States during the trial phase of this proceeding.

Applicant also complained that Opposer had not identified Ms. Chen as a potential witness in its initial disclosures under Rule 2.120(a)(3). The Board, however, pointed out that there is no need to supplement a party's disclosures "to include information revealed by a witness in a deposition or otherwise through formal discovery, including the identity of the witness." Applicant not only attended her deposition but also had more than two months to take additional discovery.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

posted by John L. Welch @ 9/04/2009   0 comments