Wednesday, December 31, 2008

Is Stylization of "GRUNGE" Mark Distinctive? You Be the TTAB Judge!

Is the stylization of the word GRUNGE in the mark shown below sufficiently distinctive in character to support a Principal Registration for various clothing items [GRUNGE disclaimed]? The Board recognized that this determination is a subjective one, so what do you think? In re Grapevine Intellectual Properties, LLC, Serial No. 77141442 (December 18, 2008) [not precedential].


During proscution, the Examining Attorney provided a dictionary definition of the term GRUNGE as "a style of dress, popularized by fans of grunge music, typified by second-hand clothes worn in layers, heavy footwear, unkempt hair, and an overall scruffy appearance."

Applicant did not dispute the descriptiveness of GRUNGE, but contended that "[e]ach letter in the word 'grunge' is displayed in its own highly stylized typeface, characterized by erratic edges and inconsistent sizes and thicknesses, creating a striking commercial impression separate and apart from the word portion of the mark." The Examining Attorney disagreed.

The Board observed that "in order for a term otherwise unregistrable to be capable of distinguishing an applicant's goods, the presentation of the term must be sufficiently distinctive so as to create a commercial impression separate and apart from the unregistrable components whereby it is possible to disclaim those unregistrable components and still have a mark which is registrable as a whole."

The determination of whether the stylization of an otherwise unregistrable designation is sufficiently distinctive in character to “rescue” the designation as a whole is a subjective one.

The Board compared the GRUNGE mark to the four marks shown below, each of which was previously found to have an inherently distinctive stylization:


So how did it come out? Read the decision.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

TTABlog Quarterly Index: October - December 2008

E-mail subscriptions to the TTABlog are available. Just enter your e-mail address in the box on the right to receive a daily update via Feedblitz. Please report any broken or inoperative links, as well as any errors and omissions, to the TTABlogger.


Section 2(a) - disparagement:

Section 2(a) - scandalous:

Section 2(a) - suggesting a false connection

Section 2(b) - flag, coat of arms, insignia:

Section 2(d) - likelihood of confusion:

Section 2(e)(1) - mere descriptiveness:

Section 2(e)(2) - primarily geographically descriptive:

Section 2(e)(3) - primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive:

Section 2(e)(4) - primarily merely a surname

Section 2(f) - acquired distinctiveness:


Abandonment:

Failure to Function:

Fraud:

Genericness:

Ownership:

Pan American Convention:

Procedural Issues:



Single Artistic Work:

Specimens of Use/Drawing:

Standing:

Other:

Text and photos ©John L. Welch 2008.

Tuesday, December 30, 2008

Precedential No. 55: TTAB Denies Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment Because Briefs Exceeded Page Limit

Under Rule 2.127(a), a brief on a motion may not exceed 25 pages in length, including table of contents, index of cases, description of record, statement of the issues, recitation of the facts, argument, and summary. The parties to this cancellation proceeding violated that rule in their respective summary judgment motions, and so the Board tossed out the motions. Cooper Technologies Company v. Denier Electric Co., Inc., 89 USPQ2d 1478 (TTAB 2008) [precedential].


Respondent Denier Electric's summary judgment motion was met with Petitioner Cooper's combined opposition and cross-motion for summary judgment [the issue being mere descriptiveness of the mark ROUGH-IN READY for electrical switches and receptacles]. Unfortunately, Denier's brief was 30 pages long! Petitioner Cooper's brief was 27 pages! Although neither party objected, the Board turned out the lights, noting that "the page limitation for briefs on motions is intended to prevent the filing of unduly long briefs and consequent unnecessary burdens on the Board. The page limitation on briefs cannot be waived by action, inaction or consent of the parties."

The 25-page limit still applied even though Petitioner's brief was a combined opposition and summary judgment cross-motion: "one cannot subvert the limit by filing both a brief in opposition and a separate brief in support of a cross-motion, when both address the same issue."

The Board dismissed both summary judgment motions without prejudice (but in a footnote pointed out several substantive flaws in the motions).

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

Monday, December 29, 2008

Precedential No. 54: "DEC" Merely Descriptive of Nuclear Decay Batteries, Says TTAB

If your energy is waning and you need your battery re-charged, this is not the case for you. In an enervating rather than energizing decision, the Board affirmed a Section 2(e)(1) refusal to register the mark DEC, finding it to be merely descriptive of "batteries deriving power from nuclear decay processes" and for related services. Applicant BetaBatt, Inc. conceded that DEC is an acronym for "direct energy conversion," and the Board found the phrase to be merely descriptive of the products and services and that relevant consumers would recognize the abbreviation. In re BetaBatt, Inc., 89 USPQ2d 1152 (TTAB 2008) [precedential].


Examining Attorney Michael S. Levy relied on various Internet articles and websites, and on an Acronym Finder entry identifying DEC as "Direct Energy Conversion." [TTABlog note: Acronym Finder lists 70 "verified definitions" for DEC. The website includes the following statement in its "Terms of Use": "Disclaimer. We've done our best to ensure the accuracy of the Acronym Finder database, however, we do not take responsibility for the accuracy of any of the information in the acronym database. Capitalization is NOT necessarily correct. Use information from this site at your own risk."]

BetaBatt did not dispute that DEC stands for "Direct Energy Conversion," but it asserted that the PTO failed to prove that "the common everyday purchaser of a battery that is used in connection with hearing aids or similar medical devices will know that DEC stands for direct energy conversion." Applicant further argued that a multi-stage reasoning process and additional information is required before a consumer will know what DEC stands for.

The Board observed that in order to conclude that DEC is merely descriptive of Applicant's goods and services, it would have to find the following:

1. DEC is an abbreviation for “direct energy conversion;"

2. "Direct energy conversion" is merely descriptive of the products and services listed in the application; and,

3. A relevant consumer viewing DEC in connection with applicant’s products and services would recognize it as an abbreviation of the term "direct energy conversion."

The Board found all three. As to (1), the Acronym Finder entry and Applicant's concession sufficed. As to (2), the PTO's evidence established that "direct energy conversion" is descriptive of Applicant's products and services.

As to (3), the Board found that "DEC is routinely used as an abbreviation for the term 'direct energy conversion.'" It was up to Applicant to show that DEC will not be so recognized, but Applicant submitted no evidence on this point.

As to BetaBatt's argument that purchasers of hearing aid batteries or batteries for similar devices will not know the meaning of DEC, the Board noted that the identification of goods is not limited to those uses. The goods could include all kinds of batteries deriving power from nuclear decay, including batteries for powering industrial wireless sensors, spacecraft, or car, trucks, and "everything in our homes within the next ten years." Likewise, the recitation of services is not limited to hearing aids and medical devices.

As to BetaBatt's "multi-stage reasoning" contention, the Board pointed out that Applicant did not describe the process nor did it submit any evidence to support its argument.

And so, the Board affirmed the refusal to register.

TTABlog comment: For a discussion of the Acronym Finder website and its reliability, see this posting.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

Wednesday, December 24, 2008

"CRASH DUMMIES" Mark Survives Abandonment Claim, TTAB Sustains 2(d) Opposition to Same Mark for Same Goods

In this Section 2(d) opposition, the goods were in part identical (action figures) and the marks either identical (CRASH DUMMIES) or highly similar (THE INCREDIBLE CRASH DUMMIES). Confusion was likely, but did Opposer have priority based on use of its mark, or had Opposer's mark been abandoned, as Applicant contended? Answer: Opposer won. Mattel, Inc. v. The Crash Dummy Movie, LLC, Opposition No. 91159002 (November 25, 2008) [not precedential].


Opposer Mattel's predecessor-in-interest, Tyco, first used the CRASH DUMMIES marks in 1991, sold toys under the marks at least through 1994, and licensed the mark to 49 different entities, some of the licenses lasting until 1995 with a sell-off period of 4-6 months.

Tyco assigned the marks to Mattel in 1997, and Mattel acquired Tyco fully at the end of that year. Two registrations for the CRASH DUMMIES marks were allowed to expire. Due to the size of the acquisition, the integration of Tyco and Mattel "was accomplished over a long period of time." In 1998, Mattel was approached by a toy retailer about products under the CRASH DUMMIES marks, but Mattel could not sell them "due to retooling requirements."

In 2000, Mattel "began product research to produce toys under the CRASH DUMMIES mark culminating in the first shipment and sales in December 2003 and continuing through 2004."

Applicant filed its I-T-U application on March 31, 2003 and has not yet used the mark for the identified goods.

The Board observed that an opposer who relies on an unregistered mark in a 2(d) opposition must show that its term is distinctive of the goods. It found that the CRASH DUMMIES marks had acquired distinctiveness by 1995, based on the extent of use and licensing by Tyco.

As to the abandonment issue, Mattel was assigned the marks on February 12, 1997 and fully acquired Tyco on December 31, 2007. "[T]hus, at most, two years had passed between the end-term date of the licensing agreements and opposer's acquisition of Tyco." The record therefore "does not support prima facie abandonment" by Tyco.

Turning to Mattel's actions, because the first shipment of CRASH DUMMIES goods did not occur until December 2003, the period of use constitutes prima facie abandonment based on three years of nonuse. However, "Opposer has shown through its continuing efforts an intent to resume use and eventual resumption of use of the marks."

Mattel acquired more than 300 trademarks from Tyco in 1997. Although Tyco was not manufacturing CRASH DUMMIES products at the time, "it is common practice in the industry to 'recycle' the more popular toys based upon key play patterns." In 1998, Mattel considered supplying those toys, but could not due to the expense of re-tooling to meet its standards. In 2000, Mattel was "able to start the process that precedes retooling, and it began shipping the toys in December 2003. The Board ruled that "the residual goodwill combined with opposer's 'constancy of effort' and the industry practice to recycle brands clearly support a finding that opposer has not abandoned these marks."

In this case ... opposer has rebutted the presumption of abandonment by showing "reasonable grounds for the suspension and plans to resume use in the reasonably foreseeable future when the conditions requiring suspension abate." Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 9 USPQ2d 1778, 1773 (2d Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).

The Board therefore found that Mattel has priority of use, and that confusion is likely between the marks.

TTABlog comment: Just goes to show, the bigger they are, the harder it is to get them to fall.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

Tuesday, December 23, 2008

Despite Fame of "RE/MAX," TTAB Finds No Likelihood of Confusion with "SAVEMAX REALTY"

An opposer who proves its mark famous usually wins in a Section 2(d) opposition, particularly when the parties' goods or services are identical. Not this time. The Board dismissed an opposition to registration of the mark SAVEMAX REALTY in the logo form shown below, finding it not likely to cause confusion with the famous mark RE/MAX, both for real estate brokerage services RE/MAX International Inc. v. Somraj Singh, Opposition No. 91175272 (December 10, 2008) [not precedential].


Opposer established the fame of its mark via testimony that it has 4,315 offices in the United States, 80,000 sales associates, and a 16% market share. Since 2006, its website has listed 3.9 million properties. In 2007, Opposer and its associates spent $1 billion, accounting for about 47% of the paid advertising in the real estate field.

The services of the parties are identical, and therefore the Board must presume that the channels of trade and classes of purchasers are the same.

Turning to the marks, the Board noted that when the services are identical, a lesser degree of similarity is necessary between the marks to support a finding of likelihood of confusion. However, here the only similarity between the marks is the suffix "max""

"Max" is an abbreviation for the descriptive or highly suggestive word "maximum." Accordingly, when we consider the marks in their entireties, we are of the opinion that they differ substantially in appearance, sound, meaning and commercial impression.

Opposer contended that the marks are similar because they "share the prominent use of the suffix 'MAX.' However, the Board observed, "While both parties adopted their marks to connote a 'maximum' quality, their marks emphasize different qualities (i.e., the maximum in real estate and experience vs. maximum savings)." "The marks are also obviously different in appearance and pronunciation because of the differences in the initial portions of the marks."



The Board rejected Opposer's argument that the dominant portion of Applicant's mark is "max," and that when "max" is used with regard to "anything related to real estate, everybody thinks of RE/MAX first." As to the latter point, the Board noted that Opposer did not plead ownership of a family of MAX marks.

The Board concluded that the marks are not similar in appearance, sound, meaning, or commercial impression, and it therefore dismissed the opposition.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

Monday, December 22, 2008

Pamela Chestek: Who Owns "Joyce Theater"? - the Mark, Not the Building

Pamela Chestek discusses here at her Property, intangibles blog the TTAB's recent, precedential decision in Ballet Tech Foundation, Inc. v. The Joyce Theater Foundation, Inc., Opposition No. 91180789 and Cancellation No. 92042019 (December 11, 2008). Pam knows a lot about trademark ownership, as evidenced by her article, "Who Owns the Mark? A Single Framework for Resolving Trademark Disputes," in the May-June 2006 Trademark Reporter (pdf here).

Joyce Theater
8th Avenue and 19th Street, New York City

The TTABlog posting (here) summarized the holding of the case: Ballet Tech (the landlord) was deemed the owner, and the Joyce Theater Foundation (the tenant) was the (implied) licensee. Pam analyzes how the Board got there:

The Board considered ownership a binary question: either the Theater Foundation owned the marks, or Ballet Tech owned the marks and the Theater Foundation was an implied licensee. The Board's analysis is therefore effectively in two parts: (1) who owns the mark (Part A); and (2) did Ballet Tech control the Theater Foundation's use of the marks, i.e., was the Theater Foundation a controlled licensee whose use, under Section 5 of the Lanham Act, would inure to the benefit of Ballet Tech (Parts B-E)? The second half of the analysis relied heavily on the law of abandonment in evaluating whether there was sufficient control.

In a thorough discussion of the facts, the Board held that Ballet Tech was the owner of the mark and that it indeed sufficiently controlled the Theater Foundation's use of the marks. It therefore cancelled the various registrations and sustained the opposition.

I find it interesting that the Board treated the two questions separately - what if the Board found that Ballet Tech owned the mark but that there was no implied license? Would the Board have held that the mark was abandoned, the legal result of finding that there are uncontrolled licensees? This is one of my pet peeves, that is, courts that hold that a trademark is abandoned when it is still functioning as a mark. If it functions as a mark how can it be abandoned, which is defined as losing significance as a mark? Isn't the only proper question WHO it is identifying, in other words, who owns it?

So, let's ask the question: Who does the mark JOYCE identify? Might it be that JOYCE identifies the dance company as the source of the dance theater services, but Ballet Tech as the source of the fundraising services?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

PTO Publishes Summary of Rule Changes Effective January 16, 2009

On November 17, 2008, the PTO published a final rule entitled "Miscellaneous Changes to Trademark Rules of Practice," 73 F.R. 67759. (pdf here). These changes become effective on January 16, 2009. According to the PTO, "[t]he changes clarify certain requirements for applications, intent to use documents, amendments to classification, requests to divide, and Post Registration practice; modernize the language of the rules; and make other miscellaneous changes." For the most part, "the rule changes merely codify and clarify existing practice, as set forth in the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP)." The PTO has now published a "Summary of Miscellaneous Changes to Trademark Rules" (pdf here).


One controversial amendment appears in Rule 2.85(f), which states that:

Classification schedules shall not limit or extend the applicant’s rights, except that in a section 66(a) application, the scope of the identification of goods or services for purposes of permissible amendments (see § 2.71(a)) is limited by the class, pursuant to § 2.85(d).

Michael E. Hall (here) and Thilo Agathe (here) have criticized Rule 2.85(f) as being beyond the PTO's authority and not required by the provisions of the Madrid Protocol.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

Friday, December 19, 2008

Irked TTAB Reverses PTO's Stubborn Refusal to Register "STEELBUILDING.COM"

Noting that this is the fourth time that Applicant has been before the TTAB in connection with the same issues of genericness and acquired distinctiveness of the mark STEELBUILDING.COM, the Board agreed with Applicant that "[t]he examining attorney is directly at odds with the findings of both the Federal Circuit and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board." It reversed the PTO's refusal to register the mark for "computerized on-line retail services in the field of pre-engineered metal buildings and roofing systems." In re Steelbuilding.com, Inc., Serial No. 78680792 (December 11, 2008) [not precedential].


Michael Hall commented on the PTO's strange position in this case in a TTABlog posting in October (here). The TTAB also took a dim view of the PTO's approach:

It is almost as if the examining attorney and her managing attorney are so unhappy with the Federal Circuit’s decision on genericness that they hope reconsideration of it may come by way of yet another refusal on the same ground. Simply put, the issue of genericness in the present case is controlled by the Federal Circuit’s earlier decision. And given the Board’s earlier findings on acquired distinctiveness of the same term STEELBUILDING.COM on the same record, we see no reason to reach a different result herein.

The current appeal involves the same applicant, the same mark, and the same services that were at issue in both the CAFC’s 2005 precedential decision in In re Steelbuilding.com, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d 1420 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (Steelbuilding I), and the Board’s 2007 non-precedential decision in In re Steelbuilding.com, Inc., consolidated Serial Nos. 76280389 and 76280390 (December 12, 2007) (Steelbuilding II). In Steelbuilding I, the Federal Circuit found that the Applicant’s mark STEELBUILDING.COM was not generic for services identical to those in the current application. Subsequently, in Steelbuilding II, the Board reversed a disclaimer requirement for STEELBUILDING.COM for virtually the same services because it found that the term had acquired distinctiveness.

The Examining Attorney maintained here that significant new evidence (two domain names and eight third-party registrations) compels a different result on genericness. The Board, however, found that the record "differs only minimally from the earlier records" and the evidence did not show generic use of the compound "steelbuilding" (one word).

As to acquired distinctiveness, the evidence here was identical to that in two prior cases. The Board again ruled that this evidence was sufficient to satisfy Section 2(f).

The Board then noted that the Managing Attorney had appended an argument to the Examining Attorney's brief, asserting that the Board was "potentially creating two divergent bodies of case law for proposed marks consisting of generic terms plus TLDs." The Board was unmoved:

... we disagree with the managing attorney’s conclusion that the Board and the Federal Circuit stand at the brink of a body of case law about to diverge into two contradictory branches. Quite simply, there are no per se rules when it comes to determining whether a term combined with a TLD is or is not generic. And the law already has developed to the point of recognizing that some terms will be registered and others will be refused. In that sense, the Federal Circuit and the Board have passed the point the managing attorney thinks is only now at hand, and we
anticipate that the Board and the Federal Circuit will continue to be able to differentiate which terms should be registered and which must be refused.

And so, the refusals were reversed.

TTABlog note: Earlier postings on the STEELBUILDING.COM marks may be found here and here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

Thursday, December 18, 2008

TTAB Finds "PUCK" Merely Descriptive of Hockey Puck-shaped Security Tags

The Board affirmed a Section 2(e)(1) refusal of the mark PUCK, finding it merely descriptive of "theft deterrent devices and anti-shoplifting devices, namely, electronic article surveillance tags embodying electronic microcircuits." Examining Attorney Michael W. Baird successfully maintained that consumers would perceive the word PUCK as indicating a feature of the goods, namely, "that they are offered in the general size and shape of a hockey puck." In re Invue Security Products Inc., Serial No. 77006342 (December 8, 2008) [not precedential].


The PTO relied on Internet articles and advertisements showing similar security devices - even some offered at applicant's website - in the size and shape of a hockey puck.

Applicant argued that PUCK merely suggests that Applicant's devices are "strong and durable like a hockey puck," but that shot missed the goal. The Board found it clear that consumers would not need to exercise any imagination in perceiving PUCK as referring to a feature of Applicant's product.

The Board observed that a mark that describes the shape or size of the goods may be considered merely descriptive: e.g., MATCHBOX for toys sold in matchbox-like boxes; TOOBS for household items shape like tubes. It concluded that others in the industry would have a need to use the word PUCK to describe their goods. Pointing to a design patent that claimed "the ornamental design for a security puck," the Board noted that PUCK may even be generic for the goods.

It therefore affirmed the refusal.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

TTAB Dismisses "Sopranos" Opposition: HBO Neglects to Prove Standing

The standing "hurdle" is usually easy to clear in a TTAB opposition, but it does require some effort: i.e., one has to submit some evidence to get the case off the ground, so to speak. In this opposition, Opposer Home Box Office apparently believed it had a slam-dunk fraud case based on Applicant's answer to the notice of opposition, but HBO failed to prove its own standing to oppose. As a result, the Board dismissed the opposition. Home Box Office, Inc. v. Vanderbilt Trading Partnership, Opposition No. 91167861 (December 3, 2008) [not precedential].


HBO challenged Vanderbilt's use-based application to register SOPRANO CREATIONS for various clothing items, including shirts and sweaters, alleging likelihood of confusion and dilution vis-a-vis its registered mark THE SOPRANOS for clothing and for a television program. In its answer, Applicant asserted that it "has not sold any shirts or sweaters and does not intend to do so in the future." HBO then amended its notice of opposition to add the grounds of lack of use and fraud.

The case moved to the trial stage, during which neither party submitted testimony. Opposer HBO did file a notice of reliance, consisting of Vanderbilt's answer (already of record) and an unauthenticated letter from Vanderbilt's counsel (inadmissible via notice of reliance).

HBO submitted a trial brief, but addressed only the fraud and lack-of-use issues. The Board deemed the other issues waived.

The Board then observed that "[s]tanding is a threshold issue that must be proven in every inter partes case." An opposer must show both a "real interest" in the proceeding and a reasonable basis for its belief that it will be damaged. Here, HBO provided no evidence of its standing. Although HBO pleaded several registrations in its notice and its amended notice of opposition, it never introduced them into evidence. (see Rule 2.122(d)). The Board does not take judicial notice of registrations. Applicant did not admit HBO's standing in its answer. Thus there was not evidence in the record to show that HBO had a real interest in the case or that it would be damaged by the registration of the subject mark.

The Board therefore dismissed the opposition.

TTABlog practice pointer: Don't forget to prove standing! Mere allegations in a notice of opposition (unless admitted) prove nothing. At a minimum, properly introduce your registration(s) into the record per Rule 2.122(d).

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

Wednesday, December 17, 2008

Precedential No. 53: TTAB Decides Ownership Dispute over "JOYCE" for Dance Theater and Charitable Services

Once again the landlord bested the tenant, this time in a service mark ownership battle. Finding that the landlord (Ballet Tech Foundation, Inc.) is the owner the marks and that the tenant (The Joyce Theater Foundation, Inc.) used the marks under an implied license, the Board sustained an opposition to one application, and granted a petition for cancellation of five registrations, for the mark JOYCE (in various forms) for dance theater and charitable fund raising services. Ballet Tech Foundation, Inc. v. The Joyce Theater Foundation, Inc., 89 USPQd 1262 (TTAB 2008) [precedential].

Joyce Theater
8th Avenue and 19th Street, New York City

Citing the McCarthy treatise, the Board observed, rather generally, that "the resolution of a service mark dispute between a landlord and tenant depends on the facts and a weighing of the policies and circumstances of each case." Here, there was no express contractual provision regarding ownership and use of the JOYCE marks, and so the Board had to "examine the dealings of the parties to determine the ownership of the JOYCE marks and whether there was an informal system of quality control sufficient to support an implied license."

The Board noted that there was "no real dispute about the operative facts; rather the parties disagree about what the facts mean." [It suggested in footnote 9 that this case "would have been a good candidate for Board's accelerated case resolution procedure ("ACR")"] Summarizing the facts at length in its 38-page decision, the Board found that:

the course of conduct between the parties created an implied license. First, when petitioner purchased the Elgin Theater and then formed respondent, petitioner intended to own the name of the theater and license it to respondent. Second, petitioner designed respondent so that petitioner could maintain control over it and, thus, maintain control over the name of the theater. Third, the lease, as evidence of the dealings between the parties, provides that respondent must render "first class" dance theater services, cannot make alterations or changes to the theater without petitioner's consent, and upon termination of the lease for any reason, including a default or breach by respondent, respondent must surrender the premises, including any alterations, to petitioner. In addition, the lease provides petitioner with a right to enter and inspect the premises. Finally, by virtue of petitioner's use of the theater, petitioner has monitored the nature and quality of the services rendered under the JOYCE marks.

The Board agreed with Petitioner that "it would be 'ludicrous' to contend that petitioner did not own the JOYCE marks after petitioner purchased the Elgin theater, did all the work raising the funds and renovating the theater, and took all the risk involved in the undertaking." It therefore ruled in favor of Petitioner Ballet Tech.

TTABlog comment: Note that the petition for cancellation was filed in 2003, when the five challenged registrations (which issued in 1999) had not yet reached their fifth anniversary. Suppose the petition had been filed in 2005. Would the petition have been barred by Section 14 of the Act? Improper ownership is not one of the stated exceptions to the five-year "statute of limitations" provided by Section 14. Note also, however, that Petitioner also pleaded likelihood of confusion, false connection (Section 2(a)), and fraud, but chose not to pursue those issues. (See footnote 7). The fraud claim would have survived the five-year bar.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

Tuesday, December 16, 2008

Precedential No. 52: TTAB Affirms 2(a) Disparagement Refusal of "HEEB" for Clothing and Entertainment Services

Despite Applicant's claim that the Jewish community neither objects to nor views Applicant's use of the mark HEEB as disparaging, the Board affirmed a Section 2(a) refusal of the mark for clothing and entertainment services. The Board noted that there are differing views on the question, but found that a substantial composite of the Jewish community would view the term as disparaging. In re Heeb Media, LLC, 89 USPQ2d 1071 (TTAB 2008) [precedential].


Applicant Heeb Media, LLC argued that Examining Attorney Allison Schrody "ignored the context and manner in which applicant’s mark is used when determining whether the likely meaning of applicant’s mark is disparaging to the Jewish community." It contended that "many of this country’s most established Jewish philanthropies and cultural organizations have openly and actively supported Applicant’s magazine and events through their continued funding and sponsorship."

The Examining Attorney relied on dictionary definitions and NEXIS excerpts to support the PTO's position that "the word HEEB is a highly disparaging reference to Jewish people, that it retains this meaning when used in connection with applicant’s goods and services, and that a substantial composite of the referenced group finds it to be disparaging."

The Board observed that "[w]hether a proposed mark is disparaging must be determined from the standpoint of a substantial composite of the referenced group (although not necessarily a majority) in the context of contemporary attitudes."

Applying the two-part Harjo test (see In re Squaw Valley Development Co., 80 USPQ2d 1264, 1267 (TTAB 2006)), the Board first found that HEEB "means a Jewish person and that HEEB has no other meaning pertinent to clothing or entertainment services." The second question was whether HEEB would be perceived as disparaging. Applicant argued that “the context in which Applicant uses the term 'heeb' is the exact opposite of derogatory and is rather as a symbol of pride and progressive identity among today’s Jews.”

The Board, however, pointed out that Applicant's identification of goods and services "is not limited to use by a Jewish group for those in the Jewish community who are not offended by this use."

What is clear from the record is that within the referenced group there are disparate views, perhaps most prominently delineated along generational lines, as to whether HEEB retains its disparaging character in the context of applicant’s use in connection with its magazine. We find it reasonable to conclude that such disparate views likewise exist in connection with use of the mark for applicant’s clothing and entertainment services. Thus, the question raised by this record is how do we balance competing views within the referenced group.

Based on the evidence of record, the Board concluded that HEEB "is considered to be disparaging by a substantial composite of the referenced group, regardless of context, including in connection with applicant’s identified goods and services."

While applicant may intend to transform this word, the best that can be said is that it is still in transition. Although some in the community may not find it disparaging, ... the evidence shows that there is a substantial component of those in the named group who do.

The Board therefore affirmed the refusal to register.

TTABlog note: Compare this decision to the PTO's action vis-a-vis the DYKES ON BIKES service mark: TTABlog postings here and here.]

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

Monday, December 15, 2008

TTABlog Holiday Reading: The Trademark Reporter Nov.-Dec. 2008 Issue

Santa Claus arrived a bit early this year with a nice present from INTA: the November-December 2008 issue of The Trademark Reporter. Four articles and an amicus brief discuss zombie trademarks, dilutions surveys, trademark use, and the "famous marks" doctrine, topped off with a brief friendly cup of STARBUCKS (or CHARBUCKS) coffee. A great big thank you to the Trademark Reporter Committee for granting permission to The TTABlog to provide these links. [The illustrations were not supplied by INTA].


Jerome Gilson and Anne Gilson LaLonde, The Zombie Trademark: A Windfall and A Pitfall, 98 TMR 1280 (November - December 2008).




Krista F. Holt and Scot A. Duvall, Chasing Moseley's Ghost: Dilution Surveys Under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 98 TMR 1311 (November - December 2008).

The Moseleys

Stacey L. Dogan and Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 98 TMR 1345 (November - December 2008).

Professors Dogan and Lemley


Anne Gilson LaLonde, Don't I Know You From Somewhere? Protection in the United States of Foreign Trademarks That Are Well Known But Not Used There, 98 TMR 1379 (November - December 2008).

Bukhara Grill, NYC


Amicus Brief of the International Trademark Association in Starbucks Corporation v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 98 TMR 1425 (November - December 2008).


[Copyright © 2008 the International Trademark Association, and reprinted with permission from The Trademark Reporter®, Volume 98 (November-December 2008).]

Friday, December 12, 2008

TTAB Contingently Sustains 2(d) Opposition Tried Under the Accelerated Case Resolution (ACR) Procedure

The parties to this Section 2(d) opposition agreed to try this case under the TTAB's Accelerated Case Resolution (ACR) procedure. The Board contingently sustained the opposition to registration of FACE THE WORLD for skincare and beauty products, finding the mark likely to cause confusion with Opposer's mark FACING THE WORLD, which is the subject of an intent-to-use application for educational and medical services. Facing The World v. Maerovitz, Opposition No. 91181253 (December 9, 2008) [not precedential].


The TTAB's ACR program offers parties the opportunity to streamline the inter partes process so that the Board may render a final decision on what is largely a stipulated record. "In order to take advantage of ACR, the parties must stipulate that, in lieu of trial, the Board can resolve any issues of material fact." The Board promises to render a written decision within fifty (50) days of the filing of the briefs. Opposer submitted a declaration of its attorney, excerpts from third-party websites and Internet articles, and Applicant's discovery responses. Applicant, appearing pro se, neither submitted evidence nor filed a brief.

FACING THE WORLD is a children's charity that provides medical services, "including complex surgeries for children in desperate need to transform their faces and radically change their quality of life." It relied on the constructive use provisions of Section 7(c) to establish priority, based on the filing date of its I-T-U application.

As to likelihood of confusion, the Board found the marks to be "strikingly similar." As to the goods and services, the Board concluded that "opposer's services, most particularly, its medical services, are related to cosmetics."

The evidence shows that physicians, in conjunction with their medical services, frequently sell cosmetic products to their patients and other consumers. One article notes that well known doctors may turn their clinical experience into products backed by their own names and medical credentials. (www.beauty-online. com). Another article discusses the fact that Rodeo Drive Plastic Surgery in Los Angeles has been named the exclusive distributor of a line of skincare cosmetics. (www.rodeodriveplasticsurgery.com).

Other articles discussed the "trend among dermatologists and plastic surgeons to offer, in conjunction with their medical services, a line of skin care cosmetics, often times under the physician's names."

The Board noted that there are no limitations in Applicant's identification of goods, nor are Opposer's services limited. Therefore, "Opposer's services and applicant's goods are capable of being sold through the same trade channels to the same classes of purchasers, including consumers who may have undergone cosmetic surgery and who wish, for example, to diminish or hide scarring by using cosmetics."

The Board ruled that, on balance, the du Pont factors weigh in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion."

However, because Opposer's priority is based on constructive use, the Board will not issue a final judgment until Opposer's registration issues. See Rule 2.129(d). According to the Board, "The time of filing an appeal or for commencing a civil action will run from the date of the present decision." [TTABlog note: That is directly contradictory to the language of Rule 2.129(d), which states that "The time of filing an appeal or for commencing a civil action ... shall run from the date of the entry of the judgment." Why, one might ask, would an appeal be allowed from a contingent decision that may never become a judgment?]

TTABlog comment: Okay, on one side we have a charity and on the other a pro se applicant who submits nothing. Guess who wins? The charity, of course. Cases like this tend to make for badly-reasoned decisions.

Opposer's evidence of the relatedness of its services to Applicant's goods was extremely flimsy. Articles that talk about "trends" and about what some doctors may do are plainly hearsay! So is the supposed "fact" stated on some website that "Rodeo Drive Plastic Surgery in Los Angeles has been named the exclusive distributor of a line of skincare cosmetics." What real proof did Opposer have that any medical charity (not individual doctors) also sells skin care and beauty products? None that I can see.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

Thursday, December 11, 2008

TTAB Affirms Section 2(a) False Connection Refusal of "MOJAVE" for Cigarettes

Applying the four-element test of Buffett v. Chi-Chi's, Inc., 226 USPQ 428 (TTAB 1985), the Board affirmed a Section 2(a) refusal to register the mark MOJAVE for cigarettes, tobacco, and related paraphernalia, finding that the mark falsely suggests a connection with the Fort Mojave Indian Tribe of Arizona, Colorado & Nevada. In re G&R Brands, LLC, Serial No. 77011920 (November 21, 2008) [not precedential].


In order to establish a false connection claim under Section 2(a), the PTO must establish the following four elements:

(1) that the defendant's mark is the same or a close approximation of plaintiffs previously used name or identity;
(2) that the mark would be recognized as such;
(3) that the plaintiff is not connected with the activities performed by the defendant under the mark; and
(4) that the plaintiff's name or identity is of sufficient fame or reputation that when the defendant's mark is used on the goods or services, a connection with the plaintiff would be presumed. Buffett at 429.

As to element 1, Examining Attorney Kathleen M. Vanston relied on dictionary definitions in arguing that the Fort Mojave Indian Tribe of Arizona, California & Nevada is also known as "Mojave." Observing that an applicant "cannot take the significant element of the name of another and avoid a refusal," the Board found this element satisfied.

As to the second element, Applicant pointed to the Mojave Desert, the Mojave Valley, etc., in arguing that "MOJAVE" would not be recognized as referring to the tribe. However, the Examining Attorney submitted Internet evidence showing that these geographical locations derive their names from the Mojave tribe. See In re White, 80 USPQ2d 1654 (TTAB 2006) [other uses of "Mohawk" did not detract from the public's recognition of MOHAWK as referring to the Mohawk tribe].

As to element 3, Applicant admitted to having no connection with the Mojave tribe.

Finally, as to element 4, the Examining Attorney submitted evidence showing that "Mojave" is defined as "members of the Mojave tribe," that members of the tribe continue to live in Arizona, California, and Nevada, and that the tribe has a commercial impact in that area. The Board found this evidence "more than adequate to show that the Mojave tribe is well known among residents of the region and visitors to the area."

The Examining Attorney also provided evidence to show that the relevant public perceives a connection between Indian tribes and tobacco-related products: Internet articles discussing tobacco-related products produced by Indian tribes, articles describing the benefits of buying tax-free tobacco and other products on Indian reservations, and evidence demonstrating that the Mojave tribe itself operates a smoke shop. The Board accordingly found that "purchasers of applicant’s identified goods would be aware of Native American manufacturing and marketing
of Native American brand cigarettes, and, given the fame of its name, would think uniquely of the Mojave tribe when they see MOJAVE as a mark used on or in connection with those identified goods."

The PTO having satisfied all four elements of the Buffett test, the Board affirmed the refusal to register.

TTABlog note: For other recent Section 2(a) false connection cases involving tobacco-related products and Indian tribes, see In re White, cited above [TTABlogged here]: In re Shinnecock Smoke Shop, Serial Nos. 78918061 and 78918500 (September 10, 2008) [not precedential] [TTABlogged here]; and In re WM Distribution Inc., Serial No. 78195284 (October 13, 2005) [not precedential] [TTABlogged here].

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

Wednesday, December 10, 2008

TTAB Affirms Refusal of "DESIGN EXPRESSIONS" Mark: Not Used as Source Indicator on Specimen of Use

The Board affirmed a refusal to register the mark DESIGN EXPRESSIONS for "referral to building contractors needing building materials or sources of supply of building materials," on the ground that Applicant's specimen "fails to demonstrate use" of the mark for the identified services. In re Contractor Express, No. 76682478 (November 21, 2008) [not precedential].

[complete specimen here]

Examining Attorney Mariam Aziz Mahmoudi maintained that customers will not perceive the mark DESIGN EXPRESSIONS as a source identifier "when the mark is used in an advertisement which refers to a showroom and design center." Although the specimen informs customers about certain features of the showroom, "it is silent on the source of referral services."

Applicant Contractor Express, of course, disagreed and offered a declaration of its Vice-President, who stated:

2. Our customers are contractors who come to our facility at which, as noted on the specimen of record, they consult with our staff in "our Special Order Department to get [what they] want and how [they] want it;"
3. Accordingly, it is my experience that in our facility our contractor customers receive our DESIGN EXPRESSIONS-identified referral services….

The Board observed that, under Rule 2.56(b)(2), a service mark specimen "must show the mark as actually used in the sale or advertising of the services." The mark must be used in such a way that it would be perceived by customers as a source-identifier for the identified services. An advertisement must "show an association between the mark and the services for which registration in sought."

Here, the mark as it appears on the specimen would not be perceived as a source indicator for the recited services. Instead, it would be viewed as referring to Applicant's showroom and design center.

Indeed, the specimen includes the following statements: "It's our brand new Design Expressions Showroom and Design Center" and "With almost triple the space of our present showroom, Design Expressions will feature more products, more displays and best of all more selection." Additionally, at the bottom of the specimen there is a reference to "DESIGN EXPRESSIONS Showroom and Design Center."

The fact that the showroom is "staffed by our Special Order Department to get you what you want, and how you want it" does not help, since such a department "is not the same thing as the services of 'referral to building contractors needing building materials or source of supply of building materials.'"

And so, the Board affirmed the refusal to register.


TTABlog comment: Looking at the specimen of use, exactly what, if any, services does it refer to? And note that, according to the specimen, the DESIGN EXPRESSIONS showroom hasn't even opened yet! In fact, the specimen looks like the first page of a newsletter announcing the coming of the new showroom. I think you'd have to say the Board got this one right.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

Tuesday, December 09, 2008

TTAB Denies Petitioner's Motion to Re-open Discovery Because of Failure to Prove Excusable Neglect

In a nonprecedential interlocutory decision recently reported in the USPQ, the Board denied Petitioner's motion to re-open discovery (which was filed on the last day of its testimony period) but re-set testimony dates to allow Petitioner time to submit its case in chief. The Board ruled that Petitioner, who asserted that the parties had agreed to suspend proceedings for the purposes of settlement, failed to establish excusable neglect for its failure to act. Jodi Kristopher, Inc. v. International Seaway Trading Corp., 88 USPQ2d 1798 (TTAB 2008) [not precedential].

Respondent's INTRIGUE brand footwear

Under Pumpkin Ltd. v. The Seeds Corp., 43 USPQ2d 1582 (TTAB 1997), the standard to be applied to Petitioner's motion is "whether petitioner has demonstrated excusable neglect for its failure to act." The Board has adopted the Supreme Court's four-factor test set out in Pioneer Invest. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd., 507 U.S. 280 (1993). The third factor, the reason for the delay, is the most important.

Petitioner stated that its failure to take discovery was due to its good faith belief that the parties had agreed "to suspend proceeding during the discovery period for the purposes of settlement." The Board, however, observed that attempts at settlement, though generally favored, do not excuse Petitioner's failure to act. Petitioner could have sought an extension of discovery or a suspension of the proceeding. Instead it waited until nearly three months after discovery closed before filing its motion.

Although the Board found no evidence of bad faith, nor of prejudice to Respondent, it did find that "from a docket management standpoint ... the delay has a significant potential impact on the judicial proceedings because reopening discovery would extend proceedings by eight months (six months for discovery and a sixty-day period between discovery and trial) which runs counter to the Board’s interest in expeditious adjudication of this case."

If therefore found that Petitioner had failed to show excusable neglect, and it denied the motion to re-open discovery.

As to the motion to re-set the testimony periods, the standard for granting such an extension of time is good cause. See FRCP 6(b)(1) and TBMP Section 509. The TTAB "generally is liberal in granting extensions before the period to act has elapsed so long as the moving party has not been guilty of negligence or bad faith and the privilege of extensions is not abused." Finding no bad faith or negligence on the part of Petitioner, and noting that there were settlement discussions during the testimony period, the Board exercised its discretion to re-set the testimony periods.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

Monday, December 08, 2008

TTABlog Guest Comment: Marty Schwimmer on TTAB's "CUBITA" Summary Judgment Under The Pan American Convention

Pursuant to Article 7 of the Pan American Convention, the Board granted Opposer's motion for summary judgment in its opposition to registration of the mark CUBITA in the design form shown immediately below, for "coffee." The Board ruled that Opposer, a Cuban company, had standing to bring the opposition and enjoys priority over Applicant by reason of Opposer's ownership of the CUBITA mark in Cuba and its pending application to register that mark in the United States under Section 44 of the Trademark Act. Corporation Cimex, S.A. v. DM Enterprises & Distributors Inc., Opposition No. 91178943 (November 17, 2008) [not precedential]. [Marty Schwimmer of the Trademark Blog comments below.]


Cuba and the United States are parties to the Pan American Convention, which is self-executing and "has the same force as a federal statute and provides remedies independent of the Lanham Act."

Opposer Cimex has standing by reason of the PTO's refusal to register its mark in view of the application here opposed. Applicant DM Enterprises argued that the existing embargo between the United States and Cuba deprived the Opposer of standing, but the Board disagreed, pointing out that Opposer's claims are not based upon ownership of a "confiscated mark" and citing it recent decision in Corporacion Habanos, S.A. v. Anncas, Inc., 88 USPQ2d 1785 (TTAB 2008) ["opposer has standing, although it does not and cannot engage in any business in the United States due to the embargo on Cuban goods."] As in Habanos, Opposer here provided a letter from the U.S. Department of Treasury confirming that entities like Opposer are permitted to oppose "where these actions relate to the protection of a trademark in which Cuba ... has an interest."

Turning to the merits, in order to prevail under Article 7 of the Pan American Convention, Opposer must here establish (1) that it owns a CUBITA mark protected in Cuba; (2) that Applicant is using or applying to register an "interfering mark" in the United States; (3) that Applicant had knowledge of the existence and continuous use in Cuba of Opposer's CUBITA mark in connection with goods in the same class, prior to its use of the CUBITA mark in the United States; and (4) that Opposer has complied with the requirements of the U.S. legislation and the Convention -- i.e., that it is seeking protection under Section 44 of the Lanham Act.

The Board found that Opposer satisfied these four requirements. Opposer submitted a copy of its Cuban registration and a copy of its United States application file history. [Opposer's registered mark is depicted immediately below]. Applicant did not dispute that its mark interfered with registration of Opposer's mark.


Moreover, Applicant DM conceded that it knew of the existence and use of the CUBITA mark in Cuba by Opposer and its predecessor. Finally, Opposer satisfied the fourth element because it filed to register its mark in the USA under Section 44 (stating that it intends and expect to use in commerce in the United States its Cubita-marked Cuban origin coffee as soon as U.S. law permits").

Applicant "failed to make any legal arguments against opposer's claim of priority" and its factual assertions were both irrelevant and unsupported by any evidence. The Board therefore entered summary judgment in favor of Opposer.


Marty Schwimmer comments: The Pan American priority clause is somewhat unique. Unlike the Paris Convention priority clause, it is neither limited in time nor applied as of right. Nor is it quite like a "famous mark" protection clause in that the senior user does not have to prove fame in the country where the dispute takes place, but merely that junior user was aware of senior user’s rights in the home country.

Accordingly, the Pan American Convention does not create a trap for the "innocent filer" as the Paris Convention does. [Do any old-timers out there remember the expression “to be Lemon-Treed,” named after the LEMON TREE case, the seminal case enforcing Paris Convention priority against the ‘unaware’ US applicant?]

Instead, while this Pan American priority enforces the same sort of policy as does Paris priority -- the race will go not to the swiftest but the oldest -- it eliminates land mines by inserting what is essentially a bad-faith element that must be established.

Now, someone has to write a law review note on the CUBITA case, squaring the holding in the COHIBA case in the Second Circuit [discussed here at the Trademark Blog], which refused to enforce trademark rights of the Cuban plaintiff on the ground that to do so would violate the Cuban Embargo Act, with the matter-of-fact statement in the CUBITA decision allowing Cuban entities to file and obtain trademark registrations.

TTABlog note: Last year, the Board dismissed an opposition involving the mark PARDO'S CHICKEN, because the Peruvian applicant established priority under the Pan American Convention. Diaz v. Servicios De Franquicia Pardo's S.A.C., 83 USPQ2d 1320 (TTAB 2007) [precedential]. [TTABlogged here].

Text Copyright John L. Welch and Martin Schwimmer 2008.

Friday, December 05, 2008

Renown of "THE BLACK DOG" Marks Brings TTAB 2(d) Victory Over "YELLOW DOG NANTUCKET" for Clothing

In a copiously-illustrated, 54-page decision, the Board sustained Section 2(d) oppositions to registration of the mark YELLOW DOG NANTUCKET in standard character and design form (shown below right) for T-shirts [NANTUCKET disclaimed], finding the marks likely to cause confusion with Opposer's numerous registered and common law marks, including the standing dog design shown below left, the phrase THE BLACK DOG, and combinations and variations thereof, for clothing and other goods and services. The Black Dog Tavern Company, Inc. v. Joseph J. Juras, Oppositions Nos. 91152364 and 91153557 (December 2, 2008) [not precedential]. [TTABlog note: Because yours truly served as co-counsel to Opposer, along with General Counsel Emily LaPointe, this posting will hit just the high points, without editorial commentary.]


The Board began by finding that, based on "significant sales, extensive advertising and continuous use of Opposer's marks for almost thirty years for dining services and over two decades on a wide range of merchandise" and on the "ongoing, favorable publicity opposer's services and products have received," Opposer's marks "have achieved a degree of fame, and serve as strong indicators of source for Opposer's products and services." This factor "strongly favors a likelihood of confusion."


The Board next found the goods to be identical in part and otherwise closely related, and the channels of trade (brick-and-mortar and online stores) identical. The parties' common goods, T-shirts, are impulse items purchased with "ordinary care, at best."


Turning to the marks, the Board found "the accumulated points of similarities in appearance and commercial impression" to be "quite remarkable, including the general size and style of fonts employed in the wording positioned between the respective standing dog images."

Hence, based upon the entire record herein – with the various combinations of dog silhouettes, the word "DOG," font choices, listing popular localities in the Cape and the islands, precisely the same placement on T-shirts and other identical items of clothing, and especially in light of the renown of opposer’s marks in connection with T-shirts on the Cape and the islands – we find that the degree of similarity in commercial impressions with applicant's composite mark is strongest when comparing opposer's common law composite mark as used above, as opposed to singling out the similarities of any two registered marks.

In sum, "the confusing similarity of the marks is a factor that strongly favors a finding of likelihood of confusion in this case."


Applicant Juras argued that Opposer's marks were weakened by the existence of a dozen third-party registrations for marks containing the words "BLACK DOG," some with a depiction of a black dog. But Juras was barking up the wrong tree: the Board found that these registrations did not undermine Opposer's marks because the goods and services involved were not closely related to those of Opposer, and/or the designs involved were "quite different" from those at issue here. Third-party Internet uses of "Black Dog" were not probative since there was no evidence of the nature and extent of use of those marks.

Next, Juras pointed to the lack of proof of actual confusion, but the Board noted that likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion, is the proper test. Moreover, Juras's evidence of use of his marks was so scanty that the absence of evidence of actual confusion was "meaningless."

Opposer vehemently urged that Juras adopted his marks in bad faith. The Board deemed it unnecessary to find bad faith "in order to conclude that there is clearly a likelihood of confusion herein."

Nonetheless, in light of the renown of opposer’s marks, applicant’s professed interests in images of dogs, his years of formal education and professed business acumen, and his having lived in Nantucket for one or more high-tourist seasons, we find that his claimed ignorance of opposer’s well-known enterprise and branding success prior to adopting his marks and filing the involved applications strains credulity. As a newcomer, under this set of circumstances, applicant had a duty to select a mark that would not give rise to a likelihood of confusion. e.g., Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 203 USPQ 191, 200-01 (TTAB 1979).

Considering the relevant evidence, the Board ruled that confusion is likely, and it sustained the oppositions.

(1) Cape Cod,(2) Martha's Vineyard, (3)Nantucket.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.