Thursday, December 31, 2009

WYHO? Oakland A's Oppose University of Alabama's Circled "A" Logo

Would you have brought this opposition, Hot Stove Leaguers? The Oakland A's are involved in a long-suspended opposition, commenced in April 2005, to the University of Alabama's application to register the logo shown immediately below, for a host of souvenier items, including stuffed animals, yo-yo's, golf balls, metal key chains; flash lights, jewelry, playing cards, bar stools, drinking glasses, and clothing. Athletics Investment Group LLC d/b/a The Oakland Athletics Baseball Company v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, Opposition No. 91165229.


Oakland claims that Alabama's logo is likely to cause confusion, or to create a false association, with its registered "Stylized A With Concentric Circle Design Marks" (shown below), for a variety of goods and services, including clothing, jewelry, printed matter, and novelty items.


Do you think the Oakland A's have any chance of winning this opposition? Do you think Alabama could win on summary judgment?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

TTABlog Quarterly Index: October - December 2009

This quarter saw the fifth anniversary of the TTABlog and its one-millionth hit. More significantly, November 1st brought the retirement of Chief Judge J. David Sams. The Board has begun populating the new post-Bose fraud landscape as trademark practitioners re-calibrate their thinking. And the CAFC overturned two TTAB rulings, one concerning the acceptability of website specimens of use, and the other the contents of the record in inter partes proceedings. [In any event, please note that E-mail subscriptions to the blog are available: just enter your e-mail address in the box on the right to receive a daily update via Feedblitz. You may also follow the blog on Twitter (here). And don't forget to leave your comments! Finally, please report any broken or inoperative links, as well as any errors and omissions, to the TTABlogger at jwelch at ll-a.com.]

Sunset, Eastham, MA, October 12, 2009

Section 2(d) - likelihood of confusion:

Section 2(e)(1) - mere descriptiveness:

Section 2(e)(2) - primarily geographically descriptive:

Section 2(e)(4) - Primarily Merely a Surname:

Section 2(e)(5) - Functionality:

Section 2(f) - Acquired Distinctiveness:

Fraud:

December 13, 2009

Genericness:

Lack of Bona Fide Intent:

Procedural Issues:

Specimen of Use/Mutilation:

CAFC Decisions:


CAFC Oral Argument:

Hot Stove League:

Other:


Text and photographs ©John L. Welch 2009.

Wednesday, December 30, 2009

Precedential No. 50: TTAB Strikes Opposer's Documents Produced During Testimony Period

Applicant Resort Option won the evidentiary skirmish but lost the war in this opposition to its registration of the mark PANDA TRAVEL in standard character and design form (shown below left) for "travel agency services, namely making reservations and bookings for transportation" [TRAVEL disclaimed]. The Board found that Applicant's mark is likely to cause confusion with the previously-used mark PANDA TRAVEL and the design mark shown on the right, for travel agency services. Panda Travel, Inc. v. Resort Option Enterprises, Inc., 94 USPQ2d 1789 (TTAB 2009) [precedential].

Evidentiary Issue: Was Opposer's document production timely? No, said the Board.

Opposer served some production documents prior to the commencement of its testimony period, but it served additional responsive documents during its testimony period. It then filed a notice of reliance that included some of those additional documents. Applicant objected to the introduction of those additional documents during Opposer's testimony deposition, and it moved to strike the documents during the briefing period.

Opposer contended that it timely served written responses to the production requests, and that there is no requirement that responsive documents be produced concurrently with written responses.

The Board was not pleased, loftily pointing out that "[e]ach party has a duty to make a good faith effort to satisfy the reasonable and appropriate needs of its adversary."

A responding party which, due to an incomplete search of its records, provides an incomplete response to a discovery request, may not thereafter rely at trial on information from its records which was properly sought in the discovery request but was not included in the response thereto (provided that the requesting party raises the matter by objecting to the evidence in question) unless the response is supplemented in a timely fashion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e).

The Board granted Applicant's motion to strike: "it stretches credulity for opposer to contend that its written responses to the effect that opposer would produce documents responsive to applicant's discovery requests absolves opposer of timely producing other responsive documents in its custody or under its control."

Priority: Applicant established first use of its marks in late 1983. Opposer's testimony established first use of PANDA TRAVEL in June 1981. Applicant argued that Opposer did not use its mark in interstate commerce until 2001, but that was irrelevant to the issue of priority because "an opposer claiming priority may rely on intrastate use."


Likelihood of Confusion: The Board's likelihood of confusion analysis was straightforward. Applicant asserted a laches defense, but the oppositions were timely filed, and so that defense travelled nowhere.

Applicant next tried equitable estoppel, asserting that Opposer learned of Applicant's use of its marks in 1998 but did not object. According to Applicant, it was prejudiced "by its reliance on Opposer's failure to act and its justifiable assumption that Opposer's business was limited to Hawaii or was transitioning to use of PANDA ONLINE, PANDA HAWAII, or one of Opposer's other marks."

The record, however, showed that Applicant and Opposer did have some communications in 2005 regarding a possible co-marketing initiative, but Opposer never indicated that it would not oppose the subject marks and it did not delay in asserting its rights. So there was no basis for an equitable estoppel defense.

Therefore, the Board sustained the opposition.

TTABlog comment: These oppositions were commenced prior to the effective date of the amended TTAB Rules requiring pre-trial disclosure. See Rule 2.121(e). However, even under the new disclosure regime, Opposer would not have been required to identify every individual document that it intended to introduce at trial, but only "a general summary or list of the types of documents and things which may be introduced as exhibits during the testimony of the witness."

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

Detroit Tigers Oppose "BUILD-A-TIGER" for Stuffed Toys and Related Store Services

The Detroit Tigers make a visit to the Hot Stove League with an opposition to registration of the mark BUILD-A-TIGER for plush and stuffed toys and accessories therefor, clothing for stuffed and plush toys, and related retail store services. Detroit Tigers, Inc. v. Build-A-Bear Retail Management, Inc., Opposition No. 91191960.


Opposer claims rights in the mark TIGERS for, inter alia, "retail store services, online retail store services, toys, including, without limitation, stuffed and plush toy animals and clothing and accessories therefor, novelty items, clothing, and sporting goods." As usual, the Tigers allege that the applied-for mark will likely cause confusion with the TIGERS mark and will suggest a false association with the Detroit Tigers.

Applicant is, of course, the owner of the well-know BUILD-A-BEAR WORKSHOP retail store chain.

Build-A-Bear tiger

Who do you think will win this one? Isn't the word "Tiger" generic for stuffed toys shaped like a tiger? [Like ATTIC is generic for a type of sprinkler]. Now maybe I can see a problem with BUILD-A-YANKEE or BUILD-A-PATRIOT, but BUILD-A-TIGER? Gimme a break!

Let's suppose, hypothetically, that Opposer doesn't really expect to win this opposition and that Applicant doesn't want to spend the time and money to fight the opposition to it's conclusion. What would be a reasonable settlement in terms of restrictions placed on Applicant's use of the applied-for mark?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

Tuesday, December 29, 2009

Precedential No. 49: TTAB Affirms Surname Refusal of "BINION"; Renown of Binion Family Does Not Equal Acquired Distinctiveness

Applicant Jack B. Binion rolled snake eyes in his attempt to register the marks BINION and BINION'S for "casino and gaming services" and "hotel and bar services." The Board affirmed Section 2(d) and 2(e)(4) refusals to register his marks, finding them to be (1) confusingly similar to the registered mark BINION'S ROADHOUSE for restaurant services [ROADHOUSE disclaimed], and (2) primarily merely surnames. In re Jack B. Binion, 93 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 2009) [precedential].


Likelihood of Confusion: The Board found the involved marks to be similar in sound, appearance, and meaning, and very similar in overall commercial impression. Third-party registration evidence regarding the relatedness of the services, on balance, weighed in favor of the refusal to register, and the evidence showed that "casinos, hotels, bars and restaurants are often housed under the same roof."

Applicant argued that he owns three registrations for marks comprising JACK BINION or JACK BINION'S for "restaurant services" that issued over the cited registration, and that these registrations "have peacefully coexisted with the cited registration for a number of years." [One is for JACK BINION'S in standard character form for restaurant services, while the other two are for JACK BINION in the form of a signature, one for "casino, hotel, restaurant and bar services" and the other for "restaurant services."] The Board found that the applied-for marks BINION and BINION'S are "actually closer to the registered mark" than the three prior marks. Applicant's assertion of no actual confusion is of little probative value in this ex parte context.

Applicant feebly argued that the cited mark is used at a single restaurant located in Hendersonville, North Carolina, and that the mark is often used with a design. The Board pointed out that these arguments are irrelevant to the Section 2(d) analysis, which is based on the mark shown in the cited registration, nationwide in scope.

And so it affirmed the Section 2(d) refusal to register.


Primarily Merely a Surname: Examining Attorney Evelyn Bradley established a prima facie case under Section 2(e)(4): 1416 listings of the surname "Binion" in a nationwide telephone directory search; the fact that Applicant is named Jack Binion; the lack of any other meaning for "Binion"; and the "fact" that "Binion" looks and sounds like a surname.

Applicant attempted to overcome this refusal by contending that the term BINION has historical significance in the gaming industry, relying on a "variety of references to Mr. Binion and other family members in the printed press and on the Internet." The Board, however, did not find that "Mr. Binion's personal history is in any way so extraordinary that he warrants treatment under the 'historical person' exception to the surname refusal." Although he "has played a significant role in the gaming industry in Las Vegas, his notoriety in this regard is not so remarkable or so significant that he is a historical figure as contemplated by the case law." [Jack Binion is no John Philip Sousa - ed..]

The Board then considered Applicant's claim of acquired distinctiveness. Although the involved applications were filed based on intent to use, a Section 2(f) claim may be made if "as a result of the applicant's use of the mark on other goods or services, the mark has become distinctive of the goods or services in the intent-to-use application," and if "the previously created distinctiveness will transfer to the goods and services in the intent-to-use application when use in commerce begins."

The Board found, however, that the involved marks BINION and BINION'S are not the "same" marks as the previously registered marks JACK BINION and JACK BINION'S; i.e., they are not legally equivalent.

Applicant submitted evidence regarding the publicity about Mr. Binion and his family, establishing that Binion and other family members are "legends" in the Las Vegas gaming industry. However, "[a]ll of the evidence submitted by applicant shows that purchasers would regard 'Binion' or 'Binion's' as a surname; it is the surname of Jack, as well as Benny, Jack's father, and Becky, Jack's sister. The record is devoid of any use of the term 'Binion' or 'Binion's' as a trademark or service mark, let alone use to an extent sufficient to show acquired distinctiveness."

Simply put, the renown of Jack Binion and the Binion family name in the gaming industry does not establish that 'Binion' is no longer perceived as a surname by purchasers, but rather as a service mark for services emanating from applicant."

And so the Board affirmed the Section 2(e)(4) refusal.

TTABlog comment: Too many Binions spoiled the broth? Suppose BINION'S is recognized in Las Vegas as a service mark owned by this Applicant, but in the rest of the country it is seen as just another surname. Would that be enough to overcome the Section 2(e)(4) bar to registration?

TTABlog postscript: Ryan Gile, at his Las Vegas Trademark Attorney blog, comments here on the Binions and on this decision.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

Monday, December 28, 2009

Precedential No. 48: Rejecting Asserted "Newly Discovered Evidence," TTAB Refuses to Set Aside Judgment

Respondent Michel Farah lost a cancellation proceeding before the TTAB in January 2008 [decision here], and then lost his appeal to the CAFC in November 2008 [here]. Farah then returned to the Board and, on December 12, 2008, filed a motion under FRCP 60(b)(2) for relief from final judgment based upon what he claimed to be newly discovered evidence: namely, the issuance of a registration for the mark OMIC for goods related to the cancelled OMIC PLUS registration. The Board denied the motion. Pramil S.R.L. v. Michel Farah, 93 USPQ2d 1093 (TTAB 2009) [precedential].


Farah argued that the new registration “is prima facie evidence that [registrant], and not [petitioner], is the owner of the mark OMIC and has the exclusive right to use the mark OMIC in commerce." Since the cancellation proceeding had been based on Pramil's ownership of the mark OMIC, Farah contended, "[t]his prima facie evidence of [registrant]’s exclusive rights effectively destroys the very basis of [petitioner]’s claim for cancellation.”

Farah asserted that the new registration did not exist until after the Board’s decision, and it therefore constitutes new evidence that could not have been discovered prior to the Board’s decision.

However, the Board ruled that, for purposes of FRCP 60(b)(2), the new evidence "must be of facts in existence at the time of trial, but only discovered later." Here, the new registration was not in existence at the time of trial (it issued on June 3, 2008, well after the Board's original decision of January 29, 2008). Therefore it is not "newly discovered evidence."

Moreover, even if the registration were newly discovered evidence, Farah's motion does not meet the requirement of FRCP 60(c)(2) that the motion be filed "within a reasonable time." According to the Board, upon issuance of the registration respondent should have filed the motion.

If the Board was inclined to grant the motion, the Board would have issued an order indicating its intention to grant the order upon proper remand, and respondent could have filed a motion with the Federal Circuit to remand the appeal to the Board to grant the Rule 60(b) motion.

This is the procedure followed in virtually all of the circuit courts. It conserves the resources of the courts because the appellate court may not need to decide the appeal if the motion is granted. If the motion is denied, then an appeal from that denial may be included in the renewed appeal.

By waiting to see whether the Federal Circuit would grant his appeal before filing his motion for relief from judgment, respondent unnecessarily maximized the resources that the Board and the Federal Circuit expended on this case.

Finally, the Board pointed out that, in any case, such a motion may be denied "if the evidence is merely cumulative or not of a type that would change the result." Here, the issuance of the registration for OMIC "does not change the trial record in any significant way."

[T]he registration is neither unrebuttable nor prima facie evidence of respondent’s priority of use of that mark, and the evidence at trial established petitioner’s priority of use. The subsequent issuance by the Office of an arguably conflicting registration does not alter the record created at trial or dictate that the decision should be set aside.

And so the Board denied the motion.

TTABlog comment: Why wouldn't Pramil petition for cancellation of the new registration on the same grounds as previously, viz., priority and likelihood of confusion? In fact, wouldn't res judicata (issue preclusion) apply to many of the issues?

Note that in an earlier federal court action with Farah, Pramil was permanently enjoined from using the OMIC PLUS mark. So the upshot of this affair seems to be that Farah may use OMIC PLUS but can't register it.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

Sunday, December 27, 2009

MLB Poised to Oppose "MAJOR LEAGUE WOODWORKING" Logo

Here we go again, Hot Stove Leaguers. Major League Baseball has obtained an extension of time to oppose the application of Thomas J. McDonald of Canton, Massachusetts, to register the logo shown immediately below for hand tools and woodworking services. Presumably MLB will rely on its "swinging batter" logo, shown further below. In re Thomas J. McDonald d/b/a Major League Woodworking, Serial No. 77722224.


Tommy McDonald's website is here, "where you will find all things woodworking to help elevate your woodworking game." Videos, too, starting with a visit to Red Sox "pitching legend" Bill Lee, with Tommy showing us "the first steps in creating a Major League Baseball Bat."



If MLB opposes, who do you think would win the opposition? Why?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

Saturday, December 26, 2009

Seattle Mariners Torpedo Application for "M'S USA" for Clothing

The Hot Stove League remained in action over the holiday, with the Seattle Mariners finally winning something. The Mariners opposed the application of New York City's Components by John McCoy, Inc.to register the mark M'S USA" for various clothing items. On Christmas Day, the Board issued an order sustaining the opposition after Applicant had filed a voluntary abandonment of its application without consent. The Baseball Club of Seattle, Inc. v. Components by John McCoy, Inc., Opposition No.91186390.


As usual, the Mariners claimed that the applied-for mark would likely cause confusion, or create a false association, with several of their registered "M" design marks (see below). [The Mariners own a registration for the letter "S" in standard character form for caps, but not for the letter M alone.]

old Mariners' logos

Do you think the Mariners would have won this opposition? What if Applicant's mark had stylized lettering that was different from that of the Mariners? Would the Mariners have opposed based on their standard character "S" registration? Would you be surprised if they did?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

Thursday, December 24, 2009

CAFC Reverses TTAB: Website Specimen of Use Need Not Include a Picture

The CAFC reversed a TTAB ruling [TTABlogged here] that rejected a website specimen of use that did not include a photograph of the subject product. The appellate court held that "a picture is not a mandatory requirement for a website-based specimen of use." It pointed out that the test for an acceptable website specimen, "just as any other specimen, is simply that it must in some way evince that the mark is 'associated' with the goods and serves as an indicator of source." In re Michael Sones, 93 USPQ2d 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2009) [precedential].

Applicant's specimen of use
(click on picture for larger image)

The TTAB based its bright-line rule on Lands' End, Inc. v. Manbeck, 797 F. Supp. 511 (E.D. Va. 1992), which dealt with a catalog specimen. The Board had carried over its interpretation of Lands' End to website specimens. The court, however, did not interpret Lands' End or the law of trademarks "to require that specimens of use from the Internet always have pictures." The trademark statute does not specify any particular requirements for a specimen of use. For displays, the mark "must simply be 'associated' with the goods."

The court observed that, for brick-and-mortar stores, "there is no rule that specimens of use must show pictures." A label or container bearing the mark may suffice. "Thus, a product box that bears the trademark, but does not display a picture of the goods or allow customers to see the goods, may be an acceptable specimen." Moreover, in several cases tangible specimens that described the goods "in sufficient detail in relation to the marks" but did not include a picture, were found sufficient. The court therefore saw no reason why website specimens "must necessarily have pictures to associate a trademark with the goods being sold."

Precedent such as Lands' End and Dell establishes that a visual depiction of a product is an important consideration in determining whether a submitted specimen sufficiently associates a mark with the source of the goods. It might well be that the absence of a picture will render website specimens ineffective in many cases and will be, as the PTO argues, "[a] crucial factor in the court's analysis." *** But a picture is not the only way to show an association between a mark and the goods, and we cannot approve of the rigid, bright-line rule that the PTO applied here.

The court remanded the case to the TTAB for consideration of the evidence as a whole "to determine if Sones' specimen sufficiently associates his mark with his charity bracelets so as to 'identify and distinguish the goods.'"

Relevant factors include, for example, whether Sones’ webpages have a “point of sale nature,” Lands’ End, 797 F. Supp. at 514, and whether the actual features or inherent characteristics of the goods are recognizable from the textual description, given that the more standard the product is, the less comprehensive the textual description need be. See McCarthy § 19:48 (“The applicant’s identification of goods . . . should identify the goods by their common, ordinary name so that the average person would recognize what they are.”). The term “charity bracelet” is listed in the PTO’s Acceptable Identification of Goods and Services Manual under Class Code 014. See TMEP § 1402.04 (describing the Manual as “a listing of acceptable identifications of goods and services . . . that are acceptable in the [PTO] without further inquiry” for application purposes). Though not dispositive, the “use of the designation ‘TM’ . . . lends a degree of visual prominence to the term.” Dell, 71 USPQ2d at 1729. These and other factors will help determine whether Sones’ mark “signifies the source and quality of the goods.” Int’l Flavors, 183 F.3d at 1366.

Judge Newman, in dissent, noted that Applicant Sones had subsequently filed a use-based application for his mark ONE NATION UNDER GOD, and had provided a picture of the mark in association with the goods. That action, opined Judge Newman, has rendered the appeal concerning his first application moot (despite the resulting loss of Applicant's original priority date).

Applicant's later specimen of use

TTABlog comment: I'll bet the TTAB, on remand, accepts the non-picture-containing specimen of use. What do you think?


Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

Wednesday, December 23, 2009

WYHO? Red Sox and White Sox Oppose "e.SOX" for Cellphone Sleeves

Here we go again, Hot Stove Leaguers! The Chicago White Sox and Boston Red Sox have teamed up to oppose the application of Digital Access, Inc. of Carson City, Nevada, to register the mark e.SOX for "Protective sleeves for electronic devices, namely, cellular phones, cameras and MP3 players, sound and video recorders and players." [Applicant claimed the mark in the special form shown below]. Would you have filed this opposition? Or maybe the better question is, do you think Opposers would win this opposition if it ever went to final decision? Boston Red Sox Baseball Club Limited Partnership and Chicago White Sox, Ltd. v. Digital Access, Inc., Opposition No. 91193106.


Opposers assert (without specifically citing the statutory sections) that this mark would likely cause confusion and/or false association with their various SOX marks.

Putting aside the admittedly descriptive connotation of the "e" prefix, as well as the obvious descriptive connotation of "sox" for the involved goods, what about these ESOX?

Edina, Minnesota ESOX

And what about these Esox?

Esox (pike fish)

And what would you call electrically-heated socks?


So I get the feeling that the White Sox and Red Sox are not really expecting to win this opposition. I suspect they just want to extract some restrictions out of the applicant, or maybe run it off the court (so to speak).

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

Tuesday, December 22, 2009

WYHA? TTAB Affirms Mere Descriptiveness Refusal of "STENTALLOY" For Alloys Used to Make Medical Devices

So let's imagine that you're facing a final Section 2(e)(1) mere descriptiveness refusal of STENTALLOY for "wrought or unwrought metal alloys for use in sheet, bar, coil, wire, strip and plate form having mechanical properties, purity and corrosion resistance suitable for use in medical devices." Examining Attorney Eugenia K. Martin has cited a dictionary definition of "stent" and Internet website excerpts showing that metal stents "are often, if not normally, made from metal alloys." Would you have appealed? Applicant Metalwerks PMD, Inc. did, and it lost. In re Metalwerks PMD, Inc., Serial No. 77362611 (December 10, 2009) [not precedential].

stent

Applicant lamely argued that "stent" does not describe "a wrought or unwrought alloy because a stent could be molded or extruded plastic." The evidence showed, however, that stents are made from metal alloys and that "there is nothing unusual about the use of the term 'alloy stent' to describe a stent made with a metal alloy." Although Applicant's goods are not stents, they are metal alloys that "can be used to make a particular type of stent, i.e., stents made from metal alloys."

The Board considered not only the individual terms but also the meaning of the mark as a whole, but found no difference in meaning.

Finally, Applicant dragged out the following guaranteed loser of an argument: that there is no evidence of any third-party use of the terms "stentalloy" or "stent alloy." The Board, however, pointed out for the millionth time that "[e]ven if applicant is the only user of the term, that fact does not mean that its mark is suggestive rather than merely descriptive."

In sum, the Board concluded that STENTALLOY will immediately describe a feature or purpose of the goods: i.e., that they have the "mechanical properties, purity and corrosion resistance suitable for use in medical devices such as stents." And so the Board affirmed the refusal.

TTABlog comment: So what do you think? Bear in mind that the Board affirms 80% of mere descriptiveness refusals on appeal.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

Monday, December 21, 2009

Finding "BELL HILL" for Wine and "BELL'S" for Beer Too Dissimilar, TTAB Dismisses 2(d) Opposition

Bell's Brewery, Inc. uncorked a loser when it opposed registration of the mark BELL HILL for packaged wine. Opposer claimed that the applied-for mark (1) would likely cause confusion with its registered mark BELL'S & Design for beer, and (2) is primarily geographically descriptive under Section 2(e)(2). Also falling flat was Opposer's assertion that (3) Applicant committed fraud when it represented to the PTO that BELL HILL has no geographic significance. Bell's Brewery, Inc. v. Bell Hill Vineyards, LLC, Opposition No. 91177980 (December 18, 2009) [not precedential].

Likelihood of Confusion: The Board found that beer and wine are "somewhat related" and that there is "at least some consumer exposure to wine and beer marketed under the same mark." However, the record did not establish that it is "common practice for these goods to emanate from the same source." The Board also found that, based on the identifications of goods in the involved application and registration, the goods would travel in the same channels of trade to the same classes of customers.


In any event, the Board found the differences in the marks to be dispositive. "[W]e read applicant's mark as a unitary phrase BELL HILL which has the connotation and commercial impression of a place." Opposer's mark, however, "evokes bells when viewed in concert with the design element or simply a last name when viewing the word element by itself." In short, it found "the overall connotation and commercial impressions quite different and sufficient to outweigh any similarities in appearance or sound based on the common element BELL.


Primarily Geographically Descriptive: The first element of a Section 2(e)(2) claim is that the mark must be the name of a place generally known to the public. If the place is so obscure or remote that purchasers would fail to recognize the term as indicating the geographical source of the goods, then Section 2(e)(1) is not satisfied.

The record showed that Applicant Bell Hill Vineyards derived the mark from a road named Bell Hill, near its vineyard (in Kelseyville, California). But there was insufficient evidence "to establish that Bell Hill designates a specific geographic region or location.other than this local road." The Board found that BELL HILL, as the name of a road (or even the local reference to a topographical rise) is so obscure or remote that purchasers of applicant's wine would typically fail to recognize the term as indicating the geographical source of applicant's goods."

Fraud: In view of the Board's findings regarding the remoteness of the BELL HILL reference, it ruled that Applicant did not commit fraud when it represented that its mark did not have a geographical significance. Moreover, Opposer did not present any evidence of Applicant's intent to deceive.

And so the Board dismissed the opposition.

TTABlog update: affirmed per curiam, December 13, 2010.

Text copyright John L. Welch 2009.

Sunday, December 20, 2009

White Sox and Red Sox Oppose "GAMESOX" for Vehicle Mirror Cover

Our latest Hot Stove League case involves a strange double-header: my Chicago White Sox have teamed up with the Boston Red Sox to oppose an application to register the mark GAMESOX for a "vehicle accessory, namely, decorative item for a vehicle mirror." Applicant S & C Concepts, LLC of Springdale, Arkansas, submitted the specimen of use shown immediately below. Boston Red Sox Baseball Club Limited Partnership and Chicago White Sox, Ltd. v. S & C Concepts, LLC, Opposition No. 91185694.


The Opposers claim that the applied-for mark is likely to cause confusion, or create a false association, with their various SOX marks used for a "wide variety of goods and"services, including, without limitation, vehicle accessories." [Somewhere among my personal treasures I have a Chicago White Sox license plate].

So what do you think about this one? Would the Sox prevail if this case went to final decision?

TTABlog comment: I recall attending a game in Comiskey Park in which Ted Williams dropped a fly ball and then hit a home run over the right field roof. Can anyone verify that this occurred? [Not that I attended, but that the Splendid Splinter did this].

Here's a trivia question for you baseball fans: when I played softball with Morgan Finnegan in New York, I was nicknamed "the Stick." What Yankee player was given that monicker?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

Saturday, December 19, 2009

Trademark Public Advisory Committee (TPAC) Issues its 2009 Annual Report

The Trademark Public Advisory Committee of the USPTO (TPAC) has issued its annual report for Fiscal Year 2oo9. (pdf here). According to TPAC, " this report does two things: (i) it reports on the performance aspects of the USPTO that the TPAC enabling statute requires be addressed, with an emphasis on the performance issues that are of greatest interest to the trademark community, and (ii) it reports on the status of issues TPAC is championing or has championed during FY 2009."


Here are some interesting tidbits from the report:

  • In FY 2009, for the first time in seven years, the number of trademark applications decreased, going from 401,392 classes in FY 2008 to an Annualized Total of 351,348 as of July 31, 2009. This is a reduction of approximately 12 percent. (p. 5).

  • The increase in FY 2009 registrations was lower, 8.2 percent, which likely indicates that in the slowing economy a larger-than-usual percentage of applicants chose to abandon their applications. (p.6).

  • The TTAB has significantly decreased the time it takes to issue decisions:

    • •In FY 2008, the average pendency of contested motions was 17.8 weeks. In FY 2009, that average decreased to 6.9 weeks.
    • •The pendency of final decisions was reduced from 11.7 weeks in FY 2008 to 6.6 weeks in FY 2009.
    • •Average pendency of appeals (from final decisions of Examining Attorneys), measured from appeal filing to decision, decreased from 53 weeks in FY 2008 to 44 weeks in FY 2009. (p. 22).

  • New TTAB filings are down compared to FY 2008: new appeals are down 13.5%, new oppositions are down 21.4%, and new cancellation proceedings are down 15.5%. The number of cases maturing in FY 2009 for a final decision on the merits was virtually the same as FY 2008. The number of final decisions issued in FY 2009 decreased by 11.9% due to the assignment of half of the TTAB judges to work on revisions to the Trademark Board Manual of Proceduree. In addition, the number of decisions on contested motions decreased slightly (by 1.5%) due to the assignment of interlocutory attorneys to work on TBMP revisions. (pp. 22-23).

  • TPAC has been tracking the issue of fraud because of the concern of some TPAC members that the Medinol standard for proving fraud was too low. TPAC must now assess whether any action in this area should be taken in the wake of Bose. The USPTO is particularly interested in finding ways to decrease the number of applications which include multiple pages of goods because of concerns that the applicant may not in fact have a bona fide intent to use the mark on so many goods. (p. 26).

  • The TTAB anticipates completion, approval and posting of the revised TBMP on the USPTO website in FY 2010. When the TBMP text is completed and approved, it will be posted in HTML. (p. 26).
.

Friday, December 18, 2009

Fame of Snoop Dogg Overwhelms "SNOOPTUNES" Applicant in 2(d) Opposition

Calvin Broadus, a/k/a SNOOP DOGGY DOGG, SNOOP DOGG, and SNOOP, successfully opposed an application to register the mark SNOOPTUNES for "wireless transceivers for distributing audio, visual, and textual computer files over computer networks including music, books, plays, pamphlets, brochures, newsletters,journals, magazines on the subjects of sporting and cultural activities and a wide variety of topics of general interests." The fame of the registered SNOOP DOGG mark and the name SNOOP for musical entertainment played a dominant role in the Board's conclusion that confusion is likely. Calvin Broadus v. Kristyn Kelley Allen dba Passive Devices, Opposition No. 91176834 (December 16, 2009) [not precedential].

Snoop Dogg

The record was filled with evidence of the fame of Opposer and also established that SNOOP is a well-recognized nickname for SNOOP DOG. "[T]he public upon hearing the name Snoop would immediately associate the nickname Snoop with opposer and his music."

Applicant argued that Opposer failed to provide evidence of use of the "Snoop mark" in commerce. However, even without direct use of a mark by the claimant, "the courts and the Board generally have recognized that abbreviations and nicknames of trademarks or names used only by the public give rise to protectable rights in the owners of the trade name or mark which the public modified." [For example, AMEX for the American Stock Exchange].

Moreover, Applicant admitted that Opposer is commonly known as Snoop. And so there was no question that when used in the context of music, consumers understand SNOOP to be a reference to SNOOP DOGG.

Opposer's SNOOP DOGG mark and persona "have been associated with a diverse range of products and services." For example, Opposer endorsed Chrysler automobiles (along with Lee Iacocca) with the pitch line: "If the ride is more fly, then you must buy." In 2004, Opposer established a community sports program for inner-city youth, culminating each year in the "Snoop Bowl," held on the day of the Super Bowl and in the same city.

His endorsement value and crossover appeal have been widely recognized. A Rolling Stone cover story in 2006 entitled "At Home with America's Most Lovable Pimp," stated: "Snoop Dogg has survived gangsta rap, charmed Hollywood and won over soccer moms - he's a hip-hop family man who's evolved from the consummate thug to the ultimate mack." [Talk about a role model? Take that, Tiger! - ed.]

Nonetheless, Applicant argued that "the exclusive use of SNOOP is contrary to the evidence," but it was able to point only to the Snoopy cartoon character (in an unrelated field) and the character "Snoop" on the television show The Wire (but no evidence of the extent of exposure of this name to the public).

Turning to a consideration of Applicant's goods, its product is an electronic device that allows users to share music between portable playing devices, including cell phones. The Board recognized that this is a distinctly different product from Opposer's musical recordings, but the question is whether the goods/services are so related as to cause confusion regarding source.

Applicant's specimen of use

Opposer has used his mark and identity with consumer products such as cell phones and his music may be downloaded as ring tones for cell phones. Other celebrities are associated with or have endorsed mp3 products. [E.g., U2]. And Opposer has been in discussions with Microsoft about a Zune mp3 player that would bear his name and likeness and feature his music.

The Board therefore found that the goods pf the parties are related in that consumers are likely to believe that an mp3-sharing device bearing a mark similar to the famous SNOOP DOGG mark and the SNOOP name emanates from or is licensed by Opposer.

As to the marks, the Board had no trouble in finding them similar in sound and appearance. Applicant feebly argued that the marks have different meanings, with SNOOPTUNES referring to "snooping tunes" because its device allows others to "snoop" the "tunes." The Board, however, found it more likely that the public would associate SNOOPTUNES with the famous entertainer rather than with some function of the device. And so the Board concluded that the similarity of the marks strongly favored Opposer.

Two incidents of confusion involving Applicant's MySpace profile also bolstered Opposer's case.

Finally, Applicant managed to win on the issue of intent, the Board ruling that Applicant had offered "a plausible 'good faith' explanation, supported by the record, for its adoption of the mark."

However, with the balance of du Pont factors tipping decidedly toward Opposer, the Board sustained the opposition.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

Thursday, December 17, 2009

"PEDRO PAN" Merely Descriptive of Charitable Services, Says TTAB

The Board sustained a Section 2(e)(1) opposition to registration of the mark PEDRO PAN in standard character form, finding the mark merely descriptive of "Eleemosynary services in the field of monetary donations." Applicant claimed acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) but its proofs fell short, and the Board ruled that Applicant could not rely on transferred distinctiveness from its prior registration of the mark shown immediately below. Yvonne M. Conde and Oscar B. Pichardo v. Operation Pedro Pan Group, Inc., Opposition No. 91177853 (December 15, 2009) [not precedential].


Morehouse Defense: Applicant asserted the Morehouse defense based on its ownership of an incontestable registration for a mark that incorporates PEDRO PAN (see above), and contending that "equity therefore estops Opposers from asserting that they will be damaged by Applicant's registration of the mark PEDRO PAN."

However, the Board pointed out, the Morehouse defense is not available in response to a claim of mere descriptiveness. [It never works anyway - ed.]

Mere Descriptiveness: Both Opposers testified that they escaped from Cuba to the United States in a program organized by the United States government and dubbed "Operation Pedro Pan." As one Opposer explained:

"Pedro Pan is a spin on Peter Pan, the play by James Barrie and it's a twist using a Spanish name for the child who could fly and Never Neverland and who did not have parents so this was coined by the press in Miami."

The record included dozens of newspaper articles that use the term "Pedro Pan" to refer to the 14,000 unaccompanied minors who arrived in the United States from Cuba during 1960-62. Some of the articles discussed related charity services. Moreover, Applicant's own website has used the term PEDRO PAN descriptively to refer to those children.

Applicant contended that the third-party uses and its own uses refer to Applicant's services, but the Board found that "the term PEDRO PAN has been used by many third-parties generally as a moniker for this particular group of children." In addition, "many charitable services have been rendered to, and on behalf of, this group of 'Pedro Pan' children, who are now adults." The general public and the Pedro Pan children (now adults) recognize PEDRO PAN as describing this group of children, "even as they are now adults."

Acquired Distinctiveness: The Board noted that Applicant may rely on any evidence submitted during prosecution of its applications, since the entire file of the application is automatically a part of the record under Rule 2.122(b) and the CAFC's Cold War Museum decision. [TTABlogged here].

Applicant maintained that its prior Section 2(f) registration of the "same mark" constitutes prima facie evidence of acquired distinctiveness under Rule 2.41(b). The question was whether the marks and identified services are sufficiently similar that the distinctiveness of the registered mark may extend to the mark and services in the application.

The Board noted that, although only the words PEDRO PAN are not disclaimed in the registration, those words are not highlighted and the word OPERATION is more outstanding.Moreover, the design features of the mark "figure prominently." Therefore, the Board could not say that based on this prior registration alone, PEDRO PAN has acquired distinctiveness.

Furthermore, in view of the many third-party uses of PEDRO PAN, the Board found the mark to be highly descriptive, and so Applicant had a higher burden to show acquired distinctiveness. Applicant failed to satisfy that burden.

And so the Board sustained the opposition.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

Tuesday, December 15, 2009

Applying Foreign Equivalents, TTAB Deems "AZUCAR MORENA" Generic for Brown Sugar

Applying the doctrine of foreign equivalents, the Board granted Petitioner Marquez Brothers International's motion for summary judgment, finding the registered mark AZUCAR MORENA to be generic for brown sugar. And so it ordered cancellation of Respondent Zucrum's registration for "unrefined sugar; brown sugar; molasses" [AZUCAR disclaimed]. Marquez Brothers International, Inc. v. Zucrum Foods, L.L.C., Cancellation No. 92048266 (December 11, 2009) [not precedential].


The Board began by finding the genus of goods at issue to be those stated in Respondent's identification of goods, i.e., "unrefined sugar; brown sugar; molasses." Applicant Zucrum argued at length that "the products sold under its registered mark are azứcar estandar, an unrefined sugar, which is not brown sugar, as commonly understood in the United States." The Board, however, pointed out that "registrability of a mark must be decided on the basis of the identification of goods set forth in the registration, regardless of what the record may reveal as to the particular nature of a respondent's goods." In short, Respondent's goods must be presumed to include all types of unrefined sugar, brown sugar, and molasses.

As to the public's understanding of AZUCAR MORENA, the Board first ruled that, since Spanish is a modern and ubiquitous language, the term would be translated into English by the ordinary American purchaser (who is defined to be knowledgeable in both English and Spanish). See In re La Peregrina Limited, 86 USPQ2d 1645 (TTAB 2008) [precedential] [TTABlogged here]. It found that Petitioner had made a prima facie showing"that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the Spanish term 'azứcar morena' directly translates to the English term "brown sugar," one of the products identified in respondent's involved registration."

Applicant contended that AZUCAR MORENA is not generic because "azứcar morena" or "morena" standing alone can, in another context, refer to a dark-skinned or brunette Latina. [The registration included a statement that "[t]he English translation of 'AZUCAR MORENA' is 'sugar beautiful dark complexioned brunette Latin girl.'"] The Board found that evidence insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact "as to the genericness of 'azứcar morena' in the context of respondent’s goods."

Nor was the Board persuaded by Respondent's argument that its mark is not generic because there are other generic terms that translate to "brown sugar." "Even if we assume, as respondent argues, that the goods at issue could also be identified as "azucar terciado," "azucar rubio," "azucar negro," and other terms, a product may have more than one generic name, none of which is registrable."

Finding that there did not exist any genuine issue of fact as to genericness, the Board granted the motion for summary judgment.

TTABlog comment: With regard to the doctrine of equivalents, compare the approach taken here with In re Tia Maria Inc., 188 USPQ 524 (TTAB 1975), in which the Board found it unlikely that a purchaser would translate TIA MARIA into "Aunt Mary" when dining at the TIA MARIA restaurant "surrounded by Mexican decor and Mexican food."

Is there now any situation where a Spanish term won't be translated into English?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

Monday, December 14, 2009

USPTO Issue Annual Report for FY2009

The USPTO has issued its Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2009. (Downloadable .pdf here). Any comments or observations?


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WYHA? "MANWEAR" Merely Descriptive of Retail Men's Clothing

We haven't had many WYHAs lately, what with all those Hot Stove League cases, so let's take a look at this one. Webid Consulting, based in London, sought to register the mark MANWEAR for "online retail stores featuring men's clothing and accessories and small leather goods from suppliers other than applicant." Examining Attorney Brendan D. McCauley issued a Section 2(e)(1) refusal on the ground of mere descriptiveness. The TTAB affirmed. How would you have argued the appeal? In re Webid Consulting Ltd., Serial No. 77397586 (December 10, 2009) [not precedential].


Not surprisingly, the Examining Attorney relied on dictionary definitions of "man" and "wear," as well as on various webpages using the term "manwear" to refer to men's clothing. He also submitted excerpts from foreign websites, but most of them appeared to be "from those in the clothing industry who are poorly translating another language into English." The Board wisely gave those websites "less weight than websites clearly describe their products in English." [Why give these foreign websites any weight? This is not a highly technical field? For a discussion of foreign website evidence, see "The TTAB and Foreign Website Evidence - Quo Vadis?" by John L. Welch and Ann Lamport Hammitte].

The Board found the foreign website evidence "interesting" because it showed "that when the term 'manwear' appears in the context of websites about clothing (even those with grammatical and other idiosyncrasies), there is nothing incongruous about the use of the term MANWEAR."

The Board concluded that consumers who "see the term MANWEAR in association with clothing-related services ... would understand immediately that the services are directed to clothing for men."

Applicant argued that the combination of "man" and "wear" creates an "obvious incongruity in the mind of the prospective purchaser." The Board failed to see any incongruity. It noted that descriptive terms that are misspelled are still merely descriptive, citing a somewhat cryptic 1911 Supreme Court decision:

Bad orthography has not yet become so rare or so easily detected as to make a word the arbitrary sign of something else than its conventional meaning, as different, to bring the example to the present, as the character of an article is from its origin or ownership. Standard Paint Co. v. Trinidad Asphalt Mfg. Co., 220 U.S. 446, 458 (1911).

Finally, Applicant lamely argued that its mark "is not commonly used or understood to relate in any way to [Applicant's] services." Of course, it is black-letter law that even if applicant is the first or only user of a descriptive term, that fact does not mean that the term is not descriptive.

And so the Board affirmed the refusal.

TTABlog comment: Well, would you have appealed? Since about 4 out of 5 mere descriptiveness refusals are affirmed on appeal, what do you think the odds were for a successful appeal here?

TTABlog postscript: I thought bad orthography was a reason for seeing the dentist.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.

Sunday, December 13, 2009

Chicago Bears Oppose "PAPA BEAR" for Clothing, Football Equipment

The Chicago Bears have taken umbrage at the attempt by Papa Bear Enterprises, Inc. to register the mark PAPA BEAR for, inter alia, football helmets, books in the field of sports, clothing, and football equipment. Da Bears contend that this mark will likely cause confusion, dilution, and false association vis-a-vis various BEARS-formative marks. Chicago Bears Football Club, Inc. and NFL Properties LLC v. Papa Bear Enterprises, Inc., Opposition No. 91190267.


Now you may be thinking that "Papa Bear" is a reference to the Goldilocks story, but Bears fans know that the term PAPA BEAR refers to the late George Halas, founder, owner, and long-time coach of the Bears. I don't think Goldilocks played football, and Applicant's website makes it clear just what Applicant has in mind.


By the way, has any NFL team ever made as good a video as the Bears' Super Bowl Shuffle? [It includes the line: "This is for Mike [Ditka] and Papa Bear Halas."]


TTABlog comment: Why are football helmets in class 9 and football pads in class 28?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2009.