Supreme Court Developments in TTAB cases

The U.S. Supreme Court has recently denied petitions for certiorari in several cases arising out of the  TTAB and CAFC, while two petitions remain pending.

On October 6th, the Court denied petitions for certiorari in the US SPACE FORCE case (Section 2(a) false connection refusal) [TTABlogged here] and in the "pink hip joint" case (Section 2(e)(5) functionality).  [TTABlogged here].

On November 10th, the Organization for Transformative Works filed an Amicus Brief supporting the grant of certiorari in the RAPUNZEL case (consumer standing).  [TTABlogged here]. The case has been distributed for conference on December 12, 2025.

On November 21st, the USPTO filed an Opposition [pdf here] to the petition for certiorari in the VETEMENTS genericness case. [TTABlogged here].

On November 24th, the Court denied a petition for certiorari in the "green medical glove" case (genericness).  [TTABlogged here].

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: The Supreme Court docket search site is here, where one may sign up for email updates for any case.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

TTAB Deputy Chief Judge Thomas V. Shaw Retires

Deputy Chief Judge Thomas. V. Shaw has retired. Judge Shaw was appointed to the Board in 2011, after serving as a Trademark Examining Attorney, Senior Attorney, Managing Attorney, and Associate Solicitor at the USPTO. Judge Melanye K. Johnson has assumed the role of Deputy Chief Judge.

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TTABlogger comment: By my count, Judge Shaw is the ninth TTAB judge to resign this year. There are now 22 judges on the Board.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

TTAB Posts December 2025 Hearing Schedule

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Tee-Tee-Ā-Bee) has scheduled two oral hearings for the month of December 2025. Both will be held in-person in the Madison East Building, 600 Dulany Street 9th Floor (Hearing Room C), Alexandria, VA. Briefs and other papers for the case may be found at TTABVUE via the links provided.

December 4, 2025 - 11 AM : In re Nowpay, LLC, Serial No. 98073381 [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark shown below, for , credit card and debit card transaction processing services, in view of the registered mark PAYNOW for, inter alia, "Credit card and debit card services; Credit card payment processing services"].

December 10, 2025 - 10 AM: Olsman, MacKenzie, Peacock & Wallace, P.C. v. Emily Grace Thomas, Opposition No. 91272167 [Opposition to registration of the mark shown below, for legal services, on the grounds of non-ownership, fraud, and likelihood of confusion with opposer's essentially identical common law mark for identical services].

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Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

TTABlog Test: How Did These Three Section 2(d) Appeals Turn Out?

Section 2(d) affirmances continue to run at a 90% clip this year (as usual). Here are three recent appeals. No hints this time. How do you think they came out? [Answer in first comment].

In re Curo Health Services, LLC, Serial No. 98414104 (November 19, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas W. Wellington). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark ILLUMIA HEALTH for “palliative care services; hospice services; home health care services" [HEALTH disclaimed] in view of the registered mark ILLUMINA for, inter alia, "medical services."]

In re Herbert, Rowland & Grubic, Inc., Serial Nos. 97698576 and 97698586 (November 21, 2025) (Opinion by Judge David K. Heasley) [Section 2(d) refusal to register the mark HRG, in standard character and logo form (below left), for "engineering services focusing on the coordination and design of civil infrastructure systems; structural engineering design services; site design services, namely, engineering design services for commercial buildings; land surveying services” in view of the registered mark shown below right, for "professional engineering services for the design and construction of facilities in the transportation, water, governmental services, senior living and energy markets."]

In re Bruhhl LLC, Serial No. 97741879 (November 21, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christoper C. Larkin). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark SANITEE for “Spray sanitizer for personal use," in view of the registered mark SANITY for "Disinfectants, hand sanitizers."]

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TTABlogger comment: How did you do? See any WYHA?s ?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

TTAB Grants Petition to Cancel RAFT Registration for Computer Game Software Based on Prior Trademark Use and Analogous Use

In an 81-page opinion, the Board granted a petition for cancellation of a registration for the mark RAFT for "survival mobile games," finding that Petitioner Redbeet Interactive had priority for the identical mark for computer game software, based both on trademark use and use analogous to trademark use. Or, as the Board put it, "Petitioner’s RAFT mark reached our shores before Respondent’s RAFT mark did." This blog post will attempt to hit the "highlights." Redbeet Interactive AB v. Alexander Novikov, Cancellation No. 92075698 (November 20, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christopher C. Larkin).

Petitioner Redbeet objected to the testimony declaration of Respondent Novikov (in English) on the ground that "Mr. Novikov was not competent to provide such Declaration and there is no reason to believe that [he] understood what he signed." Redbeet pointed out that during cross-examination, Mr. Novikov required a Russian translator in order to understand the questions asked of him, and he responded only in Russian throughout the deposition, requiring the translator to translate his responses back into English for the record.” Novikov stated that he understands English "at a very low – low level," and that he required a translator "[i]n order to have a full understanding of the questions asked of me."

The Board pointed out that the proper practice "would have been for Mr. Novikov to sign a declaration in Russian, have the signed Russian declaration translated into English by a qualified translator, and submit the English translation introduced into evidence under oath by the translator with the Russian original." It sustained Redbeet's objection and struck the Novikov Declaration from the record in its entirety, as well as two of the three exhibits to the declaration.

With respect to priority, the parties agreed that the critical date was April 28, 2017, the date on which Respondent’s RAFT game was published on the Google Play Store and made available to consumers in the United States. The Board carefully set out the history of Redbeet's development of the RAFT game, beginning in October 2016 with the creation of a "development blog" for the game and the publishing of blog entries on October 13, 2016.

Petitioner Redbeet Interactive AB was formed in February 2017. Four days later, the Developers published their second blog entry and made a first prototype of the RAFT game available to the general public for downloading. During the summer of 2017, the Developers continued to post entries on their blog and on social media with information about the RAFT game and new features that were being added to the game.

On May 23, 2018, the Developers released the RAFT game on Steam Early Access, because they had had plans to add more features to the game and "Early Access was the best vehicle for that.” A "full release" was listed on Steam in June 2022.

The parties differed "dramatically" as to the characteristics that a computer game must have before trademark rights can attach. According to Respondent Novikov, the game must be a "completed" game; according to Redbeet, an "uncompleted" game with bugs and future modifications suffices if the game can be played. The Board concluded that Redbeet had the better of the argument.

Respondent’s vision of a “completed” or “final” version of computer game software is an illusion. Software, a good that is ubiquitous in modern society, is not a static one, but instead evolves by its very nature; as anyone who owns a mobile phone or uses a personal computer can attest, software is routinely updated. The record suggests that computer game software may be the paradigm of such dynamism. The relevant issue with respect to when trademark rights attach to computer game software is not when it is “final” or “completed,” but rather when consumers recognize computer game software as a game that can be played and the involved mark is associated by purchasers in the United States with a particular source for the goods

The Board found that, from the standpoint of consumers, the RAFT game was a playable computer game in its most rudimentary version and continued to be one throughout its development, and all versions of that game came from the source identified as “Redbeet.” "[F]or purposes of priority, Petitioner is not required to show that its use of RAFT prior to April 28, 2017 would entitle it to registration of its mark based on use of the mark “in commerce.” Rather, Petitioner need only prove that the RAFT mark was “previously used in the United States” prior to that date.

The Board found Redbeet enjoyed priority because its RAFT mark was in fact used "in commerce" before April 28, 2017, and such prior use necessarily means that the mark was “previously used in the United States.”

Between December 16, 2016, the date of the release of the RAFT game on itch.io, and April 21, 2017, the Developers’ RAFT listing on itch.io had nearly 14,000,000 page views, and nearly 3,500,000 users, and the largest portion of users during this time period (13.11%) were from the United States. *** That is, there were approximately 450,000 U.S. players of the RAFT game before April 21, 2017. These activities establish that the RAFT game was “transported” in commerce in the same manner as the email software.

Moreover, the Board found that the Developers made analogous use of the RAFT mark between October 2016 and the end of April 2017, and they and Redbeet took steps to commercialize the game both during and after that period. Accordingly, Redbeet proved its priority by analogous use if its pre-April 28, 2017 distribution of the RAFT game through the Internet did not constitute technical trademark use of the RAFT mark in commerce.

Finally, the Board jettisoned Novikov's laches defense because "it is well established that equitable defenses such as laches and estoppel will not be considered and applied where, as here, the marks of the parties are identical and the goods are the same or essentially the same."

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TTABlogger comment: What's next? A suit for trademark infringement?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

TTABlog Test: Two Section 2(d) Refusals of THE JILLY BOX: How Did the Appeal Turn Out?

The USPTO refused to register the mark THE JILLY BOX (standard characters) [BOX disclaimed] for "jewellery; curated boxes being kits comprised of jewellery" in Class 14, and for subscription box services (described more fully below) in Class 35, on the ground of likely confusion with two different registered marks. Keeping in mind the comment of one former TTAB judge that the outcome of a Section 2(d) case can be predicted 95% of the time based on just the marks and the goods, how do you think these appeals (set out in more detail below) came out? [Answer in first comment]. In re The Jilly Box Inc., Serial No. 90253914 (November 19, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande).

As to the class 14 goods, registration of THE JILLY BOX for "jewellery; curated boxes being kits comprised of jewellery" was refused in view of the registered mark shown immediately below, for "jewelry."

As to the class 35 services - "subscription services, namely, online retail store services featuring subscription boxes containing clothing and handbags, footwear, fashion accessories in the nature of belts, scarves, shoulder wraps, mittens, gloves and socks and headwear, health and beauty, home décor, technology, fitness and food products; promoting the goods and services of others through the distribution of boxes filled with assorted items in the fields of fashion, health and beauty, home décor, technology, fitness and food products" - registration of THE JILLY BOX was refused in view of the registered mark JILLY'S MOM MADE THAT (in standard form) for "On-line retail store services featuring woman, teens, and children’s apparel, namely, shirts, long sleeve shirts, short sleeve shirts, tank tops, sweaters, dresses, pants, capris, jackets, footwear, hats and caps, children’s and infant’s apparel, namely, shirts, tank tops, jackets, pants, capris, jumpers, overall sleepwear, pajamas, rompers and one-piece garments, bodysuits, baby bibs not of paper, children’s headwear, gloves for apparel, hats for infants, one piece garment for infants and toddlers, shirts for infants, babies, toddlers and children, sleeping garments, shoes, sandals, boots, purses, clutches, handbags, all-purpose carrying bags, wallets, and plush toys."

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TTABlogger comment: Good luck!

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

TTABlog Test: Is RODEO TEXAS Primarily Geographically Descriptive of Sports Event Parties and Non-rodeo Clothing?

The USPTO refused to register the mark RODEO TEXAS (in standard characters) for “Clothing and apparel, namely, shirts, hats, and jackets not for use by rodeo competitors,” in International Class 25, and for “Entertainment services, namely, conducting special events in the nature of pre event [sic] parties, watch parties, and after parties in connection with sports and entertainment events” in International Class 41, on the ground that the mark is primarily geographically descriptive of the goods and services under Section 2(e)(2). On the same ground, the Board refused to register the word-and-design mark shown below, for "Clothing and apparel, namely, shirts, hats, and jackets, all of the foregoing not for use by rodeo competitors,” absent a disclaimer of RODEO TEXAS. Applicant argued that it does not render rodeo services or sell clothing to wear in rodeo competitions. How do you think this appeal came out? In re Fantasy Rodeo, LLC, Serial Nos. 90531680 & 905316991 (November 18, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Robert Lavache).

A mark is primarily geographically descriptive when: 

1. the mark sought to be registered is the name of a place generally known to the public; 
2. the source of the goods or services is the geographic region named in the mark; and 
3. the public would make an association between the goods or services and the place named in the mark, that is, believe that the goods or services for which the mark is sought to be registered originate in that place.

As to the first prong of the test, the Board unsurprisingly found that TEXAS "is the name of a place known generally to the American public, including the relevant purchasing public, and is far from obscure or remote." Applicant Fantasy Rodeo conceded that Texas is a well-known place. [never heard of it - ed.].

Fantasy's Class 41 specimen of use confirmed that at least some of its watch parties feature rodeo competitions, and so the Board found that "RODEO is highly descriptive in this context because it identifies the subject matter of Applicant’s entertainment services, and the relevant purchasing public will perceive it in that manner."

As to the Class 25 goods, Fantasy clashed with Examining Attorney Mark Pilaro over the meaning of various registrations for RODEO-containing marks in which that word was, or was not, disclaimed. The Board observed:

[I]f there is a pattern to be discerned based on a review of the third-party registrations of record as a whole here, it is that, more often than not, RODEO has been disclaimed in connection with clothing, especially where the term appears along with geographically descriptive matter, or where the application includes both clothing and rodeo-related services.

Fantasy contended that RODEO is not merely descriptive of its goods because it "does not sell clothing to wear in rodeo competitions" - as indicated in its identification of goods. The Board was not moved: "T]here is no reason to conclude that RODEO is only descriptive as to clothing when that clothing is specifically worn or used in rodeo competitions; in fact, the record suggests otherwise."

Here, the evidence of record, considered as a whole, indicates that RODEO can be used to refer to rodeo-themed or rode[o]-appropriate attire, or to clothing items that are otherwise associated with rodeo events. Thus, the term has been disclaimed in many, though not all, RODEO-formative marks applied to clothing.

Moreover, according to the Board, relevant consumers may view RODEO "as indicating that the goods are provided by a rodeo exhibitor (albeit one who exhibits rodeo events through watch parties)." [Really? -ed.].

The Board concluded that "the addition of the term 'RODEO' does not detract from the primarily geographic descriptiveness of RODEO TEXAS as a whole."

As to the second prong of the test, the Examining Attorney relied on the fact that Fantasy is organized and located in Texas. One of Fantasy's specimens indicated that at least some of its services are rendered in Fort Worth, and they also indicate that its goods "are sold online without any apparent restrictions 'regarding where consumers can purchase [the goods],' meaning Applicant sells its goods in Texas." That was enough to satisfy the second prong.

As to the third prong, since the primary significance of RODEO TEXAS is geographic and the named place is neither obscure or remote, the Board is allowed to presume that the relevant public will make the requisite association of the goods and services with the named place.

And so, the Board upheld the refusal of the standard character mark but allowed the application to proceed to registration on the Supplemental Register in view of Fantasy’s proposed amendment in the alternative during prosecution. The Board also upheld the disclaimer requirement regarding the logo mark but allowed Fantasy 30 days to submit the required disclaimer, which will allow the application to proceed to registration.

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TTABlogger comment:

Like a bronco rider, I'm uncomfortable with this decision. It just seems so formulaic. I hesitate to call it mechanical bull.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

TTAB Grants Petition to Cancel ZIGONG LANTERN GROUP Registration due to Geographical Descriptiveness

In a rare inter partes proceeding involving geographical descriptiveness, the Board wasted little time in granting a petition for cancellation of a registration for the mark ZIGONG LANTERN GROUP for, inter alia, "Entertainment services in the nature of production of lantern shows" [LANTERN GROUP disclaimed] under Section 2(e)(2). Respondent China Lantern International is a company located in Kissimmee Florida, with a branch office in Zigong, China, where it designs, fabricates, and ships materials for its lantern festivals. Zigong Lantern Culture Industry Group Co., Ltd v. China Lantern International, LLC DBA Zigong Lantern Group, Cancellation No. 92078432 [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Lawrence T. Stanley, Jr.).

A mark is primarily geographically descriptive if: (1) the primary significance of the mark is the name of a place that is generally known; (2) the goods or services originate in the place identified in the mark; and (3) the relevant purchasers would associate the identified services with the place named, i.e., the purchasing public would believe that the services come from the place named. See Spiritline Cruises LLC v. Tour Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2020 U.S.P.Q.2d 48324 (TTAB 2020).

As to the first prong of the Section 2(e)(2) test, the Board took judicial notice that multiple English language dictionaries list Zigong as a city in the Sichuan province of China. The evidence of record further showed that Zigong is well known for lanterns and lantern festivals. According to Wikipedia, "As one of the Historical and Cultural Cities of China, Zigong is called 'Lantern Town in the South Kingdom.'"

The addition of the disclaimed term 'LANTERN GROUP,' which is "highly descriptive if not generic for Respondent and its services," did not change the overall geographic significance of the challenged mark. The Board therefore found that "the primary significance of Respondent’s use of ZIGONG is the name of a place that is generally known and the addition of LANTERN GROUP does not detract from that geographical significance."

As to the second prong, as stated above, the evidence established that Respondent has a branch office in Zigong and that respondent (like petitioner) designs, fabricates, and ships materials for its lantern festivals from Zigong. "That materials for the lantern festivals originate from Zigong is sufficient to support that Respondent’s services (i.e., lantern festivals that display lanterns from Zigong) originate in Zigong."

As to the third prong, a services-place association may be presumed where (1) the location in the mark is generally known to the purchasing public, (2) the term’s geographical significance is its primary significance, and (3) the services originate from the named location in the mark. See, e.g., Cal. Pizza Kitchen, 1988 TTAB LEXIS 64, at *7-8.

Here, as previously explained, the primary significance of “Zigong” is a geographic location generally known to purchasers of Respondent’s services and the services originate from that location. As such, a services-place association is presumed.

The three prongs having been satisfied, the Board granted the cancellation petition, declining to consider the other grounds raised by the petitioner.

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TTABlogger comment: Bang the Zigong, the three prongs are satisfied!

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Re-designated as Precedential: TTABlog Test: Is DANKE Confusable with MERCI for Chocolates?

August Storck KG opposed an application to register the mark DANKE in the stylized form shown here, for "chocolate; chocolate bars," claiming likelihood of confusion with its registered mark MERCI for "chocolate and chocolates." Applying the doctrine of foreign equivalents, the Board found that both marks mean "thank you" in English. How do you think this opposition came out? August Storck KG v. Florend Indústria e Comércio de Chocolates LTDA, 2026 USPQ2d 76 (TTAB 2026) [re-designated as precedential January 27, 2026] (Opinion by Judge Wendy B. Cohen).

Applicant Florend (a Brazilian company) argued that the doctrine of foreign equivalents should not apply, but it failed to meet its burden to prove that it is unlikely that U.S. consumers will stop and translate the two terms. See Vetements, 137 F.4th at 1331. The Board noted that MERCI and DANKE appear in U.S. English dictionaries, defined as foreign terms, establishing that "U.S. consumers are likely to be familiar with both foreign language words and translate the words to understand their English meaning." "Based on the evidence of record, an appreciable number of U.S. purchasers are capable of translating MERCI and DANKE, and in the context of the marks’ use with chocolate, a purchaser with ordinary sensibilities would translate the wording." But that was not the end of the story.

[Florend's mark] is pronounced DAHN-kuh' whereas MERCI is pronounced 'mehr-SEE'. The marks look and sound nothing alike. To state the obvious, [Florend's mark] and MERCI do not share any letter strings and although they are both two-syllable terms, overall they are quite dissimilar in appearance and sound.

The Board recognized that the marks have the identical meaning of "thank you" and share the connotation of gratitude. "But ... the message of 'thanks' is widely used in the industry and pervasively associated with chocolate. Further, when it comes to commercial impression, because the marks are derived from different foreign languages and have distinct appearances and pronunciations, we find the marks are somewhat dissimilar overall in commercial impression, despite sharing an identical meaning."

We are not convinced by Opposer’s argument that these differences are outweighed by the marks’ “exact same connotation and meaning,” particularly because the shared meaning is a common message related to chocolate. Rather, we find the differences in sound and appearance and the differences in commercial impression outweigh the marks’ identical meaning and weigh strongly against a finding of likelihood of confusion.

The Board next turned to the issue of the strength of Stork's mark. Stork proved use of its mark since 1965, sales in various national retail stores, and revenues of more than $100 million in the 2017-2022 time period. It advertised in a number of online magazines and on many television shows. However, its evidence of sales and marketing efforts were provided without context. The Board concluded that this evidence supported a finding that the mark has some commercial strength in the marketplace, but was not a famous mark for purposes of Section 2(d).

Florend offered only one third-party registration for a mark containing the word MERCI, but under the 13th DuPont factor the Board considered the results of a Google® images search intended to show that ‘Thank you’ is commonly associated with goods made of chocolate. The Board rejected Stork's claim that saying “thank you” with chocolate is a unique theme, instead finding that "thank you" is conceptually weak when used in relation to chocolate "because consumers are conditioned to seeing this phrase used as an expression of gratitude."

In sum, while MERCI is not conceptually weak under the sixth DuPont factor, the common use of “thank you” in connection with chocolate supports that the meaning of the mark MERCI is conceptually weak under the thirteenth DuPont factor.

Balancing the relevant DuPont factors, the Board concluded that "the substantial differences in sound, appearance and commercial impression of [Florend's mark] and MERCI under the first factor coupled with the conceptual weakness of “thank you” — the shared meaning of the terms and the only similarity between the marks — for chocolates under the thirteenth factor are dispositive and outweigh the other factors."

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TTABlogger comment: Do you think this opinion should have been deemed precedential?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Anonymous Comment on Letters of Protest

Set out below is an anonymous comment on the ALTAMURA DISTILLERIES case, recently TTABlogged here.

The TTAB has published some statistics on the "approvals" of Letters of Protest. The number of LOP's increased after the TMA, but then the PTO started charging $50 and then raised it to $150.

In the past the USPTO rejected an extremely high percentage of LOP's because they "allegedly" contained irrelevant information or were filed improperly. They even had a class on it, although it was far from clear how to properly format the letter and what evidence to present. The class was TERRIBLE.

Interestingly, the number of rejections is substantially higher (about 30% v. 94%) for those filed post-publication - which makes no sense because that is when third parties often first become aware. Is that not the purpose of publication? But in typical PTO fashion they punish people for learning about it after publication. I guess because it messes up their "system."

Even though the rejections may have gotten better, this page makes it even more confusing.

The sad part is that a letter of protest had to be filed in this case in the first place.

This shows the inconsistency of the office in issuing refusals. Clearly, this was the exact same mark on related goods, so the examiner just completely blew it and failed to read his own search report which I checked and it clearly showed the issue. At least good for him that he noted his error and issued a refusal.

In almost identical situations, I have found that examiner's ignore the letter of protest and allow it to be published - maybe because they do not want to look like they blew it. This results in an expensive TTAB proceedings and in most cases having the application refused by TTAB.

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Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

TTABlog Test: Is HOLY HABITS Merely Descriptive of Spiritual Growth Management Software?

The USPTO refused to register the mark HOLY HABITS for "Downloadable computer application software for mobile phones, namely, software for spiritual growth management, including tools for habit-building, personal reflection, daily scripture engagement, confession tracking, and personalized recommendations for holiness," deeming the mark merely descriptive of the goods. Applicant Acutis, appearing pro se, argued that a consumer seeing the mark would not know what the goods are, and furthermore that the mark is a double entendre and/or a unitary mark. How do you think this appeal came out? In re Acutis Technology Inc., Serial No. 98669016 (November 13, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Elizabeth K. Brock).

In support of the refusal, Examining Attorney Daniel Brody pointed to applicant's specimen of use, which states that applicant’s mobile application is used for “Catholic habit tracking,” to “track your daily spiritual habits."

As to Acutis's first argument, the Board observed once again that the mark at issue must be considered in the context of the goods, not in the abstract. “The question is not whether someone presented with only the mark could guess what the goods or services are. Rather, the question is whether someone who knows what the goods or services are will understand the mark to convey information about them.” DuoProSS, 695 F.3d at 1254.

As to the double entendre argument, Acutis contended that the mark “may carry multiple connotations, including references to Catholic religious life (e.g., ‘habit’ as attire)” and “[t]his ambiguity and multiplicity of meaning reinforce the suggestiveness of the mark." The Board was not impressed. "The multiple meanings that make an expression a double entendre must be readily apparent from the mark itself in the context of the applied-for goods." Applicant did not provide any evidence that "potential purchasers confronted with Applicant’s goods would find ambiguity or multiplicity of meanings in Applicant’s mark."

As to the unitary mark argument, Acutis maintained that the mark "evokes a conceptual journey toward sanctity — a rich and layered meaning that is not directly descriptive of what the app does." However, the evidence showed that this meaning of "a conceptual journey toward sanctity" is "precisely how HOLY HABITS is used by third-parties:" to describe “practicing habits showing a devotion to a religion."

In conclusion, the Board found that purchasers of Acutis's goods would recognize HOLY HABITS "as immediately conveying knowledge of a quality of Applicant’s mobile application, as a tool 'for spiritual growth management,' as described in the identification of goods." And so, it affirmed the refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: I confess, at first glance I thought the mark had something to do with religious clothing. Also, I don't understand the Board's response to the unitary mark argument, nor why it would make any difference for the descriptiveness issue if it were a unitary mark.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Again Finding Wine Related to Whiskey, TTAB Upholds Refusal of ALTAMURA DISTILLERIES & Design Over ALTAMURA

A letter of protest derailed this application after approval for publication, the Office deeming the mark shown below, for "vodka, gin, whisky, blended whisky, malt whisky, wheat absinthe, all of the aforementioned distilled using wheat originating from Altamura, Italy," to be confusing similar to the registered mark ALTAMURA for wine. Unsurprisingly, the Board found the word ALTAMURA to be the dominant element in applicant's mark. Third-party use and registration evidence suggested that the involved goods "are of a type that may emanate from the same source under the same mark." In re Altamura Distilleries SRL, Serial No. 97600477 (November 12, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark Lebow).

During prosecution, Examining Attorney Robert Cohen required the applicant to amend its identification of goods to indicate that its distilled alcoholic beverages are made using wheat from Altamura, Italy. "According to Applicant, this means that the combined term “has a clear, distinct and well-known meaning and provides a distinct commercial impression to consumers, that the product is distilled using wheat that originates in the unique Altamura area of Italy." The Board was unmoved: this "does not mean that consumers are aware of this. Consumers encountering the marks are unaware of the contents of trademark files at the USPTO, such as specific identifications or goods or services, or any required amendments thereto."

Similarly, “ALTAMURA” as a surname may not be known to many consumers, and even if recognized as such in Registrant’s mark, those same consumers might interpret Applicant’s mark as likewise incorporating a surname, given the shared identical term. Or, they might perceive Registrant’s ALTAMURA mark as an extension of Applicant’s offerings under a shortened version of Registrant’s mark.

Applicant argued that relatively few companies sell wine together with whiskey, gin and/or vodka, or if they do, they sell them under different marks. The Board, however, observed that "the third-party use evidence in this case shows a significant number of companies that do offer both types of goods." That evidence corroborated the third-party registration evidence showing that both wine and whiskey, gin and/or vodka often originate from a common source, which "bolsters our finding of relatedness."

Applicant then contended that wine is found in a different section of a retail store than spirits or liquor, under different signage, and that the same is true of most websites. The Board, however, pointed out that there was no evidence to support this argument, and in any case, "the issue before us is not whether consumers would confuse Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods, but rather whether there is a likelihood of confusion as to the source of these goods."

Applicant oddly maintained that consumers of wine and distilled spirits are "generally very well educated" "well read," or "consult with other consumers and experts of these products before purchasing." That said, “even careful or sophisticated purchasers are not immune from source confusion.” Again, there was no evidence to support this attorney argument, and in any case "even careful or sophisticated purchasers are not immune from source confusion."

Furthermore, there are no restriction in the subject application or as to price or quality, and so the goods are presumed to include wines and distilled spirits offered at both low and high prices.

Finding that the first, second, third and fourth DuPont factors weigh in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion, and the other factors were not relevant or argued, the Board affirmed the refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: The letter of protest is an inexpensive way to protect one's trademark. See Trademark Rule 2.149(d)(1), 37 C.F.R. § 2.149(d)(1) and TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE (TMEP) § 1715.02. See September 1, 2023 Letter of Protest Memorandum. I wonder how many are filed in a given year and how many are accepted.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Organization for Transformative Works Files Amicus Brief Supporting Grant of Certiorari in RAPUNZEL Standing Case

The Organization for Transformative Works (OTW), "a nonprofit organization founded by fans, whose mission is to serve the interests of fandom by both providing access to and preserving the history of noncommercial fanworks and fan culture in its myriad forms," has filed an amicus brief [pdf here] at the Supreme Court in support of Professor Revecca Curtin's petition for writ of certiorari in the RAPUNZEL case. In Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc., 2025 USPQ2d 784 (Fed. Cir. 2025), the CAFC ruled that Professor Curtin, as a mere consumer, lacked statutory standing to oppose registration of the mark RAPUNZEL for dolls and toy figures. Set out below are several excerpts from OTW's amicus brief.

This Court should grant certiorari to determine the minimal scope of the rights of the public to access and use those items in the public domain. The specific issue before the Court is whether the Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946 allows the federal government and courts, without direct authority from Congress, to exclude the public from objecting to the registration of a trademark regarding “Rapunzel,” a character that is indisputably in the public domain.

Imagine a single company being able to monopolize the market for dolls or figurines identified as the “Virgin Mary” or “Santa Claus” or “Cinderella” or “Uncle Sam,” and the public being unable to object. That is what is at stake here.

However, this Court has never addressed whether the public has standing to oppose an application to register a public domain term as the trademark of an item embodying public domain material under the framework used below as outlined in Lexmark International Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014).

In accepting the lower court’s analysis, wide swaths of now common items could be privatized in pieces thereby threatening the right of the public to use and create embodiments of characters like the Virgin Mary, Santa Claus, Cinderella, Rapunzel, and others in the public domain.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

• I. This Court Should Clarify the Role of the Public in Trademark Registration
• A. This Court has not addressed the role of the public domain in trademark registration 
• B. The Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the zone of interests for registration is unduly constrained
• i. The Lanham Act does not specify the zone of interest for opposing registration 
• C. One of the Lanham Act’s purposes is to protect the public from deceptive practices 
• E. (sic) Economic limitations and trademark bullies will drive out small businesses that participate in commerce and cater to the public.

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TTABlogger comment: The USPTO should have pulled back this application and re-examined it.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

TTABlog Test: Is TRIFOX for Bicycle Forks Confusable With FOX for Bicycle Shock Absorbers?

Fox Factory petitioned for cancellation of a registration for the mark TRIFOX for “bicycles; bicycle frames; bicycle handlebars; bicycle parts, namely, forks; bicycle parts, namely, handle bar stems; bicycle saddles; bicycle seat posts; bicycle water bottle cages; bicycle wheels,” claiming likely confusion with its registered mark FOX, in standard and logo form, for bicycle shock absorbers and other bicycle parts. How do you think this came out? Fox Factory, Inc. v. Dong Yongqiang, Cancellation No. 92081730 (November 6, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas W. Wellington).

In a cancellation proceeding where both parties own registrations, priority is in issue. Respondent Yongqiang did not introduce evidence of use of TRIFOX prior to Fox Factory's constructive first use dates (the filing dates of its underlying applications), and so Fox Factory had priority.

As to the goods, the Board agreed with Yongqiang that bicycle forks and shock absorbers are not legally identical, but "the evidence makes it abundantly clear that these two components are very closely related and share the same purpose, i.e., absorbing shocks from uneven terrain and assist control by keeping the bike’s wheels in contact a bike with the ground." Moreover, these items are "are offered to the same class of consumers, bike enthusiasts, and may be found in the same retail environments, namely, online and retail stores that sell bicycle parts."

The Board concluded that the second and third DuPont factors weigh "heavily" in favor of Fox Factory. [Why "heavily"? -ed.].

The Board found that the FOX marks to are inherently distinctive and also "enjoy significant marketplace presence with evidence showing considerable exposure amongst consumers of bicycle parts, particularly in the mountain bike marketplace." Yongqiang's evidence of third-party use and registration of FOX-containing marks, although not completely discounted, did "little to show any conceptual or marketplace weakness to Petitioner’s FOX marks."

The Board next found the involved marks to be "quite similar," "mainly due to the recognizable and arbitrary word FOX being the sole literal element in Petitioner’s marks and merely preceded by the prefix TRI- in Respondent’s mark."

Fox Factory admitted that it was unaware of any actual confusion, but it pointed to the results of a Squirt-style survey showing 50% confusion. The Board agreed with Yongqiang, however, that the survey "has very little probative value given the circumstances in this proceeding." 

That is, in view of Petitioner’s strong evidence showing significant commercial strength and consumer exposure to its FOX marks in connection with bicycle parts that include forks, the Squirt survey was ill-suited for purposes of showing the likelihood that consumers would be confused with respect to Petitioner’s FOX mark.

Yongqiang brought up the lack of evidence of actual confusion, but the Board observed that "there has not been a meaningful opportunity for actual confusion to have occurred." And so, the eighth DuPont factor was neutral

As to purchaser care, the Board noted that" the identifications of the parties’ goods in the registrations do not set a particular price point." It therefore presumed that the goods are offered to ordinary consumers at prices ranging from inexpensive to expensive, and it deemed the fourth DuPont factor to be neutral.

Balancing the relevant DuPont factors, the Board found confusion likely, and it granted the petition for cancellation.

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TTABlogger comment: The Board rejected Yongqiang's argument that Fox Factory's choice of the Squirt survey format was evidence of the weakness of its marks.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

TTABlog Test: Is DUO for Personal Mobility Devices Confusable with DUOPOWER for Land Vehicles?

The USPTO refused to register the mark DUO for "motorized, electric-powered, self-propelled, self-balancing, wheeled personal mobility, transportation device," finding confusion likely with the registered mark DUOPOWER for "electric vehicles, namely, buses; buses and land vehicles; engines and motors for buses and land vehicles; drive trains for use in land vehicles and power trains for use in land vehicles; vehicle power train mechanism comprised of clutch, transmission, drive shaft, and differential." Applicant DEKA argued that the goods are "divergent" because its device is fully electric while the registrant's vehicles are gas/electric-powered, that DUO is a weak formative, that the marks are "significantly different," and that consumers will exercise care in their purchasing decisions. How do you think this appeal came out? In re DEKA Research & Development Corp., Serial No. 98740807 (November 7, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Catherine Dugan O'Connor).

Beginning with the goods, the Board found DEKA's "motorized, electric-powered, self-propelled, self-balancing, wheeled personal mobility, transportation device" to be fully encompassed within Registrant’s "land vehicles," and so it deemed the goods legally identical in part. The legally identical goods presumably travel in the same trade channels to the same classes of consumers. The Board concluded that "the second and third DuPont factors weigh heavily in favor of likelihood of confusion." [Why "heavily"? - ed.].

Regarding the strength or weakness of the cited mark, DEKA pointed to four existing registrations for DUO-formative marks - DUOLEVER for motorcycles and parts therefor; DUO-SKID for street sweeper vehicles; and DUO LIFT for agricultural implements; and REV FLEX DUO for ambulances - but only three were relevant, they were too few in number, and each included an additional element not present in either DEKA’s mark or the cited mark. The Board found the sixth DuPont factor to be neutral.

Turning to the marks, the Board observed that "the common element DUO is the leading term in each mark, rendering it dominant in position, and most likely to be noticed and remembered by consumers." The Board rejected DEKA's argument that the commercial impressions of the marks "diverge meaningfully" due to a purported association of DUOPOWER with hybrid vehicles. "There is no evidence that the addition of POWER changes the meaning of DUO in DUOPOWER."

The Board opined that the word POWER "has some descriptive or suggestive meaning when used with Registrant’s goods, including 'buses and land vehicles,' which must have a power source to operate. It is also descriptive to the extent it is laudatory in nature." "[T]o the extent it is descriptive or suggestive it is appropriately given less weight in the likelihood of confusion analysis than the more distinctive term DUO"

Moreover, according to the Board, "consumers may perceive DUO, the more source-identifying part of the mark, as a brand extension of the senior DUOPOWER mark." [Really? Are consumers that dumb? -ed.].

Considering the involved marks in their entireties, the Board deemed them "similar," and so, the first DuPont factor weighed in favor of likelihood of confusion.

The Board next found that the involved goods "are not the subject of routine purchases, such that consumers may exercise some care in purchasing, but we are mindful that even careful or sophisticated consumers are not immune from source confusion." It found that the fourth DuPont factor weighed slightly against a likelihood of confusion.

Balancing the pertinent DuPont factors, the Board concluded that confusion is likely and so it affirmed the refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: Is this an example of the "stacked deck" against Section 2(d) appellants? Seems like the Board knew what conclusion it wanted to reach, and then mechanically applied various of its standard formulae to get there.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

TTAB Affirms Refusal of PARKAI Application for Failed Response to Rule 2.61(b) Request for Information

In this application to register the proposed mark PARKAI for parking meters, parking lot services, and monitoring of parking, the USPTO refused registration on the ground of mere descriptiveness and, as to some of the class 9 goods, indefiniteness of the identification. Examining Attorney Drew Ciurpita also requested information and documentation regarding the goods and services, under Rule 2.61(b). The Board affirmed the last refusal due to Applicant MPS's "failure to respond adequately" to that request. In re Municipal Parking Services, Inc., Serial No. 98187940 (November 5, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christopher C. Larkin).

Under Rule 2.61(b), "[t]he Office may require the applicant to furnish such information, exhibits, affidavits or declarations, and such additional specimens as may be reasonably necessary to the proper examination of the application."

The Board found that the Examining Attorney's requests for information were reasonably necessary to the proper examination of the application because (1) the information is directly relevant to whether the wording [PARK] in the proposed mark . . . is merely descriptive of the goods and services identified in the application," and (2) because "the Examining Attorney’s questions regarding the possible use of artificial intelligence properly sought information that is directly relevant to whether the initialism AI in the proposed mark . . . is merely descriptive of the goods and services identified in the application."

The question, then, was whether Applicant MPS complied with the requests “fully and in good faith.” DTI P’Ship, 2003 WL 22169270, at *3 n.3.

MPS argued that it filed the application based on intent to use and therefore did not possess the requested information. The Board pointed out, however, that "[i]ntent-to-use applicants are not exempted from responding to information requests simply because use of the proposed mark has not yet commenced." SICPA Holding, 2021 WL 2374679, at *1 n.1. "To the contrary . . . information requests are especially useful where, as here, an 'application is based on intent-to-use' and the identifications of goods and services are 'technical in nature.' DTI P’Ship, 2003 WL 22169270, at *3 n.3."

The Board took judicial notice of MPS's ownership of a registration for mark SENTRY for the same goods and services as identified in classes 9 and 39 here, in which it claimed a first use date in 2014.

Applicant cannot possibly have no “[f]actual information about the [Class 9] goods [including] how they operate, salient features, and prospective customers and channels of trade,” no “factual information [including] what the [Class 39] services are and how they are rendered, salient features, and prospective customers and channels of trade,” and no documents reflecting those goods and services.

As to MPS's "highly technical" class 42 and 45 services, all of which are described as "using computers or sensors," MPS stressed its bona fide intent regarding those services  The Board found it "simply impossible to believe that Applicant has no 'factual information [including] what the . . . services are and how they are rendered, salient features, and prospective customers and channels of trade,' and no documents reflecting those services."

Applicant’s suggestion that it does not understand what is meant by the letters “AI” is disingenuous at best in view of the current ubiquitous use of “AI” in American English. *** At a minimum, it is self-evident that Applicant itself knows what it means by the letters “AI” in its mark, but it did not provide even that information to the Examining Attorney.

And so, finding that MPS "failed to respond fully and in good faith to the Examining Attorney’s information requests," the Board affirmed the refusal under Rule 2.61(b) and declined to reach the other two refusals.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Was MPS's claim of lack of intelligence artificial?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

TTABlog Celebrates 21st Anniversary !

Well actually it's tomorrow, November 8th. The TTABlog debuted on November 8, 2004, with a post entitled "Leo Stoller Loses Again." (here). Here we are, more than 5,800 blog posts and 15,000 "tweets" later. Thank you all for reading!

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Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Precedential No. 10: TTAB Explains How to Submit Video Evidence, Reverses 2(d) Refusal of GASPER ROOFING Over JASPER CONTRACTORS

In a rather lackluster Section 2(d) ruling, the Board reversed a refusal to register the (standard character) mark GASPER ROOFING [ROOFING disclaimed], finding confusion unlikely with the registered mark JASPER CONTRACTORS [CONTRACTORS disclaimed], both for roofing services. The Board rejected the examining attorney's argument that GASPER and JASPER might be pronounced the same, and concluded that the differences in the marks and the "elevated level of purchaser care" outweighed the identity of the services and presumed channels of trade. Preliminarily, after rejecting Applicant Jimenez's attempt to submit YouTube videos, the Board explained how best to submit video evidence in connection with an ex parte appeal. In re Jason Jimenez, 2025 USPQ2d 1355 (TTAB 2025) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Angela Lykos).

Video Evidence: An applicant may make video files of record during prosecution by submitting them in one of the formats designated as acceptable by the USPTO (see TMEP 904.03). However, once the TTAB has jurisdiction over an ex parte appeal and the time for filing a request for reconsideration has lapsed, "the only way to make a new video of record is to file with the Board a separately captioned written request for remand with a showing of good cause prior to the deadline for filing an applicant’s main appeal brief."

Practitioners should note that unlike during prosecution with TMEO (the Trademark Examining Operation electronic filing system), ESTTA, the Board’s filing system for uploading submissions via TTABVUE does not have the technical capacity to accept video files. Applicants should, if possible, file a transcript of the video content to support the request for remand with the Board, and indicate that if and when the remand request is granted and jurisdiction is restored to the examining attorney, the applicant will submit the video file through TMEO’s electronic filing system so that it can be uploaded to TSDR. This is another reason why applicants should not wait until after the filing of a notice of appeal to attempt to make video evidence of record.

Section 2(d): Relying on the line of case law holding that there is no correct pronunciation of a trademark, the examining attorney maintained that the surname GASPER and the term JASPER are phonetic equivalents because GASPER can be pronounced with a hard or soft letter “g” sound. The Board was unimpressed: "Because neither GASPER or JASPER is a coined term, case law . . . does not require us to find that these two terms may be pronounced in an identical manner."

The record in this case establishes that “Gasper” is a surname that begins with the letter strings “G-a-s” and “G-a-s-p,” each of which forms the words “gas” and “gasp” that are recognized in U.S. English, and pronounced with a hard letter “g” sound. * * * The dictionary entry for “jasper” further shows that it is pronounced as “ˈja-spər” with the soft letter “j” sound and not with the hard letter “g” sound. Therefore, contrary to the Examining Attorney’s argument, we find that “Gasper” would be pronounced with a hard letter “g” sound and that “Jasper” would be pronounced with a soft “j” sound, consistent with the rules of pronunciation for U.S. English. We find that “Gasper” and “Jasper” sound different when verbalized.

Further considering the differences in appearance and sound of the marks in their entireties, and the differences in connotation and overall commercial impression, the Board found that the first DuPont factor weighed against a finding of likelihood of confusion.

Moreover, the evidence supported a finding that "roofing service purchases may involve multiple steps and may be complex. As a result, even the least sophisticated consumer is likely to exercise an elevated level of care." The fourth DuPont factor therefore weighed against a likelihood of confusion.

Applicant Jiminez pointed to the lack of evidence of actual confusion, but the Board observed that "[t]he Examining Attorney is under no obligation to adduce such evidence in an ex parte appeal." In any event, “[t]he relevant test is likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion.”

Conclusion: The Board found that "the dissimilarity of the marks in sound, appearance, meaning and commercial impression is sufficiently great that, coupled with an elevated level of purchaser care, [it] outweighs the identical nature of the services, trade channels and classes of consumers." And so, the Board concluded that there is no likelihood of confusion, and it reversed the refusal.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: What about filings in inter partes proceedings? Since the TTAB's ESTTA electronic filing system is unable to accept audio or video files, a party must record the materials on an appropriate medium, such as a CD-ROM or DVD, and physically file that medium with the Board. See TBMP 106.03; Hunter Industries, Inc. v. The Toro Company, 110 USPQ2d 1651 (TTAB 2014) pdf here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

TTAB Orders Cancellation of EDGE GAMES Registration Due to Nonuse, Rejecting Founder's Testimony

In a rare case in which a party proved a negative, the Board granted Mobigame's petition for cancellation of a registration for the mark EDGE GAMES for computer game software, on the ground of nonuse. The Board found that the case "ultimately . . .turns on the answer to a simple question: do we believe the testimony of Dr. Timothy Langdell, the CEO of Respondent Edge Games, Inc., that Respondent used the mark EDGE GAMES on or before the date it filed the use-based application that matured into the challenged registration?" The answer was "no." Mobigame v. Edge Games, Inc., Cancellation No. 92075393 (October 30, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande).

The CAFC has acknowledged that "proving nonuse is essentially 'prov[ing] a negative,' which can be challenging, . . . [but] 'direct evidence' is not required: it is perfectly appropriate to rely on 'proper inferences' from indirect evidence."

Where the testimony of use comes only from an interested witness “testifying long after the events happened …, such testimony … should be most carefully scrutinized” to make sure it is reliable. B.R. Baker Co. v. Lebow Bros., 150 F.2d 580, 583-84 (CCPA 1945). The testimony should not be “characterized by contradictions, inconsistencies and indefiniteness,” but rather should carry with it “conviction of its accuracy and applicability.”

Mobigame relied on circumstantial evidence to show that Respondent did not use the mark before filing its application: prior enforcement litigation and other assertions regarding various EDGE marks of Respondent, but never the mark EDGE GAMES; testimony from Mobigame's CEO and founder that he was unaware of any use by Respondent of EDGE GAMES as a mark prior to the filing date of Respondent’s underlying application (October 7, 2010); and Respondent's filing of that application on the day after it agreed to a the stipulated judgment cancelling its EDGE registrations.

The clear inference we draw from this circumstantial evidence is that before October 2010, Respondent never considered EDGE GAMES a trademark—and never used it as such.

In rebuttal, Respondent relied solely on the testimony of its CEO, Dr. Langdell, but the Board found his testimony to be "wholly unreliable."

He testified repeatedly that his memory of events prior to 2010 is weak, or nonexistent. His testimony about whether, as CEO of Respondent or its predecessor, he worked with any other corporate officers is both contradictory and simultaneously vague. He was evasive, nonresponsive, and argumentative during his two depositions in this case. And, while this case was pending and in the trial period, he lied to the USPTO in filing his combined Section 8/15 Declaration for the very registration at issue here.

Reviewing past rulings by the Board and various courts involving Dr. Langdell, the Board saw "an astoundingly abysmal record of disregard and contempt for the solemnity and integrity of government adjudicatory proceedings involving Respondent’s trademarks, and repeated instances of untruthfulness in such cases on the part of Dr. Langdell." From these rulings, the Board drew "a level of comfort" that its decision to reject Dr. Langdell’s testimony about pre-filing use "is not an outlier."

In sum, the Board found "no credible evidence in the record that Respondent, prior to filing its application, used EDGE GAMES as a trademark" for computer game software. It therefore ruled that Mobigame had proven its nonuse claim by a preponderance of the evidence, and so it granted the petition for cancellation.

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TTABlogger comment: In proving the negative, taking the deposition of Dr. Langdell was crucial. Compare the recent FAT KATZ case, TTABlogged here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Recommended Reading: A Legal Strategist's Guide to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Practice, Fifth Edition

The American Bar Association has just published the Fifth Edition of "A Legal Strategist's Guide to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Practice," edited by the indefatigable Ted Davis. To quote myself from the back cover: "A must-have resource for both TTAB tyro and veteran, this book combines legal expertise with practical insights. Well-organized and plentifully annotated, it will make us all much better TTAB practitioners." The book may be purchased here for a very modest sum.

The Introduction by Ted Davis reminds us that this project was the brainchild of the late Judge Jonathan Hudis, a force of nature in the trademark field, admired and befriended by many.

In this helpful guide, experienced trademark lawyers and specialists who practice before the U.S. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board share invaluable analysis and practical insights drawn from their years of practice. Chapters include a checklist of critical items to consider during each stage of a Board proceeding. This updated edition considers all relevant case law, as well as the 2021 and 2023 changes to the Board's rules.

Now completely updated, this one-of-its-kind treatment provides invaluable analysis and practical insights from an array of experienced attorneys who practice before the U.S. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.

This edition considers all relevant case law, as well as the 2021 and 2023 changes to the Board's rules. Every chapter clearly describes and analyzes a separate facet of Board practice and concludes with a valuable checklist of items for practitioners to bear in mind during each stage of a Board proceeding. Topics include:

• Inter partes matters and prefiling considerations
• Pleadings and commencement of proceedings
• Disclosures and discovery
• Motion practice
• Trial procedures and rules of evidence
• The use of experts
• Briefs on final hearing and oral argument
• Appeals from final TTAB decisions
• Settlement, alternative dispute resolution, and accelerated case resolution
• Ex parte appeals
• Ethical issues when practicing before the Board

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TTABlogger comment: It's on my desk.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Which of These Three Section 2(d) Refusals Was/Were Reversed?

The TTAB affirmance rate for Section 2(d) appeals last year fell just under 90%. So far this year it's back to 90%. Here are three recent Board decisions, at least one of which reversed the refusal. How do you think they came out? [Answer in first comment].

In re Greg Gillespie, Serial No. 97840298 (October 29, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark DRAGONSLAYER, in standard form, for "Role playing game equipment in the nature of downloadable game book manuals," and "Role playing game equipment in the nature of printed game book manuals," in view of the registered mark shown below, for "Board games and equipment sold as a unit for playing boardgames."]

In re MVE Biological Solutions US, LLC, Serial No. 97930469 (October 30, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Elizabeth K. Brock). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark CRYOCUBE for “Refrigerated shipping container” in view of the identical mark registered for "Freezers and refrigerators used in scientific laboratories."]

In re Biogena GmbH & Co KG, Serial No. 79396760 (October 30, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Jennifer L. Elgin). [Section 2(d) refusal to register the mark shown immediately below, for, inter alia, dietary and nutritional supplements for sports and increased performance for medical purposes, in view of the registered mark JUPITER for "Dietary supplements; dietary supplemental drinks in the nature of vitamin and mineral beverages."]

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TTABlogger comment: How did you do? See any WYHA?s ?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.