Thursday, January 31, 2008

TTAB Dimisses 2(d) Opposition for Lack of Evidence: Opposer's Notice of Reliance Mailed to Wrong PTO Address

Another Section 2(d) opposition went off the track when an opposer failed to submit evidence properly into the record. Here, Opposer El Dorado Park Self Service attempted to file a Notice of Reliance, but mailed it to the old PTO address in Arlington, Virginia, rather than the new address in Alexandria. It arrived at the PTO after El Dorado's testimony period had closed and therefore was untimely. And in any case, the evidence that Opposer tried to submit, a telephone directory advertisement, did not show its supposed mark "TOO MUCH STUFF?" used as a source indicator. The Board therefore dismissed the opposition. El Dorado Park Self Storage v. Yelenich, Opposition No. 91159837 (January 18, 2008 [not precedential].


El Dorado did not take testimony but did submit by mail its Notice of Reliance on the last day of its testimony period. However, in addition to improperly including many documents that were not the proper subject matter for a Notice of Reliance, El Dorado addressed the Notice to the PTO's old Arlington, Virginia address. The PTO did not actually receive the notice until three days later. Applicant Yelenich moved for an order striking the Notice as untimely, and for judgment based upon Opposer's failure to submit evidence. Opposer did not contest the motion.

The Board agreed with Applicant Yelenich that the Notice of Reliance was untimely, noting the statement in the TMEP that the certificate of mailing requirements are strictly enforced. It dismissed the opposition under Rule 2.132(a) because El Dorado had not offered any evidence.

Moreover, the Board observed that, even if El Dorado could be permitted to amend the mailing certificate to state the correct mailing address, or even if its testimony period could be reopened to make its Notice of Reliance timely, El Dorado would still fail to meet its burden of proof. The only proper evidence included in its Notice of Reliance was a telephone directory listing (shown above) displaying the phrase "Too Much Stuff?" On its face, however, the directory listing "fails to show ... that as displayed the term 'Too Much Stuff?' functions as a service mark which would be perceived by purchasers and prospective customers of opposer's services as identifying and distinguishing its alleged self-storage services."

"Instead, as used therein, such term appears simply to ask consumers the rhetorical question of whether they have accumulated 'too much stuff' and hence would need to rent space for their 'stuff' in self-storage facilities of the kind offered under the mark and the associated logo 'EL DORADO PARK SELF STORAGE.'"

The Board thus delivered an alternative knockout punch to the already defeated Opposer.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

Wednesday, January 30, 2008

Mesmerized by Fame of "VANITY FAIR" Mark, TTAB Sustains 2(d) Opposition to "VANITY INSANITY" for Clothing

Here's the scenario: famous mark holder versus pro se applicant in a TTAB 2(d) opposition. Take a guess as to who wins? Not Applicant Kelly C. Hainline. Like the lady who backed into the airplane propeller, it was "dis-as-ter" when she tried to register the marks VANITY INSANITY, VANITY & SANITY, and VANITY N SANITY for clothing and athletic apparel. The Board found the marks likely to cause confusion with the famous mark VANITY FAIR, registered for underwear, pajamas, and like clothing items. Vanity Fair, Inc. v. Hainline, Oppositions Nos. 91163354, 91166973, and 91166975 (January 15, 2008) [not precedential].

Vanity Fair argument?

The Board began its analysis with the fifth du Pont factor, the fame of the mark. The record evidence showed that the VANITY FAIR mark has been used for 90 years, and that Opposer's sales and advertising figures [filed under seal] are "very substantial and certainly large enough to support a finding of fame." Indeed, the Board found that the VANITY FAIR mark has achieved a "significant degree of fame." And of course, fame "weighs heavily in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion."

Turning to the goods, the Board observed that the applications and Opposer's registrations, respectively, include lingerie, loungewear, sleepwear, and underwear. Therefore, the second du Pont factor weighs in Opposer's favor. As to the third factor, the Board must presume that the goods travel in all normal trade channels to all normal classes of consumers. Thus this factor, too, favored Opposer. Likewise, the fourth factor, the conditions under which the goods are purchased, favored Opposer, since the goods are ordinary consumer items purchased with only ordinary care.

Finally, the Board turned to the first du Pont factor, the similarity of the marks. The Board deemed the word VANITY to be the dominant feature of all the marks: "The other words in the respective marks also contribute to the marks' commercial impression and we have given them due consideration, but we deem VANITY to be the most prominent feature of the marks and we therefore accord it the most significant weight in our comparison of the marks." [Game, set, and match - ed.]

Moreover, "the similarity in appearance and sound which results from the presence of VANITY in both marks outweighs the difference between the marks which result from the presence of the different additional wording." And although the marks are "somewhat dissimilar in connotation," the presence of the word VANITY gives them similar commercial impressions.

In sum, because Opposer's VANITY FAIR mark is famous, it is entitled to a "very broad scope of protection." "Given the long use and fame of opposer's VANITY FAIR mark, potential purchasers are likely to view applicant's mark beginning with the word VANITY as whimsical, contemporary variations on opposer's mark," and so confusion is likely.

The Board therefore sustained the three oppositions.

TTABlog comment: Does anyone believe that, in the real world, a half-way intelligent person would find these marks confusingly similar? Oops, I forgot. We're not dealing with the real world here. My bad.

Why is VANITY the dominant portion of all the marks? What about the alliteration of VANITY SANITY? What about the recognized meaning of the two-word phrase VANITY FAIR?

The lesson for Opposers, once again, is this: take the time and make the effort to prove that your mark is as strong as possible. The likelihood of your success in a 2(d) opposition will increase exponentially.

TTABlog postscript: The CAFC affirmed this decision in a nonprecedential dated December 5, 2008.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

Tuesday, January 29, 2008

Precedential No. 1: TTAB Reverses Mere Descriptiveness Refusal of "SUGAR No. 11" For Futures Exchange Services and Finds Specimen of Use Acceptable

In its first precedential decision of 2008, and an unusually dull ruling at that, the Board reversed the PTO's Section 2(e)(1) refusals to register the marks SUGAR NO. 1 1 , SUGAR NO. 14, and COTTON NO. 2 [SUGAR and COTTON disclaimed], finding the marks not merely descriptive of "financial services, namely, futures exchange and related commodity trading services." In addition, the Board reversed the PTO's refusal of registration based on the ground that Applicant's specimens fail to show use of each mark in connection with the identified services. In re ICE Futures U.S., Inc., 85 USPQ2d 1664 (TTAB 2008) [precedential].


Mere Descriptiveness: The PTO argued that the words SUGAR and COTTON identify the type of commodity being traded, and the wording NO. 2, NO. 11, and NO. 14 identify the contract numbers that the applicant provides for its future exchanges. Applicant pointed out that investors trade, buy, or sell contracts from each other, according to the established rules set forth by the SUGAR NO. 11, SUGAR NO. 14, and COTTON NO. 2 contract terms.

Applicant ICE asserted that none of the more than 100 commodity exchanges worldwide offer services concerning the SUGAR NO. 11, SUGAR NO. 14, or COTTON NO. 2 contracts. Those services are exclusively associated with Applicant. And the numbers 2, 11, and 14 are arbitrary.

The Board noted that "While the full marks identify contracts with detailed, uniform terms, the record established that applicant created those terms for its exclusive use in the rendering of its services." Third-party references to those terms "shows a consistent, explicit association with applicant."

The Board found that the marks "do not identify a commodity applicant sells, as the Examining Attorney argues." Furthermore, there is no evidence that others need to use these terms to compete. Accordingly, the marks are not merely descriptive of the services.

Specimens of Use: Applicant's specimens of use comprised printouts from its website discussing the trading specifics (hours, ticket symbol, etc.). "At the top of the page appears a link to the contract specifications for futures trading associated with the Subject Marks." Below the link is a header that states, e.g., FUTURES CONTRACT ON SUGAR NO. 14 (DOMESTIC)." [See below].

Click on photo for larger picture

The Examining Attorney argued that the term SUGAR NO. 14, for example, appearing on the specimen merely identified the name of the contract and did not function as a source indicator for the services.

The Board ruled that these specimens were sufficient, "based on the context of use and the history of applicant's exclusive use in the industry."

"In the cases we consider here, when we view the full context of the use of the marks, including the "futures contract" wording, we conclude that the inclusion of this wording would not interfere with the perception of the marks as service marks for futures exchange services by relevant consumers. While the marks may also identify the futures contracts, again contracts which, on this record, are unique to applicant, the contracts are an integral and essential component of the identified services, that is, the operation of a futures exchange."

According to the Board, "the connection between the marks and services is evident and need not be stated explicitly as the Examining Attorney implies." The prominent use of the marks in the corresponding regulations further confirms their service mark status. [Huh? - ed.] Again acknowledging long and exclusive use of the marks, the Board concluded that the specimens show use of the marks as source indicators.

TTABlog comment: Wow, was the Board determined to rule in favor of Applicant, or what? Apparently if one uses a term long enough, and exclusively, the requirements for proper specimens of use go out the window. How in the heck are Applicant's specimens of use proper for its services? The specimens refer to the contracts and the terms. Is a contract a service? I just don't see it.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

Monday, January 28, 2008

PTO Letters of Protest: Is "CYBERLAW" Registrable?

In Blawg Review #144, Kevin A. Thompson reports that a Washington, D.C. lawyer named Eric Menhart has filed an application to register the term CYBERLAW as a service mark for various legal services (Serial No. 77341910). Mr. Menhart has been so bold as to send a cease-and-desist letter to another blogger. Many have protested, including Mr. Thompson, whose own blog is called Cyberlaw Central. They believe the term "Cyberlaw" is generic, or at least descriptive, of legal services involving Internet issues.

Kevin A. Thompson

Just to throw in my own two cents, I agree with the protesters, and I recommend that each one file a Letter of Protest with the PTO. Several years ago (here), I wrote a posting about Letters of Protest, the supposed "mark" then in question being PODCAST (Serial No. 78564869).]

Letters of protest are discussed at Section 1715 of the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure. A Letter of Protest may be sent to: Letters of Protest, ATTN Trademark Administrator, 600 Dulany Street, MDE-4B89, Alexandria, Virginia 22314-5793. The letter should not be send directly to the Examining Attorney.

As to the contents of the letter, Section 1715.01 (a)(1) sets forth several "Issues Appropriate As Subject of Letter of Protest." The first of three of the "most common areas of protest" is applicable here:

"(1) A third party files an objection to the registration of a term because it is allegedly generic or descriptive. The objection must be accompanied by evidence of genericness or descriptiveness. The evidence should be objective, independent, factual evidence that the examining attorney can use to support the suggested refusal. Personal opinions are subjective and may be self-serving, and are not forwarded to the examining attorney. If the protest is granted, the examining attorney is informed that an objection to registration has been filed on the ground that the mark is generic or descriptive, and is given a copy of any factual evidence submitted with the letter of protest."

The fee required for filing a letter of protest: nothing. The satisfaction to be gained from voicing your objection: priceless!

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

TTAB Reverses Ornamental Refusal of Embossed Design on Tire; PTO Fails to Make Prima Facie Case

The Board reversed an "ornamental" refusal to register the design mark shown below for vehicle tires, finding that the PTO Examining Attorney had failed to make a prima facie case that the mark is merely ornamental and does not function as a trademark (Sections 1, 2, and 45 of the Trademark Act). In re Tire Mart, Inc., Serial No. 78292388 (January 22, 2008) [not precedential].


Applicant's specimens (see below) show the lightning bolt design molded into the outside shoulder of the tire and extending onto the sidewall. The groups of three lighting bolts is repeated some 15 to 20 times around the tire. The Board pointed out that the issue of functionality (Section 2(e)(5)) was not raised by the PTO.


The fact that a mark may be "visually pleasing" or ornamental odes not mean it cannot be registered. The question for the Board was "whether applicant's mark is inherently distinctive; in other words, whether - as used on the specimens - the mark is an indication of source notwithstanding any aesthetic qualities it may have."

Recognizing that its conclusion is "somewhat subjective," the Board found that the PTO's evidence and argument does not support the refusal.

The Examining Attorney submitted pictures of other tires with various tread designs to demonstrate that "tire tread consists of many designs that resemble recognized objects." The Board, however, could find no "designs resembl[ing] objects" on the PTO's pictures, and it noted Applicant's argument that its embossed mark is not "tread" in the sense of tire lugs. The specimens showed that the molded design has a "considerably lower profile than the adjacent tread." Moreover, the mark does not appear "where the rubber meets the road."

The Board did agree with the PTO that Applicant's evidence of use of the mark on collateral gods was entitled to little weight, since it did not address the issue of whether consumers would view the lightning bolt design as a source indicator for tires.

On the other hand, the PTO did not provide any evidence that Applicant's design or similarly-placed designs "are widely-viewed as mere ornamentation in the tire industry" (unlike, for example, whitewall on tires). In short, there was essentially no evidence one way or the other as to whether Applicant's design would be perceived as a trademark. Because the PTO had the burden of proof to make at least a prima facie case to support its refusal, the Board reversed.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

Friday, January 25, 2008

Finding Acquired Distinctiveness and Substantial Exclusivity Lacking, TTAB Cancels Registration for the Color Gold for Fluorescent Lamps

In a rare "color" case, the Board granted the consolidated petitions of three companies for cancellation of the registration for a mark comprising the single color gold applied to the end caps of fluorescent lamps. It ruled that the subject mark had not acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) and that Respondent's use of the mark had not been substantially exclusive. H & H Indus. Inc. v. LTG, Ltd., Cancellations Nos. 92042050, 92042382, and 92042496 (January 11, 2008) [not precedential].

The Petitioners contended that Respondent "has not enjoyed substantially exclusive use of the color gold due both to petitioners' use of the identical designation on the end caps of various types of fluorescent lamps as well as third-party use of the identical or similar designations therefor." They further contended that Respondent failed to show customer recognition of the color gold as a source identifier for its lamps.

Respondent bore the burden of persuasion on the issue of acquired distinctiveness, a "difficult" burden for a color mark. Evidence developed after registration, as well as pre-registration evidence, must be considered.

Turning first to the sufficiency of Respondent's 2(f) evidence, the Board noted that sales figures indicated a "substantial degree of success," but evidence was lacking as to Respondent's market share or sales ranking. Moreover, sales figures show only the popularity of the product, not that consumers view the gold end caps as a trademark.

Respondent's marketing materials were directed to its sales representatives, not customers, and it was "not clear therefrom that such end caps are displayed as a trademark so much as a feature of respondent's lamps." Furthermore, the materials display numerous products under a variety of marks, and so it is unclear how much of the advertising expenditures relate to the products with gold end caps.

Respondent submitted 28 form affidavits during prosecution, which affidavits the Board found unpersuasive: they were cursory in nature and lacked basic information regarding the bases for the statements made; they were made by "regular customers for various lengths of time," rather than the average purchaser of fluorescent tubes; and the affiants did not state that they recognized the gold end caps as a trademark.

Given the heavy burden to prove acquired distinctiveness for a color mark, Respondent's proofs were insufficient to convince the Board that the public recognizes the color gold as a trademark for Respondent's products.

Turning to the issue of exclusivity of use, the cumulative effect of the use of the color gold by the Petitioner, as well as numerous third-party uses, led the Board to rule that Respondent's use "fails to qualify as 'substantially exclusive' as required under Section 2(f)." The Board rejected the contention that only uses commenced prior to Respondent's adoption of the gold color are probative on this issue. Moreover, even though there was little evidence as to the "precise extent" of the third-party use, "such users are too numerous to ignore."


In sum, the Board concluded that Respondent's use of its alleged color mark "has not been substantially exclusive," and that the evidence of acquired distinctiveness was insufficient to support a registration under Section 2(f).

TTABlog query: When is the last time the Board upheld the validity of a single color registration? I think it may have been in Newborn Bros. v. Dripless, Inc., Opposition No. 91113471 (August 16, 2002) [not precedential], involving the color yellow for a caulking gun. On the 2(f) issue, the Board there found "particularly significant" Applicant’s “extensive ‘image’ advertising and promotion stressing the color 'yellow' in a trademark sense.”

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

Thursday, January 24, 2008

TTAB Rule of Thumb: Introduce No Evidence, Lose Your Opposition

One may safely posit the following rule: an Opposer who fails to introduce evidence will lose at the TTAB. Healix Infusion Therapy, Inc. fell victim to that rule in its opposition to registration of the mark HELIX for computer software in the healthcare field. Healix claimed likely confusion with its registered mark HELIX for healthcare-related cost management and record maintenance services. However, it failed to introduce its registrations into the record and offered no evidence whatsoever. Ergo, it lost. Healix Infusion Therapy, Inc. v. Cerner Corp., Opposition No. 91170997 (January 10, 2008) [not precedential].


Opposer Healix pleaded ownership of one registration and three pending applications; by the time of trial, the applications had issued to registration. But none of Opposer's four registrations were offered in evidence.

Healix argued that, even though it did not comply with Rule 2.122(d), the Board should take judicial notice of its registrations. No, said the Board. It does not take judicial notice of registrations. See In re Duofold Inc., 184 USPQ 638 (TTAB 1974).

Healix also urged that Applicant Cerner had admitted Opposer's ownership in its answer to the notice of opposition. Cerner, however, stated that it was "without information sufficient to admit or deny the allegations ..., and therefore denies same." Healix boldly asserted that Applicant "could have quickly verified, through the USPTO's records, the truth of opposer's allegations ... and that by denying such allegations without attempting to verify them, applicant's answer is 'evasive' and therefore constitutes an admission." Again the Board said no way. Applicant's answer followed FRCP Rule 8(b), and was a proper denial. Moreover, it was not Applicant's job to verify Opposer's ownership; it was Opposer's obligation to follow Rule 2.122(d).


Having failed to introduce any evidence as to ownership of its registrations, Healix did not establish its standing to oppose. The Board therefore dismissed the proceeding with prejudice.

TTABlog comment: Here's a question for you: Why shouldn't the Board take judicial notice of the PTO records? Amended Rule 2.122(d) allows a party to submit a pleaded registration by attaching ordinary copies from the PTO database regarding status and title. Why not just take judicial notice of that information? Or at least create a rebuttable presumption that the PTO information is correct?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2007.

Wednesday, January 23, 2008

The Ten Worst TTAB Decisions of 2007? [Part 2 of 2]

Here for your reading pleasure is the second batch of the "ten worst" Board decisions of last year. The first five were TTABlogged here yesterday. As you read these postings, please bear in mind that it takes a skilled carpenter to build a barn, but any jackass can knock it down. Or so they say. I've never actually confirmed this.


The Children's Inn at NIH v. Bhandari, Opposition No. 91120549 (December 17, 2007) [not precedential]. Applicant Vinod Bhandari's eight-year quest for registration of the mark KIDS INN for hotel, motel, and restaurant services ended in futility at the TTAB. Although in 1999 the Board had ruled, in an ex parte appeal, that Bhandari's mark was not confusingly similar to the registered mark CHILDREN'S INN for "lodging services for use of children and their families who are patients at NIH," the Board here sustained the opposition subsequently filed by The Children's Inn at NIH. However, because the NIH's registration was not renewed, it had to rely on its common law rights (arising from a single facility on the NIH grounds). The Board noted that Applicant Bhandhari's recitation of services was broadly worded, and therefore that it must assume those services would include "offering lodging to families that travel to Maryland for treatment at NIH." It then astonishingly ruled that these consumers "would exercise nothing more than ordinary care in making their decisions regarding nearby lodging in connection with a family's visit to NIH." The Board found that the marks convey the same meaning and, given the notoriety of the CHILDREN'S INN AT NIH, that confusion was likely. [If your child were ill and a patient at NIH, would you use only ordinary care in choosing lodging for your family? Would you not notice the difference between the CHILDREN'S INN at NIH and KIDS INN? - ed.] (TTABlogged here).

The Children's Inn at NIH

In re Deutsche Telekom AG, Serial No. 78492246 (March 7, 2007) [not precedential]. Missapplying Knight Textiles, the Board reversed a Section 2(d) refusal of the mark T-MOBILE NEWS EXPRESS for various telecommunication and information technology services ["news express" disclaimed], finding it not likely to cause confusion with the registered mark NEWSEXPRESS for electronic telecommunication services. Even though the marks are used for "closely related, if not identical services, marketed in the same trade channels and to the same classes of consumers," the Board found that the dissimilarity of the marks "outweighs the other factors." The PTO cogently argued that Applicant "has simply taken registrant’s nearly identical mark, NEWSEXPRESS, and added its T-Mobile house mark to it," but the Board found that the addition of Applicant's house mark is sufficient to avoid a likelihood of confusion, citing Knight Textile. But there, the record included 23 third-party registrations for clothing items in which the marks included the word ESSENTIALS. Those third-party registrations corroborated the dictionary definition of "essentials," leading the Board to find the mark NORTON McNAUGHTON ESSENTIALS not confusingly similar to the registered mark ESSENTIALS for clothing. Here, however, there was no similar evidence regarding the term NEWSEXPRESS, and yet the Board effectively stripped that registration of any strength. (TTABlogged here).


In re Cheezwhse.com, Inc., Serial Nos. 78711311 and 78730624 (October 29, 2007) [not precedential]. Despite a questionable evidentiary record, the mark NAPOLEON BRIE (in standard character and design form) for cheese [BRIE disclaimed] met its Waterloo at the TTAB. The Board, relying primarily on third-party registration evidence to show the relatedness of the goods, affirmed a Section 2(d) refusal in view of the registered mark NAPOLEON for "edible oils, namely, salad oil, olive oil processed vegetables, namely, cocktail onions, baby corn, stir-fry vegetables, hearts of palm, artichokes; processed seafood, namely, anchovies, oysters, mussels and sardines; and processed olives, vinegar, capers and pasta." The PTO submitted ten third-party registrations “for marks for goods that include cheese and many or all of the registrant’s identified goods,” as well as two websites that provide recipes using cheese and one or more of Registrant’s goods, and a third website offering “gift tins, with the featured tin including ‘brie cheese’ and ‘gourmet olives.’” The Board sided with the PTO, even though the Examining Attorney offered no evidence (e.g., websites) that the relevant goods are actually being offered under the same mark, even though the evidentiary value of recipes is minimal at best [e.g., eggs and peanut butter may be used in the same recipe (for peanut butter cookies?), so does that make them related for Section 2(d) purposes?], and even though it was unclear that the cheese and the olives sold in the gift tin bore the same mark. (TTABlogged here).


Allergan, Inc. v. BioCentric Labs., Inc., Opposition No. 91161603 (August 20, 2007) [not precedential]. ]. Swept away by the fame of the BOTOX trademark, the Board sustained an opposition to registration of the mark SEATOX for "cosmetic[s]." According to the Board, consumers "may believe … that SEATOX identifies a related product emanating from opposer, perhaps an adjunct or complementary product with a formulation that includes a sea-based ingredient." Sales of the BOTOX product approached $1.7 billion in the period 1999-2004, and advertising expenditures were in the $10 to 20 million range. Applicant admitted that "[e]verybody has heard of BOTOX." Accordingly, the Board found the mark to be famous for Section 2(d) purposes. And, of course, fame plays a dominant role in the Board's du Pont analysis. The only wrinkle that the Board encountered was the evident dissimilarity of the marks. Not to worry! "The marks BOTOX and SEATOX are similarly constructed, two-syllable coined terms. The marks are similar in sound and appearance in that both begin with a single syllable and end in a TOX-suffix." "[A]ny specific differences … are outweighed by the similarities, especially in light of the absence on this record of any instances of third-party use of similar marks." [Thus, in effect, Opposer owns the phantom mark *TOX - ed.] (TTABlogged here)


Tabor v. LaBarba, Opposition No. 91166743 (June 14, 2007) [not precedential] and In re Sigma Alimentos, S.A. de C.V., Serial Nos. 78572313 and 78572318 (July 3, 2007) [not precedential]. In these two decisions, the TTAB found bottled water related to soy shake mix, and spring water related to "soy based beverages not being milk substitutes," for Section 2(d) purposes. In the first, the Board relied on six third-party registrations of questionable evidentiary value (and as usual, with no actual proof of use of the marks), and on a “study reported in several online locations showing that healthy beverages include lots of water and several servings of nonfat, fortified soy beverages.” Finally, the Board feebly noted several advertisements and online ordering forms from supermarkets “showing all kinds of non-alcoholic beverages listed together, e.g., alphabetically by type.” From this it was clear to the Board that the goods move in the same general channels of trade and may be seen as alternative, healthy bottled beverages. In the second, the Board found the products related because Opposer's soy mix product "is to be blended with water." By that odd logic, one would find sugar and coffee to be related products, as well as tea and honey, tea bags and water, water and coffee, and so on ad nauseam. (TTABlogged here and here).


Text Copyright John L. Welch 2007-08.

Tuesday, January 22, 2008

The Ten Worst TTAB Decisions of 2007? [Part 1 of 2]

Every year, as a prologue to the "10 Worst" list, I remind readers that no one is perfect, not even yours truly. After all, Babe Ruth failed to hit safely 65% of the time and Michael Jordan missed about half his shots. So is it any wonder that, out of the 500 or so final decisions issued by the TTAB in 2007, there were a few that were "off the mark," so to speak? I list below (the first five of) what I consider to be the Board's ten worst decisions of last year. [Part 2 of this two-part posting will appear tomorrow]. Obviously, these are subjective judgments, and some of you may disagree with one or more of my selections. I can live with that.


In re PNC Bank, N.A., Serial No. 78492942 (January 16, 2007) [not precedential]. In this dubious decision, the Board found the mark GREEN BRANCH not to be merely descriptive of banking, financial, investment, and insurance services, and it therefore reversed the PTO's Section 2(e)(1) refusal to register. The PTO reasonably contended that the mark describes financial and banking service offered in branches that have environmentally-friendly features, pointing to Applicant's own press release "referencing 'green branch' in connection with environmentally friendly buildings," to dictionary definitions of "green," and to a newspaper article using the terms "green branch," "green offices," and "green bank branches" in referring to Applicant. PNC argued that the term GREEN BRANCH has a wide range of "potential meanings' and that its identified services "do not imply or suggest environmental protection." The Board sided with PNC, oddly observing that "the rendering of such services in environmentally friendly or ecologically efficient facilities does not affect the basic principles of the financial and banking business." Despite the PTO’s evidence, the Board ruled that the connection between the mark GREEN BRANCH and banking services "is too indirect or remote to find the mark merely descriptive." (TTABlogged here).


B.V.D. Licensing Corp. v. Right Ascension, Inc., Opposition No. 91169355 (December 14, 2007) [not precedential]. When one party does all the work and the other neither submits evidence nor files a brief, the resulting decision may be as unsatisfactory as this one. The Board sustained a Section 2(d) opposition to registration of the mark DVD EMPIRE for shirts, finding it likely to cause confusion with the marks B.V.D. and BVD, registered for underwear, t-shirts, shirts, and shorts. The Board found the BVD marks to be famous for, at a minimum, men's underwear. Moreover, the goods are in part identical and would be purchased without great care, and the channels of trade and class of purchasers the same. But what about the differences in the marks? No need to get your shorts in a twist! Because the goods are identical, a lesser degree of similarity in the marks is required to support a finding of likely confusion. Taking into account the fame of Opposer's mark, the Board found that "the points of similarity outweigh the dissimilarities." "We first observe that the term DVD is the dominant element in applicant's mark. It is the first word in the mark and, as opposer notes, EMPIRE has a certain laudatory quality to it inasmuch as it connotes a degree of supremacy, rendering it less influential as the source identifier in applicant's mark."[What about the plain meaning of DVD as digital video disk? - ed.] Moreover, "B" and "D" are visually similar and are somewhat phonetically similar. And Applicant's mark could be displayed in the manner in which Opposer's mark is displayed. [That's if you hide the word EMPIRE - ed.]. Both BVD and DVD are arbitrary with regard to shirts, and a one-letter difference is not sufficient to distinguish between two other otherwise identical letter combinations. Therefore the Board found confusion likely and it sustained the opposition. (TTABlogged here).


Scheder v. Touristik Arbeitsgemeinschaft Romantische Strabe GbR, Cancellation No. 92045257 (June 19, 2007) [not precedential]. In a puzzling decision granting Respondent Touristik's motion for summary judgment, the Board dismissed a petition for cancellation of a registration for the mark ROMANTIC ROAD for tourism promotion services in class 35, finding the mark not to be primarily geographically descriptive under Section 2(e)(2). Petitioner claimed that the phrase "Romantic Road" describes a particular region in Southern Germany, but the Board found that Petitioner failed to overcome Registrant's prima facie case that ROMANTIC ROAD functions primarily as a mark. Registrant's evidence established that the term ROMANTIC ROAD was coined in 1950 by a group of tourist boards in Germany. Petitioner Scheder offered maps, road signs, websites, Internet search results and documents, all "purporting to show that ROMANTIC ROAD identifies a physical location." The Board oddly found that ROMANTIC ROAD "has become a known travel destination. Thus, Registrant has set out a prima facie case that ROMANTIC ROAD functions primarily as a mark." Somehow unable to find a genuine issue of material fact in dispute, the Board granted Registrant's motion. (TTABlogged here).


Riviana Foods Inc. v. Romero-Nunez, Opposition No. 91167098 (July 24, 2007) [not precedential]. Relying on questionable evidence and an equally questionable interpretation of the case law, the Board sustained a Section 2(d) opposition to registration of the mark EL MAGO for restaurant services, finding the mark likely to be confused with the identical mark registered for rice and rice mixes. "[O]pposer's goods and applicant's services must be presumed to include rice and rice mixes on the one hand and restaurants on the other with the same theme or flavoring." [Huh? - ed.] The Board unconvincingly distinguished Jacobs v. Int’l Multifoods Corp. and its progeny, which hold that "to establish likelihood of confusion a party must show something more than that similar or even identical marks are used for food products and restaurant services." It relied on several articles from printed publications "all discussing the growing trend among restaurants to license the use of their marks on food items" [hearsay? - ed.] and pointed to third-party registrations "in which the same mark is used to identify restaurant services and a variety of food products." Finally, the Board concluded that the involved goods must be presumed "to be marketed to the same class of consumers, i.e., the general public, through the same media outlets such as television, radio, internet, and printed advertisements." (TTABlogged here).


In re Eolith Co., Serial No. 78139104 (February 9, 2007) [not precedential]. Applicant Eolith’s appellate gamble paid off when the Board reversed the PTO’s refusal to register EL DORADO for "computer electronic games; automatic slot machines" (class 9). The PTO maintained that Applicant's specimen did not show use of the mark in connection with the goods identified, but instead showed an arcade game, properly in Class 28. There was no debate that Applicant's product was not an "electronic computer game;" the Board noted that "its operation by gamers appears to be primarily mechanical." [The user, more than likely a child, controls a crane built into the machine to rake coin-like medals off a pile (see below).] Dictionary definitions of "slot machine" were in disagreement. The PTO’s definitions restricted "slot machines" to coin operated "vending machines." Applicant's dictionary and two judicially-noticed references defined "slot machines" as broadly encompassing machines operated by dropping a coin into a slot. Casting aside common sense, the Board determined that the majority of the definitions "do not restrict 'slot machines' to 'vending machines,’” and that the specimen “is sufficient evidence of use of the mark for the identified goods, i.e., 'automatic slot machines.'" (TTABlogged here).



Text Copyright John L. Welch 2007-08.

Friday, January 18, 2008

TTAB Finds "OLD TIMER" and "OLD TIMERS' HOCKEY CHALLENGE" for Clothing Too Dissimilar, Reverses 2(d) Refusal

Old Timers games are usually slow, dragged-out affairs, but that's not the case if Judge Grendel is the referee. His six-page decision brought a quick and successful conclusion to the appeal of Taylor Brands from the PTO's Section 2(d) refusal of the mark OLD TIMER for various outdoor apparel items. The Board found the mark not confusingly similar to the mark shown immediately below, registered for various clothing items. In re Taylor Brands, LLC, Serial No. 78565933 (December 17, 2007) [not precedential].


The Board began its analysis with the second du Pont factor: the similarity of the goods. It didn't take long to find the goods identical in part, and otherwise closely related (except, perhaps, for Applicant's fishing waders).

Moreover, the Board presumed (as it must) that the goods move in the same, normal trade channels of trade to the same, normal classes of purchasers. Thus the third factor also pointed in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion.

As to the fourth factor, the sophistication of the purchasers, that call too went against Applicant, since the involved clothing items include "ordinary, inexpensive goods purchased by ordinary consumers who would exercise only a normal degree of care in making their purchasing decisions."

With things looking bad for Applicant, the Board turned to the first du Pont factor, the similarity of the marks. Here, Applicant rallied for victory. The Board found that "the visual and aural differences which result from the presence of the design element and additional wording in the cited registered mark outweigh the similarity in appearance and sound which result from the present of OLD TIMER or OLDTIMERS' in the two marks."

The Board also found that the marks differ in connotation and overall commercial impression. The similarity of the words OLD TIMER and OLDTIMERS' is "greatly outweighed by the presence in the cited registered mark of the words HOCKEY CHALLENGE and the hockey puck design element."

"The cited registered mark specifically calls to mind a hockey game or exhibition featuring a reunion of once-active but now-retired former hockey players. The words OLD TIMER in applicant's mark have no such connotation (much less a specific connotation)."

Balancing all the du Pont factors, the Board found the marks "sufficiently dissimilar that no confusion is likely to result even in the marks are used on identical or closely related clothing items which may be purchased on impulse."

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2008.

Thursday, January 17, 2008

TTABlog Flotsam and Jetsam: Issue No. 11

It's been more than 18 months since the last "Flotsam and Jetsam" posting. But with a temporary lull in the Board's issuance of decisions, now is a good time to catch up on a few recent, newsworthy items.


TTAB's ACR Program: Bill Heinze, at his I/P Updates blog, reports here on the TTAB's new "Accelerated Case Resolution" (ACR) program, which offers parties the chance to streamline the inter partes process so that the Board may render a final decision on what is largely a stipulated record. "In order to take advantage of ACR, the parties must stipulate that, in lieu of trial, the Board can resolve any issues of material fact." The Board promises to render a written decision within fifty (50) days of the filing of the briefs. [The Board's notice may be found here.]


Georgetown Law School TTAB Event: At her 43(B)log, Professor Rebecca Tushnet announces (here) that Georgetown Law School will host a reception on Tuesday, January 22nd, 4 to 6pm, in honor of the publication of Jeffrey A. Handleman's "Guide to TTAB Practice."



TTABlogger Road Trip: Yours truly will be speaking at the Practicing Law Institute's Program snappily entitled "Navigating Trademark Practice Before the PTO 2008: From Filing Through the TTAB Hearing," held in New York City on February 21-22, 2008. [Brochure here].
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Wednesday, January 16, 2008

The Top Ten TTAB Decisions of 2007® [Part 2 of 2]

In Part 1 of this posting, which appeared here yesterday, the TTABlog presented half (or maybe six-elevenths) of the Top Ten TTAB Decisions of 2007. The remaining five are summarized below. The decisions are not necessarily listed in order of importance, although they may be. I leave that for the reader to decide.


Bose Corp. v. Hexawave, Inc., Opposition No. 91157315 (November 6, 2007) [not precedential]. Opposer Bose lost the fraud battle but won the war in its Section 2(d) opposition to registration of the mark HEXAWAVE for various electronic devices, including amplifiers and tuners. The Board sustained Applicant Hexawave's fraud claim as to one of Bose's pleaded registrations, but went on to find the HEXAWAVE mark likely to cause confusion with Bose's famous WAVE and ACOUSTIC WAVE marks for audio products that include amplifiers and tuners. The claim of fraud against Bose centered on the renewal in 2001 of its registration for the mark WAVE for, inter alia, audio tape recorders. Although Bose stopped offering audio tape recorders in 1996-97, it did not delete those goods when it filed for renewal, claiming that shipment of returned products after repair satisfied the use requirement. The Board noted that Bose offered no case support for its theory that "transporting" a product back to its owner after repair constitutes use of a trademark on the product as contemplated by Section 45 of the Trademark Act. Finding that it was not reasonable for Bose to believe that this shipment of goods that it no longer owned constituted "use" under the Act, the Board (rather harshly) ruled that Bose had committed fraud. (TTABlogged here).

CNL Tampa Int'l Hotel Partnership, LP v. Palazzolo, Opposition No. 91163724 (March 7, 2007) [not precedential]. The TTAB dismissed a Section 2(d) opposition to registration of the mark PELAGIA for "clothing, namely shirts," finding the mark not likely to cause confusion with the identical mark for restaurant services. Opposer claimed that clothing "is within the natural scope of expansion for restaurant services." Its only proof of relatedness of these goods and services, however, was a collection of 102 third-party registrations each encompassing both restaurant services and clothing. The Board noted that third-party registrations "may have some probative value to the extent that they serve to suggest that the listed goods and/or services are of a type that may emanate from a single source," but the Board refused to draw the inference that these goods and services are "legally related products" requiring a finding of likelihood of confusion. It noted that acceptance of Opposer's argument would be tantamount to creating a per se rule "that the same or similar marks for restaurant services and clothing is likely to cause confusion." Taken to the "absurd extreme," if third-party registrations alone were sufficient to prove relatedness of goods and services, "then virtually all consumer products and services would be related." (TTABlogged here).


Hormel Foods Corp. v. Spam Arrest, LLC, Cancellation No. 92042134 (November 21, 2007) [not precedential]. The Board dismissed Hormel's petition for cancellation of a registration for the mark SPAM ARREST for "computer software, namely software designed to eliminate unsolicited commercial electronic mail," finding that Hormel had failed to prove likelihood of confusion and dilution vis-à-vis its famous mark SPAM. Likelihood of Confusion: Respondent conceded the fame of the SPAM mark for purposes of Section 2(d), and also conceded that Hormel owns a family of SPAM marks. It was undisputed that "spam" is a generic term for unsolicited commercial e-mail. "This dichotomy between the fame of petitioner’s trademark and the generic meaning of the same term" was crucial to the Board’s 2(d) determination. Although the Board gave "great weight" to the fame of the SPAM mark, "that fame does not extend to computer software." Dilution: The Board found that Hormel had proven SPAM to be famous for canned meat but failed to prove that its mark is "distinctive" for dilution purposes – i.e., "that the mark has become the principal meaning of the word." Hormel's dilution by tarnishment claim was given short shrift, being based on a few Internet postings dissing Respondent's software. And so, Hormel's petition for cancellation was scraped off the Board's plate and into the trash can. (TTABlogged here).


In re Valenite Inc., 84 USPQ2d 1346 (TTAB 2007) [precedential]. In view of the "prevalence of online retailing" and the specialized nature of Applicant's products, the Board found that Applicant's home webpage constituted a "display associated with the goods" and therefore was a proper specimen of use for the mark VALPRO for tools for power operated metal cutting machines. Applicant relied on Lands' End Inc. v. Manbeck, 24 USPQ2d 1314 (E.D. Va. 1992) and In re Dell Inc., 71 USPQ2d 1725 (TTAB 2004) in arguing that the webpage is a display associated with the goods (Rule 2.56(b)(1)). The Examining Attorney maintained that the specimen of use failed because "the mark is not associated with the goods" and "sufficient ordering information" is lacking. The word VALPRO appears at the top middle of the webpage, to the right of a picture of some of Applicant’s tools. [see below]. A link to an online catalog is provided, along with a toll free number and web links to customer service, technical support, and Applicant’s "Technical Resource Center." The Board found that the webpage satisfies Lands' End and Dell because it (1) includes a picture of the goods; (2) shows the mark near enough to associate the mark with the goods; and (3) contains information necessary to order the goods. (TTABlogged here).

Specimen webpage
Click on photo for larger picture

Paris Glove of Canada, Ltd. v. SBC/Sporto Corp., 84 USPQ2d 1856 (TTAB 2007) [precedential]. The Board granted Respondent's motion for summary judgment, permitting amendment of its registered mark and finding Petitioner's claims of abandonment, naked licensing, and fraud to be without merit. Respondent convinced the Board to strike from the record a Google "hit list" search summary retrieved via the "Wayback Machine" because it was not properly authenticated. The Board pointed out that Internet materials "may be admissible as evidence in connection with a summary judgment motion, if competent and relevant, provided that they are properly authenticated by an affidavit or declaration pursuant to FRCP 56(e). See TBMP Section 528.04(e)(2d ed. rev. 2004)." Petitioner argued that concerns about authentication no longer exist in view of the availability of the Internet Archive and its "Wayback Machine" feature. According to Petitioner, the "Wayback Machine" shows "each date on which a website has undergone a significant change." The Board, however, observed that the "Wayback Machine" suffers from a serious evidentiary flaw: "What may be insignificant to the archivers for the 'Wayback Machine' may have significance from the standpoint of evidentiary value in a trademark proceeding. Thus, changes to a website, or in this case the excerpts taken from a website that appear in a Google search summary, may not appear in the Internet Archive." (TTABlogged here ).

"The Top Ten TTAB Decisions of 20**" is a Registered Trademark of John L. Welch. Text Copyright John L. Welch 2007-08.

Tuesday, January 15, 2008

The Top Ten TTAB Decisions of 2007® [Part 1 of 2]

The TTAB issued 500 or so final decisions in 2007, as well as numerous interlocutory rulings. Sixty-six of its decisions and rulings were deemed precedential (listed in yesterday's posting here). Once again, yours truly has unabashedly chosen the ten decisions that he believes are the year's most important and/or interesting. Five are precedential decisions and five (or six) are not. Perhaps the precedential rulings are the more important because they constitute binding precedent, but the non-precedential rulings at a minimum have educational and/or entertainment value. Or at least I hope so. [This posting is in two parts, the first five (or six) decisions being listed below].


Hurley Int'l LLC v. Volta, 82 USPQ2d 1339 (TTAB 2007). [precedential]. Extending its Medinol jurisprudence to a pending application, the TTAB found fraud because Applicants' mark was not in use in commerce in connection with all of the recited entertainment services when the Voltas filed their used-based application. But in dictum, the Board pointed practitioners to a possible escape route out of the fraud quagmire. The Voltas pleaded innocence, claiming that they misunderstood the requirements of Section 1(a), did not comprehend the legal meaning of "use in commerce," and "honestly believed that their ownership of the same mark in Australia and their use in commerce of such mark in Australia justified their Section 1(a) filing in the U.S." They noted that Applicant Paul Volta suffered a "major coronary infarct" in November 2003 [after the application was published and opposed], and further that they have been "defending themselves and have no legal representation as such." The Board was totally unsympathetic and it agreed with Opposer that "this case is similar to the Medinol case." "[P]roof of specific intent is not required." Significantly, Applicants' "asserted misunderstanding regarding the meaning of 'use' was not reasonable." The Board therefore deemed the application void ab initio and entered summary judgment in Opposer's favor. In a noteworthy footnote, however, the Board cited Universal Overall Co. v. Stonecutter Mills Corp., 154 USPQ 104 (CCPA 1967) in observing that a false statement corrected prior to an application's publication does not constitute fraud. (TTABlogged here).


Intel Corp. v. Emeny, Opposition No. 91123312 (May 15, 2007) [not precedential]. In a rare ruling on "intent to use" that may cause trademark practitioners to re-think their approach to ITU applications, the Board sustained an opposition to registration of the mark IDEAS INSIDE for on-line ordering and distribution services for a host of goods (including more that 200 items of clothing, from "anoraks" to "wrestling uniforms"), search engine services, and digital transmission services. Applicant Steven Emeny, appearing pro se, failed to produce any objective evidence of a bona fide intent to use his mark: no evidence of any business plans, nor any evidence of a single business contact with any potential partner who would supply the goods that Applicant would sell. Moreover, the application (like eight others filed by Emeny and later abandoned) included "an unreasonably broad listing of goods and services," and on cross-examination, Emeny admitted that he wanted to "make sure that nobody else [can] take advantage of those marks." The Board observed, ominously, that under Commodore Electronics Ltd. v. CBM Kabushiki Kaisha, 26 USPQ2d 1503 (TTAB 1993), the "failure to produce any objective evidence of an intent to use is sufficient basis for ruling in Intel’s favor." (TTABlogged here).


In re Joint-Stock Company "Baik", 84 USPQ2d 1921 (TTAB 2007) [precedential]. Judge Seeherman's concurring opinion was the highlight of this decision reversing a Section 2(e)(4) refusal of the mark BAIK for vodka. The Board found that the PTO failed to establish a prima facie case that BAIK is primarily merely a surname. Based upon the PTOs evidence, essentially comprising 456 hits from a Verizon database, the Board saw BAIK as an "extremely rare surname," with no evidence that anyone with that surname has achieved any notoriety. As to other meanings of the term, the PTO pointed to "negative dictionary evidence," while Applicant argued that BAIK is an arbitrary Russian-sounding word "similar to Baikal, a Russian lake in Siberia" and to "the Baikal mountain range in Siberia," and that the public sees BAIK as a "fanciful Russian term used in a trademark sense." The Board agreed with Applicant. It was not convinced that "the similarity of Baik to other obscure surnames somehow results in Baik having the 'look and feel' of a surname." Judge Seeherman thoughtfully questioned the appropriateness of the "look and feel" factor, opining that registration should not be refused just because a mark is similar in sound or appearance to other surnames." She urged that the refusal of a surname should focus on how many people have that same surname and would thus be affected by registration of the surname. (TTABlogged here).


In re IP Carrier Consulting Group, 84 USPQ2d 1028 (TTAB 2007) [precedential]. The TTAB adopted the same stance as the Trademark side of the USPTO on admissibility of Wikipedia evidence: admissible, but its weight may vary depending on corroborating sources. The PTO refused registration under Section 2(e)(1) of the marks ipPCS and ipPIPE for telecommunications services featuring a device that allows Internet transmission of images and video. Applicant submitted the Wikipedia entry for "Internet Service Provider" to show that a common abbreviation for "Internet Provider" is "ISP." The Board observed that "[t]here are inherent problems regarding the reliability of Wikipedia entries because Wikipedia is a collaborative website that permits anyone to edit the entries." On the other hand, the Board also noted that Internet evidence is "generally admissible and may be considered for purposes of evaluating a trademark." It determined that it will consider Wikipedia evidence "so long as the non-offering party has an opportunity to rebut that evidence…," but the "better practice" is to corroborate that information. Although there was corroborating evidence for Applicant’s definition in the form of a dictionary listing, the Board nonetheless found that "IP" means "Internet Provider" and/or "Internet Protocol," and it deemed the two marks to be merely descriptive. (TTABlogged here).


New York State Dept. of Economic Development v. Stewart, Opposition No. 91162024 (March 13, 2007) [not precedential] and New York State Dept. of Economic Development v. I Love Santa Barbara, Inc., Opposition No. 91165648 (October 31, 2007) [not precedential]. The TTAB dismissed two Section 2(d) oppositions brought by the State of New York in connection with the familiar, registered I♥NY mark, because New York failed to prove its case in each instance. New York took no testimony and submitted mere photocopies of its registrations, rather than status-and-title copies, by way of notice of reliance. In the first, the Board ruled that New York had failed to establish priority, and in the second New York failed to prove both standing and priority. What makes New York’s mistake particularly unfathomable is the fact that, in each case, the Board, in denying New York's summary judgment motion, gave notice to New York that mere photocopies of the registrations were not sufficient for purposes of Rule 2.122(d). [As of August 31, 2007, ordinary photocopies from the PTO database are sufficient under Rule 2.122(d) when submitted with an original pleading, but that new rule applies only to proceedings commenced on or after that date]. (TTABlogged here and here).


[Part 2 of this two-part posting will appear tomorrow.]

"The Top Ten TTAB Decisions of 20**" is a Registered Trademark of John L. Welch. Text Copyright John L. Welch 2007-08.

Monday, January 14, 2008

TTAB Issued 66 Precedential Decisions in 2007 (Make That 67!)

The TTAB issued 66 precedential decision in calendar 2007, topping last year's total by nine. Set out below is a compilation of those precedential rulings, categorized according to subject matter. [The accompanying photographs were taken in the vicinity of my office; they are not meant as commentary on the Board or its decisions, precedential or otherwise.] [TTABlog explanatory note: the 67th decision came to my attention in February 2008, necessitating a revision of the heading to this posting].


Section 2(a) - Suggesting a False Connection:

Section 2(d) - Likelihood of Confusion:


Section 2(e)(1) - Mere descriptiveness:

Section 2(e)(2) - Primarily Geographically Descriptive:

Section 2(e)(3) - Primarily Geographically Deceptively Misdescriptive:

Section 2(e)(4) - Primarily Merely a Surname:

Section 2(f)- Acquired Distinctiveness:

Declaration/Oath:

Dilution:

Fraud/Nonuse:

Functionality:

Genericness:

Goods in Trade:

Identification of Goods:

Laches/Estoppel/Acquiescence:

Ownership:

Procedural Matters:


Specimen of Use/Mutilation:

Text and photographs Copyright John L. Welch 2007-08.