TTAB Affirms Requirement to Disclaim DATA STREAMS for Database Management and Storage Services

The USPTO affirmed a refusal to register the mark CHAINLINK DATA STREAMS for “Database management services, namely, collecting secure data for use by decentralized computing networks” (International Class 35) and “Storing of secure electronic data for use by decentralized computing networks” (International Class 42), absent a disclaimer of the term DATA STREAMS. Applicant argued, inter alia, that the wording CHAINLINK DATA STREAMS, as a whole, is unitary, and so DATA STREAMS cannot be descriptive. The Board disagreed. In re SmartContract Chainlink Limited SEZC, Serial No. 98004679 (May 7, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark Lebow).

Examining Attorney David Tooley contended that “[t]he wording DATA STREAMS is a well-defined term in the computer industry referring to a manner of transmitting data across computer networks.” He submitted dictionary definitions and numerous examples showing the meaning of “data streaming” within the relevant industry. He concluded that the term DATA STREAMS is descriptive of applicant’s services because they all involved streaming of data among networked computers.

The Board agreed: "Here, DATA STREAMS is not a blended or coined unitary term. It’s a common, well-established phrase in the computer and data-processing industry that directly and immediately conveys the continuous transmission or flow of data – precisely the core feature of Applicant’s services."

Applicant maintained that DATA STREAMS has multiple meanings. The Board pointed out, however, that “[i]t is well settled that so long as any one of the meanings of a term is descriptive, the term may be considered to be merely descriptive.”

Applicant’s own promotional materials of record confirm that its CHAINLINK DATA STREAMS offering involves the reliable delivery and availability of data in distributed systems using active multi-site deployment models that ensure continuous operations.

Applicant also argued that its services involve “data at rest," while the Examining Attorney’s evidence relates primarily to real-time analytics, ingestion pipelines, and transmission, not to the identified storage and database management services. The Board was unmoved.

These services necessarily involve the collection of data from one or more sources and the provision of that data for use by a decentralized network of computers. In the context of computer networks – especially decentralized ones – collecting and making data available for network use inherently requires the transmission or flow of data across network nodes. One of the primary methods for transferring data among network nodes is via data streams, as the record abundantly demonstrates. Applicant’s own promotional materials of record confirm that its CHAINLINK DATA STREAMS offering involves the reliable delivery and availability of data in distributed systems using active multi-site deployment models that ensure continuous operations.

Applicant further contended that the combination of CHAINLINK (its alleged house mark) with DATA STREAMS creates an incongruity because “streams” “connotes ephemerality and flow, and Applicant’s identified services focus on durable, secure storage. The Board waved off that argument: "There is no incongruity in using a term that describes a key feature or function of the services simply because the services have multiple aspects. DATA STREAMS directly and immediately describes the transmission aspect inherent in collecting and making data available for use by decentralized computing networks." The mere addition of the house mark, CHAINLINK, does not create an incongruity.

Applicant’s own evidence confirms that its services employ multi-site deployment models to ensure continuous, reliable data availability across distributed origins. For the foregoing reasons, the term DATA STREAMS is merely descriptive of a feature of Applicant’s services.

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TTABlogger comment: WYHA?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Is GRUPPO VAVA for Clothing Excluding Lingerie Confusable with VAVA for Lingerie?

The USPTO refused to register the mark GRUPPO VAVA for various clothing items, including hats, t-shirts, and sweatshirts (and excluding "lingerie, bras, underwear, or intimate apparel"), concluding that confusion is likely with the registered mark VAVA for "lingerie." Applicant ADG Vanguard conceded, in the face of third-party use and registration evidence, that the goods are related. It argued, however, that consumers will not perceive "VAVA" when applied to lingerie in the same way as when GRUPPO VAVA is applied to its clothing items. What do you think? Did ADG give the USPTO the slip? In re ADG Vanguard IP LLC, Serial No. 98516000 (May 18, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande).

The Board wasted little time in finding the marks confusable. Although ADG's mark begins with GRUPPO, and the first word of a mark can often make the biggest impact, here the impact of GRUPPO "is blunted because Applicant disclaimed GRUPPO—which is Italian for 'group'—because it has descriptive, rather than source-identifying, significance." Furthermore, the fact that applicant's mark incorporates the entire cited mark "can be significant in comparing the marks for likelihood-of-confusion purposes."

Applicant ADG argued that consumers will perceive the cited VAVA mark as comprising the first part of the known phrase “va-va-voom,” which connotes sexiness, an attribute naturally associated with lingerie. In contrast, consumers will not associate “va-va-voom” with ADG's mark because the word “GRUPPO” before the term “VAVA” will cause consumers to see “VAVA” not as part of “va-va-voom” but just a “vaguely Italian-sounding term.” Moreover, Applicant argued, its goods aren’t sexy.

The Board found these to be "interesting theories," but there was no evidence in support.

“Sexiness” is highly subjective, and we don’t think the “va-va-voom” connotation—if indeed that’s the connotation that “VAVA” without the “VOOM” imparts—can be so precisely limited only to lingerie. Although Applicant characterizes some of the clothing items in its identification of goods as “functional”—as opposed to “sexy”—items (e.g., business wear, running shoes, track suits), other types of clothing listed in the application (dresses, skirts, shirts, blouses, and shorts, for example) are made or worn in a wide variety of ways, including ways that are perceived as “sexy.”

Moreover, the Board noted, the dictionary definitions of “lingerie” in the record indicated that, "besides women’s intimate apparel, it also includes 'sleepwear,' which is not exclusively a 'sexy' category of goods, and—to use Applicant’s terms—includes 'functional' sleepwear."

In sum, the Board found the marks to be similar, the goods to be related, and the trade channels and classes of customers overlapping. No DuPont factors indicated that confusion is unlikely. "With the only relevant factors all indicating that confusion is likely and nothing to counterbalance them, there’s no real balancing to be done. On the record here, we conclude that confusion is likely."

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TTABlogger comment: The term VA-VA-VOOM, in my experience, is usually accompanied by a pair of eyeballs bulging out of a cartoon wolf's head.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Is HORSETHIEF CANYON VINEYARDS for Wine Confusable with HORSE THIEF HOLLOW for Beer?

The USPTO refused to register (on the Supplemental Register) the mark HORSETHIEF CANYON VINEYARDS for "wine" [VINEYARDS disclaimed], concluding that confusion is likely with the registered mark HORSE THIEF HOLLOW for "beer." As we know, different alcoholic beverages are usually found to be related under Section 2(d) based on third-party registration and use evidence, but what about these marks? Did Applicant stand a chance? In re HC Vineyards LLC, Serial No. 98579854 (May 4, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Catherine Dugan O'Connor).

“There is no per se rule that holds that all alcoholic beverages are related.” Examining Attorney Lisa McCrary provided evidence of 16 entities offering both wine and beer under the same mark, 20 third-party registrations covering both goods, and an article in Wine Enthusiast titled “‘Give ‘Em What They Want’: These Craft Breweries Make Wine Now, Too.” [Why isn't this article hearsay? - ed.]

Applicant HC Vineyards, appearing pro se, argued that "these few examples are not representative of the industry standard. It is unusual for a winery to brew its own beer, just as it is even more rare for a brewery or restaurant/bar to produce and brand its own wine." The Board was unmoved, noting that applicant provided no evidence for its assertions, and further that the Office's evidence was sufficient to support a finding of relatedness under the second DuPont factor.

The same evidence established that the channels of trade "overlap to at least some degree." The third DuPont factor therefore supported the refusal.

Turning to the marks, the Board found that, "visually and phonetically, HORSETHIEF CANYON VINEYARDS and HORSE THIEF HOLLOW are similar due to the nearly identical first word(s) HORSETHIEF and HORSE THIEF." Moreover, the overall marks "engender similar impressions because they both convey the idea of a depressed area of land where thieves hide their stolen horses." The Board concluded that the first DuPont factor "somewhat heavily" supported the refusal.

HC Vineyards unsuccessfully argued that the involved consumers are sophisticated and exercise care in purchasing, but it provided no evidence thereof. The Board noted that neither identification of goods contains any limitations on quality or price of the goods, and they therefore must be presumed to include goods of all quality levels and price points. Beer is offered at moderate prices and wine may be more expensive but still includes moderately priced products that appeal to average consumers. The Board's decision must “be based on the least sophisticated potential purchasers.” "And even if some consumers of the goods are more sophisticated or discerning than others, even “careful or sophisticated consumers are not immune from source confusion.” The Board deemed the fourth DuPont factor to be neutral.

The Board also found the eighth, tenth, twelfth and thirteenth DuPont factors to be neutral, and no factor weighed in applicant's favor.

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TTABlogger comment: Unless this was your first rodeo, you surely got this right. A typical mechanical application of the Board's stacked-deck Section 2(d) analysis.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Affirms Genericness Refusal of THE SKIN COACH for . . . . Guess What?

The Board upheld a genericness refusal of the proposed mark THE SKIN COACH for, inter alia, "Professional coaching services in the field of health and wellness," "Providing on-line training in the form of courses, workshops, seminars, and private coaching in the field of health and wellness," and "Holistic health services," rejecting the application for a Supplemental Registration under Sections 23(c) and 45 of the Trademark Act. Applicant acknowledged the considerable third-party evidence of use of "skin coach" "in connection with skincare, wellness, or esthetics," but contended that the term is at most descriptive, not generic. In re The Skin Coach LLC, Serial No. 98351505 (May 11, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christopher C. Larkin).

The Board determines the issue of genericness as a question of fact, based on the preponderance of evidence. ["Clear evidence" is not required]. The Office bears the ultimate burden of proof. "Determining whether a mark is generic . . . involves a two-step inquiry: First, what is the genus of goods or services at issue? Second, is the term sought to be registered . . . understood by the relevant public primarily to refer to that genus of goods or services?"

The Board observed that "A term is generic if it refers to the class or category of goods or services on which it is used," citing Marvin Ginn and Dial-A-Mattress, or to "part of the claimed genus of goods or services, even if the public does not understand the term to refer to the broad genus," citing Royal Crown and Cordua. [Emphasis by the Board].

The Board found the genus of the respective two classes of services to be “Professional coaching services in the field of health and wellness” and “Providing on-line training in the form of courses, workshops, seminars, and private coaching in the field of health and wellness” in Class 41, and “Holistic health services” in Class 44. Applicant conceded that “‘skin coach’ may describe a niche focus within Applicant’s broader wellness services.” The question for the Board was whether the evidence showed "that the primary significance of THE SKIN COACH is to refer to that sub-genus of the involved services."

Turning to the public's understanding of the term THE SKIN COACH, Examining Attorney Janice McMorrow submitted dictionary definitions of "skin" and "coach," applicant's own specimen website pages (using “skin coach” generically in lowercase letters to identify the provider of the services, applicant’s principal “Malia,” as “your new skin coach & BFF”), and numerous third-party websites. After a detailed analysis of those websites, the Board concluded:

On balance, the third-party website evidence shows that the primary significance of the phrase “skin coach” is to refer to the sub-genuses of “professional coaching services in the field of health and wellness,” “on-line training in the form of courses, workshops, seminars, and private coaching in the field of health and wellness,” and “holistic health services” regarding skin care.

A number of LEXIS/NEXIS articles use "skin coach" and variants "generically to identified multiple instructors who provide services falling within" the sub-genuses listed above.

The Board found, from this evidence, that "the primary significance of THE SKIN COACH to the relevant consuming public is to refer to the sub-genuses of 'Professional coaching services in the field of health and wellness' and 'Providing on-line training in the form of courses, workshops, seminars, and private coaching in the field of health and wellness' in Class 41, and 'Holistic health services' in Class 44, regarding skin care."

And so, the Board affirmed the refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: I'm a bit confused. Is THE SKIN COACH a sub-genus of the sub-genuses? Anyway, the term seems merely descriptive to me. If you looked for a phone book listing of health or fitness providers, would you find a sub-heading, "skin coaches?" But then, a mere descriptiveness rejection that would still allow a Supplemental Registration. The Board didn't want that to happen.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Which of These Three Section 2(d) Refusals Was/Were Reversed?

TTAB affirmances of Section 2(d) refusals continue to run at about 90% this year. Here are three recent decisions. At least one of them resulted in a reversal. What say you? [Answer in first comment].

In re Grandvision France, Serial No. 79389236 (May 12, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christopher C. Larkin). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark shown below left, for "“Spectacles; spectacle frames; eyeglasses; sunglasses; masks for sports in the nature of sports goggles, with the exception of fencing masks; spectacle lenses; optical lenses; lenses for sunglasses; correcting lenses being optical lenses; contact lenses; eyeglass lenses; ophthalmic lenses; corrective lenses being optical lenses; spectacle cases; eye glass cases; carrying cases for contact lenses; headbands, cords, chains and ties for holding spectacles, namely, eye glass cords and eye glass chains; binoculars; optic magnifiers being magnifying glasses” in view of the registered mark below right, for "Beauty masks; Cleaning preparations; Cosmetic preparations for eyelashes; Cosmetic products in the form of aerosols for skin care; Cosmetics; Cotton sticks for cosmetic purposes; Cotton wool for cosmetic purposes; Facial cleansing milk; Lotions for cosmetic purposes; Make up removing preparations.”]

In re Destiladora del Valle de Tequila SA de CV, Serial No. 98588895 (May 12, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Robert Lavache) [Section 2(d) refusal of AI for "Distilled agave liquor" in view of the identical mark registered for "Wine."]

In re TDI Novus Inc., Serial No. 98593408 (May 12, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas W. Wellington). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark shown below, for "A voice communication system for an autonomous vehicle in maritime comprised of an apparatus to record, transcribe, translate, and parse voice communications over the radio frequency spectrum and autonomously providing a system generated voice transmission response that is appropriate and in context of the transmission and any earlier transmissions," in view of the registered mark MERMADE for, inter alia, "apparatus for recording, transmission or reproduction of sound and images."].

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TTABlogger comment: How did you do? See any WYHA?s ? 

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Affirms Refusals to Register Restaurant Interior Designs: Distinctiveness Neither Inherent Nor Acquired

The Board affirmed refusals to register the two restaurant interior designs shown below, for "restaurant services," finding that the proposed marks lacked inherent distinctiveness and were not shown to have acquired distinctiveness. In re ETLC Trademarks, LLC, Serial Nos. 98166506 and 98120339 (May 5, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Jessica B. Bradley).

Applicant's trade dress comprised the interior design of a restaurant consisting of the combination of the following elements:  

• One or more Chicago style brick walls; 
• A bar counter with either a Chicago brick facade or an abstract wood accent facade;  
• A finishing counter connected to the bar; 
• A prep table; and 
• A rotisserie grill that includes a wheel on the upper left side that adjusts the grills with chains to create movement of the metal structure that sits on top of the grill.

The Board applied the CAFC's Seabrook factors and found that the proposed marks satisfy both the second and third Seabrook factors, and accordingly are not inherently distinctive. Chippendales, 622 F.3d at 1351 (Where “a mark satisfies any of the first three [Seabrook] tests, it is not inherently distinctive.”).

The Proposed Marks would be perceived by patrons of Applicant’s restaurant services simply as part of the overall decor or ambiance of Applicant’s restaurants. Given the common use of the claimed elements and the common arrangement of the elements in other restaurants, customers are not likely to view this decor or ambience as identifying and distinguishing the source of Applicant’s restaurant services.

Turning to the issue of acquired distinctiveness, the Board considered the Converse factors and found that Applicant's evidence fell far short.

And so, the Board affirmed the refusals.

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TTABlogger comment: Ran into a brick wall?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

Are These Two Logo Marks Confusable for Candy?

Candy Dynamics, Inc. opposed an application to register the mark below left, for candy, claiming likely confusion with its registered mark shown below right, also for candy. The Board found the first DuPont factor, the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks, to be dispositive. How do you think this came out? Candy Dynamics, Inc. v. Aurox Distributors LLC, Opposition No. 91292159 (May 7, 2027) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Marth B. Allard).

The Board acknowledged that Applicant’s mark includes a large design element, but it found the literal element SOUR CITY to be its dominant element. "Moreover, the exaggerated expression on the character’s face, i.e., its wide-eyes and outstretched tongue, suggests it has just eaten something extremely sour. Thus, the image reinforces the literal elements of the mark and, for that reason, further supports our finding that the literal elements SOUR CITY are the dominant portion of Applicant’s mark. This is so, despite the fact that, as Opposer argues, the image is larger in size compared to the size of the literal elements."

Comparing the marks for similarity in sight and sound, the Board found that "the marks share no common literal elements and are dissimilar in sight and sound."

As to connotation and commercial impression, "nothing in Applicant’s mark suggests that the character has tasted something toxic; rather, the literal elements SOUR CITY suggest the character has eaten something sour." This is in contrast to Opposer’s mark, in which "the mushroom cloud image and the resulting toxic connotation is completely missing from Applicant’s mark. As a result, the marks when considered in their entireties are different in connotation and commercial impression."

When comparing the parties’ marks in their entireties, we agree with Opposer that the parties’ design portions share some general, thematic similarities, i.e., each character has (i) a sort of rounded head; (ii) bloodshot eyes, with the right eye slightly larger than the left; and (iii) a fully extended tongue extending from the left-center of their mouth. However, the record shows that the shared elements of a character with a rounded head, wide-eyes and outstretched tongue are relatively weak, and not “unique” as Opposer argues. Moreover, the presence of the wording SOUR CITY in the Applicant’s mark suffices to distinguish the marks aurally and further distinguishes them visually.

And so, the Board dismissed the opposition.

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TTABlogger comment: WYHO?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Judge Elizabeth A. Dunn Has Retired

Administrative Trademark Judge Elizabeth A. Dunn has retired from the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board. She was appointed to the Board in 2019. Judge Dunn is, by my count, the tenth TTAB judge to leave the Board since January 2025. A current roster of the TTAB judges may be found here.

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Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

TTABlog Test: How Did These Three Section 2(d) Appeals Turn Out?

Here are three recent TTAB decisions in Section 2(d) appeals. Remembering that a TTAB Judge (now retired) once said that one can predict the outcome of a Section 2(d) appeal 95% of the time just by considering the marks and the goods/services, how do you think these came out? [Answer in first comment].

In re Studio Mir Co., Ltd., Serial No. 90310822 (April 24, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Lawrence T. Stanley, Jr.). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark KOJI for, inter alia, comic or picture books and toys "relating to fictional character from anime series" in view of the identical mark registered for "stickers."]

In re Natures Generator, Inc., Serial No. 97519777 (April 28, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Robert Lavache). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark shown below, for "Solar-powered electricity generators; Wind-powered electricity generators" in view of the registered mark POWERHOUSE for "Portable electric generators."]

In re Marx Brothers, Inc., Serial No. 98455354 (May 1, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Robert Lavache). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark PALM ISLE for "Coconut milk; Coconut oil for food; Desiccated coconut; Flaked coconut; Processed coconut" in view of the registered mark PALM ISLAND for "Gourmet sea salt for cooking and spices."]

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TTABlogger comment: How did you do? See any WYHA?s ?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

Recommended Reading: Prof. Lisa P. Ramsey: Trademarks and Free Speech - Conflicts and Resolutions

Cambridge University Press has just published Trademarks and Free Speech: Conflicts and Resolutions, by Lisa P. Ramsey, Professor of Law at the University of San Diego School of Law.  Professor Ramsey has given presentations throughout the United States and around the world about how certain trademark laws may conflict with the right to freedom of expression.

This book explores how trademark laws can conflict with the right to freedom of expression and proposes a framework for evaluating free speech challenges to trademark registration and enforcement laws. It also explains why granting trademark rights in informational terms, political messages, widely used phrases, decorative product features, and other language and designs with substantial pre-existing communicative value can harm free expression and fair competition. Lisa P. Ramsey encourages governments to not register or protect broad trademark rights in these types of inherently valuable expression. She also recommends that trademark statutes explicitly allow certain informational, expressive, and decorative fair uses of another’s trademark, and proposes other speech-protective and pro-competitive reforms of trademark law for consideration by legislatures, courts, and trademark offices in the United States, Europe, and other countries.

There will be a book launch on May 7, 2026, 2:30 PM to 4:00 PM, at UCL Laws, Bentham House, Endsleigh Gardens, London WC1H 0EG. Book ticket here.

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Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.