Precedential No. 2: TTAB Upholds USPTO Reexamination Ruling: EVERWISE CREDIT UNION Registration to be Cancelled for Nonuse

In what appears to be the first review of a reexamination decision under Section 16B of the Trademark Act, the Board affirmed the USPTO’s finding that a registration for the mark EVERWISE CREDIT UNION for various banking, credit union, and financial services should be cancelled because the registrant failed to prove that it had used the mark as of the deadline date for its Statement of Use. “In light of the overwhelming evidence showing that Registrant did not adopt EVERWISE CREDIT UNION as a mark for its financial services until after the SOU Deadline, the single use of ‘Everwise Credit Union™’ on the specimen is insufficient to demonstrate bona fide use of the mark in commerce. Rather, in view of the record, the specimen demonstrates only Registrant’s attempt to reserve rights in the mark through minimal, token use.” In re Everwise Credit Union, Reexamination No. 2023-100533R for Registration No. 7068783 (April 29, 2026) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge George C. Pologeorgis).

In a reexamination proceeding, the USPTO may cancel a registration, in whole or in part, if the evidence shows that the registered mark was not in use in commerce as of the filing date of a use-based application or, in the case of an intent-to-use application, as of the date of an amendment to allege use, or as of the deadline for filing a statement of use, including all approved extensions, as applicable.

Registrant filed its Statement of Use on April 14, 2023, and the registration issued on May 30, 2023. A third-party petitioned for reexamination on June 20, 2023. The Director of the USPTO instituted the reexamination proceeding based on the petitioner's prima facie showing of nonuse. Registrant was then required to rebut the prima facie case.

Registrant's specimen of us comprised a screenshot of its website. Petitioner submitted the results of a Wayback Machine search showing no use of the mark prior to the critical date. Google Play Store and Apple Store evidence showed that Registrant, as of the SOU Deadline, offered an app for its credit union services under the name “TCU Mobile Banking” and not EVERWISE CREDIT UNION.

In rebuttal, Registrant submitted a declaration from its Chief Marketing & Growth Officer, asserting that the mark was in use during the relevant time period. When Examiner Brittany Lee-Richardson issued a final office action finding that Registrant had failed to rebut the prima facie case of nonuse, Registrant appealed.

Registrant argued that its webpage specimen showed the mark EVERWISE CREDIT in a tagline at the top of the webpage above a section that describes what it means to be a credit union, stating that TCU is an “Everwise Credit Union." [See illustration above]. Its declaration attested that the mark has been in continuous and extensive use

The examiner contended that, when compared to the display of the TCU or TEACHERS CREDIT UNION marks, the non-prominent use of the EVERWISE CREDIT UNION mark on the specimen of use failed to demonstrate bona fide use in commerce. Moreover, a blog post by Registrant on June 26, 2023, announced that it would be re-branding the credit union from TEACHERS CREDIT UNION to EVERWISE CREDIT UNION.

The Board first observed that, non surprisingly, the fact that the original examining attorney accepted the statement of use was not dispositive of the issue. See In re Locus Link USA, No. 2022-100137E, 2024 WL 3274709, at *6 (TTAB 2024).

Reviewing the specimen of use, the Board found that the appearance of the wording EVERWISE CREDIT UNION "buried in the text of the webpage in the same font and size as the rest of the wording in the corresponding paragraph," would not be perceived by relevant consumers as a source indictor for the recited services.

As to the use of the mark in the tagline, the Board found that "such use of the wording on the specimen does not constitute bona fide use of the mark in commerce, but is merely use made in an attempt to reserve a right in the mark until Registrant was actually using the mark in commerce in connection with its financial services."

Registrant filed a change of name from Teachers Credit Union to Everwise Credit Union with the Office on July 19, 2023. The change of name was executed on June 26, 2023, after the SOU Deadline (April 14, 2023). The fact that Registrant did not actually change its name to EVERWISE CREDIT UNION until two months after the SOU Deadline supports the finding that it added the tagline incorporating the mark to a single page on its website merely to preserve its right to make bona fide use of the mark in the future, i.e., to merely reserve a right in the mark.

The Board found it "quite remarkable" that Registrant "could not produce a single additional document that uses the wording EVERWISE CREDIT UNION as a source indicator of its financial services as of the SOU Deadline." Moreover, none of the exhibits attached to registrant's declaration showed use of the wording EVERWISE CREDIT UNION as a source indicator for these services. Instead, the marks TCU or TEACHERS CREDIT UNION appear throughout the exhibits as the source indicator for the listed services."

[The] lack of additional evidence demonstrating use as a source identifier pre-dating the SOU Deadline, viewed in conjunction with the screenshots of Registrant’s website advising that Registrant would officially offer its registered financial services under the EVERWISE CREDIT UNION mark after the SOU Deadline, clearly shows that Registrant’s use of the EVERWISE CREDIT UNION mark on the submitted specimen was not bona fide in nature but submitted for the purpose of reserving the mark for use at a future date. This is exactly the type of use the statute was designed to avoid.

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TTABlogger comment: The Board's opinion includes a lengthy and helpful discussion of how reexamination works. Note that, rather than the term "examining attorney," Section 16B of the Act uses the term "examiner."

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Posts May 2026 Hearing Schedule

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Tee-Tee-Ā-Bee) has scheduled three oral hearings for the month of May 2026. In the first two cases listed below, the hearings will held virtually. In the third, the hearing will be in-person at the Madison East Building 600 Dulany Street, 9th Floor (Hearing Room C), Alexandria, VA. Briefs and other papers for each case may be found at TTABVUE via the links provided.

May 6, 2026 - 10:00 AM [Virtual]: In re Rivers IP Holdngs, LLC, Serial No. 97511850 [Section 2(d) refusal to register the mark shown immediately below, for "Fast casual take away restaurant services featuring Mexican food served to patrons in a casino" [TACO disclaimed] in view of the registered mark SUERTE for "Restaurant services; Bar services; Catering services."]

May 27, 2026 - 10:00 AM [Virtual]: NIKE, Inc. v. Gotemkicks, Opposition No. 91287908 [Section 2(d) opposition to registration of the mark GOT EM KICKS for "Retail consignment stores featuring retro sneakers and clothing," in view of the opposer's alleged common law rights in the mark GOT 'EM for retail store services featuring footwear and clothing.]

May 28, 2026 - 10:00 AM [In-Person]: Constellation Brands U.S. Operations Inc. v. The Vineyard House LLC, Opposition No. 91245800 et al. [Consolidated oppositions against twelve applications for registration of marks comprising variations of the name Henry Walker Crabb, for wine, on the grounds that (1) Applicant lacked a bona-fide intent to use nine of its marks at the time the opposed applications were filed; (2) the CRABB’S BLACK BURGUNDY trademark violates the wine and spirits provision of Section 2(a); (3) applicant’s marks misdescribe qualities and characteristics of applicant’s Goods in a way that would deceive consumers; (4) applicant’s marks are likely to cause confusion as the source of goods because they are confusingly similar to opposer’s marks; and (5) applicant’s marks create a false association with opposer and opposer’s TO KALON Vineyard.]

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TTABlogger comment: What say you? See a WYHA?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

The Trademark Reporter's "Annual Review of European Trademark Law"

The Trademark Reporter has published its "Annual Review of European Trademark Law," with contributions from an impressive roster of authors from across Europe. The volume may be downloaded here. Willard Knox, Staff Editor-in-Chief, comments as follows:

This annual curated compendium highlights European trademark case law decisions rendered by courts in 2025 in the European Union (“EU”) (at both the EU and national levels), the United Kingdom, and other European jurisdictions.

A big shoutout to TMR member and principal author/editor Tom Scourfield as well as TMR member and contributor Jordi Güell for their work on this issue!

Please join me as Tom, Jordi, and TMR author Alicja Zalewska-Orabona present their popular Annual Review of Leading Case Law in Europe session on Tuesday, May 5, 12:00 pm–1:00 pm.

TTABlogger comment: Once again I thank The Trademark Reporter for granting leave to provide a link to this issue, which is Copyright © 2026 the International Trademark Association and reprinted with the permission of The Trademark Reporter®, 116 TMR No. 2 (March-April 2026).

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Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Upholds Genericness Refusal of SOCIAL SECURITY LAW GROUP for . . . . Guess What?

The Board squelched Applicant Victor Arruda's attempt to register the proposed mark SOCIAL SECURITY LAW GROUP (in standard character form) for "Legal services for individuals seeking social security disability and supplemental security income claims. Legal document preparation, legal research and legal consultancy in the context of social security disability and supplemental security income claims." Finding the term generic for Arruda's services, the Board declined to reach the Office's mere descriptiveness refusal. In re Arruda, Serial No. 98083575 (April 27, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Cheryl S. Goodman).

As to the genus of the services, Examining Attorney Lee-Anne Berns maintained that the appropriate genus is "Social Security legal services," but the Board found the genus to be "adequately defined by Applicant’s recitation of services."

In this case, the specific identification of services in the application is a subcategory (social security disability and supplemental income legal service) of a broader spectrum of social security legal services. Furthermore, reliance on the identification of services to identify the genus of the services at issue “is based on the premise that the recitation accurately reflects actual conditions of use of the involved term.” In re DNI Holdings Ltd., No. 76331011, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 515, at *9.

The next question was "whether the term sought to be registered is understood by the relevant public primarily to refer to that genus of goods or services." In light of Applicant Arruda's recitation of services, the Board found the relevant consuming public to be individuals "who seek legal services to assist with social security disability and supplemental security income claims, as well as long term disability insurers who engage attorneys for their insureds who pursue Social Security Disability claims with the Social Security Administration."

It is appropriate, as a first step, to "analyze the constituent terms." Not surprisingly, the Board found that SOCIAL SECURITY refers to “a U.S. government program established in 1935 to include old-age and survivors insurance, contributions to state unemployment insurance, and old-age assistance.”

Considering the evidence as a whole, we find the term SOCIAL SECURITY is a unitary generic term identifying a category of legal services. The dictionary evidence, the treatise and CLE evidence, the law directory evidence, the third-party use evidence, as well as Applicants own use and statements (yellow pages, brochure, website and declaration testimony) demonstrate that Social Security is generic for a legal practice area or legal category.

The evidence also showed that LAW GROUP is "a unitary generic term for a group of lawyers that provide legal services together."

As to the public's understanding of the term SOCIAL SECURITY LAW GROUP as a whole, based in part on third-party declarations submitted by Applicant Arruda, the Board concluded that when the terms SOCIAL SECURITY and LAW GROUP are combined, "they retain their generic significance, and the combination provides no additional difference in meaning."

Applicant Arruda argued that none of the evidence showed that the proposed mark SOCIAL SECURITY LAW GROUP can be immediately recognized as a service related to “disability and supplemental income claims." However, if that were the test, "then no word or term would be found to be generic provided that applicant submitted a highly detailed description of its goods and services." Moreover, a word or term that names a category is generic for more narrowly identified goods or services.

[A]lthough applicant contends SOCIAL SECURITY LAW GROUP is not the term the relevant public would use to describe the genus, the record evidence reflects that the relevant public would nonetheless understand SOCIAL SECURITY LAW GROUP to refer to a law firm that practices Social Security Law, which would include practicing law in the more specific area of Social Security Disability Supplemental Security Income claims.

And so, the Board affirmed the refusal to register.

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TTABlogger comment: WYHA? The "refer to" language comes from Marvin Ginn, 782 F.2d at 989-990.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Affirms Refusal of THEE EARTH logo due to "Mismatch" Between the Identified Goods and Specimens of Use

The Board upheld a refusal to register the logo mark shown immediately below, for "compost," on the ground that the specimens do not show use of the mark on the single good identified in the application. Applicant Thee Earth described its two specimens of use as a photo of a toter bin and a picture of "food waste, food scraps, and solid food inside the bin which is considered compost." [The two specimens are shown further below]. Thus, there was "a mismatch between the identified good and the goods and/or services reflected by the specimens." In re Thee Earth & Composting Solutions, LLC, Serial No. 98020099 [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande).

Thee Earth explained that its business consists of “compost collection services” and the “production and sale of finished compost." "Customers purchase a heavy-duty, two-wheeled plastic compost toter bin—available in 35-gallon, 65-gallon, and 96-gallon sizes—for purposes of storing their compostable organic waste prior to scheduled collection." The logo appears on each bin and on every bag of finished compost.

This explanation makes clear that Applicant does indeed sell compost, which is the only good identified in the application. And Applicant states that the compost is sold in bags with Applicant’s mark on them. That’s all good. But the problem is that none of the specimens Applicant submitted shows a labelled bag of compost as Applicant sells it.

The specimens show the mark only on a “toter bin” and Thee Earth made clear it does not sell compost in a toter bin, but in bags. "In layperson’s terms, there is a 'disconnect' or 'mismatch' between the single good listed in the application (compost) and the goods and services Applicant says that specimens represent."

The Board noted that, "at this late stage," nothing can be done to "fix" the issue. An application that has been considered and decided on appeal cannot be re-opened, except for entry of a disclaimer. The Board further noted that Thee Earth may file another application and provide a proper specimen.

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TTABlogger comment: WYHA?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Are T-Shirts Related to Entertainment Services Under Section 2(d)?

The USPTO refused to register the mark FAMOUS FRIENDS for “shirts; t-shirts," concluding that confusion is likely with the registered mark FAMOUS FRIEND for “entertainment services by a musical artist and producer, namely, musical composition for others and production of musical sound recordings." Despite applicant's argument that the addition of the plural “S” materially changes how consumers perceive its mark, the Board unsurprisingly found the marks to be confusingly similar. But what about the goods and services? Is clothing related to everything? In re Runnin’ Behind, Inc., Serial No. 97603035 (April 23, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Wendy B. Cohen).

Specimen issues: The examining attorney deemed the use of the mark to be merely ornamental in light of its size and placement on the t-shirt, and thus unregistrable. The Board pointed out that "[a]lthough '[i]t may have once been the practice in the clothing industry to limit logos to small sizes in discrete areas rather than to have them ‘emblazoned’ across a garment ... such is no longer the industry practice, or at least no longer the only one.'"

Applicant contended that FAMOUS FRIENDS is recognized as an indicator of secondary source for the goods because of the "extensive use of FAMOUS FRIENDS in connection with Chris Young’s song, album, tour, and fan club services, rendering it easily recognizable by consumers as Applicant’s distinctive brand extendable to souvenir merchandise (bearing his image).” The Board found the evidence convincing that the mark serves as an indicator of secondary source, and it reversed this refusal.

Section 2(d) Refusal: The Board found the difference between the singular form of the cited mark and the plural form of applicant's mark to be "not meaningful." "Any consumers who do notice the slight difference in the marks may consider Applicant’s mark a variation of the Cited Mark covering companion product lines."

Regarding connotation and commercial impression, applicant argued that its mark is associated with Chris Young, "but that even if the consumer is unaware of 'the verbal irony of Chris Young’s use of ‘Famous Friends’ for non-famous hometown heroes, the marks … create distinct commercial impression on their faces.'" The Board was unmoved:

We are constrained to base our analysis on the applied-for mark and identification of goods. While Applicant has submitted evidence of its use of FAMOUS FRIENDS in connection with Chris Young and his song, we cannot consider alleged marketplace realities not reflected in the identifications of goods and services.

The Board found that '[g]iven the near identical similarity of the marks, this first DuPont factor weighs strongly in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion."

As to the goods and services, the examining attorney relied on twenty use-based third-party registrations covering t-shirts and entertainment services, including the marks AUSTIN CITY LIMITS, KELLY CLARKSON, and BARRY MANILOW, as well as on a number of internet uses, including RED HOT CHILI PEPPERS, PRINCE, and GEORGE CLINTON.

Applicant, in turn, submitted twenty-two pairs of registrations in which the identical mark was registered by different entities for songwriting or music production and for shirts and t-shirts. The Board was not impressed: "the fact that different third-parties may own these registrations does not negate those examples of common ownership submitted by the Examining Attorney and what that may suggest as to consumer perception in the marketplace."

The Board found that the second DuPont factor supported the refusal.

Noting that none of the DuPont factors favored applicant, the Board affirmed the Section 2(d) refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: Chris Young is not related to Neil Young, says Claude.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: How Did These Three Section 2(d) Appeals Turn Out?

Here are three recent TTAB decisions in Section 2(d) appeals. Remembering that a TTAB Judge (now retired) once said that one can predict the outcome of a Section 2(d) appeal 95% of the time just by considering the marks and the goods/services, how do you think these came out? [Answer in first comment].

In re USI Insurance Services LLC, Serial No. 98585708 (April 21, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christen M. English). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark shown below, for "insurance services, namely, the brokerage, underwriting, issuance and administration of commercial property and casualty, personal property and casualty, accident, and health insurance tailored to the needs; of insureds; insurance agency services; wholesale brokerage of various types of insurance tailored to the needs of insureds” [SPECIALTY disclaimed] in view of the registered mark IGP for "administration and underwriting of life insurance, accident and health insurance, annuity contracts, and pensions."]

In re Nekki Limited, Serial No. 98767008 (April 22, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas W. Wellington) [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark SPINE – THIS IS GUN FU for, inter alia, "downloadable computer games software," "home video game machines," "hand-held computer games equipment, namely game consoles," and "providing online, interactive multi-player computer games" [GUN FU voluntarily disclaimed] in view of the registered mark GUN FU for "Downloadable computer game software via a global computer network and wireless devices."]

In re Heretic Beauty Inc., Serial No. 98831998 (April 22, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge George C. Pologeorgis). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark EAU DE MACABRE for “fragrances and perfumery” in view of the registered mark shown below for various clothing items and the registered standard character mark MACABRE for candles.]

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TTABlogger comment: How did you do? See any WYHA?s ?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Is "READY, FETCH, GO!" for Dog Toys Confusable with "READY SET FETCH" for Balls and Flying Discs?

The USPTO refused to register the proposed mark READY, FETCH, GO! for "dog toys," concluding that confusion is likely with the registered mark READY SET FETCH for "flying discs; flying disc throwing apparatus; rubber balls; tennis balls; tennis ball throwing apparatus." Applicant NAAJ LLC argued that its mark conveys "a spirited, call-to action voice" that "signals energy and enthusiasm," whereas the cited mark READY SET FETCH "introduces a more restrained, perhaps even instructive tone." I think you know how this appeal came out. In re NAAJ LLC, Serial No. 98577734 (April 21, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Angela Lykos).

The Goods: The evidence submitted by Examining Attorney Robert Ratcliffe established that rubber balls and flying discs are types of dog toys. NAAJ’s goods are identified as “dog toys,” and the cited registration identifies, inter alia, “rubber balls” and “flying discs.” Thus, the involved goods are identical in-part. Third-party registration and website evidence also demonstrated the relatedness of the goods.

Applicant’s and Registrant’s “dog toys,” “rubber balls,” and “flying discs” presumptively move in all normal trade channels and to consumers that purchase such goods.

The Marks: NAAJ further argued that the exclamation point and the inclusion of the word GO! at the end of its mark “gives the mark a joyful, commanding presence closely aligned with the action of play and engagement between a dog and its owner” while the cited mark “reads as a single command or product title, not a playful interaction.” NAAJ was barking up the wrong tree.

Both marks are short, three-word phrases that evoke the familiar idiom “Ready, set, go,” making them similar in structure and cadence. Each mark begins with READY and incorporates the word FETCH. While FETCH appears in a different position in each mark, that distinction does not significantly alter the marks’ appearance or sound. Nor does the substitution of GET [sic] for GO appreciably change the marks in sight or sound.

The Board found that the marks are similar in sound, appearance, meaning and commercial impression.

As to connotation and commercial impression, the Board observed that both marks are a clever play on the expression “Ready, set, go.” "The shared term FETCH projects the same connotation by suggesting that a pet dog is ready to play a game of fetch with a dog toy, stick, ball or flying disc." The minor differences in punctuation "do not materially distinguish the marks in either sound, appearance, connotation or commercial impression."

Other Factors: NAAJ's evidence of six third-party registrations for marks based on the same theme fell short both in number and probative value. Only four covered similar goods and those did not include the word "fetch." The Board deemed the sixth DuPont factor to be neutral. The lack of evidence of actual confusion was meaningless because there was no proof that NAAJ's mark had been put into use.

Conclusion: Balancing the relevant DuPont factors, the Board found confusion likely and it affirmed the refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: My old friend, David Perlsack, had a dog that would chase his own tail when David called, "GO FETCH YOURSELF."

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Are Perfume and Clothing Related Under Section 2(d)?

The USPTO refused to register the mark shown below for "Perfumery; Bleaching preparations for laundry use; Cleaning, polishing, scouring and abrasive preparations; Essential oils; Non-medicated cosmetics; Non-medicated dentifrices; Non-medicated toiletry preparations," concluding that confusion is likely with the registered mark ASSAF, in standard characters, for "Clothing, namely, hats, caps, and beanies." Applicant argued that its goods have a different nature and purpose than hats and caps, that its goods are expensive and its customers sophisticated and careful, and that its mark focuses on horses, which are used in the branding for exclusive and expensive goods. I suspect you know how this appeal came out. In re Assef Trading Est., Serial No. 98642858 (April 20, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark A. Thurmon).

The Board found the marks to be similar in appearance. It acknowledged that the shield design is distinctive and is likely to be noticed and remembered by consumers, but the only English word in applicant's mark is identical to the cited mark. "This type of similarity can lead to consumer confusion, even when one of the marks contains a design element."

The non-Latin script in Applicant’s mark transliterates to ASSAF, so consumers who can read the English word ASSAF and the Arabic script will not find that this script distinguishes the marks, but instead will see the literal elements of the mark as ASSAF ASSAF. For those consumers who cannot read Arabic, the Arabic script will likely be viewed as another design element of the mark, one that does not provide much distinction from the cited ASSAF mark.

Most importantly, according to the Board, "the marks are identical in sound for consumers who do not attempt to pronounce the Arabic script in Applicant’s mark." The word ASSAF has no established meaning in English, but because the same word is used in both marks, the marks will share the same meaning." The additional elements in applicantnd sole English literal element, of both marks is the word ASSAF, so the dominant or primary commercial impression created by the two marks will be the same."

The Board noted that if horse designs are in common use for similar goods, as applicant claimed, then the horse element in applicant's mark is less distinctive and less likely to be relied upon by consumers than the other elements of the mark.

Turning to the goods, Examining Attorney Philip Liu submitted evidence that marks used on clothing, including caps and hats, are also often used with perfumes. He also provided thirteen third-party, use-based registrations that identify both perfume (as identified in the Application) and hats or caps (as identified in the cited Registration).

Applicant argues that its goods have a different nature and purpose than hats and caps. While this is surely true—perfumes are not head coverings, as hats and caps are—it is largely irrelevant. Differences of this type might be important for some goods, but as we noted above, the key question here is whether the evidence shows that these different goods are related in the minds of consumers.

The Board found that the goods are related, and so the second DuPont factor supported the refusal.

The third-party use evidence demonstrated that the channels of trade overlap. Applicant's argument that its customers are sophisticated and careful ignored the lack of any limitation in the application as to price or type of customer. "With no limits on the goods, we find that the perfume goods identified in the Application may include products at any price point. Similarly, the hats and caps identified in the cited Registration may include such goods at any price point." Moreover, there was no evidence to support applicant's assertion regarding purchaser care.

Finally, we are required to base our decision “on the least sophisticated potential purchasers.” Stone Lion Capital Partners, 746 F.3d at 1325. We find that the “least sophisticated potential purchasers” of perfumes, hats and caps, which are ordinary consumer goods, are likely to exercise ordinary care in making purchasing decisions, which does not alter the likelihood of confusion. The fourth DuPont factor is neutral.

The Board observed that only the first three DuPont factors were probative in this appeal, and all three supported the Section 2(d) refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: Clothing, jewelry, perfume - all related.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Which of These Three Recent Section 2(d) Oppositions Was/Were Dismissed?

Here are three recent TTAB decisions in Section 2(d) oppositions. At least one of the oppositons was dismissed and the other(s) sustained. Remembering that a TTAB Judge (now retired) once said to me that one can predict the outcome of a Section 2(d) claim 95% of the time (at least in ex parte appeals) just by considering the marks and the goods/services, how do you think these came out? [Answer in first comment].

Chatham Imports, Inc. v. Farmer’s Creed Corp., Opposition No. 91283157 (March 30, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Martha B. Allard). [Section 2(d) opposition to registration of the mark FARMER'S CREED for "Alcoholic beverages, except beer," in view of the registered mark FARMER’S for “Alcoholic beverages, namely, distilled spirits."]

Allied Lomar, Inc. v. Talnua, Inc, Opposition No. 91284670 (April 13, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Jennifer L. Elgin) [Section 2(d) refusal to register of the mark OLDE SAINT’S KEEP for "distilled spirits," in view of the registered mark OLDE ST. NICK “alcoholic beverages, except beers.”]

Sun Garden Packing Co. v. Da Napoli Foods LLC, Opposition No. 91284802 (April 17, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas W. Wellington). [Section 2(d) opposition to registration of the mark shown below left, for "Pasta; Sauces; Packaged meals consisting primarily of pasta or rice," in view of the registered mark shown below right, for "canned tomatoes, canned tomato puree, and canned tomato paste."

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TTABlogger comment: How did you do?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.