Tuesday, March 19, 2024

TTABlog Test: Are Gummy Vitamins Related to Personal Care Products Under Section 2(d)?

The USPTO refused to register the mark KUDO for "Gummy vitamins; Nutritional supplements in the form of gummies," finding confusion likely with the nearly identical mark KUDOS registered for "Hair shampoo, hair conditioner, soap for hands, face and body, skin/body moisturizer, skin/body lotion, shaving preparations, body/hand cream, skin cleansing cream, and bath gels/oil." Are the goods related? Do they travel through the same trade channels? How do you think this appeal came out? In re Salvation Nutraceuticals Inc., Serial No. 97015288 (March 8, 2024) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark Lebow).

Examining Attorney Yat Sye Lee submitted internet evidence that some eighteen different companies offer the goods of both applicant and registrant under the same mark (including SEPHORA, BATH & BODY WORKS, and PACIFICA), along with twenty use-based third-party registrations covering these goods. The Board therefore found the goods to be related.

Applicant Salvation contended that “[c]ompanies typically separate their topical goods from their consumable goods,” which “prevents consumers from believing that the consumable goods somehow contain similar ingredients or characteristics as the topical products, which can contain toxins or other undesirable ingredients to consume and allows the companies to market the products with different message." [sic].: According to applicant:

[The USPTO actually has a long and consistent practice of not finding dietary and nutritional supplements to be related or similar to skin care products. But recently, many marks are being rejected by presenting extrinsic evidence that improperly extends the rights of registrants in an ex parte proceeding based on being so-called substantially related. And the pendulum has swung too far.

However, evidentiary support for that assertion was lacking.

Salvation also complained that it “was not allowed to present extrinsic evidence of actual use by the registrant to show that the goods are not substantially related,' specifically, that Registrant is a manufacturer of guest amenities for hotels, which do not provide supplements and vitamins for their guests." The Board was not impressed, pointing out once again that:

“[the] likelihood of confusion determination must be made on the basis of the goods or services as identified in the application and the registration, rather than on the basis of what the evidence might show the applicant’s or registrant’s actual goods or services to be.” In re Trackmobile, 15 USPQ2d 1152, 1153 (1990)),

With regarding to the overlap in trade channels, the examining attorney relied on the same evidence discussed above regarding the relatedness of the goods, including the webpage evidence from retailers Avon, Honest, Pacifica, Tula, Ulta, Vegamour, Hello Bello, Love Beauty & Planet, Sephora, Blue Mercury, Bath & Body Works, Blu Atlas, Consult Beaute, Gimme, Love Wellness, New Nordic, Oase, and ZAS Naturals. "This evidence supports a finding that these goods are offered in at least one common channel of trade, that is, the websites operated by the third-party specialty retailers, often on the same page."

And so, the Board affirmed the refusal to register.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Does this one bother you? Would you rub a gummy vitamin on your skin?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2024.

Monday, March 18, 2024

TTABlog Test: How Did These Three Section 2(e)(1) Mere Descriptiveness Appeals Turn Out?

So far this year, the Board has affirmed more than 90% of the Section 2(e)(1) mere descriptiveness refusals reviewed on appeal. Here are three more. How do you think they came out? [Results in first comment].



In re DMG Mori Co., Serial No. 79317839 (March 5, 2024) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark A. Thurmon). [Mere descriptiveness refusal of GEAR PROFILER for "Metalworking machines and machine tools, and their structural parts" and for "Computers; downloadable and recorded computer software for controlling and monitoring tools of metalworking machine tools for use in connection with metalworking machine tools; computer peripheral devices; laser measuring systems; scanners." Applicant argued that the mark does not directly describe "metalworking machines and machines tools, computers, laser measuring systems, or scanners, much less with the requisite level of particularity required to support a ‘merely descriptive’ refusal.”]


In re Roto-Mix LLC, Serial No. 90862644 (March 6, 2024) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Wendy B. Cohen) [Refusal to register AUTO-FEED for “agricultural machines, namely, motorized-vehicle-based automated and semi-automated livestock feed dispensers for livestock feeding trucks and systems" and for "land vehicles, namely, automated feed delivery vehicles." Applicant maintained that "'feed' has a double meaning–both as sustenance for animals and as supplying a consumable within a machine . . . meaning the term is not merely descriptive" and that "'auto' could be a shortened version of automatic but also a reference for an automobile and thus, the proposed mark requires '[s]everal mental steps' to determine what the coined term suggests about the goods and that the mark may be suggestive."]

In re Low Carbon Technologies LLC, Serial No. 88632729 (March 15, 2024) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark Lebow) [Mere descriptiveness refusal of the proposed certification mark LOW CARBON BEEF for "beef processing." Applicant argud that its services "do not evaluate 'carbon emissions' or specific characteristics of beef itself" and instead "certify numerous steps of beef processing and whether or not they meet numerous, non-obvious criteria that are part of its certification proceeding to reduce overall greenhouse gas emissions."]

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: How did you do? See any WYHA?s

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2024.

Friday, March 15, 2024

TTABlog Test: Is VEUVE OLIVIER for Sparkling Wines Confusable with VEUVE CLICQUOT for Champagne?

Petitioner MHCS sought cancellation of a registration for the mark VEUVE OLIVIER for sparkling wines, claiming a likelihood of confusion with the registered mark VEUVE CLICQUOT for champagne. Priority was not an issue because MHCS filed its underlying application first. The Board found the goods to be, in part, legally identical, since champagne is a type of sparkling wine. But what about the marks? How do you think this came out? MHCS v. Les Grands Chais De France, Cancellation No. 92075021 (March 8, 2024) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Martha B. Allard).


As to the conceptual strength of the cited mark, since the mark is registered on the Principal Register without a claim of acquired distinctiveness, it is presumed to be inherently distinctive. Furthermore, the word "veuve" (meaning widow) "is an arbitrary term as applied to Champagne and therefore is conceptually strong."

With regard to commercial strength, MHCS has used the mark VEUVE CLICQUOT in the United States since 1994. VEUVE CLICQUOT brand champagne is sold everywhere in the United States, through both online and in more than 50,000 brick-and-mortar stores. The mark has been widely advertised and promoted, has enjoyed high sales for the years since 2011, and has been the subject of numerous unsolicited media references. However, MHCS did not provide sales or advertising figures for the VEUVE CLICQUOT mark alone, but rather as to total figures for all of its “VEUVE Marks.”

The Board concluded that "overall the mark has substantial commercial strength and falls on the stronger side of the spectrum from very strong to very weak."

Turning to the marks, each of the marks could connote "a specific widow, i.e., the widow named Clicquot and the widow named Olivier." The Board found that "an appreciable number of purchasers are unlikely to be aware that VEUVE means 'widow' and are unlikely to translate the marks into English."

The slight difference in the “widow” connotations of the respective marks in translation, i.e., “the Widow Clicquot” versus “Widow Olivier,” would likely be lost on these purchasers, and it will not aid such purchasers in distinguishing the marks. They will perceive only that the same French-looking and French-sounding word, VEUVE, appears as the first term in both.

MHCS provided evidence that it has made VEUVE "a theme of its marketing efforts because of the history, and the widow Clicquot herself, connected with the origins of the company." "The presence of this strong distinctive term as the first word in each party’s mark further substantiates the marks' similarities."

Viewing the marks in their entireties in terms of sight, sound, meaning and commercial impression, we find that the marks are similar due to the shared initial term VEUVE. This shared dominant element outweighs the specific points of dissimilarity between the marks due to the terms that follow, i.e., CLICQUOT and OLIVIER.

And so, the Board granted the petition for cancellation.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Do you think consumers would be confused? Respondent did not submit any evidence or testimony, nor did it file a brief. That rope-a-dope strategy didn't work. Would the lack of actual confusion over 8 years of coexistence have been a fertile ground for exploration?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2024.

Thursday, March 14, 2024

Despite Applicant's Bad Intent, TTAB Dismisses Oppositions to EVSFOOD for Beverages

The Board tossed out these three-pronged oppositions to registration of the mark EVSFOOD for beverages and beverage components, dismissing Opposer's claims of lack of bona fide intent, false suggestion of a connection under Section 2(a), and likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). Opposer's proofs came up way short on all three claims. Nu Science Corporation v. Yuyao Deutrel Chemical Science and Technology Co., Ltd., d/b/a Evsfood Group, Oppositions Nos. 91225314 and 91225328 (March 11, 2024) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande).

Lack of Bona Fide Intent: Opposer Nu Science bore the burden of proof but failed to make a prima facie case of lack of bona fide intent. "Opposer did not submit any document request(s) and response(s) to substantiate its argument that there is no documentary evidence reflecting a bona fide intent to use the mark. The prima facie case may not require much, but it requires at least that. Nor does Opposer cite any other evidence in the trial record to substantiate its Section 1(b) claim."

Likelihood of Confusion: Nu Science alleged that applicant’s EVSFOOD mark "is a clear combination of Opposer’s two (2) Trademarks. ‘EVS’ is the initials of ‘EVERETT STOREY’ and ‘FOOD’ is the suffix of ‘CELLFOOD.’ Put together, the mark creates ‘EVSFOOD.'" Both notices of opposition alleged that "there exists a likelihood of confusion based on Opposer’s use of two marks conjointly."

Nu Science argued that the public will see, understand, and pronounce applicant’s mark as "Ev’s Food" because they "(1) will see and understand 'EV' as short for 'Everett Story,' (2) know 'Everett Storey' either as the inventor of Opposer’s CELLFOOD supplement or as a trademark used by Opposer, and therefore (3) will view the mark EVSFOOD as a hybrid of EVERETT STOREY and CELLFOOD." However, Nu Science failed to provide any evidence that consumers "will undertake this multi-step perceptive process."

Comparing the opposed mark with Nu Science's marks individually, the Board found the opposed mark more dissimilar than similar to CELLFOOD and very dissimilar to EVERETT STOREY.

As to the goods, Nu Sciene's registrations covered vitamin and mineral supplements. Nu Science provided no evidence to prove that these goods are related to applicant's beverages and beverage components.

Here, the goods are not identical, which is to say, they’re different. And the lack of probative evidence in this case constrains us, as in IKEA Systems, from finding that the goods are related. We’re not super-consumers with expertise in particular markets. We must rely on parties to submit the evidence we need to decide their claims. On the evidence―or more precisely, the lack thereof―in this case, this factor weighs against a conclusion that confusion is likely.

As to channels of trade, the "spotty" evidentiary record left the Board "unable to determine which way this factor tips," and so the Board considered it to be neutral. And although the overlap in classes of consumers favored Nu Science, the import of that overlap "pales by comparison to the dissimilarities in the marks and goods."

False Suggestion of a Connection: Nu Science made applicant's intent the centerpiece of its case. The Board found that the evidence "evinces Applicant’s intent to create an association between EVSFOOD, on the one hand, and Dr. Everett Storey and CELLFOOD products, together, on the other hand."

But bad intent is not what Section 2(a) proscribes. Falsely suggesting to the consuming public a connection is the proscribed wrong. That question, like so many others in trademark law, is one of consumer perception.

The Board found no direct evidence supporting Nu Science's argument that consumers will understand that “EVS” is a reference to Everett Storey. The evidence fell "far short of supporting Opposer’s claim that '“Everett Storey' is a part of Opposer’s name or identity such that, when U.S. consumers see EVSFOOD, they will associate it with Opposer."

In sum, there was a clear lack of evidence that "(1) EVSFOOD is the same as, or a close approximation of, the name or identity previously used by Opposer and that (2) EVSFOOD would be recognized by consumers as such, in that it points uniquely and unmistakably to Opposer."

And so, the Section 2(a) claim failed.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Note that Judge Casagrande did not discuss applicant's bad intent in connection with the 2(d) claim. Perhaps his Trademark Reporter article explains why: "A Verdict For Your Thoughts? Why an Accused Trademark Infringer's Intent Has No Place in Likelihood of Confusion Analysis," 101 Trademark Reporter 1447 (September-October 2011).

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2024.

Wednesday, March 13, 2024

Stock Ticker Symbol HIG Confusable with H.I.G. for Financial Services, Says TTAB

The Board affirmed a refusal to register the mark HIG for, inter alia, "financial services," finding confusion likely with the registered mark H.I.G., in standard character and design form (below) for "investment services in the nature of venture capital and private equity financing, and investment banking services." The Board found these services to be legally identical. Focusing on the cited standard character mark, it found the marks to be confusingly similar. Is that the end of the story? In re Hartford Fire Insurance Company, Serial No. 90263124 (March 11, 2024) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark Lebow).

Applicant Hartford pointed out that its stock ticker symbol HIG has been publicly listed on the New York Stock Exchange since 1995, peacefully co-existing with the cited registrations. It argued that its use of the mark HIG as a stock symbol "is a dramatically different use than the use made of the marks in the registrations."

Specifically, it asserts, “Registrant’s use is made in connection with financial services sold to consumers and promoted through its website,” whereas “Applicant’s stock securities are only available for purchase.” Thus, “[t]he refusal and the arguments by the Examining Attorney do not take into account the dramatically different uses by Applicant and Registrant in this situation.”

The Board pointed out, however, that proof of actual confusion is not necessary to establish a likelihood of confusion. Furthermore,Hartford's argument regarding the differences in the services actually offered missed the point. "The question of likelihood of confusion must be determined based on an analysis of the services recited in Applicant’s application, rather than what evidence or attorney argument shows the services might be."

Hartford stated that "its primary intention with the application is to protect its stock ticker symbol." It explained:

Since there is currently no approved identification relating to the sale of securities on a public exchange in the Official Identification Manual, Applicant described its services with both specific and broad terms. Once the U.S. Trademark Office approves an identification for stock ticker symbols, Applicant will amend its identification to exclude the broader wording. Applicant respectfully submits that once this is done, there will be no likelihood of confusion.

The Board found this to be an acknowledgement by Hartford that "at least until such time as the USPTO adopts an identification for stock ticker symbols, that its recitation of services is currently broad enough to result in a likelihood of confusion."

And so, the Board affirmed the refusal.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Is Hartford ticked off?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2024.

Tuesday, March 12, 2024

Finding MRS. COLORADO Use-less, TTAB Grants Petition for Cancellation

The Board granted a petition for cancellation of a registration for the mark MRS. COLORADO, finding that Respondent Abundance Productions had not used the mark in commerce in connection with "Entertainment in the nature of beauty pageants" on or before the filing date of the underlying application. The registration was therefore void ab initio. Miss United States of America LLC, DBA United States of America Pageants v.Abundance Productions, LLC, Cancellation No. 92071814 (March 8, 2024) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Melanye K. Johnson).

Abundance had a license from Mrs. Patricia Dampier to use the mark MRS. COLORADO for its beauty pageant, but that license was terminated in 2015. Respondent was permitted to use the mark until December 2017. The licensor allowed the registration to expire in February 2018. In March 2018, Abundance filed its Section 1(a) application to register the mark, claiming use since 2008. The subject registration issued in November 2018.

Petitioner contended that Abundance was not using the MRS. COLORADO mark in commerce as of the filing date of the underlying application because it had not yet rendered any pageant services under the mark, and that any prior use under the license inured to the benefit of the licensor, not to Abundance.

The Board observed that, under Section 45 of the Trademark Act, a service mark is in use in commerce "(1) when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of services; and (2) the services are rendered in commerce ...." [Emphasis supplied].

“Mere publicity about services to be rendered in the future does not lay a foundation for an application. The statute requires not only the display of the mark in the sale or advertising of services but also the rendition of those services in order to constitute use of the service mark in commerce.” Intermed Comms., Inc. v. Chaney, 197 USPQ 501, 507-08 (TTAB 1977); see also Aycock Eng., 90 USPQ2d at 1308. “Rendering services requires actual provision of services.” Couture v. Playdom, 113 USPQ2d at 2044 (citing MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 19:103 (4th ed. Supp. 2013)).

Abundance argued that, along with the application to register the MRS. COLORADO mark, it submitted a webpage specimen displaying the words "MRS. COLORADO PAGEANT" at the top and a pink rectangle superimposed with the words "BUY TICKET HERE," through which the public could purchase tickets for the MRS. COLORADO pageant.

The Board, however, concluded that Abundance did not render its entertainment services until its 2018 MRS. COLORADO Pageant actually took place, on or about April 16, 2018. The Board further found that the licensed use of the mark under the prior registration "does not qualify as rendering 'Entertainment in the nature of beauty pageants.'" 

Under the terms of the license agreement, all of the goodwill pertaining to the Prior Registration belonged to Mrs. Dampier [the licensor], and all rights resulting from the use of the Prior Registration (sic) inured to the benefit of Mrs. Dampier.

The Board therefore found that "the underlying application and resulting registration for Respondent’s Mark is void ab initio." It declined to entertain Abundance's laches defense:

“[L]aches is not available as a defense in an action to remove a registration which was clearly void ab initio.” Wandel Mach. Co. v. Altoona Fam Inc., 133 USPQ 410, 410-11 (TTAB 1962) (citation omitted); see also Am. Velcro, Inc. v. Charles Mayer Studios, Inc., 177 USPQ 149, 153 n.5 (TTAB 1973).

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Should have filed an I-T-U application?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2024.

Monday, March 11, 2024

TTAB Dismisses AMERICAN APPAREL Cancellation Petition: Claims Should Have Been Raised as Counterclaims in Pending Opposition

On summary judgment, the Board dismissed this petition for cancellation because Grateful American's claims (genericness and lack of acquired distinctiveness) should have been raised in a pending opposition as compulsory counterclaims. Grateful American waited nearly a year after filing its answer in Gildan Activewear's opposition to registration of the mark GRATEFUL AMERICAN APPAREL before filing this petition for cancellation. Grateful American Apparel LLC v. Gildan Activewear SRL, Cancellation No. 92081329 (March 8, 2024) [not precedential].

Trademark Rule 1.114(b)(3)(i) provides that "[a] defense attacking the validity of any one or more of the registrations pleaded in the petition shall be a compulsory counterclaim if grounds for such counterclaim exist at the time when the answer is filed." Gildan asserted that Grateful American knew of the grounds as evidenced by a letter it sent to Gildan six weeks before its answer, stating that "[t]he trademark AMERICAN APPAREL is notable [sic] weak given half the mark, the term APPAREL, is generic and afforded no protection as a trademark. The other half of the mark, AMERICAN, is blatantly descriptive."

The Board noted that Gildan did not expressly plead, as an affirmative defense, that Grateful American's counterclaims were untimely compulsory counterclaims. However, Gildan did plead that "as a result of Petitioner’s own acts and/or omissions, Petitioner has waived any right to pursue its Cancellation." Grateful American did not move to strike this statement, and the Board concluded that the statement "can be construed to allege that [Grateful American] waived its claims by failing to timely assert them in the Opposition."

Furthermore, Grateful American did not object to the summary judgment motion as being directed to an unpleaded issue, but rather addressed the issue on the merits. The Board therefore deemed Gildan's pleading as amended to include a defense of untimeliness.

The Board then found no genuine dispute of material fact that the newly raised grounds of genericness and lack of acquired distinctiveness existed at the time Grateful American filed its answer in the opposition.

It is well established that a defendant that fails to timely plead a compulsory counterclaim cannot avoid the effect of its failure by thereafter asserting the counterclaim grounds in a separate petition to cancel. * * * Inasmuch as Petitioner’s claims were compulsory in the Opposition, and were not timely asserted in that proceeding, they are waived.

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TTABlogger comment: In Jive Software, Inc. v. Jive Communications, Inc., 125 USPQ2d 1175 (TTAB 2017) [precedential] [TTABlogged here], the Board ruled that the failure to plead a compulsory counterclaim in an original answer is not a per se bar to its later assertion in the same proceeding. There, however, the delay was a mere few weeks and was excusable.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2024.

Friday, March 08, 2024

TTABlog Test: How Did These Three Recent 2(d) Appeals Turn Out?

Here are the three Section 2(d) appeals recently decided by the TTAB. So far this year, the affirmance rate in Section 2(d) appeals is over 90%. How do you think these three came out? No hints this time. [Answers in first comment.]


In re Bath Busters, Inc., Serial No. 90850908 (February 28, 2024) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christen M. English) [Section 2(d) refusal of BATH BUSTERS for "remodeling of residential and commercial bathroom[s]" in view of the registered mark TILE BUSTERS, in standard character and logo form, for dust free tile removal services.]

In re Tiffany L. Henry, Serial No. 90446044 (March 5, 2024) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge George C. Pologeorgis). [Section 2(d) refusals of NOBODY CARES ... THEY REALLY DON'T! for "Sweatpants; Sweatshirts; Baseball caps; Bathing suits; Fleece pullovers; Gym pants; Hats; Headwear; Hooded sweatshirts; Hooded pullovers; Hooded sweat shirts; Jackets; Jeans; Jogging pants; Jogging suits; Jumpers; Long sleeve pullovers; Men's socks; Outer jackets; Pajama bottoms; Pants; Robes; Short sets; Shorts; Socks; Sweat jackets; Sweat pants; Sweat shirts; Sweat suits; Sweaters; Swim trunks; Swimsuits; T-shirts; Tank tops; Track jackets; Track pants; Track suits; Tracksuits; Undergarments; Underpants; Undershirts; Underwear; Wind resistant jackets," in view of the registered mark NOBODY CARES for Backpacks; Fanny packs; Tote bags; Gym bags, Shirts, and On-line retail store services featuring apparel and accessories.]

In re Hinsdale Bank & Trust Company, National Association, Serial No. 97374049 (March 6, 2024) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Melanye K. Johnson). [Section 2(d) refusal to register COMMUNITY BANK OF WILLOWBROOK for banking services [COMMUNITY BANK disclaimed], in view of the registered mark WILLOWBROOK for "financial management services, investment administration and consulting services, and investment of funds for other."]


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TTABlog comment: How did you do? See any WYHA?s

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2024.

Thursday, March 07, 2024

TTABlog Test: Is MOTO CLUB INTERNATIONAL Merely Descriptive of Bumper Stickers and T-Shirts?

The USPTO refused to register the proposed mark MOTO CLUB INTERNATIONAL, deeming it merely descriptive of "decals; sticker; bumper stickers" and of "beanies; headwear; pants; shirts; sweaters; sweatshirts; t-shirts; hooded sweatshirts; jackets; long-sleeved shirts; tank tops" under Section 2(e)(1) [MOTO or INTERNATIONAL disclaimed]. The examining attorney maintained that the mark "merely describes a feature and the intended user or provider of applicant’s goods," because the products are motorcycle-themed and are available on the Internet. How do you think this appeal came out? In re Moto Club International, LLC, Serial No. 90715523 (March 5, 2024) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark A. Thurmon).

The Board began by "noting the obvious:" the mark does not directly describe the goods since they are not sold by or to members of an international motorcycle club. Moreover, applicant is not a club. However, the Board agreed that if the mark describes "a feature of the goods, the intended or expected users/purchasers of the goods, or something significant about the source of the goods, the mark may be merely descriptive."

The examining attorney offered two rationales: applicant's products are motorcycle-themed, and the goods are "international" because they are sold on the Internet without a geographical restriction to the United States. The Board, however, noted the lack of evidence of international promotion of the mark, and there was nothing about the motorcycle theme that suggested an international nature for the goods.

[W]e find the word “international” technically describes something about the goods, but there is no evidence relevant consumers are aware of this fact. Without that connection, we cannot find the word “international,” as used in this mark, is understood as descriptive by consumers.

The Board further observed that the word “international" modifies “moto club,” so relevant consumers are likely to understand the mark as a reference to an international motorcycle club. In that light, the examining attorney’s position that "international" refers to the fact that some purchasers of the goods reside outside the United States "makes little sense."

The other basis for the refusal - that the mark describes "the intended user” of the goods - was unsupported by any evidence that consumers interested in clothing, decals and stickers with a motorcycle theme, think of themselves are being part of a MOTO CLUB. "That is a step too far."

The meanings of “moto” and “club” and “international” do not come together to form a descriptive meaning of the mark as a whole. Instead, these words support different meanings in this case. When a multi-step analysis is used, that analysis must come together, it cannot continue to point in different directions. That is what happened here. It takes too much effort to tie together the disparate threads of analysis relied upon by the Examining Attorney in this case.

The Board found this to be a close case, but any doubt must be resolved in favor of the applicant. And so, the Board reversed the refusal to register.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: After 16 affirmances of mere descriptiveness refusal, this is 2024's first reversal.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2024.

Wednesday, March 06, 2024

TTABlog Test: Which of These Three Section 2(d) Oppositions Was/Were Dismissed?

A TTAB judge once said to me that one can predict the outcome of a Section 2(d) case about 95 percent of the time just by looking at the marks and the involved goods and/or services. Here are three Section 2(d) oppositions recently decided by the TTAB. At least one of the oppositions was dismissed. How do you think these three came out? [Answers in first comment.]

Hormel Foods, LLC v. Empacadora Dilusa de Aguascalientes S.A. de C.V., Opposition No. 91275380 (March 4, 2024) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark Lebow). [Section 2(d) opposition to registration of the mark shown below, for "Butter; Chicharron; Compotes; Eggs; Lard; Milk; Pork; Canned fruits and vegetables; Edible oils and fats; Meat extracts; Milk shakes; Milk beverages, milk predominating; Pork steaks; Jellies, jams, compotes; Meat, fish, poultry and game, not live; Preserved, dried and cooked fruit and vegetables; Unflavored and unsweetened gelatins," in view of the registered mark DI LUSSO for dry sausage, poultry, beef, pork, cheese , horseradish, mustard, and sauces.]

Juvia’s Holdings LLC v. Sustainable Nutrition, Inc., Opposition No. 91271554 (February 29, 2024) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Jennifer L. Elgin). [Section 2(d) opposition to ADJUVIA in standard character and design forms, for "Anti-aging cream; Anti-wrinkle cream; Moisturizing creams" (Class 3) and for "Nutritional supplements consisting primarily of astaxanthin and coconut oil with none of the foregoing for the treatment of diabetes" (Class 5), in view of the registered mark JUVIA'S SKIN for "Cosmetic creams for skin care; Cosmetic preparations for skin care; Moisturizing preparations for the skin; Non-medicated skin care creams and lotions; Non-medicated skin care preparations; Non-medicated balms for use on skin; Non-medicated cleansers, namely, skin cleansers; Non-medicated cleansers, namely, facial cleansers; Non-medicated exfoliating preparations for skin" [SKIN disclaimed]].

Baxter S.r.l. v. Wholesale Interiors, Inc., Opposition No. 91263387 (February 16, 2024) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Karen S. Kuhlke). [Section 2(d) opposition to registration of BAXTON STUDIO for furniture [STUDIO disclaimed], on the ground of likelihood of confusion with the registered mark BAXTER and Design for furniture.]

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: How did you do?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2024.