TTAB Reverses Requirement to Disclaim "1833" in Barber's 1833 Logo, Finding "1833" Not Merely Informational
The Board reversed a requirement that the applicant disclaim the term "1833" in its composite mark shown below, for "aged cheese," finding that the term was neither merely informational (and thus failing to function as a trademark), or merely descriptive. The Board noted that "there is ambiguity and confusion concerning the ground or grounds for refusal. That ambiguity appears to have led Applicant to claim acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) of the Act, and the Examining Attorney’s treatment of that claim is also ambiguous." In re A.J. and R.G. Barber Limited, Serial No. 90647853 (November 16, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande).
Because applicant thought the refusal was based on mere descriptiveness, it did not address, during prosecution, whether the term 1833 fails to function as a source identifier because it is merely informational. Instead, applicant claimed acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f). The Board observed that "a Section 2(f) claim cannot overcome a failure-to-function refusal based on a proposed mark’s (or a component of a mark’s) merely informational nature." [What if a survey shows that it the term is recognized as a source indicator? - ed.].
In this appeal, applicant recognized that the refusal was based on the informational nature of 1833, and it addressed only that issue. The Examining Attorney argued that:
The wording 1833 is merely a non-distinctive year designation, more specifically the year of establishment of Applicant’s cheese production, and which such non-distinctive year designations or years of establishment are commonly used in business to impart information about the goods and/or services and would not be perceived as distinguishing the goods and/or services and identifying their source; thus, the wording does not function as a mark and must be disclaimed
The Board agreed that "[m]erely informational components of marks thus are subject to Section 6(a)’s disclaimer requirement." "In cases involving terms or phrases that allegedly are 'merely informational,' we typically look for evidence of 'widespread use' of the term in its informational sense."
Wide use by many others tends to show that consumers exposed to such uses will not perceive the term or phrase at issue to be an indicator of a unique source. Also relevant is whether the term or phrase at issue is used with “another designation that clearly identifies source,” as where the phrase “Investing in American Jobs” was used with the main source identifier WALMART).
Here, neither circumstance applies. As to widespread use, the examining attorney points to (1) a “plethora” of websites showing that cheese producers use year numbers to impart information about when the producer was established or first started making cheese; and (2) several third-party registrations for goods including cheese where the year appearing in the mark was disclaimed. The Board was unimpressed.
First, in the majority of the third-party registrations, the disclaimer includes words that immediately precede the year such as “Since 1938,” “Est. 1909,” “Established 1911,” “Depuis 1936,” etc. *** Second, in all but one of the third-party registrations that are composite marks that include literal elements, stylized typefaces, and design elements, the typeface in which the disclaimed year appears is significantly smaller than the main literal components of the marks. *** The same two observations apply to the examples of third-party use of marks.
The Board found this third-party usage "too different from Applicant’s use of '1833' in its mark to convince us that Applicant’s use of '1833' is 'merely informational."
Here, the record does not disclose that anyone else uses '1833' merely informationally in a manner that would inform how consumers would perceive that number in the context of Applicant’s mark. Against that backdrop, the refusal here seems perilously close to a per se rule that numbers that could represent a year always fail to function as marks, no matter how they’re depicted in a composite mark. [Not any numbers; just numbers that look like years - ed.].
In any event, the Board found that the evidence here fell short of showing that consumers view “1833” in applicant's mark (even if it does represent a year) as merely conveying information about when Applicant was established and not as source-identifying.
And so, the Board reversed the refusal.
The Board then found that, to the extent the disclaimer requirement was based on mere descriptiveness, that basis was also not supported. And it considered Applicant's Section 2(f) claim to have been made in the alternative, and deemed it withdrawn
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TTABlogger comment: I think the Board got this wrong. How about you? If a competitor began making cheese in 1833, can it say so on it's packaging without fear of an infringement claim?
Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.
















