TTAB Upholds Genericness Refusal of SOCIAL SECURITY LAW GROUP for . . . . Guess What?

The Board squelched Applicant Victor Arruda's attempt to register the proposed mark SOCIAL SECURITY LAW GROUP (in standard character form) for "“Legal services for individuals seeking social security disability and supplemental security income claims. Legal document preparation, legal research and legal consultancy in the context of social security disability and supplemental security income claims.” Finding the term generic for Arruda's services, the Board declined to reach the Office's mere descriptiveness refusal. In re Arruda, Serial No. 98083575 (April 27, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Cheryl S. Goodman).

As to the genus of the services, Examining Attorney Lee-Anne Berns maintained that the appropriate genus is "Social Security legal services," but the Board found the genus to be "adequately defined by Applicant’s recitation of services."

In this case, the specific identification of services in the application is a subcategory (social security disability and supplemental income legal service) of a broader spectrum of social security legal services. Furthermore, reliance on the identification of services to identify the genus of the services at issue “is based on the premise that the recitation accurately reflects actual conditions of use of the involved term.” In re DNI Holdings Ltd., No. 76331011, 2005 TTAB LEXIS 515, at *9.

The next question was "whether the term sought to be registered is understood by the relevant public primarily to refer to that genus of goods or services." In light of Applicant Arruda's recitation of services, the Board found the relevant consuming public to be individuals "who seek legal services to assist with social security disability and supplemental security income claims, as well as long term disability insurers who engage attorneys for their insureds who pursue Social Security Disability claims with the Social Security Administration."

It is appropriate, as a first step, to "analyze the constituent terms." Not surprisingly, the Board found that SOCIAL SECURITY refers to “a U.S. government program established in 1935 to include old-age and survivors insurance, contributions to state unemployment insurance, and old-age assistance.”

Considering the evidence as a whole, we find the term SOCIAL SECURITY is a unitary generic term identifying a category of legal services. The dictionary evidence, the treatise and CLE evidence, the law directory evidence, the third-party use evidence, as well as Applicants own use and statements (yellow pages, brochure, website and declaration testimony) demonstrate that Social Security is generic for a legal practice area or legal category.

The evidence also showed that LAW GROUP is "a unitary generic term for a group of lawyers that provide legal services together."

As to the public's understanding of the term SOCIAL SECURITY LAW GROUP as a whole, based in part on third-party declarations submitted by Applicant Arruda, the Board concluded that when the terms SOCIAL SECURITY and LAW GROUP are combined, "they retain their generic significance, and the combination provides no additional difference in meaning."

Applicant Arruda argued that none of the evidence showed that the proposed mark SOCIAL SECURITY LAW GROUP can be immediately recognized as a service related to “disability and supplemental income claims." However, if that were the test, "then no word or term would be found to be generic provided that applicant submitted a highly detailed description of its goods and services." Moreover, a word or term that names a category is generic for more narrowly identified goods or services.

[A]lthough applicant contends SOCIAL SECURITY LAW GROUP is not the term the relevant public would use to describe the genus, the record evidence reflects that the relevant public would nonetheless understand SOCIAL SECURITY LAW GROUP to refer to a law firm that practices Social Security Law, which would include practicing law in the more specific area of Social Security Disability Supplemental Security Income claims.

And so, the Board affirmed the refusal to register.

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TTABlogger comment: WYHA? The "refer to" language comes from Marvin Ginn, 782 F.2d at 989-990.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Affirms Refusal of THEE EARTH logo due to "Mismatch" Between the Identified Goods and Specimens of Use

The Board upheld a refusal to register the logo mark shown immediately below, for "compost," on the ground that the specimens do not show use of the mark on the single good identified in the application. Applicant Thee Earth described its two specimens of use as a photo of a toter bin and a picture of "food waste, food scraps, and solid food inside the bin which is considered compost." [The two specimens are shown further below]. Thus, there was "a mismatch between the identified good and the goods and/or services reflected by the specimens." In re Thee Earth & Composting Solutions, LLC, Serial No. 98020099 [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande).

Thee Earth explained that its business consists of “compost collection services” and the “production and sale of finished compost." "Customers purchase a heavy-duty, two-wheeled plastic compost toter bin—available in 35-gallon, 65-gallon, and 96-gallon sizes—for purposes of storing their compostable organic waste prior to scheduled collection." The logo appears on each bin and on every bag of finished compost.

This explanation makes clear that Applicant does indeed sell compost, which is the only good identified in the application. And Applicant states that the compost is sold in bags with Applicant’s mark on them. That’s all good. But the problem is that none of the specimens Applicant submitted shows a labelled bag of compost as Applicant sells it.

The specimens show the mark only on a “toter bin” and Thee Earth made clear it does not sell compost in a toter bin, but in bags. "In layperson’s terms, there is a 'disconnect' or 'mismatch' between the single good listed in the application (compost) and the goods and services Applicant says that specimens represent."

The Board noted that, "at this late stage," nothing can be done to "fix" the issue. An application that has been considered and decided on appeal cannot be re-opened, except for entry of a disclaimer. The Board further noted that Thee Earth may file another application and provide a proper specimen.

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TTABlogger comment: WYHA?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Are T-Shirts Related to Entertainment Services Under Section 2(d)?

The USPTO refused to register the mark FAMOUS FRIENDS for “shirts; t-shirts," concluding that confusion is likely with the registered mark FAMOUS FRIEND for “entertainment services by a musical artist and producer, namely, musical composition for others and production of musical sound recordings." Despite applicant's argument that the addition of the plural “S” materially changes how consumers perceive its mark, the Board unsurprisingly found the marks to be confusingly similar. But what about the goods and services? Is clothing related to everything? In re Runnin’ Behind, Inc., Serial No. 97603035 (April 23, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Wendy B. Cohen).

Specimen issues: The examining attorney deemed the use of the mark to be merely ornamental in light of its size and placement on the t-shirt, and thus unregistrable. The Board pointed out that "[a]lthough '[i]t may have once been the practice in the clothing industry to limit logos to small sizes in discrete areas rather than to have them ‘emblazoned’ across a garment ... such is no longer the industry practice, or at least no longer the only one.'"

Applicant contended that FAMOUS FRIENDS is recognized as an indicator of secondary source for the goods because of the "extensive use of FAMOUS FRIENDS in connection with Chris Young’s song, album, tour, and fan club services, rendering it easily recognizable by consumers as Applicant’s distinctive brand extendable to souvenir merchandise (bearing his image).” The Board found the evidence convincing that the mark serves as an indicator of secondary source, and it reversed this refusal.

Section 2(d) Refusal: The Board found the difference between the singular form of the cited mark and the plural form of applicant's mark to be "not meaningful." "Any consumers who do notice the slight difference in the marks may consider Applicant’s mark a variation of the Cited Mark covering companion product lines."

Regarding connotation and commercial impression, applicant argued that its mark is associated with Chris Young, "but that even if the consumer is unaware of 'the verbal irony of Chris Young’s use of ‘Famous Friends’ for non-famous hometown heroes, the marks … create distinct commercial impression on their faces.'" The Board was unmoved:

We are constrained to base our analysis on the applied-for mark and identification of goods. While Applicant has submitted evidence of its use of FAMOUS FRIENDS in connection with Chris Young and his song, we cannot consider alleged marketplace realities not reflected in the identifications of goods and services.

The Board found that '[g]iven the near identical similarity of the marks, this first DuPont factor weighs strongly in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion."

As to the goods and services, the examining attorney relied on twenty use-based third-party registrations covering t-shirts and entertainment services, including the marks AUSTIN CITY LIMITS, KELLY CLARKSON, and BARRY MANILOW, as well as on a number of internet uses, including RED HOT CHILI PEPPERS, PRINCE, and GEORGE CLINTON.

Applicant, in turn, submitted twenty-two pairs of registrations in which the identical mark was registered by different entities for songwriting or music production and for shirts and t-shirts. The Board was not impressed: "the fact that different third-parties may own these registrations does not negate those examples of common ownership submitted by the Examining Attorney and what that may suggest as to consumer perception in the marketplace."

The Board found that the second DuPont factor supported the refusal.

Noting that none of the DuPont factors favored applicant, the Board affirmed the Section 2(d) refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: Chris Young is not related to Neil Young, says Claude.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: How Did These Three Section 2(d) Appeals Turn Out?

Here are three recent TTAB decisions in Section 2(d) appeals. Remembering that a TTAB Judge (now retired) once said that one can predict the outcome of a Section 2(d) appeal 95% of the time just by considering the marks and the goods/services, how do you think these came out? [Answer in first comment].

In re USI Insurance Services LLC, Serial No. 98585708 (April 21, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christen M. English). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark shown below, for "insurance services, namely, the brokerage, underwriting, issuance and administration of commercial property and casualty, personal property and casualty, accident, and health insurance tailored to the needs; of insureds; insurance agency services; wholesale brokerage of various types of insurance tailored to the needs of insureds” [SPECIALTY disclaimed] in view of the registered mark IGP for "administration and underwriting of life insurance, accident and health insurance, annuity contracts, and pensions."]

In re Nekki Limited, Serial No. 98767008 (April 22, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas W. Wellington) [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark SPINE – THIS IS GUN FU for, inter alia, "downloadable computer games software," "home video game machines," "hand-held computer games equipment, namely game consoles," and "providing online, interactive multi-player computer games" [GUN FU voluntarily disclaimed] in view of the registered mark GUN FU for "Downloadable computer game software via a global computer network and wireless devices."]

In re Heretic Beauty Inc., Serial No. 98831998 (April 22, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge George C. Pologeorgis). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark EAU DE MACABRE for “fragrances and perfumery” in view of the registered mark shown below for various clothing items and the registered standard character mark MACABRE for candles.]

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TTABlogger comment: How did you do? See any WYHA?s ?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Is "READY, FETCH, GO!" for Dog Toys Confusable with "READY SET FETCH" for Balls and Flying Discs?

The USPTO refused to register the proposed mark READY, FETCH, GO! for "dog toys," concluding that confusion is likely with the registered mark READY SET FETCH for "flying discs; flying disc throwing apparatus; rubber balls; tennis balls; tennis ball throwing apparatus." Applicant NAAJ LLC argued that its mark conveys "a spirited, call-to action voice" that "signals energy and enthusiasm," whereas the cited mark READY SET FETCH "introduces a more restrained, perhaps even instructive tone." I think you know how this appeal came out. In re NAAJ LLC, Serial No. 98577734 (April 21, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Angela Lykos).

The Goods: The evidence submitted by Examining Attorney Robert Ratcliffe established that rubber balls and flying discs are types of dog toys. NAAJ’s goods are identified as “dog toys,” and the cited registration identifies, inter alia, “rubber balls” and “flying discs.” Thus, the involved goods are identical in-part. Third-party registration and website evidence also demonstrated the relatedness of the goods.

Applicant’s and Registrant’s “dog toys,” “rubber balls,” and “flying discs” presumptively move in all normal trade channels and to consumers that purchase such goods.

The Marks: NAAJ further argued that the exclamation point and the inclusion of the word GO! at the end of its mark “gives the mark a joyful, commanding presence closely aligned with the action of play and engagement between a dog and its owner” while the cited mark “reads as a single command or product title, not a playful interaction.” NAAJ was barking up the wrong tree.

Both marks are short, three-word phrases that evoke the familiar idiom “Ready, set, go,” making them similar in structure and cadence. Each mark begins with READY and incorporates the word FETCH. While FETCH appears in a different position in each mark, that distinction does not significantly alter the marks’ appearance or sound. Nor does the substitution of GET [sic] for GO appreciably change the marks in sight or sound.

The Board found that the marks are similar in sound, appearance, meaning and commercial impression.

As to connotation and commercial impression, the Board observed that both marks are a clever play on the expression “Ready, set, go.” "The shared term FETCH projects the same connotation by suggesting that a pet dog is ready to play a game of fetch with a dog toy, stick, ball or flying disc." The minor differences in punctuation "do not materially distinguish the marks in either sound, appearance, connotation or commercial impression."

Other Factors: NAAJ's evidence of six third-party registrations for marks based on the same theme fell short both in number and probative value. Only four covered similar goods and those did not include the word "fetch." The Board deemed the sixth DuPont factor to be neutral. The lack of evidence of actual confusion was meaningless because there was no proof that NAAJ's mark had been put into use.

Conclusion: Balancing the relevant DuPont factors, the Board found confusion likely and it affirmed the refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: My old friend, David Perlsack, had a dog that would chase his own tail when David called, "GO FETCH YOURSELF."

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Are Perfume and Clothing Related Under Section 2(d)?

The USPTO refused to register the mark shown below for "Perfumery; Bleaching preparations for laundry use; Cleaning, polishing, scouring and abrasive preparations; Essential oils; Non-medicated cosmetics; Non-medicated dentifrices; Non-medicated toiletry preparations," concluding that confusion is likely with the registered mark ASSAF, in standard characters, for "Clothing, namely, hats, caps, and beanies." Applicant argued that its goods have a different nature and purpose than hats and caps, that its goods are expensive and its customers sophisticated and careful, and that its mark focuses on horses, which are used in the branding for exclusive and expensive goods. I suspect you know how this appeal came out. In re Assef Trading Est., Serial No. 98642858 (April 20, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark A. Thurmon).

The Board found the marks to be similar in appearance. It acknowledged that the shield design is distinctive and is likely to be noticed and remembered by consumers, but the only English word in applicant's mark is identical to the cited mark. "This type of similarity can lead to consumer confusion, even when one of the marks contains a design element."

The non-Latin script in Applicant’s mark transliterates to ASSAF, so consumers who can read the English word ASSAF and the Arabic script will not find that this script distinguishes the marks, but instead will see the literal elements of the mark as ASSAF ASSAF. For those consumers who cannot read Arabic, the Arabic script will likely be viewed as another design element of the mark, one that does not provide much distinction from the cited ASSAF mark.

Most importantly, according to the Board, "the marks are identical in sound for consumers who do not attempt to pronounce the Arabic script in Applicant’s mark." The word ASSAF has no established meaning in English, but because the same word is used in both marks, the marks will share the same meaning." The additional elements in applicantnd sole English literal element, of both marks is the word ASSAF, so the dominant or primary commercial impression created by the two marks will be the same."

The Board noted that if horse designs are in common use for similar goods, as applicant claimed, then the horse element in applicant's mark is less distinctive and less likely to be relied upon by consumers than the other elements of the mark.

Turning to the goods, Examining Attorney Philip Liu submitted evidence that marks used on clothing, including caps and hats, are also often used with perfumes. He also provided thirteen third-party, use-based registrations that identify both perfume (as identified in the Application) and hats or caps (as identified in the cited Registration).

Applicant argues that its goods have a different nature and purpose than hats and caps. While this is surely true—perfumes are not head coverings, as hats and caps are—it is largely irrelevant. Differences of this type might be important for some goods, but as we noted above, the key question here is whether the evidence shows that these different goods are related in the minds of consumers.

The Board found that the goods are related, and so the second DuPont factor supported the refusal.

The third-party use evidence demonstrated that the channels of trade overlap. Applicant's argument that its customers are sophisticated and careful ignored the lack of any limitation in the application as to price or type of customer. "With no limits on the goods, we find that the perfume goods identified in the Application may include products at any price point. Similarly, the hats and caps identified in the cited Registration may include such goods at any price point." Moreover, there was no evidence to support applicant's assertion regarding purchaser care.

Finally, we are required to base our decision “on the least sophisticated potential purchasers.” Stone Lion Capital Partners, 746 F.3d at 1325. We find that the “least sophisticated potential purchasers” of perfumes, hats and caps, which are ordinary consumer goods, are likely to exercise ordinary care in making purchasing decisions, which does not alter the likelihood of confusion. The fourth DuPont factor is neutral.

The Board observed that only the first three DuPont factors were probative in this appeal, and all three supported the Section 2(d) refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: Clothing, jewelry, perfume - all related.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Which of These Three Recent Section 2(d) Oppositions Was/Were Dismissed?

Here are three recent TTAB decisions in Section 2(d) oppositions. At least one of the oppositons was dismissed and the other(s) sustained. Remembering that a TTAB Judge (now retired) once said to me that one can predict the outcome of a Section 2(d) claim 95% of the time (at least in ex parte appeals) just by considering the marks and the goods/services, how do you think these came out? [Answer in first comment].

Chatham Imports, Inc. v. Farmer’s Creed Corp., Opposition No. 91283157 (March 30, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Martha B. Allard). [Section 2(d) opposition to registration of the mark FARMER'S CREED for "Alcoholic beverages, except beer," in view of the registered mark FARMER’S for “Alcoholic beverages, namely, distilled spirits."]

Allied Lomar, Inc. v. Talnua, Inc, Opposition No. 91284670 (April 13, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Jennifer L. Elgin) [Section 2(d) refusal to register of the mark OLDE SAINT’S KEEP for "distilled spirits," in view of the registered mark OLDE ST. NICK “alcoholic beverages, except beers.”]

Sun Garden Packing Co. v. Da Napoli Foods LLC, Opposition No. 91284802 (April 17, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas W. Wellington). [Section 2(d) opposition to registration of the mark shown below left, for "Pasta; Sauces; Packaged meals consisting primarily of pasta or rice," in view of the registered mark shown below right, for "canned tomatoes, canned tomato puree, and canned tomato paste."

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TTABlogger comment: How did you do?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

Supreme Court Denies Petition for Certiorari in RAPUNZEL Consumer Standing Case

In an order issued this morning, the Supreme Court denied Professor Rebecca Curtin's petition for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the Federal Circuit's ruling in Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc., 2025 USPQ2d 784 (Fed. Cir. 2025) [precedential]. [TTABlogged here]. The CAFC had affirmed the Board's holding that "only commercial actors affected by the mark’s registration fall within the zone of interests to oppose the registration as generic, descriptive, or [failing to function as a trademark]," and it upheld the Board's dismissal of mere consumer Curtin's opposition to registration of the mark RAPUNZEL for dolls and toy figures on the ground of lack of statutory standing. [Petition for certiorari here: Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc., No. 25-435 (October 3, 2025)].

Professor Curtin based her petition on the argument that the Lexmark test for statutory standing did not apply to administrative proceedings, and she pointed to a conflict in the circuit courts of appeal.

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TTABlogger comment: Too bad. Now I think the USPTO should return the application for further examination on the issues of genericness, mere descriptiveness, and failure to function.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Upholds Surname Refusal of GOLIA for Candy

The TTAB affirmed a Section 2(e)(4) refusal of the proposed mark GOLIA for "non-medicated candy confectioneries and non-medicated candies," finding the term to be primarily merely a surname. Applicant Michael J. Golia argued that "the surname GOLIA is exceedingly rare and virtually unknown to the American public" and he pointed to the Italian translation of GOLIATH, purportedly establishing a readily understood non-surname meaning. The Board (cast in the role of David?) was unmoved. [BTW: GOLIA is the brand name of a popular Italian candy (depicted below) having no apparent connection with this applicant - ed.]. In re Michael J. Golia, Serial No. 98516586 (April 17, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Catherine Dugan O'Connor).

Examining Attorney Kennina Ip contended that Applicant Michael J. Golia's own use of the mark as a surname is probative evidence of the significance of the term. The Board agreed. It further observed that even if the name is relatively rare, the purchasing public has been exposed to GOLIA as a surname through media references to individuals with that name. "Section 2(e)(4) makes no distinction between rare and commonplace surnames ... and even a rare surname is unregistrable if its primary significance to purchasers is a surname."

The evidence included more than two dozen media mentions and references to individuals with the surname Golia, including jazz musician Vinny Golia and New York Mets trainer Joe Golia. Applicant faulted the Examining Attorney for not presenting evidence of a “nationally famous figure" with the surname GOLIA, but the Board pointed out that there is no such evidentiary requirement. "Although the total number of persons in the United States with the surname Golia may be somewhat low, the examples of people in law, the arts, business, and other fields having the surname Golia show meaningful and fairly broad public exposure to GOLIA as a surname."

The Board found that GOLIA has no recognized meaning beyond its surname significance. Applicant argued that GOLIA is recognized as the Italian equivalent of GOLIATH, a Biblical and cultural reference connoting size and strength, but he provided no dictionary or translation evidence that "Golia" means "Goliath." The Board concluded that "the evidence supports a finding that the primary significance of GOLIA is as a surname, potentially derived from the Biblical name “Goliath” as a reflection of the physical characteristic of size."

Finally, the Board found that GOLIA has the structure and pronunciation of a surname: "we have multiple examples of other surnames that share the GOL- prefix or the -IA suffix as well as examples of surnames that differ by only one letter. In particular, on their face names such as GOLIAS, GOLIO, GOLIS and GOLLA are quite similar to GOLIA."

And so, the Board affirmed the refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: To state the obvious, you start out behind the 8-ball when the mark you're trying to register is your own surname.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Is PLAYER EXCLUSIVE for Distilled Spirits Confusable with PLAYERS VODKA for Vodka?

The USPTO refused to register the proposed mark PLAYER EXCLUSIVE, in standard characters, for “Bourbon; Distilled spirits,” [EXCLUSIVE disclaimed], concluding that confusion is likely with the registered mark PLAYERS VODKA, in standard characters, for “vodka” [VODKA disclaimed]. Applicant Game Changer argued that the marks differ in meaning because the word "exclusive" shows that the goods sold under the mark will be special in some way, and further that a “player exclusive” is an item designed uniquely for a particular player, such a special basketball shoes made for a particular basketball player. How do you think this appeal came out? In re Game Changer Bourbon LLC, Serial No. 97934533 (April 15,2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge George C. Pologeorgis).

The Marks: The first words in the marks are essentially identical, and the second words are disclaimed. "The first word, 'PLAYER(S),' is dominant in both marks and is more likely to be relied upon and remembered by consumers. The marks, considered in their entireties, look similar." They are also similar in sound: "It is likely that many consumers familiar with the cited mark may refer to the mark as simply PLAYERS when asking for the goods."

We also find the marks are similar in meaning and commercial impression. The shared use of the word “player” in both marks creates a common meaning. Consumers familiar with PLAYERS VODKA are likely to view PLAYER EXCLUSIVE for bourbon and other distilled spirits (which includes vodka) as a variation or extension of the PLAYERS VODKA mark. Many consumers will mistakenly conclude that these businesses operated under these marks are connected, perhaps thinking the new “exclusive” version is a business extension involving more exclusive or limited production goods.

As to Game Changer's aforementioned arguments, the Board found that "most consumers of Applicant’s bourbon and other distilled spirits are unlikely to connect these goods with custom-made basketball shoes." Moreover, "consumers familiar with the cited PLAYERS VODKA mark may view Applicant’s mark as a business extension, with Registrant extending its business from vodka to other exclusive distilled spirits."

"The marks are similar. The first DuPont factor supports the refusal."

The Goods: Since vodka is a distilled spirit, the goods overlap, and so the second DuPont factor strongly supports the refusal. The overlapping goods are presumed to travel in the same normal trade channels to the same classes of consumers, and so the third DuPont factor "also heavily favors a finding that confusion is likely."

Game Changer argued that its goods are very expensive and thus will be purchased with care. It submitted evidence confirming high prices for some of its goods (e.g., $4500 for a small bottle of Steph Curry endorsed bourbon). However, because the application contains no restrictions on the goods, it covers bourbon and distilled spirits sold at any price point. The Board found the fourth DuPont factor to be neutral.

Conclusion: "The marks are similar and the goods are identical in part. The identical in part goods are presumed to travel through the same trade channels and offered to the same classes of purchasers. The record supports the refusal. Confusion is likely."

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TTABlogger comment: WYHA? The "line extension" finding is another of the Boards's makeweight arguments. In the real world, do you think there would be any confusion?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Is SEAFISH Merely Descriptive of Seafood?

The USPTO refused to register the proposed mark SEAFISH for, inter alia, "seafood products and fish-based food products, namely, processed seafood; frozen seafood; frozen fish," on the ground of mere descriptiveness under Section 2(e)(1). Applicant Triunfo Foods argued that SEAFISH is not merely descriptive but only suggestive because it is “not an actual word, but a new, fun play on words,” a "'whimsical' and 'unitary term that is an imaginative combination of 'sea' and 'fish, which together make up more than the sum of their separate parts.'" How do you think this appeal came out? In re Triunfo Foods Import & Export Corp., Serial No. 97898551 (April 1, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Angela Lykos).

Triunfo further argued that, while competitors in the seafood industry may need to use the words "sea" and "fish" to describe their products, “it is highly unlikely any of them would need to use SEAFISH in order to sell their products” because “[t]here are innumerable other terms and combinations thereof which a competitor could adopt to describe similar goods.” However, the evidence submitted by Examining Attorney Brett Golden "belie[d] applicant's arguments."

“Sea fish,” otherwise known as “saltwater fish,” is a well-recognized designation in the seafood industry and includes many species for human consumption such as bluefin tuna and Atlantic cod. Contrary to Applicant’s assertion, the term “sea fish” appears as an entry in multiple dictionaries to denote “any fish found in salt waters” or “a fish that lives in the sea, rather than in rivers or lakes. The fact that Applicant’s mark is presented as a single term as opposed to the two separate words “sea” and “fish” does not lessen its merely descriptive nature. *** This is especially so here since “seafish” is also an alternative form of spelling of “sea fish.”

Triunfo did not submit any evidence to support its claim that the term SEAFISH is "whimsical." The evidence shows that "SEAFISH in relation to Applicant’s goods is not unique but rather is part of ordinary U.S. lexicon."

Triunfo pointed to its prior application for the same mark and goods, as to which another examining attorney also issued a mere descriptiveness final refusal but subsequently withdrew the refusal while the application was on appeal at the Board. However, that application was abandoned for failure to timely file a statement of use. The Board noted that it is "not bound by a previous examining attorney’s decision."

In sum, Applicant’s proposed mark SEAFISH immediately conveys, without conjecture or speculation, the type of Applicant’s fish or a key attribute of Applicant’s processed fish and seafood products. The evidence further shows that consumers may specifically shop for “seafish” for nutritional value or other health reasons. Competitors in the seafood industry should be free to use this merely descriptive designation when describing their own fish items to the public in advertising and marketing materials

And so, the Board affirmed the refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: Is this a WYHA? Too bad for the applicant. It had the registration with reach, but watched it swim away

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.