TTAB Grants Petition to Cancel Registration of BMF For Media Production Services Due to Nonuse as of SOU Filing Date

The Board granted a petition for cancellation of a registration for the mark BMF for a broad range of entertainment and media production services, finding that Registrant Byron Belin's mark was not in use for the recited services when he filed his statement of use in the underlying application. Belin's evasive testimony and lack of business records regarding use of the mark led the Board to find that Opposer Zuffa (an American sports promotion company specializing in mixed martial arts) had established nonuse by a preponderance of the evidence. Zuffa, LLC v. Byron Belin, Cancellation No. 92077633 (March 10, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas W. Wellington).

To prove nonuse as of the SOU deadline, Petitioner Zuffa relied on indirect evidence and reasonable inferences to "prove a negative." Belin, when deposed in March 2024 - only four years after the relevant date - was asked whether he was using the BMF mark in connection with all twelve services listed in his registration when he signed his SOU in January 2020. His answer: "I don't recall." When pressed about advertising and first use dates for each of the twelve listed services, Belin repeatedly testified that he could not recall, or "my attorney has all that." The Board, citing Nationstar Mortgage LLC v. Ahmad, found Belin's testimony "not at all credible," noting that a person in his position "would normally be expected to know" basic information about his own alleged use of a mark.

Belin's documentary evidence fared no better. The only pre-deadline sales documents he produced were "seriously flawed:" a "sales receipt" and a "payment receipt" purporting to show a single sale or rental of prop money and a prop gun - documents that, as Beline admitted, were prepared by the buyer. The "sales receipt" had "BMF"on the letterhead; the "payment receipt" was addressed to HeataHD Visuals but was signed "Thanks, HeataHD Visuals." Belin admitted that he handwrote "For BMF Prop Money" at the bottom of the payment receipt. The Board was unmoved by the argument that selling prop money to a videographer constitutes use of a mark in connection with multimedia entertainment production services. "Put simply, we are not convinced that the single sale of “prop money” is tantamount to multimedia production services." 

Other evidence also fell short. A confidentiality agreement with a photographer was illegible and appeared to be signed by only one party. A declaration from a script writer was undated and had the declarant's own surname misspelled - including at the signature line. Agreements with actors showed only preparations for a production, not actual rendition of any listed services. And actual copies of the YouTube videos Belin claimed to have posted were never introduced into the record; providing a hyperlink, the Board reminded, is not sufficient to make content of record.

Drawing adverse inferences from both the evasive testimony and the absence of business records, and "left with no credible evidence in the record that Respondent, prior to January 30, 2020, used BMF as a mark in connection with the services listed in his registration," the Board found that Petitioner Zuffa had established nonuse by a preponderance of the evidence, and so it ordered that the BMF registration be cancelled.

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TTABlogger comment: In March 2025, Belin's trademark infringement action against rapper 50 CENT and several media companies was suspended pending the outcome of this cancellation proceeding. (C.D. Cal. Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-09586). The district court had dismissed the case in 2023 based on fair use under Rogers v. Grimaldi, but the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded in view of the Supreme Court's Jack Daniels decision limiting the scope of the Rogers doctrine. The appellate court directed the district court to "consider in the first instance whether the defendants use the BMF mark as a trademark."

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Are Safari Expedition Services Related to Restaurant Services Under Section 2(d)?

The USPTO refused to register the mark WHERE LIFE HAPPENS for "arranging and conducting safari expeditions for recreational purposes," finding confusion likely with the identical mark registered for "restaurant services." The fact that the marks are identical weighed "heavily" in favor of affirmance, and it also lessened the degree of similarity of the services needed to support the refusal. How do you think this came out? In re Aggressor Adventures, LLC, Serial No. 98356369 (March 9, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Jessica B. Bradley).

The Examining Attorney argued that the term "safari" included any recreational tour or expedition, pointing to a second-listed meaning found in the Merriam-Webster dictionary. However, the Board, relying on the primary definition in that dictionary and on other dictionaries, as well as on Aggressor's website, agreed with Aggressor that a "safari" is "specific type of journey or expedition that includes viewing and/or hunting game, and does not encompass other kinds of recreational tours or expeditions."

To establish relatedness between safari expeditions and restaurant services, the Examining Attorney submitted evidence of eighteen third-party uses. The Board found them wanting. Five did not reference either of the involved services. Of the remaining thirteen, twelve involved recreational activities with no connection to safari expeditions - scuba and water sports, fly-fishing, catamaran cruises, snowcat and snowmobile excursions, and the like. Only one third-party, a Hard Rock hotel in Punta Cana, in the Dominican Republic, offered a "safari half day tour," but the accompanying screenshots showed no restaurant services.

The Office's third-party registration evidence also fell short. Only three of the registrations covered both safari expedition services and restaurant services, and two of those were owned by the same entity. Although Aggressor's owns prior use-based registrations for other marks that cover both services, the Board found that on balance - given that the vast majority of the evidence showed only one or the other service, not both - "the evidence of record does not show that consumers are accustomed to seeing Applicant’s and Registrant’s services originating from the same source."

The Examining Attorney argued that because neither identification contained restrictions, the services should be presumed to travel in the same channels to the same purchasers. Wrong. That presumption applies only when the services are identical or legally identical. When the services differ, the proper presumption is merely that each is offered in the normal channels of trade for that particular type of service. The evidence did not reveal any overlap between the normal channels for safari expeditions and those for restaurant services.

As to purchaser care, the Board noted that purchasers of safari expedition services are likely to excercise some care, while restaurant services can range from fast-casual impulse purchases to fine dining. The Board deemed this DuPont factor to be neutral.

Balancing the relevant factors, the Board concluded that "the differences in the services, channels of trade, and classes of consumers outweigh the identity of the marks." And so, the refusal to register was reversed.

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TTABlogger comment: Aggressor Adventures offers some amazing tours.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Tosses Out Cancellation Petition: Untimely Section 2(d) Claim Masquerading as a Section 14(3) Claim

Finding petitioner's Section 2(d) claim time-barred and its Section 14(3) misrepresentation claim wholly deficient, the Board denied a petition for cancellation of a registration for the mark CAMP AWESOME for "child care services." Petitioner, alleging use of the name "Camp Awesum" since 2014, had filed two applications to register that mark for "providing camps for persons with intellectual or developmental disabilities services,” but the applications were blocked by Respondent O'Brien's 2015 registration. The Board was in O'Brien's camp. Camp Awesum, Inc. v. James M. O’Brien, Cancellation No. 92084926 (March 6, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Robert Lavache).

Likelihood of Confusion: The only ground for cancellation set out in the petition for cancellation (filed in April 2024) was likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d). However, since O'Brien's registration was more than five years old at the time the petition was filed, the Section 2(d) claim was barred by Section 14 of the Lanham Act. The Board observed that "[u]nder Trademark Act Section 14, a registration that has existed for at least five years on the Principal Register may be cancelled only for a very limited set of potential grounds, including genericness, functionality, abandonment, fraud, and misrepresentation of source." "Accordingly, Petitioner’s putative likelihood-of-conclusion claim is time-barred under Section 14(3) and we cannot consider it."

Misrepresentation of Source: In its petition for cancellation, petitioner did not mention its Section 14(3) misrepresentation claim. However, on the ESTTA cover sheet it checked the box for that claim (but not the Section 2(d) box). 

Noting that a Section 14(3) claim for misrepresentation of source is not barred by Section 14, the Board pointed out this claim "refers to situations where it is deliberately misrepresented by or with the consent of the registrant that goods and/or services originate from a manufacturer or other entity when in fact those goods and/or services originate from another party."

[A] misrepresentation-of-source claim goes beyond mere likelihood of confusion and requires pleaded facts reflecting the respondent’s “deliberate misrepresentation” of the source of the petitioner’s services; the respondent’s “blatant misuse of the mark” in a manner calculated to trade on the goodwill and reputation of the petitioner; or conduct amounting to the respondent’s “deliberate passing-off” of the petitioner’s services as those of the respondent. Otto Int’l, 2007 TTAB LEXIS 62, at *9.

The Board found the record to be the devoid of any pleading, argument, or evidence pertinent to such a claim. "In fact, after selecting the relevant Section 14(3) misrepresentation-of-source claim in the ESTTA petition form, Petitioner did not again refer to the claim in the body of the petition, let alone plead the elements of the claim." In its briefs, petitioner again did not mention this claim. It addressed priority and various DuPont factors and stated that the issues were priority and likleihood of confusion.

[W]e find that this is a case of a “Section 2(d) claim masquerading as a misrepresentation-of-source claim.” Bayer, 2009 TTAB LEXIS 203, at *17 (cleaned up). Thus, the misrepresentation-of-source claim was not sufficiently pleaded and we may deny the petition for that reason alone. Alternatively, putting aside the insufficiency of the pleading, Petitioner otherwise waived the claim by failing to argue the claim in its brief.

And so, the Board denied the misrepresentation-of-source claim.

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TTABlogger comment: Successful Section 14(3) misrepresentation-of-source claims are few and far between. Last year's Plumrose decision is one example [TTABlogged here].

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Reverses 2(d) Refusal of DURAJECT for Ophthalmic Instruments Over DURO-JECT for Bone Cement Injector

The DURAJECT decision that was included in yesterday's TTABlog Test deserves closer attention, both because of the applicant's impressive evidence and arguments, and the Board's careful analysis of the second, third, and fourth DuPont factors. The Board reversed a Section 2(d) refusal of the mark DURAJECT for "medical and surgical apparatus and instruments for use in ophthalmic procedures," finding confusion unlikely with the registered mark DURO-JECT for a "medical device, namely, a high pressure bone cement injector." Although the marks are "very similar," the Board found the goods dissimilar, the channels of trade distinct, and the relevant purchasers sophisticated. In re EyePoint Pharmaceuticals US, Inc., Serial No. 98414251 (March 6, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christopher C. Larkin).

The Examining Attorney argued that ophthalmic instruments and bone cement injectors are related because they can both be found on the same websites, including those of certain large medical suppliers - pointing to Rarefied International, Cardinal Health, Medtronic, Stryker, 3M/Solventum, and others. Applicant Eyepoint argued that "all such sites cited by the Examining Attorney are (1) large marketplaces offering a wide range of medical goods from different manufacturers or (2) single vendors offering a wide range of medical goods under different categories. In no case are both kind of goods offered under the same category or on the same page."

As the Board explained in OSF Healthcare, examining attorneys and the Board must focus on the precise language of the relevant identifications of goods or services, not on broadened or generalized goods or services, OSF Healthcare, 2023 WL 6140427, at *12, especially where, as here, at least one of the identifications is very specific.

The Board found that none of the sites showed ophthalmic instruments and a "high pressure bone cement injector" being sold under the same mark. The Rarefied International site listed both dental instruments (including "dental cement injectors") and ophthalmic instruments, but under separate headings and not under the same mark - and the Examining Attorney never established that teeth are made of bone or that a bone cement injector is used in dental procedures. The 3M evidence suffered the same dental-versus-bone problem. The Stryker products were for sinus surgery, not ophthalmic procedures. The Cardinal Health site showed ophthalmic kits and a bone surgery supply checklist, but no high pressure bone cement injector.

Because the record does not show that “medical and surgical apparatus and instruments for use in ophthalmic procedures” and “a high pressure bone cement injector” are commonly sold under the same marks, and there is no other probative evidence of relatedness, we find that the second DuPont factor strongly supports a conclusion that confusion is not likely. OSF Healthcare, 2023 WL 6140427, at *17.

As to channels of trade and classes of consumers, there was agreement that the goods ultimately flow through the same large GPOs (group purchasing organizations) and end up in the same hospitals and medical centers that provide ophthalmic and orthopedic surgery. But the Board, relying on Electric Design & Sales v. Electronic Data Systems, 954 F.2d 713 (Fed. Cir. 1992), drew a key distinction: the mere fact that two products are purchased by the same institution does not establish overlapping channels of trade or consumer confusion. “The likelihood of confusion must be shown to exist not in a purchasing institution, but in a ‘customer or purchaser.’”

The Board found that here, as in Elec. Design & Sales, the involved goods are sold to large institutions, but their brand names are not exposed to the same “customer or purchaser” within those institutions. The Examining Attorney appeared to agree that “‘there is no such thing as a single purchaser for a hospital customer’ because ‘different individuals or groups within a buying institution are responsible for purchasing different kinds of medical goods.’” The Board therefore found that the third DuPont factor supported reversal.

As to purchaser sophistication, the Board found the purchaser class consists entirely of professional buyers of medical supplies - not a mixed class of professionals and consumers. Even the least sophisticated professional buyer could be expected to exercise care when purchasing FDA-regulated surgical instruments for specific medical specialties. The fourth factor supported reversal.

The Board concluded that "the dissimilarity of the goods and channels of trade, and the sophistication of the professional purchasers of the goods, outweigh the similarity of the marks, and make confusion unlikely."

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TTABlogger comment: This is another example where the involved goods or services fall under a broad umbrella term, but evidence was lacking to show that anyone sells the identified goods or services under the same mark. Judge Larkin has stressed this point in at least two other relatively recent decisions: here and here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Which of These Three Section 2(d) Appeals Was/Were Reversed?

TTAB affirmances of Section 2(d) refusals continue to run at about 90% this year. Here are three recent decisions in Section 2(d) appeals. At least one of them resulted in a reversal. What say you? [Answer in first comment].

In re EyePoint Pharmaceuticals US, Inc., Serial No. 98414251 (March 6, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christopher C. Larkin). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark DURAJECT for “Medical and surgical apparatus and instruments for use in ophthalmic procedures" in view of the registered mark DURO-JECT for a “Medical device, namely, a high pressure bone cement injector.”]

In re Catholic Questions Corporation, Serial No. 97646030 (March 5, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark Lebow) [Section 2(d) refusal of CATHOLIC QUESTIONS for "Charitable education services, namely, providing one-on-one explanations and commentary via e-mail, telephone, and postal mail in the field of Catholic apologetics" [CATHOLIC disclaimed] in view of the registered mark shown below, for "Entertainment, namely, a continuing religious education show broadcast over internet, radio, and via podcast" [CHRISTIAN QUESTIONS disclaimed].]

In re Jeremiah C Jones, Serial No. 98668832 (February 27, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Catherine Dugan O'Connor). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark DUODISH for “plates, bowls” in view of the registered mark DUO COVER for “dishware covers for use with microwave ovens; non-electric cookware, namely, pans, pots, plates, dishes, bowls, for use in microwave ovens; heat-resistant dish holders; insulated containers for food and beverages" [COVER disclaimed]].

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TTABlogger comment: How did you do? See any WYHA?s ? 

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

CHATGPT Not Inherently Distinctive, but USPTO Accepted Claim of Acquired Distinctiveness

The Board affirmed a Section 2(e)(1) mere descriptiveness refusal of the proposed mark CHATGPT for downloadable and non-downloadable “chatbot software for simulating conversations.” The sole issue on appeal was whether Applicant’s mark CHATGPT is inherently distinctive for the goods and services identified in the application. Applicant OpenAI argued that ordinary consumers would not know that GPT is an acronym for "generative pre-trained transformer," but the Board pointed out that "the evidence demonstrates that many users of Applicant’s goods and services actually are sophisticated users," and further that the term GPT appears in mainstream dictionaries and mainstream media. In re OpenAI OpCo, LLC, Serial No. 97733261 (March 4, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Jennifer L. Elgin).

OpenAI submitted two expert reports asserting that the term "GPT" is not generic, but the Board found them largely irrelevant since the only issue before the Board was mere descriptiveness, not genericness.

The Board first found that consumers "would recognize the separate component terms: CHAT, which is a recognizable word to consumers; and GPT, which . . . is an initialism." The Board then turned to a consideration of the individual terms.

[T]he evidence shows that “chatbots,” as used in the identification of Applicant’s goods and services, electronically converse or “chat” with humans in the ordinary sense of that word. There is no multi-stage reasoning needed; rather, CHAT immediately describes Applicant’s downloadable and non-downloadable software “for simulating conversations” or “chatting.”

Open AI contended that the term CHAT is merely suggestive because it has several meanings relevant in the context of Applicant’s goods and services, including “to talk in an informal or familiar manner” and “to take part in an online discussion in a chat room.” The Board found, however, that these definitions are equally descriptive of Open AI's downloadable or non-downloadable “computer programs and … computer software for the artificial production of human speech and text” and “for natural language processing, generation, understanding and analysis.”

Based on the identifications of goods and services, we must presume that in addition to being used by software developers, Applicant’s downloadable and non-downloadable software is available to the general public and casual users who do not take time to craft “effective prompts,” but rather are likely to interact with the software to facilitate everyday communication or “chatting.”

And so, the Board concluded that the term CHAT "is merely descriptive of a purpose or function of Applicant’s software, i.e., to assist or facilitate communication in a conversational manner, as reflected in Applicant’s identifications of goods and services."

OpenAI and the Examining Attorney agreed that GPT stands for "generative pre-trained transformer," and the evidence supported that conclusion.

Because “generative pre-trained transformer” refers to a machine learning algorithm that is pre-trained to produce human-like text in response to a human’s prompts, we find that it merely describes a feature or characteristic of Applicant’s downloadable and non-downloadable software, namely, that it facilitates “the artificial production of human speech and text, … natural language processing, generation, understanding and analysis,” and it simulates conversations.

Next, the Board considered whether relevant consumers will recognize the initialism GPT as the merely descriptive wording it represents, “generative pre-trained transformer.” The Board answered that question in the affirmative: first, many users of OpenAI’s goods and services actually are sophisticated users; second, the term appears in mainstream dictionaries, such as CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, Dictionary.com, and URBAN DICTIONARY, and in publications like THE NEW YORK TIMES, THE ECONOMIST, NEWSWEEK, FORBES MAGAZINE, USA TODAY, and BBC NEWS.

Finally, the Board considered the term CHATGPT in its entirety and found that CHATGPT "does not present an incongruity or lose its descriptive meaning, rather it immediately informs the consumer that Applicant’s goods and services feature a conversational chatbot, utilizing a generative, pre-trained transformer algorithm."

Having no doubt as to the descriptiveness of CHATBOT for OpenAI's goods and services, the Board affirmed the refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: Why didn't OpenAI claim acquired distinctiveness? My bad. They did so, and the mark will proceed to publication. I should have read the last sentence: "The application will proceed with Applicant’s claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f)." So the bottom line is that CHATGPT is not inherently distinctive.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

Recommended Reading: Ted Davis, "Inter Partes Litigation and Ex Parte Appeals Before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board: A Primer"

Trademark scholar and expert Ted Davis provides a useful and highly readable primer on practice before the TTAB in his article, "Inter Partes Litigation and Ex Parte Appeals Before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board: A Primer" [pdf here], properly cited as: Davis, Theodore H. Jr. (2026) "Inter Partes Litigation and Ex Parte Appeals Before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board: A Primer," Akron Law Review: Vol. 59: Iss. 2, Article 5.

This Article introduces the Board to legal professionals who may be unfamiliar with it and the occasionally arcane aspects of Board practice. Part II addresses the composition of the Board and its jurisdiction. Part III surveys the two general types of matters heard by the Board, namely, inter partes disputes in which the Board acts as a panel of first resort hearing adversarial matters between two or more parties. Parts IV and V address the logistics of ex parte appeals to the Board and challenges to its decisions by dissatisfied litigants, respectively. Finally, Part VI examines the possibly preclusive weight received by Board decisions in later litigation between the same parties or those in privity with them

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Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

COGNAC LIFE for Magazine Publishing Confusable with Famous COGNAC Regional Certification Mark, Says TTAB

Applicant Dickens may have had Great Expectations when he filed his application to register COGNAC LIFE for "magazine publishing," but he fell on Hard Times when the Board sustained this opposition based on likelihood of confusion with the common-law regional certification mark COGNAC for brandy that comes from the Cognac region of France. The Board found that the COGNAC mark falls on the "high end of the fame spectrum," and therefore merits "a wider than normal scope of protection."  Institut National de l’Origine et de la Qualité and Bureau National Interprofessionnel du Cognac v. Daret K. Dickens, Opposition No. 91272506 (March 2, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christen M. English).

"Geographic certification marks are used to certify that authorized users’ goods originate in a specific geographic region." "The test for determining likelihood of confusion with respect to certification marks is the same as that applied to trademarks, i.e., the DuPont analysis derived from the seminal case setting forth possible probative factors."

COGNAC products have been sold continuously in the United States since 1794. From 2018 to 2022, 500 million bottles of COGNAC were sold, valued at about 7.5 billion dollars. The BNIC and its members have spent millions of dollars on promotions "that focus on showcasing and promoting the COGNAC geographical indication and creating awareness about the regions’ history, terroir, and product range expertise among US consumers.” Certified COGNAC wine spirts have garnered publicity “in countless publications" and COGNAC brandy has been the subject of many books.

[T]he evidence of record ... demonstrates that a significant portion of the relevant consuming public recognizes the COGNAC certification mark as indicating that brandy bearing the mark comes from the Cognac region of France, and falls on the high end of the fame spectrum as an indicator of geographic origin for purposes of the fifth DuPont factor, and therefore enjoys a wider than normal scope of protection.

As to Applicant Dickens's mark, the Board found that word COGNAC is dominant and the additional term LIFE "does not sufficiently distinguish Applicant’s mark from Opposers’ mark in any meaningful way." "[B]ecause Opposer’s COGNAC mark is the first word in Applicant’s mark, the marks share a similar sound, despite the additional second word LIFE in Applicant’s mark."

The record supports that consumers have been exposed to sources touting COGNAC brandy as a lifestyle product – a symbol of luxury, affluence, and sophistication – and describing COGNAC brandy as a popular drink in rap and hip-hop culture. Consumers therefore are likely to associate the COGNAC certification mark with such lifestyles. The addition of the second word LIFE in Applicant’s COGNAC LIFE mark thus reinforces and highlights the connotation and commercial impression of the COGNAC mark with certain lifestyles, and thus, the parties’ marks are quite similar in connotation and commercial impression.

In sum, the Board found the involved marks to be similar in appearance and sound, and very similar in connotation and commercial impression, and so the first DuPont factor weighed heavily in favor of finding confusion likely.

As to the issue of relatedness, "the parties’ correctly base their comparison under the second DuPont factor on the authorized users’ goods, namely, brandy from the Cognac region of France produced in accordance with prescribed standards." The evidence showed that COGNAC brandy is a product commonly featured in magazine articles as well as other publications. Moreover, since 2018, BNIC has published CULTURE COGNAC, a digital magazine promoting certified Cognac products.

Applicant’s magazine publishing services are broad enough to encompass publishing magazines for others on all subject matters, including lifestyle magazines such as those featuring content related to food and alcoholic beverages, including Cognac brandy.

We thus find a commercial relationship between COGNAC brandy and Applicant’s COGNAC LIFE “magazine publishing” services for others. In addition, circumstances support finding “something more” here, namely, the renown of Opposers’ COGNAC certification mark and the substantial similarity between the parties’ marks in meaning and commercial impression.

The parties’ trade channels, the buyers to whom sales are made and buyer sophistication under the third and fourth DuPont factors are neutral, as are the seventh and eighth DuPont factors concerning the absence of actual confusion.

Balancing the relevant DuPont factors, the Board concluded that confusion is likely.

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TTABlogger comment: Nothing very novel about this opinion. BTW: there are a dozen or so registered COGNAC-formative marks for brandy and the like, owned by various entities. Why hasn't COGNAC been registered as a certification mark?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Posts March 2026 Hearing Schedule

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Tee-Tee-Ā-Bee) has scheduled four oral hearings for the month of March 2026. In the first and fourth cases listed below, the hearings will held virtually. In the second case, the hearing will be in-person at Clara Barton Auditorium, 600 Dulany Street, Concourse Level, Alexandria, VA. In the third case, the hearing will be in-person at the Madison East Building 600 Dulany Street, 9th Floor (Hearing Room C), Alexandria, VA. Briefs and other papers for each case may be found at TTABVUE via the links provided.

March 11, 2026 - 10:30 AM [Virtual]: In re Kickstand Brewery, LLC, Serial Nos. 97912847 [Refusal to register the mark KIDCKSTAND BREWING COMPANY for "restaurant services" on the ground of likelihood of confusion with the registered marks KICKSTAND for "Beer, ale and lager" and KICKSTAND COCKTAILS for "Alcoholic beverages, except beer; Alcoholic cocktail mixes; Alcoholic cocktails; Alcoholic mixed beverages except beers; Ready-to-drink alcoholic beverages, other than beer-based" [COCKTAILS disclaimed].]

March 16, 2026 - 3:15 PM [In-person - public event]: In re Wemby Corporation, Serial No. 97752244 [Refusal to register the mark WEMBY for "Athletic apparel, namely, shirts, pants, jackets, footwear, hats and caps, athletic uniforms" on the ground of false suggestion of a connection with NBA star Victor Wembanyama, aka "WEMBY," under Section 2(a), and lack of written consent to register from Victor Wembanyama, under Section 2(c).]

March 19, 2026 - 11 AM [In-person]: In re Keeling Curve Foundation v. Global Warming Mitigation Project, Opposition No. 91285627 [Opposition to registration of the mark KEELING CURVE PRIZE for "Accepting and administering monetary charitable contributions for supporting climate change solutions" on the grounds of fraud, false connection under Section 2(a), and likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).]

March 26, 2026 - 10 AM [Virtual]: In re Knoll, Inc., Serial No. 98370045 [Refusal to register the mark TUGENDHAT for "seating furniture" on the ground that the mark is primarily merely a surname under Section 2(e)(4).]

Read comments and post your comment here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

TTAB Finds TARGETED DELIVERY Generic for . . . Guess What?

The Board affirmed a refusal to register the proposed mark TARGETED DELIVERY, on the Supplemental Register, for "Providing temporary use of on-line non-downloadable software tools for implementing a production and delivery timeline for direct mail campaigns with enhanced scheduling and pricing options to ensure delivery to household mailboxes nationwide within a three-day time window," deeming the term to be generic for the services. Applicant argued that the term "is almost exclusively used in conjunction with targeting specified individuals or audiences to receive direct mail," not targeting a specific date range. In re Data Network Marketing, Inc., Serial No. 97817090 (February 27, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark A. Thurmon).

As usual, the Board found the relevant genus to be defined by applicant's recitation of services. The relevant consumers are individuals and businesses that use direct mail campaigns for marketing or informational purposes.

As for applicant's argument about targeting, "[b]oth the record and common sense refute this argument." "Applicant’s own website states that "'Targeted Delivery' is our proprietary program that ensures you land in mailboxes—nationwide—within a three-day window."

This statement makes clear that the target of Applicant’s direct mail program is a date range. There is nothing distinctive about calling your service what it is, and that is exactly what Applicant has done here. *** Applicant’s argument that 'targeted delivery' is used 'almost exclusively' to refer to customer targeting is misplaced. The evidence shows that multiple targets may be used in direct mail marketing, and that timing is a key target for many such campaigns. To claim exclusive rights to use the phrase "Targeted Delivery" is clearly inconsistent with the reality of this business segment.

The Board agreed with the applicant that one meaning of "targeted delivery" is "targeting individuals or audiences to receive direct mail." That fact, however, "does not undermine the refusal because terms often have multiple meanings."

The reference to the “primary” meaning of the phrase in the genericness standard does not mean that only one meaning of a word or phrase is generic. Consumers who know that Applicant provides targeted delivery based on a date range (i.e., the relevant genus for our analysis), will understand the applied-for mark to refer to that genus.

And so, the Board affirmed the refusal.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Can't get much more descriptive than that.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.