TTAB Deems MONTANA EQUINE Confusable with MONTANA ROSE EQUINE THERAPY for Horse-related Services

The Board affirmed a Section 2(d) refusal of the mark MONTANA EQUINE for, inter alia, "Veterinary sports medicine and physical rehabilitation services for horses through use of modalities and exercise," [EQUINE disclaimed], concluding that confusion is likely with the registered mark MONTANA ROSE EQUINE THERAPY for, inter alia, "Physical rehabilitation services for horses through use of massage and exercises" [EQUINE THERAPY disclaimed]. Applicant Western Veterinary jockeyed for a reversal but the Board rode with Examining Attorney Tracy Fletcher. In re Western Veterinary IP, LLC, Serial No. 98727230 (August 24, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Cheryl S. Goodman).

Western argued that the Board should consider the extrinsic evidence regarding its and registrant’s actual uses to show that the involved services are “disparate.” The Board pointed out, however, that "we may not consider arguments “about how the parties’ actual … services … are narrower or different from the … services identified in the application[] and registration[ ].” The Board found the above-recited services to be "in part identical and in part legally identical."

Western contended that the services are offered in different trade channels and marketed to different localized customers. The Board was unmoved, pointing out again that "[t]he real-world use restrictions argued by Applicant do not appear in the identification of services, and we cannot read limitations into identifications based on either argument or evidence of actual use."

Moreover, although Applicant contends that the trade channels do not overlap because Applicant’s and Registrant’s services are each local to a specific geographic area, the Board is constrained to evaluate likelihood of confusion in terms of nationwide markets when an applicant is seeking a geographically unrestricted registration.

The Board was required to presume that the in part identical and legally identical services are offered to the same classes of consumers and move through the identical trade channels.

As to purchaser care, the Board acknowledged that "a decision as important as choosing a veterinarian or a provider of rehabilitation services for horses will be made with some thought and research and a higher degree of care," and it found that the fourth DuPont factor weighed in Western's favor.

As to the strength of registrant’s mark, the Board found it to be inherently distinctive but noted that the Board may consider whether an inherently distinctive mark is “weak as a source indicator.” Western contended that the terms MONTANA and EQUINE are weak because MONTANA is primarily geographic and commonly used in third-party registered marks, and EQUINE is generic or descriptive for horse-related services and is a term used in many third-party registrations. 

Registrant’s services, however, are offered in Minnesota, not Montana, and Western did not show that Montana is known for physical rehabilitation horse exercise and massage services. Therefore, the Board did not find the word MONTANA in Registrant’s mark to be conceptually weak as a geographic term. The Board also did not find that MONTANA or MONTANA ROSE have any surname significance. However, EQUINE is a conceptually weak term. The Board concluded that the sixth DuPont factor was neutral.

Turning to the marks, the Board found that the dominant term in Western’s mark is MONTANA while the dominant terms in registrant’s mark are MONTANA ROSE. The additional words in the cited mark " do not materially alter the similar overall commercial impression created by the shared initial term MONTANA and the related wording EQUINE."

Considered in their entireties, we find that Applicant’s MONTANA EQUINE mark and Registrant’s MONTANA ROSE EQUINE THERAPY mark are similar overall in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression due to the shared terms MONTANA and EQUINE, which are likely to create a similar overall recollection of the marks. Even if consumers note and remember the additional middle and end words in Registrant’s mark, they are not likely to ascribe the differences between the marks to differences in the source of the respective services. 

The Board concluded that the factor weighing against confusion was outweighed by the similarity of the marks, the identical-in-part and legally identical services, and the overlapping trade channels and consumers.

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TTABlogger comment: Not the most exciting decision I've ever read.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Affirms Functionality Refusal of the Color Green for Surveyor Tripods

The Board affirmed a refusal to register the color "green," on the Supplemental Register, as a trademark for "Construction and Surveyor Tripod," finding the proposed mark to be functional and therefore unregistrable under Section 23(c). In re Dave White’s SitePro, LLC, Serial No. 98404066 (August 25, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Robert Lavache).

According to the application, "[t]he mark consists of the color green, which is the equivalent of Pantone Matching System 2297C, applied to the legs of the tripods. The matter shown in the drawing in broken lines serves only to show positioning of the mark and no claim is made to it."

The Board observed that "color marks may be found functional where, inter alia, the relevant color improves the safety or visibility of a product or the product’s user; facilitates identification of a particular type of product; serves a particular function in the relevant market or industry; or simply makes the product more useful to the user." [See cited cases for examples, including "black" for outboard motors and "pink" for wound dressings].

Examining Attorney Tasneem Hussain maintained that the proposed mark is functional because it consists of a bright, “neon or fluorescent green” that, as applied to the identified construction and surveyor tripod, "acts as a visual indicator to ensure that users are employing safety measures by using high-visibility gear."

As usual, the Board applied the Morton-Norwich factors:

(1) the existence of a utility patent disclosing the utilitarian advantages of the design;

(2) advertising materials in which the originator of the design touts the design’s utilitarian advantages;

(3) the availability to competitors of functionally equivalent designs; and

(4) facts indicating that the design results in a comparatively simple or cheap method of manufacturing the product.

As to the first factor, there was no evidence or argument regarding the existence of a utility patent. As to the second, the Examining Attorney pointed to applicant's website statements: "Out-performs others and gets seen on the jobsite with UV-resistant high-visibility," and "the first hi-vis heavy-duty composite tripod designed for all environments." An Amazon listing for the product points out the "[h]igh visibility flo-yellow composite legs and struts."

This and other evidence demonstrated that "A high-visibility color, such as bright or fluorescent green, applied to products used in construction provides a utilitarian advantage when applied to such products because it enhances safety by increasing visibility and awareness."

Applicant argued that its statements touting the product were "mere puffery" that described a feature that is not essential to the functioning of the product. The Board was unmoved: "Applicant’s argument that the color is merely a feature, not an essential function, of the goods relies on an overly strict application of the functionality standard."

The evidence also shows the color claimed in the proposed mark is one of a few colors that provide high visibility in these environments. Thus, the high visibility provided by the color claimed in the proposed mark is more than a product feature; it fulfills an essential purpose or function of the goods and affects their quality and usefulness, such that granting Applicant exclusive right to the use of the color would result in a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage to competitors.

The Board therefore found that the second Morton-Norwich factor "strongly supports the conclusion that the applied-for mark is functional."

As to the third factor, the Board noted that "alternative designs need not be considered if the other evidence of record establishes functionality." In any case, "while other colors may provide similar functionality, the record establishes that the color at issue here is one of a very few colors that provide the utilitarian advantages that Applicant and others tout."

As to the fourth factor, applicant argued that its goods in the claimed color are “more costly to produce than other colors,” but it provided no evidence to support that claim. Moreover, "[e]ven if the claimed color does increase the production cost of Applicant’s goods, that higher cost does not necessarily render the claimed color nonfunctional if it otherwise results in a product of superior quality."

Thus, registration of the proposed mark must be refused to “protect[] competitors against a disadvantage (unrelated to recognition or reputation) that trademark protection might otherwise impose, namely their inability reasonably to replicate important non-reputation-related product features.”

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TTABlogger comment: When is the last time the Board found a single color mark to be registrable? I think it was In re Hodgdon Powder Company, Inc., 119 USPQ2d 1254 (TTAB 2016) [precedential], involving the color white for "preformed gunpowder charges for muzzleloading firearms." [TTABlogged here].

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

Recommended Reading: The Trademark Reporter, July-August 2026 Issue

Here's some late summer reading material: the July-August 2026 (Vol. 116 No. 4) issue of The Trademark Reporter. [pdf here]. Willard Knox, Staff Editor-in-Chief, summarizes the contents as follows (and below): "This issue of The Trademark Reporter (TMR) offers readers insights by practitioners on bad faith trademark applications under Turkish law; an argument that to uphold trademark law’s purpose of ensuring competition, a product feature valued by consumers for its own sake (regardless of source) should not receive trademark protection; an in-depth look at the potential risks posed by a 2026 U.S. Supreme Court decision to secondary liability in the trademark context; and a recommendation of a comprehensive and useful resource to practitioners appearing before the U.S. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board."

Evaluation of Bad Faith in Trademark Applications Under Turkish Trademark Law by Uğur Aktekin, Selin Bilik, and Bilge Ayperi Kemer. Brand owners doing business in Türkiye will benefit from the insights on bad faith trademark applications shared by the practitioner authors.

Trademarks, Functionality, and Competition by Glynn S. Lunney, Jr. This article argues that because trademark law’s primary objective is to ensure competition, a product feature valued by consumers for its own sake (regardless of the source) is functional and not entitled to trademark protection.

Commentary: Rethinking Contributory Trademark Infringement After Cox Communications by David H. Bernstein, Megan K. Bannigan, Christopher S. Ford, Kathryn C. Saba, and Anna M. Rennich. This in-depth look at the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2026 decision in Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment outlines the decision’s potential risks to established principles of secondary liability in the trademark context.

Book Review: A Legal Strategist’s Guide to Trademark Trial and Appeal Board Practice. Theodore H. Davis Jr., ed. Reviewed by Leigha R. Santoro. The reviewer finds this guide to be a comprehensive and useful resource for those practicing before the U.S. Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.

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TTABlog comment: This issue of the TMR is Copyright © 2026, the International Trademark Association, and is made available with the permission of the Trademark Reporter®.

TTABlog Test: How Did These Three Section 2(d) Appeals Turn Out?

TTAB affirmances of Section 2(d) refusals are running at about 86% so far this year, below the usual 90%. Here are three appeals decided recently. How do you think they came out? [Answer in first comment].

In re Ripped Franchise, LLC, Serial No. 98369548 (August 10, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Jennifer L. Elgin). [Section 2(d) refusal of the word-plus-design mark shown below, for "Physical fitness instruction," in view of the registered mark GET RIPPED for “physical fitness training services and educational services, namely, providing training of physical fitness instructors for certification in the field of physical fitness training."]

In re A.W. Farrell & Son, Inc., Serial No. 98597246 (August 10, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark A. Thurmon). [Section 2(d) refusal of the word-plus-design mark shown below, for "Roofing contracting; Roofing installation; Roofing maintenance; Roofing repair; Roofing services" [ROOFING disclaimed] in view of the registered mark FARRELL BUILDING COMPANY for "construction of buildings; real estate development; building construction services" [BUILDING COMPANY disclaimed.]

In re Iberostar Hoteles Y Apartamentos, S.L., Serial Nos. 79385220 (August 13, 2026) [not precedential] [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Wendy B. Cohen). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark JOIA BY IBEROSTAR BEACHFRONT RESORTS for “services for providing food and beverages; providing temporary accommodation; temporary accommodation reservation services for travellers; hotel accommodation and restaurant services" [BEACHFRONT RESORTS disclaimed] in view of the registered mark JOIA BEACH for “restaurant and bar services."]

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TTABlogger comment: How did you do? See any WYHA?s ?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Finds NEUROPSYCHIATRIC SERVICES, S.C. to be Generic for . . . . Guess What?

Finding the record evidence of genericness "overwhelming," an obviously annoyed Board panel upheld a refusal to register the term NEUROPSYCHIATRIC SERVICES, S.C. on the Supplemental Register, for "Psychiatric services; outpatient and inpatient care services; behavioral health services in the nature of psychiatric and outpatient psychiatric care services; neuropsychiatric testing." In re Neuropsychiatric Services, S.C., Serial No. 98169669 (August 19, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark A. Thurmon).

The Board, as usual, found the genus at issue to be defined by applicant's recitation of services. The relevant consumers are persons "seeking healthcare services of the type identified in the application."

Applicant used the term NEUROPSYCHIATRIC SERVICES generically in its specimen of use, stating: "Neuropsychiatric Services, S.C. is a leader in providing integrated neuropsychiatric services to adult and geriatric patients." Other evidence defined the term as "a branch of medicine concerned with both neurology and psychiatry." Materials from the American Neuropsychiatry Association showed that neuropsychiatry is an established field of medicine that has a recognized association of practitioners.

This evidence is highly probative of the fact that at least the key “NEUROPSYCHIATRIC” part of the applied-for mark is a generic word for a type of medical practice. When we combine this fact with the specimen, which confirms that applicant provides neuropsychiatric services, there can be little, if any, doubt that the applied-for mark is generic.

In addition, Examining Attorney Evan Federico submitted evidence of third-party use of the words “neuropsychiatry” and “neuropsychiatric” for services provided by Stanford, Brigham and Women’s Hospital, UCLA, and at least five third-party practice groups that use “neuropsychiatry” or “neuropsychiatric” in their business name. Technical articles, online newspapers, and other publications use “neuropsychiatry” and “neuropsychiatric” to refer to the type of medical services identified in the application.

The Board found it "difficult to imagine a clearer case of genericness." "There is nothing remotely distinctive in the use of NEUROPSYCHIATRIC SERVICES as part of [the] proposed mark" for Applicant’s recited services.

Applicant maintained that the term as a whole is not generic because of the word “services” and the “S.C.” at the end. The Board deemed these arguments "specious." "The word 'service' and its plural 'services' are found throughout the Trademark Act. Applicant seeks registration of a service mark. To argue that the word service is not generic for a service is pushing the limits of zealous advocacy."

The applied-for mark NEUROPSYCHIATRIC SERVICES, S.C. is generic for the services identified in the application, which constitute the genus for our analysis. The record is overwhelming. There is no evidence supporting Applicant. Indeed, the only evidence Applicant submitted was a definition of the word “service.” That evidence merely confirms that service is a generic word for a service.

The Board batted away the argument that the letters S.C. "somehow saved the term entire enterprise from the pit of genericness."

Not so. A business identifier like Inc. or Co. (S.C. identifies a Service Corporation, as the Trademark Examining Attorney established) is not a distinctive source identifier. This suffix adds nothing to the rest of the mark. See, e.g., Booking. com, 591 U.S. at 558 (noting the principle that “a generic corporate designation added to a generic term does not confer trademark eligibility”) (citing Goodyear’s India Rubber Glove Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598 (1888)). And nothing plus nothing is still nothing.

And so, the Board affirmed the refusal under Sections 23(c) and 45 of the Trademark Act.

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TTABlogger comment: Is this a double WYHA? Would have appealed? Would you have applied to register?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Three More Section 2(e)(1) Mere Descriptiveness Appeals - How Did They Turn Out?

So far this year the Board affirmed a whopping 96% of the Section 2(e)(1) mere descriptiveness refusals reviewed on appeal. Here are three recent appeals. How do you think they came out? [Answer in first comment].

In re Concert Black LLC, Serial No. 97921491(August 18, 2026) [Opinion by Judge George C. Pologeorgis]. [Section 2(e)(1) mere descriptiveness refusal of CONCERT BLACK for various clothing items "excluding formalwear, concert attire, uniforms, concert band uniforms, marching band uniforms, robes, gowns, choir robes, tuxedos, and any other clothing specifically designed for use in musical performances." Applicant argued that its goods are street wear and therefore cannot be used to create a "concert black" outfit, particularly since it has excluded formal wear from its identification of goods.]

In re The Carlstar Group LLC, Serial No. 98674193 (August 18, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Jennifer L. Elgin). [Mere descriptiveness refusal of SP-Y-KE for "Tractor towed agricultural implements, namely, closing wheels; closing wheels for use with agricultural seed planting machines; tractor towed agricultural implements, namely, spiked closing wheel." Applicant maintained that the mark is a double entendre: the intentional misspelling together with the hyphenation to isolate the “Y” represents an obvious play on the intended result of a closing wheel, which is the growth of a plant (the “Y”) from a furrow (the hyphenation).]

In Re Technip Energies France, Serial No. 79355823 (August 19, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark A. Thurmon). [Refusal to register the mark shown below, absent a disclaimer of the merely descriptive term E.FURNACE, for "Apparatus, namely, industrial electric ovens and gas purification installations for the production of ethylene, propylene, butadiene, benzene, toluene, xylene, hydrogen, vinyl chloride monomers, with low carbon dioxide emissions; apparatus and installations for the production of ethylene, propylene, butadiene, benzene, toluene, xylene, hydrogen, vinyl chloride monomers, with low carbon content." Applicant argues that the even if the term E.FURNACE must be disclaimed because of the electric ovens in the identification, the term is not merely descriptive of the “gas purification installations” also listed as part of the first goods identified in the application.]

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TTABlog comment: How did you do? See any WYHA?s

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Naked Consent Agreement Fails to Prevent Section 2(d) Refusals of GODZILLA X KONG: THE NEW EMPIRE over GODZILLA

The Board affirmed Section 2(d) refusals in twelve applications (consolidated for appeal) to register the mark GODZILLA X KONG: THE NEW EMPIRE for various goods and services (including film production, action figures, etc.), finding confusion likely with certain GODZILLA or GODZILLA-formative marks, registered by Toho Co., Ltd., for a variety of goods and services. In attempting to overcome the refusals, Applicant Legend IP submitted a "License and Consent Agreement," but the Board found that the agreement "suffers multiple failings" and "weighs only slightly against a conclusion of likely confusion." In re Legend IP Holdings Production, LLC, Serial No. 97914992 et al. (August 13, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Martha B. Allard).

The issue was "how much evidentiary weight should be afforded the Agreement given by the owner of the registrations that have been cited as a bar to registration under Section 2(d)." Not much, the Board concluded.

The entire agreement was set forth in one-half page. Although styled as a License Agreement under which Applicant Legend holds the applied-for marks "in trust for" Toho, "it remained subject to the same analytical framework applicable to consent agreements under the tenth DuPont factor (market interface). The Agreement states that applicant “is authorized to seek registration of the Trademarks incorporating [Registrant’s IP] in connection with the exploitation of the Picture."

In re Ye Mystic Krewe provided a list of non-exclusive factors that may be considered in assessing the import of a consent agreement: 

1. Whether the consent shows an agreement between both parties; 
2. Whether the agreement includes a clear indication that the goods and/or services travel in separate trade channels; 
3. Whether the parties agree to restrict their fields of use; 
4. Whether the parties will make efforts to prevent confusion, and cooperate and take steps to avoid any confusion that may arise in the future; and 
5. Whether the marks have been used for a period of time without evidence of actual confusion.

The first factor was met, since the agreement was signed by both parties, but the remaining factors were not. As a result, the Board found the Agreement to be a “naked” consent.

There are simply no undertakings of record between Applicant and Registrant which impact the likelihood of confusion analysis. This Agreement is too bare and conclusory for us to conclude that the marks can coexist without a likelihood of confusion.

Legend did not explain or address how the involved goods and/or services travel, or will travel, in separate trade channels (second element). There was no agreement to restrict their fields of use (third element). There was no agreement regarding efforts that the parties must take to prevent confusion or to avoid any confusion that may arise in the future (fourth element). And there was no evidence regarding how long Legend and Registrant Toho simultaneously used their marks in the United States without evidence of actual confusion (fifth element).

Here, Applicant filed each of its applications on an intent to use basis and no amendments to allege use have been filed, nor does Applicant argue that the marks have coexisted in the marketplace for any length of time. Along these lines, we note that the Agreement consents solely to registration of the marks of the involved applications but does not separately consent to their use. [These are I-T-U applications. How would Legend obtain registrations without use? - ed.].

The Board noted that a simple solution to avoid likely confusion "would have been for Registrant to have filed the applications in its own name, which would have resulted in its being identified as the registrant, rather than relying on Applicant to hold them “'in trust for Toho.'" [Would consumers know or care who the registrant is? Wouldn't they assume, in any case, that the parties are related or cooperating? ed.].

In short, the Agreement appears to simply to be an arrangement between the parties solely as to registration with no regard to whether it reflects the realities of no likelihood of confusion if and when both marks are concurrently used in the marketplace. While we give some weight to the existence of the Agreement and its express authorization by Applicant “to seek registration of the Trademarks incorporating [Registrant’s IP] in connection with the exploitation of the Picture,” we find that the Agreement as a whole suffers multiple failings such that this factor “weighs only slightly against a conclusion of likely confusion.”

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TTABlogger comment: Twelve applications down the drain. PS: As I have previously posited, naked consents are effective only in nudist colonies. 

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Is HVNLYDAZE Confusable with HVNLYFIT for Overlapping Clothing Items?

The USPTO refused to register the mark HVNLYDAZE for various clothing items, including t-shirts, concluding that confusion is likely with the registered mark HVNLYFIT for overlapping clothing items, including t-shirts. Applicant argued that the marks have different connotations, and that HVNLY is equivalent to "heavenly," a common term and a weak formative. How do you think this appeal came out? In re Heavenly Daze Limited, Serial No. 98209106 (August 14, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christopher C. Larkin).

Applicant did not make of record any third-party uses or registrations of HVNLY-formative marks for clothing under the sixth DuPont factor (the “number and nature of similar marks in use on similar goods”). The Board took judicial notice that "the word 'heavenly,' the acknowledged 'phonetic equivalent' of HVNLY, has a colloquial meaning of 'completely delightful' in addition to religious meanings such as 'of or relating to heaven or the heavens' and 'suggesting the blessed state of heaven.'"

We find that in the context of the clothing identified in the cited ’362 Registration, the prefix HVNLY- makes the cited mark HVNLYFIT as a whole merely mildly suggestive of “completely delightful” garments, and “we find the cited mark is entitled to ‘the normal scope of protection to which inherently distinctive marks are entitled.’”

The Board found HVNLYFIT and HVNLYDAZE to be "visually similar, as both begin with the disemvoweled contraction HVNLY." The second elements of the marks are different "and some consumers may notice and recall the difference." "But the marks share the same structure, starting with the dominant 'HVNLY' element and then add a second word to create a HVNLY-formative mark. This structure results in marks that look like variations on a 'heavenly' theme."

This is important because consumers familiar with the HVNLYFIT mark and the goods provided under that mark may view the HVNLYDAZE mark as an extension of the HVNLYFIT mark or as an affiliated branch of the business that provides clothing under the HVNLYFIT mark.

In sum, the Board found that the HVNLYFIT and HVNLYDAZE marks "are similar in appearance from the standpoint of a consumer with a general rather than specific recollection of the cited HVNLYFIT mark for clothing who separately sees the HVNLYDAZE mark used for legally identical goods."

The Board next found that the marks are similar in sound, since the first and dominant element of each mark will sound identical.

Finally, the marks HVNLYFIT and HVNLYDAZE "are also similar in meaning and are likely to create the same commercial impressions" because the prefix HVNLY- "dominates the meaning of the marks, as the first element" of both marks. 

The HVNLY-prefix imbues both marks with the same celestial aura of “complete delight,” and the respective -FIT and -DAZE suffixes “do not add more distinctive or striking content to the mark[s].” The HVNLYFIT and HVNLYDAZE marks are similar in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression, and the first DuPont factor strongly supports a conclusion that confusion is likely.

And so, the Board upheld the refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: How did you do? I find the "line extension" argument to be superfluous at best, and at worst conclusory and questionable. Either the marks are confusingly similar, or they're not. The line extension argument seems to be a way of end-running the similarity issue when the marks aren't really that close. Also, I don't think the marks have the same connotation: "heavenly days" is not the same as "heavenly fit."

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Three Recent Section 2(e)(1) Mere Descriptiveness Appeals - How Did They Turn Out?

Last year the Board affirmed about 88% of the Section 2(e)(1) mere descriptiveness refusals reviewed on appeal. So far this year, the rate is well over 90%. Here are three recent appeals. How do you think they came out? [Answer in first comment].

In re Learn 2 Read Read 2 Learn LLC, Serial No. 99176400 (July 30, 2026) [Opinion by Judge Robert Lavache]. [Section 2(e)(1) mere descriptiveness refusal of WORD BANK: WORD LEARNING PROGRAM for educational publications and services provided in the field of early literacy and vocabulary instruction. Applicant argued that the proposed mark "does not instantly describe Applicant’s proprietary literacy platform" because "[i]t does not tell a consumer what the system is, how it works, what materials it uses, or how it delivers instruction."]

In re Evan Jordan Maisano, Serial No. 99276833 (August 12, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Robert Lavache). [Mere descriptiveness refusal of MAGNETBALL for "action skill games." Applicant maintained that "[a] consumer encountering the term MAGNETBALL would not immediately know what the sport involves without further explanation," which "places the mark squarely in the suggestive, not descriptive, category."]

In Re Benjamin Langhofer, Serial No. 98693560 (August 13, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Wendy B. Cohen). [Mere descriptiveness refusal of FAMILY HANDBOOK for "downloadable documents in the field of custom documents designed by parents to establish and memorialize the purpose and direction of their family." Applicant contended that "a consumer would understand FAMILY HANDBOOK to mean a handbook about childcare or parenting techniques."]

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TTABlog comment: How did you do? See any WYHA?s

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Renown of Serena Williams Doesn't Avoid Refusal of SERENA VENTURES over SERENA for Investment Services

The Board swatted away various feeble arguments by Applicant Serena Williams in affirming a refusal to register SERENA VENTURES [VENTURES disclaimed] in view of the registered mark SERENA, for overlapping investment services. Starting out behind the 8-ball, Applicant Williams had to somehow overcome the obvious similarity of the marks. She failed to do so. In re Serena Williams, Serial No. 90321926 (August 12, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Jennifer L. Elgin).

Williams cryptically argued that her mark has a "layered meaning" that "conveys a distinct corporate and institutional identity." Interpreting this as an argument that SERENA VENTURES refers to Applicant Williams as a well-known tennis player, the Board pointed out that "[s]urprisingly, Applicant did not make of record any evidence to support her identity or claim of fame (especially as to her first name without her surname, as appears in the mark), and nevertheless, attorney argument is not evidence." However, the Board came to her rescue:

We take judicial notice, as a commonly known fact not subject to dispute, that Applicant is a well-known tennis player. See TBMP § 1208.04 and authorities cited therein. We do so solely for the limited purpose of evaluating whether the term SERENA carries a particular connotation relevant to the first DuPont factor.

The Board then observed that, even if consumers would associate SERENA VENTURES with Applicant, the same connotation would be applied to the cited mark SERENA in connection with the same services. "In short, there is nothing inherent in the marks or the financial services at issue that would portray different meanings to consumers – as it might, for example, for services related to tennis or sports in general." And so the Board found that the first DuPont factor favored a finding of likely confusion.

Williams feebly argued that the registrant's services are offered only in Clearwater, Florida, while her services are not offered in Clearwater. Irrelevant, said the Board, pointing out that this might be relevant in an infringement action, but the registrant "owns an unrestricted registration which gives Registrant presumptive exclusive rights to nationwide use of its mark in connection with the identified services under Trademark Act Section 7(b), 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b), regardless of its actual extent of use."

The Board acknowledged that both applicant’s and registrant's customers would exercise "somewhat greater than ordinary care" in seeking and providing venture capital investment services, and so the fourth DuPont factor tipped "slightly against likelihood of confusion."

Williams asserted that there was no evidence of actual confusion, but the Board noted that there was "no opportunity to hear from Registrant about whether it is aware of any reported instances of confusion in the context of this ex parte appeal." In any case, according to Williams, there was no actual overlap in trading areas that might generate incidents of actual confusion.

Summarizing, the Board found that the first, second, and third DuPont factors weighed "heavily" in favor of likelihood of confusion, and outweighed the fourth DuPont factor, which weighed slightly against likelihood of confusion. The fifth, seventh, eighth, tenth, twelfth, and thirteenth factors were neutral.

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TTABlogger comment: WYHA? What if the proposed mark had been SERENA WILLIAMS? Would her fame overcome a similar refusal?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.