Friday, October 02, 2026

TTAB Finds "JASPE" Deceptively Misdescriptive of Clothing

The Board affirmed a refusal to register the mark JASPE for various clothing items, finding the mark to be deceptively misdescriptive under Section 2(e)(1). The evidence established that Jaspe is a type of textile fabric, and Applicant Lee admitted that her clothing items do not contain jaspe. In re Teresa Michelle Lee, Serial No. 98081572 (September 29, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christen M. English).

A proposed mark is deceptively misdescriptive under Section 2(e)(1) if: (1) it misdescribes a quality, feature, function, or characteristic of the goods or services with which it is used; and (2) consumers would be likely to believe the misrepresentation.

Examining Attorney Akeela Makshood relied on definitions of the term "jaspe" provided by third parties in the clothing industry (e.g., "Jaspe is a type of fabric characterized by its unique pattern. The fabric is made by weaving together different colors of thread, creating a variegated effect"), as well as on evidence of 13 third parties selling "jaspe" clothing.

The Board disagreed with Applicant Lee’s assertion that the word “jaspe” lacks a stable, commonly understood meaning. The Board found that the word “jaspe” has two descriptive meanings applicable to shirts and pants, as identified in the subject application. First, “jaspe” is a fabric made from unique techniques in dyeing yarn and twisting or weaving two different colors or shades of the dyed yarn. Second, it also means a blended, veined, spotted, mottled or variegated appearance resembling or imitating jasper (a mottled gemstone, shown above). Both meaning are immediately descriptive of clothing with a “jaspe” design or appearance.

Applicant Lee argued that she chose the proposed mark as "a meaningful tribute to her son, Jasper," and not to convey some descriptive meaning in connection with clothing. Irrelevant, said the Board.

Applicant Lee invoked the doctrine of foreign equivalents, arguing that “jaspe” means “jasper” in Spanish and because “Spanish is the most commonly spoken language in the United States after English … a very large population of United States consumers will immediately associate the JASPE mark with the jasper gemstone.” The Board was unimpressed: "the evidence shows that Applicant’s proposed mark is an English word, so the doctrine of foreign equivalents has no application here."

In sum, based on the evidence of record discussed above, we find that the proposed mark JASPE immediately describes shirts and pants that are made from or feature a jaspe fabric or design. * * * The word “jaspe” merely describes a significant feature—jaspe fabric or a jaspe design—that Applicant’s shirts and pants might plausibly possess but do not in fact possess. Accordingly, the first part of the test is met.

Under the second prong of the test, the Board applied the reasonably prudent consumer standard to assess whether consumers are likely to believe the misrepresentation. The evidence showed that consumers are likely to regularly encounter shirts and pants described as “jaspe.” As a result, the Board found that reasonably prudent consumers encountering the proposed mark JASPE for the shirts and pants identified in Applicant’s application are likely to mistakenly believe that these goods are made from or feature jaspe.

And so, the Board affirmed the refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: The Examining Attorney withdrew a Section 2(a) deceptiveness refusal. That would have required proof that the misrepresentation was likely to affect the purchasing decision of a significant or substantial portion of relevant consumers. As you know, deceptively misdescriptive marks may be registered with acquired distinctiveness. Deceptive marks cannot be.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

Thursday, October 01, 2026

TTABlog Quarterly Index: July - September 2026

E-mail subscriptions to the TTABlog are available. Just enter your e-mail address in the box on the right to receive a daily update via Feedblitz. Please report any broken or inoperative links, as well as any errors and omissions, to the TTABlogger at jwelch at wolfgreenfield.com.

Section 2(a) - False Suggestion of a Connection:
Section 2(b) - Flag/Coat of Arms/Insignia:
Section 2(c) - Consent to Register:
Section 2(d) - Likelihood of Confusion:
Section 2(e)(1) - Mere Descriptiveness:
Section 2(e)(2) - Primarily Merely Geographically Descriptive: Section 2(e)(4) - Primarily Merely a Surname: Section 2(e)(5) - Functionality:
Section 2(f): Acquired Distinctiveness:
Abandonment/Nonuse/Specimen of Use: Dilution by Tarnishment: Genericness: Lack of Bona Fide Intent:
Nonownership: Reexamination:
Discovery/Evidence/Procedure: CAFC Decisions:
Supreme Court Decisions:
Recommended Reading: Other:

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

Wednesday, September 30, 2026

TTAB Posts October 2026 Hearing Schedule

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Tee-Tee-Ā-Bee) has scheduled five oral hearings for the month of October 2026. The first three hearings will held in-person at the Madison East Building 600 Dulany Street, 9th Floor (Hearing Room C), Alexandria, VA. The last two will be held virtually. Briefs and other papers for each case may be found at TTABVUE via the links provided.

October 7, 2026 - 10:00 AM [In-Person]: Home Depot Product Authority, LLC v. Propane Depot Inc., Cancellation No. 92084445 [Petition for cancellation of a registration for the mark shown below left, for "Fuel delivery services featuring propane for homes and businesses" [PROPANE and .COM disclaimed], on the ground of likelihood of confusion with, and likely dilution of, opposer's orange logo (shown below right) registered for home improvement store services [HOME disclaimed].

October 15, 2026 - 10:00 AM [In-Person]: Pharma Cosmetics Laboratories Ltd v. Neora Switzerland Holdings GMBH, Cancellation No. 92079320 [Petition for cancellation of a registration for the mark NEORA for, inter alia, medicated and nonmedicated skin care preparations, on the ground of likely confusion with the registered mark NEOVA for nonmedicated skin care products and medicated skin care preparations.]

October 15, 2026 - 2:00 PM [In-Person]: In re A.J. and R.G. Barber Limited, Serial No. 90647853 [Refusal to register the mark shown below, for "Aged cheese," absent a disclaimer of "1833".]

October 21, 2026 - 11:00 AM [Virtual]: In re SimplyFresco LLC, Serial No. 97435689 [Section 2(d) refusal to register the mark COCINA FRESCA for "sauces; tomato based sauces; salsa; Mexican food sauces" in view of the registered mark CUCINA FRESCA for "Fresh pasta; filled pasta; pasta sauce; and macaroni and cheese."]

October 22, 2026 - 2:00 PM [Virtual]: Encyclopaedia Iranica Foundation Inc. v. Persian Heritage Foundation, Opposition No. 91245273 [Opposition to registration of the mark PERSIAN HERITAGE FOUNDATION and Design shown below left, for "Charitable foundation services, namely, providing fundraising activities, funding, scholarships and/or financial assistance for the furthering of Persian heritage and culture in academia" [PERSIAN HERITAGE FOUNDATION disclaimed] on the grounds of lack of bona fide intent and likelihood of confusion with the common mark "flower" design mark shown below right, for a variety of goods and services, including books and other printed or online publications, publication services, services consisting in promoting preservation and awareness of Iranian culture and heritage, charitable services, namely, providing fundraising activities and granting funds to support preservation and awareness of Iranian culture and heritage.]

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TTABlogger comment: What say you? See any WYHA?s?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Tuesday, September 29, 2026

TTABlog Test: How Did These Three Section 2(d) Appeals Turn Out?

A now-retired TTAB judge once said to me that one can predict the outcome of a Section 2(d) appeal 95% of the time by looking at just the marks and the goods/services. Here are three appeals decided recently. Let's see how you do. [Answers in first comment].

In re Charlie Blue Therapy, LLC, Serial No. 99180551 (September 26, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark Lebow). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark CHARLIE BLUE for “Mental health therapy services; Clinical mental health counseling services; Counseling in the field of mental health and wellness; Psychological counseling services in the field of sports,” in view of the registered mark CHARLIE for, inter alia, “Mental health services; Providing mental health and wellness information; Psychotherapy; Psychiatric services; Outpatient and inpatient care services in the fields of mental health, psychology, psychiatry, addiction treatment, and social work; Telemedicine services in the fields of mental health, psychology, psychiatry, addiction treatment, and social work; … Cognitive therapy services; Cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT); Dialectical behavior therapy (DBT); . . . Managed mental health care and treatment services.”] [Registrant's specimen of use shown below]

In re Happy Valley Hannah, Ltd., Serial No. 98423787 (September 24, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark THE HAPPIEST VALLEY for “Hats; Ponchos; T-shirts; Clothing jackets; Hooded sweatshirts; Long-sleeved shirts,” in view of the mark HAPPY VALLEY, registered on the Supplemental Register for "Headwear; Shirts; Sweatshirts."]

In re FUL Foods B.V., Serial No. 98061361 (September 23, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark Lebow). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark shown below, for "beverages containing microalgae extracts for use as a dietary supplement" in International Class 5, and “mineral and aerated waters; carbonated drinks, non-alcoholic; non-alcoholic drinks containing fruit juices; fruit drinks and fruit juices; all the aforementioned products enriched with microalgae extract” in International Class 32 [WATER disclaimed] ,view of the registered marks BLUE WATER for a “nutritional supplement drink containing aloe” [WATER disclaimed] and BLU for “waters, namely, bottled waters; waters, namely, bottled natural spring waters; bottled waters; natural spring waters; bottled natural spring waters.”]

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TTABlogger comment: How did you do? See any WYHA?s ?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

Monday, September 28, 2026

TTABlog Test: Is "GOLF DARTS" Merely Descriptive of Action Skill Games?

The USPTO refused to register the proposed mark GOLF DARTS for "action skill games," deeming the mark to be merely descriptive under Section 2(e)(1). Applicant P & P contended that the combination of GOLF and DARTS “presents a bizarre and incongruous meaning that cannot be grasped without some measure of imagination and mental pause,” since its game lacks traditional elements of either golf (no course, holes, etc.) or darts (no feathered darts, needle darts piercing a regulation dartboard, etc.). How do you think this appeal came out? In re P&P Imports LLC, Serial No. 98669267 (September 25, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Catherine Dugan O'Connor).

Examining Attorney Claudia A. Kopenski relied on dictionary definitions of GOLF ("a game in which a player using special clubs attempts to sink a ball with as few strokes as possible into each of the 9 or 18 successive holes on a course"), DART (“a small missile usually with a pointed shaft at one end and feathers at the other”) and DARTS ("a game in which darts are thrown at a target"). The Board found that "[t]hese definitions show that golf and darts are known games that use particular implements to attain particular objectives."

P & P’s specimen of use and excerpts from its website and Amazon.com product listing showed that the goods include a “dartboard target,” “darts scoreboard,” and so-called “‘Chip N’ Stick’ golf balls” that are modified with hook-and-loop fasteners so they can stick to the target. Its advertising states" GOLF DARTS: An exciting new chipping game that combines the precision of darts with the fun of golf; The included Chip N’ Stick golf balls stick to the oversized fabric target for scoring."

This evidence shows that Applicant’s “action skill games” include features that combine elements of both golf and darts. When the words GOLF and DARTS are combined into GOLF DARTS and used for Applicant’s goods, the words retain their original meanings as referring to features of the goods, which include aspects of both golf and darts.

The Board acknowledged that the the term GOLF DARTS "may at first glance seem unusual when considered in the abstract," but it found "nothing bizarre or incongruous about the combination of the words GOLF and DARTS when it is considered in relation to P & P's “action skill games."

As seen in Applicant’s specimen and advertising, Applicant’s game combines features from both golf and darts, including a dartboard-style target and modified golf balls. The specimen depicts players hitting golf balls at the dartboard target, and the game is specifically promoted as a way to improve one’s chipping skills while playing classic darts games.

Nor did the Board find that the combination of GOLF and DARTS would be perceived as jarring or suggestive, "especially in light of P & P’s own advertising materials and specimen." Moreover, the examining attorney provided evidence of others using the terms “Golf Darts” or “Dart Golf” with reference to a game that combines features of both golf and darts.

P & P pointed to existing registrations for SMACK DARTS and RINGER DARTS (DARTS disclaimed in both marks) and cancelled registrations for SEX-DARTS and GOLFDARTS, but the Board was unmoved. The cancelled registrations "are of limited value as they are evidence only of the fact that the registrations issued." The other registrations "involve different marks than the applied-for mark GOLF DARTS and are based on entirely different records." "The great variation in facts from case to case prevents the formulation of specific rules for specific fact situations. Each case must be decided on its own merits."

[T]he proposed mark GOLF DARTS directly and immediately conveys information about Applicant’s “action skill games,” namely, that they include features of the games of golf and darts. We therefore find Applicant’s proposed mark to be merely descriptive of the identified goods.

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TTABlogger comment: WYHA?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

Friday, September 25, 2026

TTABlog Test: Three Recent Section 2(e)(1) Mere Descriptiveness Appeals - How Did They Turn Out?

So far this year, the Board has affirmed all but one of the 29 mere descriptiveness refusals reviewed on appeal. Here are three recent appeals. Did any of them buck the trend? [Answer in first comment].

In re Mitchell Industrial Tire Co., Inc., Serial No. 98814134 (August 26, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Jessica B. Bradley). [Section 2(e)(1) mere descriptiveness refusal of WIDE TRACK for “tires; solid tires.” Applicant argued that a track is a “result of a use” of a tire, i.e., the imprint left by the tire on a surface, and not a “use” of a tire, and as such does not meet the standard for a merely descriptive mark as set out in TMEP § 1209.01(b).]

In re AdReach LLC, Serial No. 99207780 (September 15, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge David K. Heasley). [Mere descriptiveness refusal of ADREACH for “advertising, marketing, and promoting the goods and services of others via placement of advertisements on packaging for food and beverages.” Applicant argued that its proposed mark is not merely descriptive because it is suggestive, a double entendre, incongruous, or indicative of an end result.]

In Re AgBio LTDA, Serial No. 98544842 (September 15, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Cheryl S. Goodman). [Mere descriptiveness refusal of BIOINPUT for Biological fungicides, herbicides and insecticides in International Class 5; Business consulting services in the agriculture field in International Class 35; Agricultural research; Providing temporary use of online non-downloadable computer software for inputting, managing, visualizing, and analyzing data and providing recommendations to improve profitability and yield in the field of agriculture in International Class 42; and Agriculture services, namely, providing agricultural advice and analysis of data for others related to row crops; Agricultural advice, namely, providing recommendations for plant and soil nutrition supplements in International Class 44. Applicant argued that “[t]he mark functions as a unitary whole with a distinct commercial impression,” and that BIOINPUT is unitary because “the words of the mark are merged together so that they cannot be viewed as separable elements."]

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TTABlog comment: How did you do? See any WYHA?s

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Thursday, September 24, 2026

TTABlog Test: Is "HANSEN HONEY FARM" for Honey Primarily Merely a Surname?

The USPTO refused to register the mark HANSEN HONEY FARM for honey and related products, fiding the mark to be primarily merely a surname under Section 2(e)(4). The applicant did not dispute that the significance of HANSEN to consumers would be as a surname. The question, then was whether the addition of the words HONEY FARM "alters the primary significance of the mark as a whole." How do you think this came out? In re Hansen Honey Farm, Serial No. 98224899 (September 22, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Jennifer L. Elgin).

Applicant did not dispute that HANSEN is a common, not rare, surname. [HANSEN appears 286,420 times in the LEXISNEXIS surname database]. It did not dispute that HANSEN is the surname of its president. And applicant did not argue that HANSEN has a recognized meaning other than a surname, or that it does not have the 'structure and pronunciation' of a surname." The Board, applying the relevant Benthin factors, found that "the primary significance of the term HANSEN to the purchasing public would be that of a surname."

The Board then turned to the question of "whether adding the additional term to the surname alters the primary significance of the mark as a whole to the purchasing public." "A key element in this determination is the relative distinctiveness of the additional terms in the mark. * * * Nondistinctive terms typically are accorded less weight and are not likely to detract from the primary surname significance of the mark."

Examining Attorney Darryl Spruill maintained that HONEY FARM is descriptive of, or generic for, the goods. He submitted seven third-party registrations on the Principal Register in which “HONEY FARM” and “HONEY FARMS” are disclaimed as descriptive, printouts from four third-party websites using the phrase “honey farm” “in connection with goods and/or services that are the same as or similar to Applicant’s goods, and other website evidence showing use of "honey farm" as part of the names of businesses selling honey. As a result, the Board found that "it is very common for businesses to use the last names of their owners along with the descriptive phrase 'honey farm[s]' in their names."

Applicant pointed to third-party registrations for LOCKHART HONEY FARMS, BEDILLION HONEY FARM, WEEKS HONEY FARM, and GEORGIA HONEY FARM to show that combining a surname or geographic term with “HONEY FARM” yields a registrable mark. The Board was unmoved because applicant's mark is "readily distinguishable from those examples." In the first three, HONEY FARM was disclaimed. The LOCKHART registration relied on Section 2(f) acquired distinctiveness. As to BEDILLION and WEEKS, the USPTO records were not in evidence and so it was uncertain whether these two were found to be common surnames. The GEORGIA mark was a word-and-design mark with the literal portion disclaimed.

The Board therefore concluded that the inclusion of the descriptive phrase HONEY FARM "does not detract from or change the primary surname significance of the entire mark HANSEN HONEY FARM."

We also are not convinced by Applicant’s argument that registering the proposed mark poses no risk of competitive harm or confusion because other competitors use distinct surnames alongside “honey farm.” The lack of potential confusion with third-party marks does not override the statutory bar under Trademark Act Section 2(e)(4) against registering a mark where the significance to the purchasing public remains primarily merely a surname.

And so, the Boad affirmed the refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: What do you think about this refusal? The Board noted that "a word which, by itself, is primarily merely a surname is no longer such when coupled with a distinctive design."

Wednesday, September 23, 2026

Precedential No. 8: Tribal Sovereign Immunity Inapplicable in Board Proceedings, Says TTAB

In a case of first impression, the TTAB ruled that the defense of tribal sovereign immunity is not available in Board proceedings. The Board therefore denied Respondent Sycuan Tribal Development Corporation's motion to dismiss a petition for cancellation (on the grounds of nonuse and naked licensing) of four registrations for certain word-and-design marks (one of which is shown immediately below) for cigarettes and other tobacco products. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. IP Services International Inc. and Sycuan Tribal Development Corporation, Cancellation No. 92063134, 2026 TTAB LEXIS 255 (TTAB 2026) [Precedential].

Respondent Sycuan's motion was originally styled a motion for summary judgment, but because the issue of tribal sovereign immunity is jurisdictional, the Board construed the motion as one seeking dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Although the time for filing an FRCP 12(b) motion had passed before Sycuan was added as a party (after the subject registrations were assigned to it), the Board considered the motion on the merits, noting that "the Board must dismiss a proceeding if it lacks subject matter jurisdiction." See FRCP 12(h)(3).

The Board began by considering the CAFC's ruling in St. Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., in which the court held that tribal sovereign immunity does not apply to inter partes review ("IPR") proceedings before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board ("PTAB"). The CAFC observed that immunity generally "does not apply where the federal government acting through an agency engages in an investigative action or pursues an adjudicatory agency action.”

The CAFC found that an IPR proceeding "is neither clearly a judicial proceeding instituted by a private party nor clearly an enforcement action brought by the federal government," but rather a ‘hybrid proceeding’ with ‘adjudicatory characteristics’ similar to court proceedings, but more like a specialized agency proceeding in other aspects.

Subsequently, the CAFC ruled in Regents of the Univ. of Minn. v. LSI Corp that state sovereign immunity does not apply in IPR proceedings. The Board later ruled that state sovereign immunity does not apply in opposition proceedings before the TTAB. Mountain Gateway Ord., Inc. v. Va. Cmty. Coll. Sys. What about tribal sovereign immunity at the Board?

The Board first observed that federally recognized tribes may apply for registration under the Trademark Act and are subject to the same provisions of the Act as any other applicant, including those "subjecting applications to opposition and registrations to cancellation proceedings." The Board saw no reason to depart from its reasoning in Mountain Gateway just because this case involved tribal rather than state sovereign immunity. Cf. U. Minn. v. LSI, 926 F.3d at 1341 (“We conclude that state and tribal sovereign immunity do not differ in a way that is material to the question of whether IPR proceedings are subject to state sovereign immunity.”).

In TTAB proceedings, a plaintiff may challenge only an applicant's right to obtain a registration or a registrant's right to maintain a registration. "Board proceedings do not involve the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the registrant, the assessment of liability for monetary damages, and the imposition of injunctive relief. * * * Consequently, '[t]raditional civil action-type remedies are unavailable in opposition [or cancellation] proceedings.'"

The Board acknowledged that TTAB proceeding "share more characteristics with district court litigation than do IPR proceedings," including a broader range of discovery tools. However, although TTAB proceedings have "adjudicatory characteristics," they also operate "like a specialized agency proceeding" (noting various powers of the Director of the USPTO with respect to Board proceedings).

But the Board cannot exercise personal jurisdiction or impose monetary or injunctive remedies, and so "the tribe’s sovereignty over its tribal members and territories remains undiminished by the Board’s administrative inter partes proceedings. Such proceedings do not implicate the tribe’s 'ability to regulate within its own domain.'" 

Inter partes proceedings before the Board fulfill the trademark regulatory scheme (of which Sycuan availed itself when it acquired the involved registrations) by ensuring that only eligible marks are registered and maintained on the federal trademark register.

The Board observed that, if tribal sovereign immunity were recognized as a defense at the TTAB, "Nothing would prevent a tribe 'from lending its sovereign immunity to private parties, as the tribe attempted to do in St. Regis. Such manipulation would undo Congress’ central quality control mechanism in creating post-grant administrative proceedings.'"

If Respondents’ position were adopted, not only could Indian tribes shield their federal applications and registrations from challenge, but non-tribal entities could also use the doctrine to insulate invalid registrations from removal from the register by assigning them to a tribe or an arm of the tribe. The danger of such gamesmanship is plainly evidenced by Respondents’ conduct here, stretching so far as to attempt to blanket itself in immunity even prior to the assignment from IP Services to Sycuan.

In short, "Respondents’ attempt to invoke tribal immunity would contravene the very letter and purpose of the federal Trademark." And so, the Board denied the motion to dismiss.

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TTABlogger comment: This proceeding was commenced in 2016. The subject motion was filed in 2018. And it's still not over! In the face of the cited precedents, Respondent Sycuan was up the creek with not much of a paddle.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

Tuesday, September 22, 2026

TTABlog Test: Are Plastic Bags Related to Paper Labels Under Section 2(d)?

The USPTO refused to register the mark MAXXOUT for "General purpose plastic bags; Merchandise bags," deeming confusion likely with the registered mark MAXOUT! for "Multi-layer pressure sensitive paper labels." The marks are too close for comfort, but what about the goods? How do you think this came out? In re Sol NY Corp., Serial No. 98587411 (September 16, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Angela Lykos).

Applicant Sol NY feebly argued that the extra letter “X” and the exclamation point in the cited mark distinguish the marks in appearance and commercial impression. The Board was not convinced: "Both marks not only sound the same but also look virtually identical. Each mark is comprised of two words, beginning with the word “max” or its phonetic equivalent “maxx” and ending with the word “out.” This makes each mark the same in structure and cadence."

Overall, the marks are virtually identical in appearance and identical in sound, connotation and commercial impression. Consumers “have but dim recollections from having previously seen or heard one or the other of the involved marks.”

As to the goods, Sol maintained that they are unrelated because they serve different functions: mass-market bags "purchased by retail establishments and ultimately used by consumers for bought items," versus registrant’s "highly specialized labels with multiple layers or pages designed to provide more information than can fit on a standard single-layer label and often used to affix detailed regulatory or instructional information directly onto products or their packaging." The Board was unmoved: "applicant's general purpose bags are not limited to any particular use. Registrant's labels are "unrestricted as to industry or application meaning that while the labels themselves are specific in nature, they are not limited to any specialized or technical uses as Applicant contends."

Furthermore, the evidence showed that "it is not uncommon for third-parties to offer via their business-to-business websites 'general purpose plastic bags' or 'merchandise bags' on one hand, and pressure sensitive paper labels on the other."

Sol claimed that its goods are ordinarily sold through retail channels, including convenience stores, smoke shops, small retail outlets, and general-merchandise suppliers, and that the classes of consumers include retailers and wholesalers, with the general public serving as the ultimate end users. In contrast, the cited registration’s goods are “multi-layer pressure-sensitive paper labels" that are specialized industrial or commercial products rather than consumer goods. Irrelevant, said the Board.

Neither the registration nor the application contains any limitations on the channels of trade, or classes of purchasers. As such, Applicant’s and Registrant’s goods presumptively move in all normal trade channels and to all types of consumers that purchase such goods. * * * We must therefore assume that Registrant’s goods are available to ordinary consumers of such products at all price points. * * * While some of these consumers might be highly sophisticated and knowledgeable, others may not. * * * Basing our analysis “on the least sophisticated potential purchasers,” Stone Lion, 746 F.3d at 1325, this DuPont factor is neutral.
https://www.blogger.com/comment/fullpage/post/9072179/6629202388663149644

With no factors weighing against a likelihood of confusion, the Board concluded that confusion is likely, and so it affirmed the refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: Do you think that confusion is likely in the real world?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

Monday, September 21, 2026

TTABlog Test: Is CODEBOX Merely Descriptive of Electronic Lock Boxes?

The USPTO refused to register the word-plus-design mark shown immediately below, for "Lockboxes, namely, digital lockboxes; Digital deadbolts and digital door locks," absent a disclaimer of CODEBOX. Applicant argued that CODEBOX is not a common descriptive term in the industry, that the mark is unitary, that the commercial impression engendered by the mark is ambiguous, that the term CODEBOX is incongruous, and that "some imagination, thought, or multistage reasoning [is required] . . . to associate the mark with Applicant’s goods." How do you think this appeal came out? In re CodeBox, Inc., Serial No. 98597114 (September 18, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Robert Lavache).

Examining Attorney Valerie Kaplan submitted internet evidence showing that the word CODE is often used to describe a feature and/or characteristic of the goods: using a code to open the lock box. Applicant's specimen show that the goods include instructions to "Enter [the] Code" to open the lockbox. As to the word "box," some of the same evidence used wording such as "combination key lock box," "combination lock box," "key box," and "lock box" to refer to lockable storage devices for holding keys and other items for accessing a property.

The Board agreed with the applicant that "the record does not establish widespread, or even significant, use of 'CODEBOX' or 'CODE BOX,' in connection with digital lockboxes or any of the other identified goods." However, the fact that applicant may be the first or only user of a proposed mark does not prove that the mark is not descriptive.

[T]he evidence shows that CODE and BOX are commonly used to describe significant features or aspects of lockboxes. Simply combining CODE and BOX, and omitting the space between them, does not change the meaning of these terms or the overall impression they create.

Applicant asserted that CODEBOX is ambiguous and incongruous, but failed to identify "what the relevant incongruity is or explain[] the multistage reasoning that would be required to determine the significance of the term in connection with Applicant’s goods." The Board had "no doubt that 'someone who knows what the goods . . . are will understand the mark to convey information about them.'"

Having found that the term CODEBOX is merely descriptive of the goods, the Board considered applicant's argument that the proposed word-plus-design mark is "unitary," and therefore does not require disclaimer of the literal portion. According to applicant, "the coloring [in the mark] unifies the design by visually connecting the dark blue ‘E’ in the first syllable with the dark blue rectangular background surrounding the second syllable, ‘BOX,’ creating the overall impression of a lockbox with an open shackle." The Board was unmoved:

[W]e agree with the Examining Attorney that nothing about the meaning of the words or their relation to the other elements in the mark renders these elements so merged together, either physically or conceptually, that they would be perceived as inseparable. Nor does the mark otherwise present any obvious incongruity between the literal portion and design portion of the mark that would render the mark unitary.

And so, the Board upheld the disclaimer requirement.

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TTABlogger comment: Is this a WYHA?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.