TTAB Sustains Nike's Opposition to BLUE RIBBON TEAM for Sports Stores Due to Lack of Bona Fide Intent

Finding that the applicant lacked the requisite bona fide intent at the time it filed the subject Section 1(b) application, the Board sustained Nike's opposition to registration of the mark BLUE RIBBON TEAM & Design for "[o]n-line retail store services” featuring dozens of categories of goods, including sporting equipment and accessories. The Board declined to reach Nike's likelihood of confusion claim based on alleged common law rights in the mark BLUE RIBBON SPORTS for retail store services offering sporting goods and equipment. Nike, Inc. v. Blue Ribbon Team, Opposition No. 91269520 (May 29, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande).

Opposer Nike had the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that applicant lacked a bona fide intention to use the mark in commerce on the goods identified in the involved application when the application was filed. "Because this sort of claim requires a plaintiff to prove a negative, we permit an opposer to make out a facie case by showing the absence of any documentary evidence regarding Applicant’s intent to use the mark." If Opposer satisfies its initial burden, applicant must bring forth rebuttal evidence showing its bona fide intent.

Nike pointed to applicant’s lack of documentary evidence and to the discovery deposition testimony of applicant, and specifically to applicant's failure to produce any documents or things responsive to Nike's FRCP 34 productions requests, including business plans, sales and advertising figures, and store locations. See, e.g., Honda Motor Co. v. Winkelmann, No. 91170552, 2009 WL 962810, at *2 (TTAB 2009) (“The Board has held … that the absence of any documentary evidence regarding an applicant’s bona fide intention to use a mark in commerce is sufficient to prove that an applicant lacks such intention . . . .").

Nike also relied on the deposition testimony of applicant's' founder about his plans to “implement[ ] his business in three, sequenced phases: establishment of the business entity, clearance of the trademarks at the national level, and institution of use of those trademarks in publicly launching the business." Nike noted that not only did applicant have no documents reflecting that it had ever taken any such steps, but also that Applicant had done nothing to accomplish, or even plan, any of those steps. Moreover, all of the prior business experience of applicant's founder was unrelated to the online retail services identified in the application.

Applicant’s failure to produce any documentation concerning the proposed online retail store venture, its admitted failure to take any steps to set up the business, and Mr. Kraus’s nearly-total lack of experience in that field establishes a prima facie case—at minimum—that Applicant lacked a bona fide intent to use its mark in commerce at the time it filed its application.

Applicant's only argument regarding the bona fide intent issue appeared to be that he was waiting to take any steps toward setting up its business, or even develop a written plan, until after this opposition proceeding was over. The Board, however, saw this as an attempt “to reserve a right in the mark” first, see M.Z. Berger, 787 F.3d at 1376, and then plan its business. As Opposer aptly puts it, this is 'the sort of cart-before-the-horse approach to trademark registration that Section 1(b) forbids.'"

Thus, applicant failed to rebut Nike's prima facie case, and so the Board sustained the opposition.

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TTABlogger comment: This opposition lasted five years from start to finish. BTW: According to Wikipedia, Nike was first known as "Blue Ribbon Sports."

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: How Did These Three Section 2(d) Appeals Turn Out?

So far this year, the frequencey of TTAB affirmances of Section 2(d) refusals has dropped to the 84% range. Here are decisions in three recent appeals. How do you think they came out? [Answer in first comment].

In re Dillon M. Fink, Serial No. 98418182 (May 27, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark A. Thurmon) [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark WHIRL PONG for "Equipment sold as a unit for playing drinking games featuring a rotating turntable that holds cups" [PONG disclaimed] in view of the registered mark WHIRLBALL for "portable action skill games; portable target games; the aforementioned goods specifically excluding amusement park equipment."]

In re Octavio J. Ramirez Bartolomei, Serial No. 98798291 (May 27, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Martha B. Allard). [Section 2(d) refusal of HAPPY MAMITA for "Shirts; Tee shirts" in view of the registered mark MAMITA for "Clothing, namely, T-shirts, jackets, pants, sweaters for children."]

In re Naturel Goods LLC, Serial No. 98702670 (May 28, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Jennifer L. Elgin). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark B NATUREL and design, shown below left, for "Body and beauty care cosmetics; Hair care creams; Hair care lotions; Hair care preparations; Beauty creams for body care; Cosmetic preparations for body care; Cosmetics sold as an integral component of non-medicated skincare preparations" [NATUREL disclaimed] in view of the registered mark B NATURAL and design, shown below right, for "Non-medicated cosmetics and toiletry preparations; perfumery, essential oils; cleaning and abrasive preparations for human skin" [NATURAL disclaimed].

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TTABlogger comment: How did you do? See any WYHA?s ? 

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Denies Petition to Disqualify Attorney Who Submitted Testimony Declaration

The Board, acting under authority delegated by the Director of the USPTO, denied a petition seeking disqualification of cancellation petitioner Cove Surf's attorney, Mr. Omid E. Khalifeh, who submitted a testimony declaration in this proceeding, ruling that Mr. Khalifeh was not a necessary witness. The testimony declaration supported certain exhibits accompanying Cove Surf's notice of reliance. Cove Surf Company Inc. v. Columbia Insurance Company, Cancellation No. 92085620 (May 27, 2026) [not precedential] (Decision by Cheryl Butler, Appointed TTAB Petitions Attorney).

Cove Surf alleged abandonment and fraud vis-a-vis Respondent's registration for the mark COVE SHOE COMPANY for "footwear." Cove Surf maintained that "the footwear allegedly sold under the 'COVE' mark was not genuinely offered to or purchased by third-party retailers, and that the [Respondent's] alleged purchase orders may reflect internal transactions or fictitious sales."

Cove Surf's notice of reliance included as exhibits copies of the purchase orders in question (from "The Shoe Factory"), a picture of a boot (shown above), and copies of email exchanges between Mr. Khalifeh and the email address shoefactoryoutlet@hhbrown.com. The Exhibits were introduced by the declaration of Mr. Khalifeh.

Mr. Khalifeh recites that 1) he called the Shoe Factory Outlet to confirm the purchases identified in the purchase orders produced by Respondent; 2) he spoke with “Dan” who informed him that the store did not carry footwear under the COVE brand and referred Mr. Khalifeh to “Denise, who has been with the company for over 30 years.”; 3) that subsequently he spoke with Denise who also informed him that COVE branded shoes were not available at the store; 4) that he inquired about a photo of a COVE branded boot and was asked to send the image by email, and did so; 4) that Denise indicated she could not recall the store selling such boot or any footwear under the COVE brand; 6) and that Dan explained the store was locally referred to as COVE but “the store carries only H & H, Caroline, Cochran, and Matterhorn branded footwear, and not any product bearing the COVE mark.”

The Board observed that disqualification of counsel "is a drastic measure which courts should hesitate to impose except when absolutely necessary." “[S]uch motions should be viewed with extreme caution for they can be misused as techniques of harassment.” 

Section 11.307(a) of THE USPTO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, 37 C.F.R. § 11.307(a), states:

A practitioner shall not act as advocate at a proceeding before a tribunal in which the practitioner is likely to be a necessary witness unless: (1) The testimony relates to an uncontested issue; (2) The testimony relates to the nature and value of legal services rendered in the case; or (3) Disqualification of the practitioner would work substantial hardship on the client. [Emphasis supplied].

Respondent Columbia Insurance contended that because the declaration included Mr. Khalifeh’s opinion as to the authenticity and credibility of Columbia’s evidence by suggesting that the produced purchase orders appear “facially irregular,” Mr. Khalifeh has made himself a necessary witness and must be disqualified from representing Cove Surf. 

Cove Surf maintained that the evidence submitted with the declaration was offered to highlight the absence of corroboration, internal inconsistencies and lack of ordinary indicia of Columbia's documents. Furthermore, it argued, the information contained in the declaration is obtainable from other sources: from Respondent Columbia itself and from the customer identified in the purchase orders.

In determining whether or not disqualification is required, the first consideration is whether the attorney is a necessary witness, and the second is, if necessary, does that attorney meet a listed exception. An attorney will be considered a necessary witness where no other person is available to testify in his place. * * * Without a showing by the petitioning party that the attorney has information only he may attest to, that person will not be deemed a necessary witness.

The Board found that Mr. Khalifeh was not a necessary witness:

Clearly there are other persons available to testify on the potential matters brought up by NOR 5. The Shoe Factory Outlet is available to address its relationship with Respondent and products purchased. More specifically to NOR 5, the Shoe Factory Outlet’s employees are available to address the inquiry made, the information they purported provided, the request for a photo that originated from one of the employees, and contents of the telephone and email exchanges. Respondent is the primary source to address its relationship with the Shoe Factory Outlet, including the sales made and the products sold.

And so, the Board denied the petition for disqualification

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TTABlogger comment: Does Columbia Insurance Company sell footwear? Anyway, it got the boot.

In 2015, the Board denied a petition to disqualify an opposer's counsel who had signed and verified certain prosecution and maintenance documents because he was not the sole source for information regarding those documents and therefore was not a "necessary witness." [TTABlogged here].

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: How Did These Three Mere Descriptiveness Appeals Turn Out?

So far this calendar year, the Board has affirmed all 12 mere descriptiveness/disclaimer refusals that it has reviewed on appeal. Here are three recent appeals, decided on the same day. How do you think they came out? [Answer in first comment].

In re Brainlab SE, Serial No. 98004456 (May 26, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Martha B. Allard). [Requirement to disclaim the merely descriptive term DYNAMIC SURFACE in the mark EXACTRAC DYNAMIC SURFACE for, inter alia, "computer hardware and recorded software for image guided patient positioning and monitoring, particularly based on optical and thermal imaging modalities" and for "image-processing and image-presenting instruments and apparatus for medical and surgical purposes and for image guided patient positioning and monitoring, particularly based on optical and thermal imaging modalities for use in radiotherapeutic procedures." [SURFACE disclaimed]. Applicant argued that the term DYNAMIC must be considered on its own and that, on its own, it is a suggestive term.]

In re P&P Imports LLC, Serial No. 98559658 (May 26, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas W. Wellington). [Mere descriptiveness refusal of WOVN for "recreational furniture." Applicant argued that its specimen of use shows that its chairs do not match any of the definitions provided by the Examining Attorney: "the back and seat are not textiles formed by weaving, or interlaced threads, or made of yarn, and do not stretch diagonally, as required by the Wikipedia reference, nor do they constitute a woven fabric."]

Applicant's specimen of use

In re Fast Slow Motion, LLC, Serial No. 98631466 (May 26, 2026) (Opinion by Judge Thomas W. Wellington) [Mere descriptiveness refusal of SCALABLE BUSINESS FRAMEWORK (in standard form) for "Computer software consulting; Consultation services relating to computer software; Consulting services for others in the field of design, planning, and implementation project management of computer software; Consulting services in the design and implementation of computer-based information systems for businesses; Consulting services in the field of software as a service (SAAS); Consulting in the field of IT project management" [FRAMEWORK disclaimed].  Applicant argued that consumers must make "mental leaps" before understanding the descriptive significance of Applicant’s mark.]

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TTABlogger comment: How did you do? See any WYHA?s ?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Is PRO-GO for Bendable Lotion Containers Confusable with HANDY PRO-GO for Plastic Pails?

The USPTO refused to register the mark PRO-GO for "lotion containers sold empty for domestic use, namely bendable tubing for personal transport of such lotions," concluding that confusion is likely with the registered mark HANDY PRO-GO for "portable plastic containers, namely, pails." Applicant Sun Tube argued that the goods are different and the cited mark is dominated by the word HANDY. How do you think this came out? In re Sun Tube, LLC, Serial No. 97365902 (May 22, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Elizabeth K. Brock).

The Goods: Of course, even if the goods are not identical, they can be related under Section 2(d). The examining attorney submitted excerpts from nine websites, contending that each showed the involved goods being sold under a single mark. The Board reviewed each website and found that the first three did not show bendable tubing for personal transport of lotions, and another one was a foreign website that had no probative value. Only four were probative.

In sum, we find that four websites . . . show that the broader category of lotion containers may be sold under the same website house mark as plastic pails, but also sometimes not, and of these four websites that offer both types of goods, only the latter three include tube containers that might be considered “bendable” like Applicant’s. Given the potential differences in the lotion container products and Applicant’s own identification (and the lack of evidence that such differences are not consequential), as well as the limited number of entities offering both types of goods, we are not persuaded that the goods are sufficiently related such that confusion is likely.

The s:The Board found the marks to be "similar in appearance and sound, to an extent, and the entirety of Applicant’s PRO-GO mark is identical to the PRO-GO component of Registrant’s mark." However, it was "not convinced that HANDY PRO-GO and PRO-GO have similar meanings and create similar commercial impressions."

When viewed in connection with the goods in the Cited Registration, i.e., plastic pails, we agree with Applicant’s assessment that this might suggest professional painters’ buckets, however, some of these meanings may change. Here, PRO-GO for travel lotion containers certainly leans on the “go” aspect of travel and portability, but the other meanings of PRO do not carryover as well; travel lotion containers for personal use do not so clearly suggest a professional use in the same manner as a plastic pail.

The Board concluded that the marks create different commercial impressions. "Overall, we do not find the find the marks sufficiently similar, which weighs against a conclusion that confusion is likely."

With the first and second DuPont factors weighing in applicant's favor, the Board reversed the refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: How did you do?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

No Evidence of Priority, So TTAB Dismisses NEAU Coffee Opposition

In this train wreck of an opposition, the Board dismissed Opposer's Section 2(d) claim based on alleged likelihood of confusion between applicant's mark NEAU COFFEE and opposer's common law marks NEAUX and NEAUX COFFEE COMPANY, both for coffee. Opposer failed to introduce any evidence to show its entitlement to bring the opposition, but applicant's evidence established that Opposer is in the business of selling coffee under the pleaded marks "and is more than a mere interloper." Opposer then tripped over the requirement to prove priority. Neaux Coffee LLC v. NEAU Brands, Inc., Opposition No. 91284466 (May 21, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas. W. Wellington).

Under Section 7(c) of the Act, applicant may rely upon the filing date of its application (March 14, 2022) as a constructive use date for purposes of priority. "Put plainly, it was Opposer’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it acquired common law rights in its pleaded marks based on use of those marks prior to March 14, 2022."

Although opposer introduced no evidence, applicant submitted Internet materials regarding opposer’s use of its marks. The Board, however, found that those materials, sufficient to prove opposer's standing, were insufficient to prove opposer's priority.

We cannot rely on any purported dates within those materials inasmuch as they are merely screenshots from websites and, without supporting testimony, any statements made in these materials or the websites are hearsay and not reliable for their truth. “Internet evidence is only admissible for what it shows on its face, and because it does not fall within an exception to the hearsay rule, will not be considered to prove the truth of any matter stated therein. * * * Indeed, Opposer, objected to Applicant’s evidence on this very basis, namely, that statements made within the materials constitute hearsay

Because opposer failed to submitted evidence that it owns “a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark Office, or a mark or trade name previously used in the United States,” the Board dismissed its Section 2(d) claim.

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TTABlogger comment: By submitting the Internet evidence, did applicant make an admission against interest regarding the contents thereof? Will the opposer seek review by way of civil action under Section 1071, during which it can submit (additional) evidence?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Test: Are these two "NWA" Marks Confusable for Clothing?

The USPTO refused to register the mark shown below, for "Hats; Sweatshirts; T-shirts," on the ground of likelihood of confusion with the registered mark NWA for "Clothing, namely, shirts, t-shirts, sweatpants, sweatshirts, track suits, hooded sweatshirts, long sleeve shirts, tank tops, hats, beanies, baseball caps, bandanas." The goods overlap and the overlapping goods are presumed to travel in the same channels to the same classes of consumers. But what about the marks? How do you think this came out? In re Malibu Shirts, Inc., Serial No. 98696754 (May 21, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Robert Lavache).

The Examining Attorney argued that the involved marks share the same dominant element, NWA. Applicant Malibu Shirts maintained that NORTHWEST AIRLINES "dominates the overall visual impression of the mark" and "introduces a distinct visual structure and additional textual content that alters the viewer’s focus and perception of the mark as a whole." Moreover, the marks differ in pronunciation, connotation, and commercial impression. According to Malibu:

[T]he inclusion of the words ‘NORTHWEST AIRLINES’ . . .immediately directs consumers to interpret the mark as identifying or evoking an airline or aviation-related entity,” specifically “an airline operating in or associated with the northwestern region.” Thus, according to Applicant, “[c]onsumers encountering [Applicant’s] mark on apparel would likely view the goods as promotional or commemorative merchandise tied to an airline or aviation-themed brand, rather than as general fashion items.”

The Board agreed with Malibu that "there are significant differences between the respective marks in terms of sound, appearance, connotation, and overall commercial impression."

[T]o the extent that NWA does create a unique impression in the minds of consumers, that impression is likely to be that NWA is an abbreviation, or initialism, of NORTHWEST AIRLINES. Thus, we find that purchasers with a general rather than specific impression of Registrant’s mark are at least as likely to focus on and remember the words NORTHWEST AIRLINES and the wing-like design elements, as they are the initialism NWA alone, which merely abbreviates NORTHWEST AIRLINES.

The wing-like design elements in Malibu's mark reinforces the impression that the mark “identif[ies] or evok[es] an airline or aviation-related entity” and that the goods are thus “promotional or commemorative merchandise tied to an airline or aviation-themed brand.” There was no evidence that consumers would perceive the same connotation when viewing the cited mark.

The Examining Attorney pointed out that the cited mark, registered in standard characters, may be presented in any font style, size, or color, including the same font style, size, and color of the NWA portion of Applicant’s mark. The Board acknowledged that this general proposition is true, but "applying that proposition in this case is of little consequence."

Even if the cited NWA mark were displayed in the relatively nondescript block capital letter font style featured in Applicant’s mark, we are not convinced that it would lead to confusion, given that Applicant’s mark has other differentiating elements that create a distinct commercial impression and that are not encompassed by Registrant’s standard-character claim.

Finding that the first DuPont factor outweighs the second and third factors, the Board reversed the refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: Surprised?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: How Did These Three Section 2(d) Appeals Turn Out?

TTAB affirmances of Section 2(d) refusals continue to run at about 90% this year. Here are three recent decisions. How do you think they came out? [Answer in first comment].

In re Skylark Nails Supply, Serial No. 97612916 (May 6, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Wendy B. Cohen) [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark CRE8TION for "Acrylic nail powder and liquid preparations for shaping or sculpting nails; Adhesives for affixing false eyelashes; Artificial eyelashes; Nail hardeners; Nail tips" and for manicure and pedicure implements and eyelash curlers, in view of the registered mark CREATION (in standard characters) for perfumes, beauty products, tanning products, skin toners, lotions, and creams, and other class 3 products.]

In re Lucky Day Entertainment, Inc., Serial No. 98391360 (May 8, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande). [Section 2(d) refusal of LUCKY DAY for “Downloadable software in the nature of a mobile application for playing games of chance; Downloadable computer game programs" in view of the registered mark MY LUCKY DAY (in standard characters) for "Machines for playing games of chance."]

In re GSM Services, Inc., Serial Nos. 98318207 and 98318223 (May 20, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Mark A. Thurmon). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark GSM HEATING AND COOLING SINCE 1927, in standard form and in the word-and-design form shown below, for "Advisory services relating to the installation of heating and cooling apparatus; Air conditioning apparatus cleaning services; Air duct cleaning services; Home energy assessment services for the purpose of determining home improvements needed to improve energy use and efficiency; HVAC contractor services; HVAC duct cleaning services; Installation of heating and cooling apparatus; Installation of insulating materials; Installation of insulating materials in buildings and structures; Installation of building insulation; Repair or maintenance of power generators; Installation of HVAC systems; Maintenance and repair of electricity generators,” in view of the registered mark GSM ROOFING for "Roofing services."]

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TTABlogger comment: How did you do? See any WYHA?s ? 

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTAB Affirms Requirement to Disclaim DATA STREAMS for Database Management and Storage Services

The USPTO affirmed a refusal to register the mark CHAINLINK DATA STREAMS for “Database management services, namely, collecting secure data for use by decentralized computing networks” (International Class 35) and “Storing of secure electronic data for use by decentralized computing networks” (International Class 42), absent a disclaimer of the term DATA STREAMS. Applicant argued, inter alia, that the wording CHAINLINK DATA STREAMS, as a whole, is unitary, and so DATA STREAMS cannot be descriptive. The Board disagreed. In re SmartContract Chainlink Limited SEZC, Serial No. 98004679 (May 7, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark Lebow).

Examining Attorney David Tooley contended that “[t]he wording DATA STREAMS is a well-defined term in the computer industry referring to a manner of transmitting data across computer networks.” He submitted dictionary definitions and numerous examples showing the meaning of “data streaming” within the relevant industry. He concluded that the term DATA STREAMS is descriptive of applicant’s services because they all involved streaming of data among networked computers.

The Board agreed: "Here, DATA STREAMS is not a blended or coined unitary term. It’s a common, well-established phrase in the computer and data-processing industry that directly and immediately conveys the continuous transmission or flow of data – precisely the core feature of Applicant’s services."

Applicant maintained that DATA STREAMS has multiple meanings. The Board pointed out, however, that “[i]t is well settled that so long as any one of the meanings of a term is descriptive, the term may be considered to be merely descriptive.”

Applicant’s own promotional materials of record confirm that its CHAINLINK DATA STREAMS offering involves the reliable delivery and availability of data in distributed systems using active multi-site deployment models that ensure continuous operations.

Applicant also argued that its services involve “data at rest," while the Examining Attorney’s evidence relates primarily to real-time analytics, ingestion pipelines, and transmission, not to the identified storage and database management services. The Board was unmoved.

These services necessarily involve the collection of data from one or more sources and the provision of that data for use by a decentralized network of computers. In the context of computer networks – especially decentralized ones – collecting and making data available for network use inherently requires the transmission or flow of data across network nodes. One of the primary methods for transferring data among network nodes is via data streams, as the record abundantly demonstrates. Applicant’s own promotional materials of record confirm that its CHAINLINK DATA STREAMS offering involves the reliable delivery and availability of data in distributed systems using active multi-site deployment models that ensure continuous operations.

Applicant further contended that the combination of CHAINLINK (its alleged house mark) with DATA STREAMS creates an incongruity because “streams” “connotes ephemerality and flow, and Applicant’s identified services focus on durable, secure storage. The Board waved off that argument: "There is no incongruity in using a term that describes a key feature or function of the services simply because the services have multiple aspects. DATA STREAMS directly and immediately describes the transmission aspect inherent in collecting and making data available for use by decentralized computing networks." The mere addition of the house mark, CHAINLINK, does not create an incongruity.

Applicant’s own evidence confirms that its services employ multi-site deployment models to ensure continuous, reliable data availability across distributed origins. For the foregoing reasons, the term DATA STREAMS is merely descriptive of a feature of Applicant’s services.

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TTABlogger comment: WYHA?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

TTABlog Test: Is GRUPPO VAVA for Clothing Excluding Lingerie Confusable with VAVA for Lingerie?

The USPTO refused to register the mark GRUPPO VAVA for various clothing items, including hats, t-shirts, and sweatshirts (and excluding "lingerie, bras, underwear, or intimate apparel"), concluding that confusion is likely with the registered mark VAVA for "lingerie." Applicant ADG Vanguard conceded, in the face of third-party use and registration evidence, that the goods are related. It argued, however, that consumers will not perceive "VAVA" when applied to lingerie in the same way as when GRUPPO VAVA is applied to its clothing items. What do you think? Did ADG give the USPTO the slip? In re ADG Vanguard IP LLC, Serial No. 98516000 (May 18, 2026) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande).

The Board wasted little time in finding the marks confusable. Although ADG's mark begins with GRUPPO, and the first word of a mark can often make the biggest impact, here the impact of GRUPPO "is blunted because Applicant disclaimed GRUPPO—which is Italian for 'group'—because it has descriptive, rather than source-identifying, significance." Furthermore, the fact that applicant's mark incorporates the entire cited mark "can be significant in comparing the marks for likelihood-of-confusion purposes."

Applicant ADG argued that consumers will perceive the cited VAVA mark as comprising the first part of the known phrase “va-va-voom,” which connotes sexiness, an attribute naturally associated with lingerie. In contrast, consumers will not associate “va-va-voom” with ADG's mark because the word “GRUPPO” before the term “VAVA” will cause consumers to see “VAVA” not as part of “va-va-voom” but just a “vaguely Italian-sounding term.” Moreover, Applicant argued, its goods aren’t sexy.

The Board found these to be "interesting theories," but there was no evidence in support.

“Sexiness” is highly subjective, and we don’t think the “va-va-voom” connotation—if indeed that’s the connotation that “VAVA” without the “VOOM” imparts—can be so precisely limited only to lingerie. Although Applicant characterizes some of the clothing items in its identification of goods as “functional”—as opposed to “sexy”—items (e.g., business wear, running shoes, track suits), other types of clothing listed in the application (dresses, skirts, shirts, blouses, and shorts, for example) are made or worn in a wide variety of ways, including ways that are perceived as “sexy.”

Moreover, the Board noted, the dictionary definitions of “lingerie” in the record indicated that, "besides women’s intimate apparel, it also includes 'sleepwear,' which is not exclusively a 'sexy' category of goods, and—to use Applicant’s terms—includes 'functional' sleepwear."

In sum, the Board found the marks to be similar, the goods to be related, and the trade channels and classes of customers overlapping. No DuPont factors indicated that confusion is unlikely. "With the only relevant factors all indicating that confusion is likely and nothing to counterbalance them, there’s no real balancing to be done. On the record here, we conclude that confusion is likely."

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TTABlogger comment: The term VA-VA-VOOM, in my experience, is usually accompanied by a pair of eyeballs bulging out of a cartoon wolf's head.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.