Thursday, December 31, 2020

The Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 ("TMA") Provides Significant Benefits to Trademark Owners

Here is a Trademark Alert Published by Wolf Greenfield regarding the Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 ("TMA") and the upcoming trademark fee changes.



The Trademark Modernization Act of 2020 (“TMA”) — signed into law by President Trump on December 27, 2020 as part of the COVID-19 relief and government funding package — provides trademark owners with several significant benefits. The legislation makes it easier for a trademark owner to obtain injunctive relief against an infringer. Courts have required that, to obtain an injunction against an infringer, the trademark owner must prove that it will be “irreparably harmed” if the infringer is not enjoined from further use of the infringing mark. The TMA provides that a trademark owner who proves infringement will enjoy a legal presumption that the harm caused by continued infringement will be irreparable, thereby increasing the owner’s likelihood of obtaining injunctive relief. 

Due to rising concern regarding the proliferation of applications and registrations (particularly emanating from China) for trademarks that are not actually in use in United States commerce, the TMA also calls for the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) to implement new procedures that will allow third parties to more readily challenge pending applications and issued registrations that may be spurious. Under current practice, challenges to pending applications are limited in scope, and challenges to registrations require costly cancellation proceedings. The TMA calls for a broadening of the scope of evidence that a third-party may submit for consideration during examination of a pending application (including evidence of non-use), and a streamlined procedure for challenging issued registrations. These changes will help clear the way for legitimate trademark users to obtain registration of their marks. 

Along the same lines, the TMA requires the Government Accountability Office to conduct a study regarding the problem of false and inaccurate claims of use in trademark applications and registrations, and to report to Congress recommendations based on the results of the study as to any changes to trademark law that will improve the accuracy of the Trademark Register or reduce inaccurate or false claims of use. 

In addition to the changes effected by the TMA, the USPTO will implement new and increased fees as of January 2, 2021, including the fee for filing a trademark application, for filing an appeal from a final refusal by the USPTO, and the fees for filing a notice of opposition or petition for cancellation. Fees for filing an appeal brief and for requesting oral argument in an opposition or cancellation proceeding are newly added. In keeping with the focus on clearing the Trademark Register of so-called “deadwood,” the USPTO will charge a fee to a registrant who seeks to maintain or renew a registration and then requests that goods or services be removed from the registration due to non-use.

Read comments and post your comment here.

Text Copyright Wolf Greenfield 2020.

TTAB Posts January 2021 (Video) Hearing Schedule

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Tee-Tee-Ā-Bee) has scheduled seven (VII) oral hearings for the month of January 2021. The hearings will be held via video. Briefs and other papers for each case may be found at TTABVUE via the links provided.



January 14, 2021 - 11 AM: In re Spohn Global Enterprises LLC , Serial No. 87826140 [Section 2(d) refusal of THERMO TIKI for "gas patio heaters" [THERMO disclaimed] in view of the registered mark TIKI for "wood burning firepits; landscape lighting fixtures; LED landscape lighting fixtures; LED lighting fixtures; lighting fixtures for decks and patios."]


January 19, 2021 - 11 AM: In re Spark Therapeutics, Inc., Serial No. 87614019 [Section 2(d) refusal of SPARK THERAPEUTICS GENERATION PATIENT SERVICES for, inter alia, providing information for patients, families and health care providers about health care insurance coverage and insurance reimbursement programs [THERAPEUTICS and PATIENT SERVICES disclaimed], in view of the registered mark SPARQ & Design for "Providing health information services, namely, providing information relating to medical healthcare plans.]


January 19, 2021 - 12 PM:
In re Golden Bison Consolidated, LLC , Serial No. 87980485 [Refusal to register CERTIFIED BISON on the Supplemental Register  for "bison meat; prepackaged meals consisting primarily of bison meat and vegetables, all of the aforementioned bison meat being certified" [BISON disclaimed] on the ground of genericness.]


January 21, 2021 - 2 PM: In re Tinazzi S.r.l. , Serial No. 88305868 [Section 2(d) refusal of N 3 VINUM ITALICUM OPERA & Design for wine [VINUM disclaimed] in view of the registered marks NO. 3 (stylized) and NO. 3 (standard characters) for whisky, spirits, and liqueurs, and OPERA (standard characters) for wines and sparkling wine.]

January 26, 2021 - 1 PM: Kudos, Inc. v. Kudo, Inc. dba Kudo Technologies, Opposition No. 91240097 [Opposition to registration of KUDO for downloadable software and SAAS for enabling online conferencing in multiple languages, on the ground of likelihood of confusion with the registered mark KUDOS for, inter alia, Internet-based social networking services, and on the ground of nonuse as of the filing date of the underlying application for the class 9 goods.]


January 27, 2021 - 1 PM:
The Marshall Tucker Band, Inc. v. MT Industries, Inc., Cancellation No. 92065794 [Petition for cancellation of registrations for MARSHALL TUCKER BAND and the stylized version shown below, for audio and video recordings, on the ground that the registrations are void ab initio because registrant was not the owner of the marks at the time of filing the underlying applications, and on the ground of fraud in filing said applications.]


January 28, 2021 - 11 AM: In re Kojima Productions Co., Ltd., Serial No. 79210110 [Section 2(d) refusal of KOJIMA PRODUCTIONS & Design for "Computer game software; computer games programmes; computer games cartridge; computer game programs for home video game machines [PRODUCTIONS disclaimed] in view of the registered mark KOJIMA PRODUCTIONS & Design for computer game software [PRODUCTIONS disclaimed.]



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here.

TTABlog comment: Any predictions? See any WYHA?s ?
Text Copyright John L. Welch 2020.

Wednesday, December 30, 2020

TTABlog Test: How Did These Three Appeals from 2(e)(1) Mere Descriptiveness Refusals Turn Out?

The TTAB recently decided the appeals from three Section 2(e)(1) mere descriptiveness refusals summarized below. Let's see how you do with them, keeping in mind that last year the Board affirmed, by my calculation, about 93% of these refusals. Answer(s) will be found in the first comment.

   

In re Larsen Medical, LLC, Application Serial No. 87892535 (December 28, 2020) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Linda A. Kuczma). [Mere descriptiveness refusal of THE CARDIO GROUP (standard characters) for "Retail store services featuring medical devices" and "Medical training and teaching; Providing a web site featuring non-downloadable instructional videos in the field of plethysmography." Applicant argued that the proposed mark does not retain the meaning of each of the words that comprise the mark, and further that, there is no definition of “the cardio group” on www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary, “consumers could have latitude to interpret its meaning."]


In re Srastr Inc.
, Application Serial No. 88185284 (December 29, 2020) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Cindy B. Greenbaum). [Mere descriptiveness refusal of TECHGEAR for downloadable mobile application software for use to connect and control IoT (Internet of Things) electronic devices in Class 9; retail services featuring technology products, namely, IoT-enabled devices and accessories in Class 35; education, entertainment and training services, namely, organizing and conducting computer game competitions and classes, seminars and workshops in the fields of teaching people how to use IoT enabled devices in Class 41; and software as a service (SAAS) services featuring computer software to connect and control IoT electronic devices in Class 42. Applicant maintained that the proposed mark is merely suggestive because there are multiple definitions of the word “gear” and the word TECHGEAR could refer to other types of products, and it also claimed to be the first user of the designation TECHGEAR specifically to refer to the identified IoT goods and services.]


In re Todd Reed Arbutina
, Serial No. 88219477 (December 29, 2020) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Melanye K. Johnson). [Mere descriptiveness refusal of DIGITAL ASSET COOPERATIVE (CO-OP) for "cooperative advertising and marketing services for advertising members’ shared digital assets in virtual e-commerce marketplaces in exchange for subscriber revenues and any other direct or in-direct forms of payment." Applicant contended that the examining attorney failed to supply any evidence that proposed mark is used in connection with “a platform in which a client’s digital assets can be collectively maintained and managed by owner of said mark.”]


Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: How did you do? See any WYHAs here?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2020.

Tuesday, December 29, 2020

New Trademark and TTAB Fee Schedule Effective January 2, 2021

While we focus on the Trademark Modernizaton Act of 2020, signed into law by President Trump on December 27th, let's not forget that a new fee schedule for trademark matters takes effect on January 2, 2020. Set out in the table below are some of the more important fee changes, including several new fees. The USPTO's summary of the fee changes may be found here.


 

Current Fee

New Fee as of 1/2/21

Application/Prosecution

 

 

TEAS Standard application (per class)

$275

$350

TEAS Plus application (per class)

$225

$250

Post Registration

 

 

Section 8 or 71 Declaration of Use (per class)

$125

$225

Deletion of goods and/or services from a registration after submitting a Section 8 or 71 declaration but before the declaration is accepted

No fee

$250

Petition/Letter of Protest

 

 

Petition to the Director

$100

$250

Petition to revive an abandoned application

$100

$150

Letter of Protest

No fee

$50

Petition to revive an abandoned application

$100

$150

TTAB Fees

 

 

Notice of Opposition (per class)

$400

$600

Petition for Cancellation (per class)

$400

$600

Initial 90-day extension request for filing a notice of opposition, or second 60-day extension request (per application)

$100

$200

Final 60-day extension request for filing a notice of opposition (per application)

$200

$400

Ex parte appeal (per class)

$200

$225

Appeal Brief in ex parte appeal (per class)

No fee

$200

Request for Oral Hearing

No fee

$500

 

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Is the Board trying to discourage oral hearings?


Text Copyright John L. Welch 2020.

Monday, December 28, 2020

TTABlog Test: Is SPIDER WOOD Merely Descriptive of Natural Wood Sculptures for Aquariums and Terrariums?

The USPTO refused to register the proposed mark SPIDER WOOD (not to be confused with Tiger Woods or Natalie Wood) for "Decorative ornaments in the nature of natural sculptures of wood for use in terrariums, animal habitats, bird cages, floral arrangements, and interiorscape installations," finding it merely descriptive of the goods under Section 2(e)(1). Applicant Petglobe argued that the mark is suggestive, not descriptive, because "the product is a tangled mass of wood roots used in animal habitats” that “does not have any other clear connection to spiders.” Petglobe's owner claimed that he “developed” the mark and was the first to use it, and so "any other industry usage of the SPIDER WOOD trademark for the same goods is an infringement of [Applicant’s] established unregistered trademark rights in this trademark". How do you think this appeal came out? In re Petglobe USA Inc., Serial No. 88640998 (December 15, 2020) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Marc A. Bergsman).

Examining Attorney Allison Holtz maintained that SPIDER WOOD is a type of tangled, decorative wood. She submitted numerous website excerpts referring to and offering for sale "spider wood" for terrariums and aquariums: for example: "Perfect for Aquariums and Terrariums - Spider-like limbs, great for climbing lizards and snake[s]." The Board concluded that "[t]he evidence shows that SPIDER WOOD is a type of driftwood used in aquariums to create a natural setting."

Petglobe's argument that “the addition of the word SPIDER’ before ‘WOOD’ makes the composite term ‘SPIDER WOOD’ a suggestive mark” was belied by the evidence. "Owners of terrariums, animal habitats, and birdcages in the market for 'decorative ornaments in the nature of natural sculptures of wood' who encounter the term SPIDER WOOD will immediately know that it is a type of driftwood without having to resort to a multi-step reasoning process, thought, or cogitation."


Likewise, Petglobe's assertion that it was first to use the mark was off target. "The fact that an applicant may be the first user of a merely descriptive designation does not justify registration if the only significance conveyed by the term is merely descriptive."

The Board therefore affirmed the refusal to register.


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TTABlogger comment: How did you do? Is this a WYHA? BTW, should "aquariums" be "aquaria"?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2020.

Wednesday, December 23, 2020

TTABlog Test: Is LOTSA STONE FIRED PIZZA for Restaurant Services Confusable with LOTZZA MOTZZA and LOTZZA HOTZZA for Pizza?

Bernatello's Pizza opposed an application to register the mark LOTSA STONE FIRED PIZZA for restaurant services (STONE FIRED PIZZA disclaimed), alleging a likelihood of confusion with the registered marks LOTZZA MOTZZA for frozen pizza (and LOTZZA HOTZZA for pizza). The Board found the involved goods and services to be related, concluding that the "something more" test of Jacobs v. International Multifoods Corp. was met because "Opposer’s goods, pizza, are the same type of food offered at Applicant’s restaurants, as announced by Applicant’s involved mark LOTSA STONE FIRED PIZZA." But what about the marks? How do you think this came out? Bernatello’s Pizza, Inc. v. Colmont Restaurant Group, LLC, Opposition No. 91241107 (December 16, 2020) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Michael B. Adlin).


The Board focused on the LOTZZA MOTTZA mark. Based on a dictionary definition and applicant's own testimony, the Board found that "LOTSA strongly suggests that Opposer’s frozen pizza features 'lots of' Wisconsin mozzarella cheese." Third-party use corroboratde the highly suggestive nature of LOTZZA. Moreover, the obvious meaning of MOTZZA is reinforced by Opposer’s see-through packaging, "which draws attention to how much mozzarella Opposer puts on its pizza:"


Opposer submitted evidence of commercial success: sales of about $305 million and promotional expenditures of some $9 million. However, there was no direct evidence that consumers recognize the mark or that the mark has received media attention. 

The Board agreed with Opposer that LOTSA is the dominant portion of applicant's mark. However, considering the involved marks as a whole, they obviously differ in appearance and sound. The meanings are somewhat similar.
 

Ultimately, we find that even though the marks convey somewhat similar meanings, and begin with terms which sound the same and look somewhat similar, they are not likely to result in consumer confusion due to the conceptual weakness of Opposer’s mark and the shared term LOTSA/LOTZZA. *** In fact, consumers will perceive the marks’ first terms as merely laudatory, strongly suggesting that Opposer provides lots of mozzarella with its pizza and that Applicant’s restaurants serve lots of pizza. Some consumers are also aware that LOTSA and variations thereof is used by unrelated food providers, perhaps especially those which offer Italian food, including pizza.


The Board found the first du Pont factor dispositive, concluding that even if the involved goods and services were identical and the channels of trade and classes of consumers overlapping, confusion is unlikely, despite the goods and services being subject to impulse purchase. In short, "Opposer should not be able to prevent others from registering marks which share with Opposer’s mark only the term LOTSA or variations thereof, even for pizza."

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TTABlogger comment: How did you do? Do you see an appeal in the offing?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2020.

Tuesday, December 22, 2020

Recommended Reading: The Trademark Reporter Issue of November-December 2020

A holiday present for all of us: the November–December 2020 (Vol. 110 No. 6) issue of The Trademark Reporter (TMR). Kudos to Editor-in-Chief Willard Knox for this impressive collection. Willard provided the summary of each article that is presented below.


In this issue we offer readers an informative and entertaining article investigating the quirks of the Lanham Act’s Section 2(a) and its right-of-publicity-style ground for refusal of registration based on false suggestion of a connection; an article providing an in-depth exploration of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc.; a book review of an overview of the likelihood of confusion analysis under European Union law; and a book review of a resource targeted to C-suite executives on the importance of integrating intellectual property into the company’s strategy. 

Giving the Wrong Impression: Section 2(a)’s False Suggestion of a Connection, by Anne Gilson LaLonde. This article investigates the quirks of the Lanham Act’s Section 2(a), which provides a right-of-publicity-style ground of refusal of registration to celebrities, universities with nicknames, and international companies seeking protection of their well-known marks in the United States (where those companies are not using such marks)—and without a showing of trademark rights, use in commerce, or likelihood of confusion. 

Awarding Some Profits Against Unintentional Infringers, by Tony Bortolin. This article explores the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 140 S. Ct. 1492 (2020), in which the Court unanimously ruled that willfulness is not a precondition to a court’s ability to award an infringer’s profits. The article agrees that the courts have this authority (except as may be modified by statute), but also provides a reminder of the sometimes-forgotten option of exercising that authority by awarding a percentage of those profits (rather than simply awarding all or none) taking that lack of intention into consideration as one of the factors. 

Book Review: The Confusion Test in European Trade Mark Law, by Ilanah Fhima and Dev S. Gangjee. Reviewed by Désirée Fields The review of this book by rising scholars Ilanah Fhima and Dev S. Gangjee finds it provides a clear and comprehensive overview of the likelihood of confusion analysis under European Union law, touching on all aspects and nuances of the law without delving into too much detail. 

Book Review: The Great Catapult: How Integrated IP Management Will Shoot Your Brand to Success, by Zeeger Vink with James Nurton. Reviewed by Stuart Green. The review of this book by well-known practitioner Zeeger Vink (with case studies by James Nurton) finds it destined for a place on the bookshelf of all forward-looking executives and all those practitioners who take seriously their responsibility to provide clients with easily understandable, holistic advice.


Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: Once again, I thank The Trademark Reporter for allowing me to make this issue available to my dear (and not-so-dear) readers. This issue of the TMR is Copyright © 2020, the International Trademark Association and is made available with the permission of The Trademark Reporter®.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2020.

Monday, December 21, 2020

TTABlog Test: Is WHALE FOUNDATION Generic For Marine Wildlife Conservation Services?

Whales may be rare, but even rarer is a USPTO quadrifusal! The Office refused to register four marks comprising or containing the term PACIFIC WHALE FOUNDATION for promotional, educational, fundraising, and research services in the field of marine wildlife conservation [FOUNDATION disclaimed] on the ground that Applicant failed to comply with a requirement that it disclaim WHALE FOUNDATION. The Examining Attorney, citing dictionary definitions and third-party registrations, maintained that WHALE FOUNDATION is the generic name of a specific sub-category of Applicant's services. Applicant cited other third-party registrations (e.g., AMERICAN HORSE FOUNDATION) in which no similar disclaimer is found. How do you think this came out? In re Pacific Whale Foundation, Serial Nos. 87891322, 87891333, 87891351, and 87891363 (December 18, 2020)[not precedential] (Opinion by Judge George C. Pologeorgis).

The Board found the genus of services at issue to be "the promotion of ocean and marine wildlife conservation and the scientific research and consultation, educational, and charitable fundraising services associated therewith." The Examining Attorney argued for a narrower genus; the Board noted that a term or phrase may be generic if it refer to a subcategory or key aspect of the services. The relevant public consists of ordinary consumers who are interested in ocean and marine wildlife conservation.

To established genericness, the USPTO must make a "substantial showing" based on "clear evidence." The Examining Attorney submitted dictionary definitions of "whale" and "foundation," third party registration that include a disclaimer of "foundation" preceded by a qualifying term, Internet excerpts using the term "whale foundation," and Applicant's own website where Applicant "consistently uses the term WHALE to identify a central feature and key aspect of its identified services." 

Applicant argued that there was no evidence of its use of the entire phrase WHALE FOUNDATION in a generic manner. It submitted third-party registrations in which only FOUNDATION was disclaimed, not together with the qualifying term. And, finally, it asserted that the Office's evidence was "woefully inadequate."


The Board found that the eleven website excerpts and blog posts submitted by the Examining Attorney "showing limited generic use of the designation 'whale foundation' are insufficient to demonstrate that the designation is the generic name of Applicant’s identified services." The Board also noted that Applicant does not use the term WHALE FOUNDATION generically. And the third-party registrations submitted by Applicant lessen the probative impact of the Office's citations.

Quite simply, based on this record, we find that the Examining Attorney has not met his difficult burden of making the substantial or strong showing required to establish by clear evidence that the designation WHALE FOUNDATION is generic for Applicant’s identified services. At a minimum, we have doubts, on this limited record, as to whether relevant consumers would perceive the designation WHALE FOUNDATION as the generic name of Applicant’s identified services, and such doubts on the issue of genericness should be resolved in Applicant’s favor. In re DNI Holdings Ltd., 77 USPQ2d 1435, 1437 (TTAB 2005); In re Waverly Inc., 27 USPQ2d 1620, 1624 (TTAB 1993)


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TTABlogger comment: What do you think a survey would show? So does this applicant own some rights to the word "whale"?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2020.

Friday, December 18, 2020

CAFC Affirms TTAB: BREW SCIENCE Merely Descriptive of Videos About Beer, Beer Accessories, and the Beer Industry

[This guest post was written by Kira-Khanh McCarthy, a law clerk (soon-to-be associate) in the Trademark Group at Wolf, Greenfield & Sacks, P.C.] In a nonprecedential opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) affirmed the TTAB’s September 26, 2019 decision (here) finding Appellant’s mark BREW SCIENCE to be merely descriptive of “Entertainment services, namely, on-line non-downloadable videos, in the field of beer, beer accessories and the beer industry; provision of entertainment, namely, on-line non-downloadable videos concerning beer, beer accessories and the beer industry.” Applicant Christopher Coles challenged the Board’s findings, contending its decision lacked substantial support. The CAFC disagreed and held that the Board’s reliance on multiple dictionary definitions, numerous online sources, and even Appellant’s own website, all amounted to substantial evidence which supported the ultimate refusal to register. In re Christopher Coles, 2020 USPQ2d 483064 (Fed. Cir. 2020) [not precedential].
 

 
The Board’s determination that a mark is merely descriptive under Section 2(e)(1) of the Trademark Act is a factual finding which the CAFC reviews for substantial evidentiary support. “Substantial evidence ‘means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” In re Bayer AG, 488 F.3d 960, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 

Here, the CAFC ruled that substantial evidence supported the Board’s findings that “brew” is a slang term for beer and that “science” refers generally to “a systematic method or body of knowledge in a given area.” It noted that the Board cited multiple dictionary definitions for both terms. From these definitions the Board found that it was reasonable that consumers would understand Appellant’s mark as describing “a body of knowledge about beer or brewing beer.” The fact that Appellant’s own website, which characterized the videos as containing “sciencey type stuff” (such as experimenting with different beer combinations), constituted further evidence of this understanding. Appellant Coles argued that “brew” could also refer to brewing tea and that “science” was used in a “playful” manner to describe the videos. But, the CAFC remained unconvinced. 

The CAFC also ruled that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that the words “brew” and “science,” when combined, retain their descriptive significance, based on numerous online sources using the term “brew science.” Again, Appellant’s website did him no favors as it clearly described his videos as relating to the knowledge of beer. 

Coles asserted that the USPTO has previously registered several marks containing the term “science” for entertainment services. However, the CAFC concluded that this evidence was “at best, probative and does not overcome the substantial evidence cited by the Board” and that such list of third-party registrations “establishes nothing of relevance to this case, as there is no basis for [the court] to assume that the cited marks are themselves inherently distinctive.” 

In sum, given the extensive evidence cited by the TTAB, the CAFC held that the Board’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. And so, the Board’s decision upholding the examining attorney’s final refusal to register BREW SCIENCE was affirmed.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: I'd call this a double-WYHA?

Text Copyright Kira-Khanh McCarthy 2020.

Thursday, December 17, 2020

TTABlog Test: Does "HELP THE PERSECUTED" Fail to Function as a Mark for Charitable Fundraising Services?

The USPTO refused registration of the proposed mark HELP THE PERSECUTED (in standard character form), concluding that it fails to function as a source indicator for "charitable fundraising services." Examining Attorney Tara L. Bhupathi maintained that the phrase is an informational message commonly used in the marketplace and in applicant’s particular trade or industry. Applicant contended that, inter alia,  HELP THE PERSECUTED functions as a trademark similar to other "HELP THE…" marks (like HELP THE AFGHAN CHILDREN) that have been registered by the Office. How do you think this appeal turned out? In re Help the Persecuted, Inc., Serial No. 88323799 (December 15, 2020) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge George C. Pologeorgis). 


The Examining Attorney relied on numerous third-party website excerpts seeking donations to "help the persecuted." She also pointed to applicant’s specimen of use that showed the proposed mark used to promote fundraising services to “provide vital support and much-needed encouragement to persecuted Christians." Based on this evidence, the Examining Attorney argued that consumers are accustomed to seeing the phrase HELP THE PERSECUTED employed in connection with requests for charitable donations, and so, when used in connection with applicant's services, the phrase will not be perceived by consumers as pointing to one particular source.

Applicant pointed to the Examining Attorney's withdrawal of a mere descriptiveness refusal as proof that the mark is merely suggestive and therefore not informational. The Board, however, pointed out that "[c]ommon phrases and slogans need not be descriptive or generic to be found informational."

The list of third-party registrations submitted by applicant had little probative value. For one thing, the list of registrations did not indicate the goods or services involved. In any case, the Board "must apply the law to the facts in every case before us, irrespective of what happened to other marks which, due to their being registered, we do not have the opportunity to review."

Finally, the Board observed that, contrary to applicant's argument, the evidence "not only shows common use of HELP THE PERSECUTED by third parties, but also demonstrates that these third parties use the wording to convey information about the services provided, such as seeking donations to aid persecuted persons."

Quite simply, the record in this case demonstrates the ubiquity of the phrase HELP THE PERSECUTED in connection with charitable fundraising services. In addition, Applicant’s own specimen reinforces the nature of HELP THE PERSECUTED as an expression commonly used in the context of charitable fundraising to request monetary donations or other assistance. In particular, we note that the specimen’s use of “You can help” and the reference to providing support and encouragement to “persecuted Christians” emphasizes that HELP THE PERSECUTED is an informational message. We therefore find that consumers will not perceive the commonly-used expression or phrase HELP THE PERSECUTED as distinguishing Applicant’s charitable fundraising services in commerce and indicating their source.


And so the Board affirmed the refusal to register under Sections 1, 2, 3, and 45 of the Trademark Act.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: Noted trademark expert David Perlsack says that he hasn't seen so many failure-to-functions in such a short period of time since his honeymoon.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2020.

Wednesday, December 16, 2020

Precedential No. 45: TTAB Finds CITY OF LONDON Geographically Descriptive for Gin, Grants Motion to Amend to Supplemental Register

Applicant Hayman Group Limited squeaked by with a Supplemental Registration for CITY OF LONDON for gin [LONDON disclaimed], after surviving an opposition based on four grounds: Section 2(e)(1) mere descriptiveness, Section 2(e)(2) geographical descriptiveness, Section 2(e)(3) geographically deceptive misdescriptiveness, and failure-to-function as a trademark. The Board sustained the geographical descriptiveness claim, dismissed the other three, rejected Hayman Group's claim of acquired distinctiveness, but granted the Group's motion to amend its application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register. City of London Distillery, Ltd. v. Hayman Group Limited, 2020 USPQ2d 11487 (TTAB 2020) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Marc A. Bergsman). 

Section 2(e)(2) - Primarily Geographically Descriptive: The Board found that CITY OF LONDON is the name of a geographic place known generally to the American gin drinking and purchasing public, namely London, England. Although the “City of London” is technically a subdivision of London, American consumers are likely to perceive the mark CITY OF LONDON as referring generally to  London, England. Alternatively, if they perceive CITY OF LONDON as a sub-area within London, that necessarily means they perceive it as referring to London.

While Applicant’s gin does not originate in the technical City of London (i.e., within the boundaries of the financial district subdivision of London), it does originate in London. "Thus, Applicant is using the mark CITY OF LONDON to reflect its association with the geographic location known as the city of London. "

We find, therefore, that a goods-place association exists (the third element of a 2(e)(2) claim) because American gin purchasers and drinkers will believe that Applicant’s gin originates within or near the city limits of London and there is some association or connection between the gin and London.

The Board therefore sustained the Section 2(e)(2) claim.

Section 2(e)(3) - Primarily Geographically Deceptively Misdescriptive: The Board gave short shrift to the Section 2(e)(3) issue: "Because Applicant produces its gin in London and bottles it in nearby Essex, the mark CITY OF LONDON for gin does not present any material misrepresentation of fact. Accordingly, the opposition is dismissed as it pertains to Opposer’s Section 2(e)(3) claim."

Section 2(e)(1) - Merely Descriptive: Opposer contended that CITY OF LONDON is merely descriptive because it immediately conveys to purchasers that Applicant’s gin is a type of gin called "London dry." The Board, however, pointed out that the opposed mark, which includes CITY OF, is not the equivalent of or synonymous with LONDON DRY. In short, opposer's evidence did not establish that CITY OF LONDON immediately conveys any information concerning a feature, quality, or characteristic of the gin itself.

[T]he City of London is a historic district of London serving as London’s central business district known as a finance center. American consumers of gin will not view CITY OF LONDON as connoting a characteristic of the gin itself, but, as we have just held regarding the Trademark Act Section 2(e)(2) claim, as describing where it comes from. CITY OF LONDON does not directly convey to the American gin drinker or purchaser that Applicant’s product is a London dry gin or any other type of gin.

And so the Board dismissed the mere descriptiveness claim.

Failure-to-Function: Opposer argued that “the words ‘city of London’ are merely informational as they are highly geographically descriptive and/or highly descriptive of the style, purity, quality, ingredients and geographic origin of gin, such that CITY OF LONDON fails to function as a mark.”

Although opposer referred to the mark as "informational," the real issue was the allegedly highly descriptive nature of CITY OF LONDON as to gin. The CAFC identified the same issue in In re Boston Beer Co., 198 F.3d 1370, 53 USPQ2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1999), where it held that the purported mark THE BEST BEER IN AMERICA was so highly descriptive of the goods and so commonly used by others in connection with the goods “as to be incapable of acquiring distinctiveness as a trademark.”

The Board, however, did not "view the record here as showing that the phrase is so highly geographically descriptive and commonly used in connection with gin that it is incapable of being perceived, in the eyes of the gin-consuming public, as a source identifier." Therefore it dismissed the failure-to-function claim.

Motion to Amend: The Board then turned to Hayman Group's motion to amend its application, in the alternative, to seek registration under Section 2(f) of the Trademark, or on the Supplemental Register.

Trademark Rule 2.133 provides that an applicant may not amend in substance its application that is the subject of an opposition, except with the consent of the other party or parties and the approval of the Board, or except upon motion granted by the Board. Such a motion should be made before trial in order to give fair notice to the other party or parties. Hayman Group filed its motion to amend after the close of discovery but before opposer’s pretrial disclosures were due, and therefore it was timely.

Opposer insisted that, because it did not have the opportunity to conduct discovery on this issue, it should be allowed to take discovery as to whether the opposed mark has acquired distinctiveness. The Board observed that the motion to amend would add issues that are in the nature of affirmative defenses. Although Hayman Group did not plead its Section 2(f) claim or its alternative amendment to the Supplemental Register in its Amended Answer, "it was not categorically precluded from raising either basis for registration later by way of motion to amend the application. See, e.g., Embarcadero Tech. Inc. v. RStudio Inc., 105 USPQ2d at 1828-29." Rule 2.133 permits a party to file a motion to amend its application "so long as the motion gives Opposer sufficient notice to prepare for trial."

Finally, opposer’s claim that the mark CITY OF LONDON for gin fails to function as a mark "presupposes that it is incapable of functioning as a mark and, therefore, is not registrable on the Supplemental Register. Therefore, we find that Opposer has not shown that it needs additional discovery on this claim because it is part of Opposer’s case in chief."

The Board found that the motion to amend was timely and would not prejudice opposer if it were granted.

Acquired Distinctiveness: Because the evidence established that "London is so well-known and so closely-associated with gin generally―indeed, it gives its name to a specific and popular type of dry gin―we find CITY OF LONDON highly geographically descriptive in connection with gin." Consequently, Hayman Group's burden of establishing acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) was commensurately high.

Hayman Group did not submit any direct evidence of acquired distinctiveness, such as testimony from actual consumers or a customer survey. It has continuously and substantially exclusively used the CITY OF LONDON mark in the United States since 2012, with sales from October 2012 through November 22, 2019 (date of the declaration) exceeding $1.5 million dollars. However, it provided no context in the form of market share or growth, and so "these numbers do not show that CITY OF LONDON has acquired distinctiveness." Hayman Group provided no data regarding advertising expenditures, nor any evidence of intentional copying or of unsolicited media exposure. Not good enough, said the Board.

We considered the evidence as a whole and find that in light of the highly geographically descriptive nature of the mark, this meager showing falls far short of proving acquired distinctiveness.


Nonetheless, in light of the finding that CITY OF LONDON is capable of functioning as a mark, the Board granted Hayman Group's Rule 2.133 motion to amend and "approve[d]" the mark for registration on the Supplemental Register.

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TTABlogger comment:That was exhausting! I need a gin and tonic.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2020.

Tuesday, December 15, 2020

Precedential No. 44: TEAM JESUS Fails to Function as a Source Indicator for Clothing and Religion-Related Services, Says TTAB

In yet another in a continuing stream of failure-to-function rulings, the Board upheld a refusal to register the proposed mark TEAM JESUS for clothing items and educational and entertainment services promoting religion, under Sections 1, 2, 3, and 45 of the Trademark Act. The Board pointed out once again that "[m]atter that is widely used to convey ordinary or familiar concepts or sentiments, or social, political, religious, or similar informational messages that are in common use, would not be perceived as indicating source and is not registrable as a mark." In re Team Jesus LLC, 2020 USPQ2d 11489 (TTAB 2020) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Cynthia C. Lynch).

Applicant's specimen of use


Examining Attorney Omolayo Adebayo submitted numerous examples evidencing general use, in a variety of contexts, of the phrase TEAM JESUS to convey a Christian affiliation: including at various religious websites, in media articles, on many t-shirts, and on bracelets (see below), lanyards, and buttons.


The Board found that, in light of the nature of use of the phrase TEAM JESUS, including on apparel from many sources, “it does not create the commercial impression of a source indicator, even when displayed on a hangtag or label.” D.C. One Wholesaler, Inc., 120 USPQ2d at 1716.

The record in this case demonstrates the “ubiquity of the phrase [TEAM JESUS] … on apparel and other [goods] of many makers,” D.C. One Wholesaler, 120 USPQ2d at 1716, as well as in connection with educational and entertainment services. In addition, Applicant’s specimen for its own Class 41 services reinforces the nature of TEAM JESUS as a message of affiliation by referring to Christians generally as part of “Team Jesus.” We find that consumers will not perceive the widely-used message TEAM JESUS as distinguishing Applicant’s goods and services in commerce and indicating their source.


Applicant Team Jesus LLC claimed that the third-party uses on were actually evidence of use of the phrase as a trademark. The Board disagreed, observing that most of the third-party clothing evidence "shows use of TEAM JESUS in an ornamental manner, such as the t-shirts shown above with the words emblazoned in large letters across the front, presumably offered for consumers who want to convey their Christian affiliation by wearing apparel that prominently proclaims that message. See Mayweather Promotions, 2020 USPQ2d 11298, at *4."

The Board therefore affirmed the refusal to register.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlogger comment: This decision doesn't add much to TTAB jurisprudence, does it? Same old citations with the same old quotations. Why is it precedential? God only knows.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2020.

Monday, December 14, 2020

TTABlog Test: Does GLOBAL OSHA and Design Falsely Suggest a Connection with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor?

[This guest post was written by Kira-Khanh McCarthy, a law clerk (soon-to-be associate) in the Trademark Group at Wolf, Greenfield & Sacks, P.C.] The USPTO refused to register the mark GLOBAL OSHA GLOBAL OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACADEMY, LLC and Design (shown immediately below) [GLOBAL OSHA and GLOBAL OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACADEMY disclaimed] for “consulting in the field of workplace safety,” finding that it falsely suggests a connection with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“Administration”) of the U.S. Department of Labor, in violation of Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act. Applicant submitted evidence of third-party use of OSHA disavowing association with the U.S. Department of Labor, similar to how Applicant's own website expressly denies any connection with the Administration. How do you think this came out? In re Global Occupational Safety and Health Academy, LLC, Serial No. 88087696 (Dec. 8, 2020) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Frances Wolfson).


Section 2(a) of the Trademark Act bars registration of marks that “falsely suggest a connection with persons . . . [or] institutions . . .” The burden rests with the USPTO to show: 

  1. The mark is the same as, or a close approximation of, the name or identity previously used by another person or institution; 
  2. The mark would be recognized as such, in that it points uniquely and unmistakably to that person or institution; 
  3. The person or institution named by the mark is not connected with the activities performed by the applicant under the mark; and 
  4. The fame or reputation of the person or institution is such that, when the mark is used with the applicant’s goods or services, a connection with the person or institution would be presumed. 

Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imps. Co., Inc., 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505, 508-10 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (emphasis added).

As to the first element, whether Applicant’s mark is the same as (or a close approximation of) a name or identity previously used by the Administration, the Board acknowledged that there are two prongs to this inquiry. First, the Board must consider whether OSHA is a name or identity of the Administration within the U.S. Department of Labor. Second, it must determine if Applicant’s mark is a close approximation of OSHA. Given OSHA is a well-known acronym for the Administration (as evidenced by the Administration’s own website: www.osha.gov) the Board found OSHA to be a name that identifies the Administration. Next, in light of the descriptiveness of GLOBAL OSHA and GLOBAL OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACADEMY, LLC (remember, these terms were disclaimed) and because GLOBAL OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACADEMY, LLC is in smaller type size (making GLOBAL OSHA the dominant feature of the mark) the Board held that Applicant’s mark is a close approximation of OSHA. 

As to the second element, whether Applicant’s mark points uniquely and unmistakably to the Administration, the Board considered whether the average consumer of Applicant’s services would recognize OSHA as pointing singularly to the Administration. In its case-in-chief, Applicant submitted copies of 21 third-party registrations for OSHA-formative marks, and copies of web pages showing use of those registered marks, for similar and related services. In addition, Applicant provided evidence of other third-party use of OSHA for training or consultation services. Since the majority of the third-party websites disavowed any business relationship with the U.S. Department of Labor (similar to Applicant’s own website, discussed in more detail immediately below), the Board agreed that Applicant’s mark does not point uniquely to a single entity such that it is unmistakably associated with the Administration. 

As to the third element, whether the Administration is connected with Applicant’s activities performed under its mark, the Board emphasized that the type of “connection” contemplated by Section 2(a) is “a commercial connection, such as an ownership interest or commercial endorsement or sponsorship of applicant’s services.” In re Sloppy Joe’s Int’l Inc., 43 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (TTAB 1997). In this case, Global Osha disavowed any such commercial connection with the Administration by clearly stating as much on its website. Its home page openly displays: “Global Occupational Safety and Health Academy, LLC is not a government agency and is not affiliated with the U.S. Department of Labor or the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.” Thus, the USPTO satisfied the third element of the test.

And finally, as to the fourth element, whether the fame or reputation of OSHA is such that a connection with the Administration would be presumed, the TTAB concluded that “[a]lthough Applicant has disavowed any relationship with the [U.S. Department of Labor], we have no doubt that prospective purchasers of Applicant’s services will recognize that the term OSHA identifies the Administration.” In its analysis, the Board considered the fact that OSHA is defined by Merriam-Webster as “Occupational Safety and Health Administration” and that Applicant promotes itself as being “founded and managed by former senior management staff and safety experts from the U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s Directorate of Training and Education.” 

 Nonetheless, in light of the USPTO failing to meet the second element of the Section 2(a) false connection test, the Board reversed this refusal to register.

Here, because there are many companies that use the designation OSHA as a constituent part of their marks to indicate their own safety-related services, the mark does not point uniquely to the Administration. Thus, there is no false suggestion of a connection with the Administration arising from Applicant’s similar use of the term OSHA. 



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TTABlogger comment: How did you do? Question: So if you want to avoid a 2(a) false connection refusal, all you have to do is disavow a connection? [Kira says no, you need to show third parties using the mark in a similar way!]

Text Copyright Kira-Khan McCarthy 2020.