Friday, August 30, 2019

TTAB Posts September 2019 Hearing Schedule

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Tee-Tee-Ā-Bee) has scheduled five (V) oral hearings for the month of September 2019. Four of the hearings will be held in the East Wing of the Madison Building, in Alexandria, Virginia. The fifth (September 18th) will be held in the Auditorium. Briefs and other papers for these cases may be found at TTABVUE via the links provided.



September 4, 2019 - 11 AM: In re Kahiki Foods, Inc., Serial No. 87648828 [Refusal to register the mark BOWL & STIX (in standard character form) for "Oriental and Pacific rim cuisine prepared foods ...," under Trademark Act Sections 1 and 45 on the ground that the specimen of use (below) does not show the mark depicted in the drawing, i.e., the drawing is not a substantially exact representation of the mark as shown on the specimen].


September 11, 2019 - 2 PM: In re Costa Farms LLC, Serial No. 87674168 [Section 2(d) refusal of GROW WITH US for "Live flowers and living plants," in view of the identical mark registered for "Distributorship services in the field of wholesale horticulture supplies and accessories"].


September 12, 2019 - 11 AM: In re Omniome, Inc., Serial No. 87661190 [Section 2(e)(1) mere descriptiveness refusal of SEQUENCING BY BINDING for "reagents for analysis of biological analytes; research laboratory analyzers for analysis of biological analytes for non-medical purposes devices for analysis of biological analytes for medical purposes; analysis of biological analytes; development of new technology for others for analysis of biological analyte"].


September 18, 2019 - 11:30 AM: In re QVC, Inc., Serial No. 86670074 [Refusal to register the standard character mark DENIM & CO. for "WOMEN'S CLOTHING, NAMELY, SHIRTS, DRESSES, SKIRTS, TOPS, BOTTOMS, SWEATERS, SHORTS, PANTS, JACKETS, LEGGINGS, T-SHIRTS MADE IN WHOLE OR SUBSTANTIAL PART OF DENIM; AND WOMEN'S CLOTHING, NAMELY, SHIRTS, DRESSES, SKIRTS, TOPS, BOTTOMS, SWEATERS, SHORTS, PANTS, JACKETS, LEGGINGS, T-SHIRTS MADE OF MATERIALS OTHER THAN DENIM ALL SOLD THROUGH INTERACTIVE TELEVISION AND INTERACTIVE ONLINE MEDIA WHEREIN THE CLOTHING PRODUCTS OFFERED FOR SALE ARE MODELED AND WHEREBY DETAILED INFORMATION REGARDING SUCH CLOTHING PRODUCTS IS PROVIDED INCLUDING INFORMATION AS TO THE FABRICS AND MATERIALS FROM WHICH SUCH CLOTHING PRODUCTS ARE MADE" [With the following disclaimer: "DENIM" FOR "WOMEN'S CLOTHING, NAMELY, SHIRTS, DRESSES, SHIRTS, TOPS, BOTTOMS, SWEATERS, SHORTS, PANTS, JACKETS, LEGGINGS,T-SHIRTS MADE IN WHOLE OR SUBSTANTIAL PART OF DENIM"] on the ground that the mark is deceptive under Section 2(a) as to the goods that do not contain denim, or in the alternative, on the ground of deceptive misdescriptiveness under Section 2(e)(1).


September 25, 2019 - 11 AM: Disney Enterprises, Inc. v. United Trademark Holdings, LLC, Oppositions Nos. 91221648 and 91224985 [Section 2(d) opposition to registration of TEEN TINKER BELL and TEEN TINK & Design for dolls, in view of the registered marks TINKERBELL and TINK for a variety of goods, including dolls, doll accessories, doll clothes, and doll playsets].



Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog note: Any predictions? See any WYHA?s?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2019.

Thursday, August 29, 2019

TTAB Affirms Failure-to-Function Refusal of Graphic Tool Used By DJ's For Harmonic Compatability

The Board affirmed a refusal to register the design mark shown below, finding that the design is a graphic tool used by DJs to discern harmonic compatability, and does not function as a trademark for "Computer software for music analysis and processing; computer software for manipulating, mixing, and performing music and sounds" and for "Providing advice and information in the field of DJ'ing methodology and the analysis, selection and arrangement of music and sound recordings." In re Mixed in Key LLC, Serial No. 87789666 (August 27, 2019) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Jonathan Hudis).


The critical question in failure-to-function cases is whether the proposed mark would be perceived as a source indicator for the involved goods or services. To make this determination, the Board looks to the specimens of record and other evidence to discern how the proposed mark is actually used in the marketplace.

From industry publications made of record by Examining Attorney Ahsen Khan, the Board concluded that the design mark at issue is a "stripped down version of the Camelot Wheel, which in turn is a reinterpretation of the Circle of Fifths." Applicant's software "processes and analyzes music with respect to musical key, energy, and cue points so that DJs may manipulate, mix and perform music and sounds in an optimal manner."


The Circle of Fifths is a graphic device that illustrates the relationship among the 12 tones of the chromatic scale, their corresponding key signatures, and the associated major and minor keys. The Camelot Wheel, which is numbered like a clock, is a variation of the Circle of Fifths and is used by DJs to select songs that are in compatible keys by using adjacent and relative major/minor keys. Applicant's Mixed-in-Key software analyzes a DJ's music files and labels them as to key. The "wheel" then indicates which keys are compatible so that the songs the DJ plays appear to "sing" together.

Applicant argued that its design is not used in the operation of the software; instead the results are displayed in row and column format. The image of the design appears at the top of the computer screen during use, and it also dominates Applicant's website, because it is set off from surrounding text and other graphic material.


The Board, however, agreed with the Examining Attorney that the prominent placement of the design on the software is not likely to cause Applicant's customers to perceive the chart as a source indicator for Applicant's services. And, as the Examining Attorney asserted, "its prominent placement is a direct result of the need to quickly refer to the chart when mixing tracks  in order to understand the relationship between the various tracks as depicted in the chart." (emphasis in original).

We conclude that the design does not serve as an indicator of source for the goods set forth in the application. Our conclusion is supported by Mr. Vorobyev’s statements regarding how the MIXED IN KEY software operates and in the DJ industry articles provided by the Examining Attorney. Without a DJ’s reference to Applicant’s Applied-For Design, the music track “Key Result” data column provided during the operation of Applicant’s software would be meaningless to a DJ using the software for Harmonic Mixing or Energy Boost Mixing – unless the DJ was to memorize the alpha-numeric designations and their relationships within Applicant’s Applied-For Design.

As to Applicant's advice or information services, "Applicant’s mere prominent inclusion of Applicant’s Applied-For Design next to a brief explanation of Applicant’s advice and information services, without more, does not turn a graphical tool for DJ techniques into a mark indicating the source of Applicant’s services."

And so the Board affirmed the failure-to-function refusal.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: Another one bites the dust.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2019.

Wednesday, August 28, 2019

TTABlog Test: How Did These Three Recent Section 2(d) Appeals Turn Out?

Here are three very recent TTAB decisions in Section 2(d) appeals, decided on the same day. I'm not giving any hints, so you're on your own. How do you think these appeals turned out? [Answer in first comment].


In re Tucker’s Trinkets & Treasures LLC, Serial No. 87627270 (August 26, 2019) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas W. Wellington). [Section 2(d) refusal of TUCKER’S TRINKETS & TREASURES (in standard characters, TRINKETS disclaimed) for "jewelry charms" in view of the registered mark TUCKER’S FINE JEWELRY & GIFT GALLERY (in standard characters, FINE JEWELRY & GIFT disclaimed) for "jewelry"].


In re Fredman Bros. Furniture Company, Inc., Serial No. 87567505 (August 26, 2019) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Cindy B. Greenbaum). [Section 2(d) refusal of TEMPTEC for "Mattresses, mattress protector covers, pillows, and pillow protector covers" in view of the registered mark TEMPTEXX for "mattress topper"].


In re DCD IDID Enterprise, LLC , Serial No. 87465751 (August 26, 2019) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christopher Larkin). [Section 2(d)refusal of the mark ID.IGNITION SYSTEMS in standard characters (IGNITION SYSTEMS disclaimed) for "keyless entry system and keyless ignition switch system for retrofit installation into classic and hot rod automotive vehicles comprised of electric wire harnesses for automobiles, controller box in the nature of electrical controllers, microprocessor, electronic signal receiver, and keyfob with electronic signal transponder and button" in view of the registered mark I.D. SYSTEMS & Design (shown below) for "wireless transmitters and receivers for use with vehicles and other powered assets"].



Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: How did you do? See any WYHAs?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2019.

Tuesday, August 27, 2019

TTAB Finds "BIG SIX" Generic for . . . . Guess What?

The Board affirmed a refusal to register the term BIG SIX, finding it generic for "wines," or in the alternative, merely descriptive thereof. The Board agreed with Examiner Samuel Paquin that "Big Six" refers to six common types of wine: usually Riesling, Sauvignon Blanc, Chardonnay (white), Pinot Noir (red), Merlot, and Cabernet Sauvignon. In re Plata Wine Partners, LLC, Serial No. 87292254 (August 22, 2019) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge George C. Pologeorgis).

The Examining Attorney submitted numerous excerpts from various websites, as well as results from a Google search, demonstrating use of "big six" in reference to wines. The Board noted that sometimes the list of six wines varies: e.g., Syrah is substituted for Merlot, Pinot Grigio is substituted for Sauvignon Blanc, and Zifandel is substituted for Riesling, but these variances did not change the Board's analysis.

Applicant contended that the term BIG SIX refers to grape varietals used to make wine and is not a generic designation for wine itself. The Board was unmoved. The evidence amply demonstrated that BIG SIX is used interchangeably to identify both the types of grapes and the types of wine produced by the grapes. "Indeed, it is common knowledge that when one orders a glass of wine, they generally do not ask for a glass of white wine comprising the chardonnay varietal grape; instead, they merely order a glass of chardonnay."

In any case, even if the term BIG SIX referred to the grape used to make wine, it would still be generic for wine because "the generic name of an ingredient of the goods is incapable of identifying and distinguishing their source and is thus unregistrable on either the Principal or Supplemental Register." See Cordua,118 USPQ2d at 1637-38 (affirming the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board’s holding of CHURRASCOS (a type of grilled meat) generic for restaurant services)).

Applicant contended that because the designation BIG SIX is not found in the dictionary or in wine glossaries, it cannot be generic for wines. Not so, said the Board. There is no such requirement for a finding of genericness.

Finally, Applicant's search results purporting to show BIG SIX as a source indicator were not very probative. The Google search results were too truncated to provide proper context. Moreover, there was no indication whether the websites were still operative, nor any evidence regarding the number of consumer views. Some of the truncated results supported the genericness refusal because they appeared to show use of the designation BIG SIX generically for wines or the grape varietals that are the ingredients for wine.

Viewing the entirety of the evidence, the Board found that consumers "would understand the designation BIG SIX primarily to refer to 'wines' or a key aspect, type or ingredient of 'wines.'"

As to the alternative refusal under Section 2(e)(1), the Board had no doubt that BIG SIX is merely descriptive of Applicant’s wines because it "clearly describes a feature or characteristic of Applicant’s wines, namely, the category of wines offered for sale or the types of varietal grapes used to produce Applicant’s wines."

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: Generic? I'm not so sure. The "refer to 'wines'" language is rather broad. You may remember that Professor McCarthy criticized this "refer to" approach to genericness in this TTABlog post from last year. Merely descriptive, yes. But generic?

BTW: Applicant's request, in the alternative, to amend its application to seek registration on the Supplemental Register was denied as moot in light of the finding of genericness.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2019.

Monday, August 26, 2019

Precedential No. 24: RICHARD MAGAZINE Not Confusable With RICARDO for Related Services, Says TTAB

Declining to apply the doctrine of foreign equivalents to a given name, the Board dismissed an opposition to registration of the mark RICHARD MAGAZINE for online services in the fields of fashion, beauty, and lifestyle, concluding that opposer had failed to prove a likelihood of confusion with its mark RICARDO for services in the culinary field. Although the involved services are related, the first du Pont factor, the dissimilarities between the marks, was dispositive. Ricardo Media Inc. v. Inventive Software, LLC, 2019 USPQ2d 311355 (TTAB 2019) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Michael B. Adlin).


The evidence established that both "lifestyle" and culinary content are offered by some media, and that was sufficient to persuade the Board that the parties' services are related, though not closely related. Therefore, this factor weighed only slightly in opposer's favor. Similarly, the limited overlap in channels of trade and classes of consumers provided slight support for a finding of likely confusion. The key issue, then was the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks. 

The Board found the marks to be "somewhat similar" in  appearance. Although RICHARD and RICARDO differ by only two letters, the word MAGAZINE cannot be ignored. Moreover, Opposer's mark appears to be a foreign language name while RICHARD is a common English language name. Considering the marks in their entireties, the Board found them more dissimilar than similar.

There was no doubt that the marks sound different. "As for RICARDO, 'it does not follow that any and all suggested pronunciations of a trademark must be deemed to be ‘correct’ or viable, even those
which are inherently implausible and inconsistent with common phonetic usage and practice.' In re Who? Vision Sys. Inc., 57 USPQ2d 1211, 1218 (TTAB 2000)." Many American consumers would perceive RICARDO as a Spanish name while RICHARD is a common English name. "It would be "'inherently implausible' for RICARDO to be pronounced similarly to RICHARD." They are different male names, and dictionary definitions indicated that they are pronounced differently.

The principal disagreement between the parties concerned whether the doctrine of foreign equivalents applied here. The Board observed that the doctrine "should generally not apply to first names such as RICHARD and RICARDO that are widely recognizable to American consumers, unless there is evidence that consumers would 'translate' the names." The Board found no such evidence.

The chief point of dispute concerned whether ordinary American purchasers would "stop and translate" Opposer's mark RICARDO. Palm Bay Import[s], Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1696 (Fed. Cir. 2005), quoting In re Pan Tex Hotel Corp., 190 USPQ 109, 110 (TTAB 1976).



The Board noted that "Richard" and "Ricardo" are each recognized personal names. There was no evidence that owners of personal name trademarks use translations of their personal names, or that consumers translate them. Indeed, "[i[nconsistent use of a personal name trademark, including by using it in more than one language, such that its spelling or pronunciation changes, could risk, and perhaps make inevitable, consumer confusion as to the true source of a product or service."

[G]enerally consumers would be unlikely to “stop and translate” personal name marks, because doing so would point to not only a different person or people (whether real or fictional), but also to a different source, and to the mark losing any “instant recognizability.”

Finally, the Board noted, Applicant's content appears to be only in English, with no indication that its services are related to the Spanish language. Thus there was no reason to think that consumers would translate RICHARD to RICARDO.

In sum, the record evidence did not support a finding that consumers would be likely to translate Ricardo to Richard, or vice versa. Instead, they would "take each name as it is, in its own language, as identifying the person named, whether real or fictional, known or anonymous."

The Board concluded that the marks, when considered in their entireties, are dissimilar.

They identify different people, with RICARDO identifying Ricardo Larrivée to those familiar with Opposer, or someone named RICARDO to those unfamiliar with Opposer, and RICHARD MAGAZINE identifying Mr. Wojtach, or someone named RICHARD to those unfamiliar with Applicant. The term MAGAZINE is another difference affecting how the marks look and sound, while RICARDO appears to identify a specific, perhaps well-known person (most likely, given Opposer’s identified goods and services, a chef or restaurateur). Absent evidence to the contrary, we find that consumers would be unlikely to “stop and translate” RICARDO into RICHARD (or RICHARD into RICARDO), as doing so would point them to a different source. This factor weighs heavily against finding a likelihood of confusion.

The Board concluded that, although there is "some relationship between the involved services, channels of trade and classes of consumers," . . . the dissimilarity between the marks outweighs these factors.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: If Little Richard sang "Tutti Frutti" in Spanish, would he be called ""Ricardito?" Would you translate "tutti frutti" into Spanish or take it as it is?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2019.

Friday, August 23, 2019

Some Thoughts on Why Product Configuration Marks Seldom Survive TTAB Scrutiny

Rarely do product configuration trademark applications survive TTAB scrutiny. Two major hurdles to registration stand in the way: the absolute bar of Section 2(e)(5) functionality and the requirement of acquired distinctiveness for product configuration trade dress. In 2004, I wrote an article reviewing these issues, entitled "Trade Dress and the TTAB: If Functionality Don’t Get You, Nondistinctiveness Will." But putting aside the legal requirements for registration, let's look at the practical side.


The applicant who seeks to register a product configuration or a product feature as a trademark is often in the following position: it has a commercially successful product but doesn't have patent protection - whether because it never sought patent protection or was denied patent protection, or because the patent protection it obtained has expired. Trademark registration, with its potentially unlimited lifespan, seems an attractive possible avenue for filling this vacancy.

However, one of the reasons a product may have achieved commercial success is that the owner has advertised and promoted the benefits of the product over its competition. A successful product will invite imitation, and thus the question of protection arises. But the fact that the product has been touted for its supposedly superior qualities will come back to bite the applicant under the Morton-Norwich test. Seldom will an applicant be able to point to "look for" advertising that promotes the shape of the product as a source indicator. The Board will downplay the sales success of the product because the success could merely reflect the desirability of the product in light of its touted superior qualities, not an indication of consumers recognition of the product shape as a trademark.

On the patent side, a utility patent that claims the product features will be fatal to trademark registrability. Even if the advantages of the design are discussed only in the specification of the patent, that disclosure is treated as an admission against interest and probative on the issue of functionality. So an applicant who decides, now that its utility patent has expired, to seek trademark protection will likely be hoist with its own (patent) petard.

As to design patent protection, the expiration of a design patent does not preempt the applicant from obtaining a trademark registration for the product design. In fact, the CAFC in Morton-Norwich says (in dictum) that the design patent is presumptive evidence that the design is not functional. That position is wrong, due to the different standards for design patent functionality and trademark functionality, but there it sits. (See the TTABlog discussion of the umbrella case two days ago (here)).


In any event, the fact that trademark protection for a product design is often an afterthought leads, in my opinion, to the likelihood that an applicant seeking to register the product design as a trademark will trip over one or both of the hurdles to registration: the design will either be deemed to be functional in view of the applicant's own utility patent or its own promotional efforts, and/or it will fail to enjoy acquired distinctiveness due to the high standard applied to product shapes and the applicant's lack of "look for advertising."

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: Not deep thoughts, I realize, but that's the best I can do.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2019.

Thursday, August 22, 2019

TTAB Dismisses YOGOLÉ Opposition: Opposer Failed to Prove Standing

Once the dust settled after a number of procedural and evidentiary rulings, the Board dismissed this opposition to registration of the marks YOGOLÉ and YOGULÉ for yogurt-based beverages because Opposer failed to establish her standing and, in any event, failed to prove priority in connection with her Section 2(d) claim and fame in connection with her dilution claim. Bibiji Inderjit Kaur Puri v. Olé Mexican Foods, Inc., Opposition No. 91218292 (August 16, 2019) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Cheryl S. Goodman).


Procedural and Evidentiary Rulings: Applicant Olé objected to Opposer's notice of reliance because it was filed too early (i.e., prior to her testimony period). The Board pointed out, however, that an alleged defect in a notice of reliance must be raised promptly in order to allow the other party to cure the defect. Therefore, Olé had waived this objection. Likewise, Olé waived its objection that Applicant had not identified the relevance of the items in its notice of reliance, because Olé did not object promptly.

Applicant successfully objected to a declaration attached to Olé's brief, since it was not filed during her testimony period. Similarly an exhibit attached to her brief was untimely and would not be considered.

Opposer submitted photocopies of the six registrations, but five of them had not been pleaded in the notice of opposition, and, in any case, did not show status and title. And so the Board refused to consider them. As to the one pleaded registration, for the mark YOGI TEA, there was no testimony or evidence establishing Opposer's interest in the registration. Opposer provided links to the USPTO records, but the Board once again refused to take judicial notice of USPTO records, and a hyperlink is not sufficient to make the evidence of record. And so, the Board refused to consider this registration.

The Board overruled Olé's objection to copies of prior Board decisions involving Opposer's YOGI marks. The Board found them admissible as official records that are relevant to show Opposer's efforts to police her mark. However, Olé successfully objected to Opposer's reference to her summary judgment papers, since this evidence was not submitted during her trial period.

In the wake of these rulings, the Board found no record evidence concerning Opposer's use of her YOGI mark. There were website printouts regarding bath products, an article relating to beauty products, a Twitter page for Yogi Beauty, and the official USPTO records of prior oppositions. The Internet evidence did not establish use because there was no testimony or other evidence showing that this use enured to Opposer's benefit. As to the prior Board decisions, Olé was not a party to those cases and cannot be bound by any findings or rulings therein. Moreover, the prior decisions "do not stand as evidence of Opposer's ownership of her pleaded registration or her use of any 'YOGI mark.'"

Standing: Since Opposer failed to submit any evidence of her ownership of a registration for the YOGI mark, nor of her use of the mark, she failed to establish her standing to bring the opposition and Olé made no admissions regarding standing. Nonetheless, for the sake of completeness, the Board went on to discuss Opposer's likelihood of confusion and dilution claims.

Priority: Opposer submitted no acceptable evidence to establish status and title of her pleaded registration, and no testimony or evidence to establish use of her mark. Since Olé did not admit priority, Opposer could not prevail on her likelihood of confusion claim.

Dilution: Obviously, there was no evidence of the fame of opposer's mark, and so her dilution claim failed.

And so the Board dismissed the opposition.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: As Yogi Berra may have said, if you want to win the game, you have to touch all the bases.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2019.

Wednesday, August 21, 2019

Precedential No. 23: TTAB Affirms Section 2(e)(5) Functionality Refusal of Umbrella Configuration

In view of Applicant OEP's own utility patent, the Board had no doubt in affirming a Section 2(e)(5) functionality refusal of the product configuration shown below, for umbrellas. Although Section 2(e)(5) is an absolute bar to registration, the Board also considered OEP's claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f) but found its proofs inadequate. In re OEP Enterprises, Inc., 2019 USPQ2d 309323 (TTAB 2019) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christopher Larkin).


Functionality: Observing that the application drawing "depicts the mark to be registered," and that unclaimed matter must be shown in broken lines, Kohler, 125 USPQ2d at 1488 (quoting Heatcon, 116 USPQ2d at 1379) (citing Trademark Rule 2.52, 37 C.F.R. § 2.52)), the Board concluded that the assessment of functionality must take into account the entire configuration of the umbrella and not, as OEP contended, just the "mesh lower canopy of a double canopy umbrella."

OEP did not dispute that the handle, shaft, runner, and ribs of the umbrella are functional, nor that the upper canopy "blocks the rain or sunlight from the user." The question, then, was "whether the mesh canopy is also functional or, if it is not, whether its non-functionality makes the applied-for mark as a whole non-functional."

OEP owned a design patent on the umbrella design (see Fig. 3 of the design patent, immediately below), and the Board agreed that this is evidence of non-functionality. "Our law recognizes that the existence of a design patent for the very design for which trademark protection is sought 'presumptively indicates that the design is not du jure functional.'" Becton, Dickinson, 102 USPQ2d at 1377 (quoting Morton-Norwich, 213 USPQ at 17 n.3). However, the existence of a design patent is not dispositive of the functionality issue.


OEP also owned a now-expired utility patent, entitled "Umbrella and Umbrella Canopy," that depicted a dual-canopy umbrella (see Fig. 5 below). The patent specification stated that, in contrast to some prior designs that utilize die cut holes, the mesh material "provides strength to the entire first canopy portion 22, helping to keep the first canopy portion taut." Moreover, the mesh portions are "easier to sew along the panel seams," and there is less waste of material as compared to die cut vent holes. And, according to the patent, "the present invention has significantly greater airflow than prior art designs." The Board observed that the inclusion of these statements in the specification of the patent rather than in the claims "does not matter." See Becton, Dickinson, 102 USPQ2d at 1377.


Moreover several dependent claims of the patent "teach all elements of the applied-for mark, including the lower mesh canopy on which Applicant focuses on appeal." Both the claims and the specification of the patent support a finding of functionality. See Becton, Dickinson, 102 USPQ2d at 1377; In re Howard Leight Indus., LLC, 80 USPQ2d 1507, 1510-11 (TTAB 2006).

The strong and explicit evidence from the ’506 Utility Patent that the applied-for mark as a whole is functional rebuts any initial presumption of non-functionality resulting from the existence of the ’125 Design Patent. In fact, we view the disclosures in the ’506 Utility Patent as so strong as to be sufficient, by themselves, to sustain the functionality refusal without consideration of the other Morton-Norwich categories of evidence. See Grote Indus., 126 USPQ2d at 1203.

For the sake of completeness, the Board went on to discuss the other Morton-Norwich factors.

In its advertising, Applicant OEP referred to its "[p]atented double canopy mesh system," thus reflecting OEP's view that the patented design was an improvement over previous designs (particularly with regard to preventing inversion of the umbrella). It generally claimed that its patented umbrellas are superior to other umbrellas. The Board found that these materials provided "some additional support for a finding of functionality."

As to alternative designs, OEP contended that there are many other types of "air transmissible lower canopies on the market, including various cutouts (e.g., circles, irregular shapes, etc.), no material at all, and other types of air transmissible materials." The Board noted, however, that there was no showing that these designs "work as well as Applicant's design."

Competitors are now free to produce the umbrellas taught in the ’506 Utility Patent because it has expired, and competition would be inhibited if Applicant could use trademark law to prevent production of what Applicant claimed in the expired ’506 Utility Patent to be a superior two-canopy umbrella design. See Qualitex, 34 USPQ2d at 1163-64.

Finally, as to cost of manufacture, the Board observed that "evidence that a design costs more, or has no impact on cost, is irrelevant if the design is found to work better." In any case, in light of the "clear statements about cost savings in the '506 Utility Patent," the Board found that the proposed mark has "at least some cost-related benefits in addition to use-related ones." Thus this factor also provided support for the finding of functionality.

The Board found that the proposed mark as a whole is functional and it therefore affirmed the refusal to register.


Acquired Distinctiveness: Even though a finding of functionality under Section 2(e)(5) precludes registration of a proposed mark, the Board went on to discuss OEP's claim of acquired distinctiveness.

The burden of providing acquired distinctiveness for a product configuration is heavier than for word marks because consumers are not predisposed to view product shapes as source indicators. See Grote Indus., 126 USPQ2d at 1210; Wal-Mart, 54 USPQ2d at 1069. Since many third parties, according to OEP, sell similarly shaped umbrellas, "a substantial showing of acquired distinctiveness" is required. Kohler, 125 USPQ2d at 1504 (quoting Udor, 89 USPQ2d at 1986).

OEP submitted direct evidence in the form of declarations from its founder and president, from four sellers of its umbrellas, and from one of its competitors, all of whom claimed to be experts "in the umbrella business." The president offered his opinion on the ultimate question of acquired distinctiveness, and all declarants opined on consumer perception of OEP's umbrella. The Board found that the declarants are experts in the umbrella business, but not experts as to how consumers perceive the design in question.

The Board gave no weight to the president's opinion on the ultimate issue, and "very little weight" regarding consumer perception. All of the declarations lacked specificity as to the basis for these opinions. Moreover the third-party declarants were not representative of all categories of end users of the product, and the use of form declarations, although not forbidden, lessened their probative value. In sum, the Board found the declarations to be non-probative.

As to OEP's circumstantial evidence of acquired distinctiveness, the Board noted that the purported mark has been in use since 1998, but long use of a mark "is not necessarily conclusive or persuasive" on the issue, Kohler, 125 USPQ2d at 1515. However, in this case OEP's long use supports its claim because there was no evidence of competitor use of a double canopy design from 1998 to 2017.

OEP's sales figures were "substantial in the umbrella industry," but large sales and advertising figures do not always compel a finding of acquired distinctiveness. OEP's advertising "did nothing to encourage readers to associate the shape of the umbrella with Applicant." The failure to do so was particularly significant because a significant portion of OEP's wholesale business comprises promotional products that are branded with the marks and logos of other companies, such as Cadillac and Lexus. In short, OEP did not provide any evidence that its advertising efforts focused on the trademark significance of the design at issue, rather than on the utilitarian benefits of the product.

Finally, OEP pointed to its policing efforts regarding the design, having successfully challenged three other entities, all of whom stopped selling their umbrellas. The Board was not impressed. It was not convinced from the scanty evidence that these entities had copied the product in order to trade on the asserted distinctiveness of the design. 

Considering the evidence in its entirety, the Board concluded that OEP had failed to meet "its burden to make a substantial showing that the applied-for product configuration mark has acquired distinctiveness."

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: Design inventions are almost never denied patent protection due to functionality. That's because, in the design patent context, a design is unpatentable on the ground of functionality only if it is the ONLY possible design. For example, a keyway for a certain lock. On the trademark side, the test for functionality is different and broader: it considers whether the design is better than alternative designs. The fact that a design is covered by a design patent should have no bearing on whether the design is de jure functional under Section 2(e)(5). For a discussion of this point, see Prof. Sarah Burstein's 2015 article from The Trademark Reporter (here).

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2019.

Tuesday, August 20, 2019

TTABlog Test: How Did These Three Section 2(d) Appeals Turn Out?

Here are three recent TTAB decisions in Section 2(d) appeals. I'm not giving any hints, so you're on your own, my friends. How do you think these appeals turned out? [Answer in first comment].


In re Young Living Essential Oils, LC, Serial No. 87684401 (August 9, 2019) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Lorelei Ritchie). [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark R.C. for "essential oils for aromatherapy use, in view of the registered mark RC COSMETICS & Design (shown immediately below) for "cosmetics and cosmetic preparations; cosmetics and make-up" [COSMETICS disclaimed]].


In re Beerworks Holdings, Serial No. 87195092 (August 13, 2019)[not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Cynthia C. Lynch). [Section 2(d) refusal of FRINGE BEERWORKS for "taproom services featuring craft beer brewed on premises" [BEERWORKS disclaimed], in light of the registered mark FRINGE for "bar and cocktail lounge services."


In re Healeo Juice Company, LLC, Serial No. 87493772  (August 15, 2019) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Cindy B. Greenbaum). [Section 2(d) refusal to register the mark LIFE FORCE REPLENISHMENT for juices, including fruit juices and fruit-based juices, in view of the registered mark LIFEFORCE V for, inter alia, fruit beverages and fruit drinks].


Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: How did you do? See any WYHAs?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2019.

Monday, August 19, 2019

TTAB Finds Wedge Shape for Yoga Blocks Functional Under Section 2(e)(5)

The Board affirmed a Section 2(e)(5) refusal to register the product configuration shown below, for "yoga blocks," finding the proposed mark to be de jure functional and therefore unregistrable. Applicant's advertising touted the advantages of the design and "there appear to be no alternative designs available that would work as well . . . ." In re Amanda Field d/b/a Republic Yoga, Serial No. 87562426 (August 14, 2019) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Jonathan Hudis).

Applicant described the design as "a three-dimensional configuration of a triangular block which has beveled edges." Examining Attorney Saima Makhdoom submitted the text of a U.S. patent application filed in 2008, entitled "Yoga comfort Wedge System," describing and claiming a wedge-shaped device, but the Examining Attorney did not include the patent application drawings. The Board noted that it could not take judicial notice of the complete application, and it concluded that it could not give this evidence "full evidentiary weight." [Is a third-party patent application entitled to any weight? Is it mere hearsay? What if it's a published application that hasn't been examined yet? - ed.]. Various websites and blog postings discussed the use of a "yoga wedge."

The Board stepped through the Morton-Norwich factors, finding that Applicant's own website touted the utilitarian advantages of the wedge shape: it stabilizes joints and creates "a safe environment for supported yoga poses and practice, and in the practice of yoga if the person is injured or in pain."

As to alternative designs, the evidence depicted yoga devices in triangular (wedge), block, and rectangular configurations. Several blog posts discussed the utilitarian usefulness of the wedge design. The Board found that the wedge shape provided "superior utilitarian benefits over block or rectangular shaped designs, and is certainly ;essential to the use or purpose of the article' under Inwood. [No mention was made of the "beveled edges" on Applicant's device - ed.].

The Board concluded that the Examining Attorney had presented a prima facie case under Section 2(e)(5), which the Applicant failed to rebut. Therefore the Board affirmed the refusal to register.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: The Board's unwillingness to take judicial notice of government records is still rather mystifying.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2019.

Friday, August 16, 2019

WORLD'S BEST DOWN Incapable of Functioning as a Trademark for Bedding Containing Down, Says TTAB

The Board affirmed a refusal to register, on the Supplemental Register, the phrase WORLD'S BEST DOWN for bedding containing down [DOWN disclaimed], finding that the phrase is "incapable of distinguishing goods and cannot function as a trademark or indicator of source." The evidence established that "World's Best Down" is "a common advertising phrase used to tout the high quality of down in bedding and other products." In re Eddie Bauer Licensing Services LLC, Application Serial No. 87471896 (August 14, 2019) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Marc A. Bergsman).


Applicant Eddie Bauer argued that WORLD'S BEST DOWN does not convey any ordinary or familiar concept: an individual "may commonly say 'DRIVE SAFELY' before someone else gets into a car, but "would not commonly say to a third party 'WORLD'S BEST DOWN' before the third party gets into a bed with down filled bedding." [Whatever works! - ed.].

Moreover, Eddie Bauer asserted that it has used WORLD'S BEST DOWN as a source indicator since 2008, and its use is not informational but puffery or exaggerated praise for its products. Finally, it pointed to more than 50 "World's Best" formative marks that are registered (mostly on the Supplemental Register) with disclaimers.

Examining Attorney Steven W. Ferrell, Jr., issued the refusal to register before applicant had submitted its specimen of use, and he relied on the nature of the term rather than the manner in which the mark is used. The Board therefore limited its analysis to the nature of the phrase. Nonetheless, it considered Eddie Bauer's manner of use in determining how the phrase would be perceived by consumers.

Under the case law, slogans and other terms that are "merely informational in nature, or ... common laudatory phrases or statements that would be ordinarily used in business or in the particular trade or industry, are not registrable." For example, ONCE A MARINE, ALWAYS A MARINE is an informational slogan expressing support or admiration of the Marines. I ♥ DC is merely an expression of affection or enthusiasm for the city of Washington, D.C. And DRIVE SAFELY is an everyday, commonplace admonition.

The question is, how would the phrase be perceived by consumers? The Examining Attorney submitted numerous website pages from third parties using the term "World's Best Down" in connection with bedding and other products. This evidence, the Board found, shows that "the term 'World’s Best Down' is a common advertising phrase used to tout the high quality down in bedding and other products." Eddie Bauer uses the phrase "in the manner of a superiority claim that should be freely available to all manufacturers of down products."

The Board concluded that consumers will not perceive the phrase as a trademark; the phrase "is incapable of distinguishing goods and cannot function as a trademark or indicator of source."

As to the third-party registrations cited by Eddie Bauer, the Board once again observed that it is not bound by the decisions of Examining Attorneys in other cases. Each case must be decided on its own merits.

And so the Board affirmed the refusal.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment:What about World's Best TTABlog?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2019.

Thursday, August 15, 2019

Precedential No. 22: PIERCE-ARROW for Autos Confusable With PIERCE ARROW SOCIETY, Says TTAB

Although the PIERCE-ARROW automobile was last produced in 1938, the Board sustained this opposition to registration of the mark PIERCE-ARROW for automobiles, finding a likelihood of confusion with the registered collective membership mark PIERCE ARROW SOCIETY for "indicating membership in a national organization whose aim is to foster and preserve interest in Pierce Arrow Motor Cars." However, a "false suggestion of a connection" claim under Section 2(a) was denied because the Society failed to show that The Pierce Arrow Society is famous or has any reputation, and failed to show that the mark PIERCE-ARROW points uniquely and unmistakably to the Society. The Pierce-Arrow Society v. Spintek Filtration, Inc., 2019 USPQ2d 471774 (TTAB 2019) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Albert Zervas).


Opposer is a non-profit organization founded in 1957. It operates the Pierce-Arrow Museum in Hickory Corners, Michigan, has published a monthly magazine about the automobile, and displays PIERCE-ARROW automobiles at the Annual Flea Market in Hershey, Pennsylvania. The Society assists members in preserving and restoring their autos, publishes service bulletins, facilitates the sale of autos and parts, and sells some parts directly to owners of PIERCE-ARROW automobiles.

The Society is not a legal successor to The Pierce-Arrow Motor Company, nor did it acquire any of its assets or any rights in the PIERCE-ARROW mark.

Section 2(a) False Suggestion of a Connection: Section 2(a) bars registration of a mark that may falsely suggest a connection with "persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols .  . . ." To support such a claim, the opposer must establish that:

1. The mark is the same as, or a close approximation of, the name or identity previously used by another person or institution;
2. The mark would be recognized as such, in that it points uniquely and unmistakably to that person or institution;
3. The person or institution named by the mark is not connected with the activities performed by the applicant under the mark; and
4. The fame or reputation of the person or institution is such that, when the mark is used with the applicant’s goods or services, a connection with the person or institution would be presumed. Univ. of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imps., 217 USPQ at 508-10.

The Board found that PIERCE-ARROW is a close approximation of opposer's name. The article "The" and the word "Society" have no source identifying significance. The Board also found that Applicant Spintek is not connected with the Society. Thus elements 1 and 3 of the Section 2(a) test were met.

However, as to the second element, the Society failed to show that PIERCE-ARROW points uniquely and unmistakably to it. Although the Society maintained that the mark would be recognized as the name of the antique automobiles and that it is the "de facto successor" to the motor car company, the Board was not impressed. It observed that when the company ceased to exist, its rights were extinguished. See In re Wielinski. There was no assignment of any interest in these rights to any another entity. The Society did not prove that it may claim rights in the name or identity of the defunct company. The use of marks containing the words  PIERCE-ARROW as collective memberships marks did not effectuate a transfer of the goodwill associated with PIERCE-ARROW for automobiles.

Likewise, the Society did not satisfy the fourth element of the Section 2(a) test: it failed to show that it has any fame or reputation. The Board noted that there are only 2,400 Pierce-Arrow automobiles in existence, that the Society has only 1,000 members, and that its advertising is limited. The Society failed to establish how may individuals visit the flea market and museum. Moreover, the Society failed to show that the defunct company enjoyed a fame or reputation that was transferred to opposer.

And so, because the Society did not satisfy all four elements of the test, the Board dismissed its Section 2(a) claim.


Section 2(d) Likelihood of Confusion: The likelihood of confusion analysis involving a collective membership mark and a trademark is not based on confusion as to the source of the goods or services provided by the organization; rather the issue is whether relevant consumers are likely to believe that the trademark owner's goods "emanate from or are endorsed by or in some other way associated with the collective organization." Carefirst of Md. Inc. v. FirstHealth of the Carolinas, Inc., 77 USPQ2d 1492, 1512-13 (TTAB 2005).

Thus, we consider whether Applicant’s goods and the indication of membership in an organization whose aim is to foster and preserve interest in PIERCE-ARROW motor cars are sufficiently related that, if similar marks were used in connection with them, such prospective purchasers of Applicant’s automobiles and current or prospective members of Opposer’s organization would be likely to believe that Applicant’s automobiles are sponsored by or in some way affiliated with Opposer’s organization.

As to the marks, the Board not surprisingly found PIERCE ARROW to be the dominant portion of the Society's, and it deemed the marks "highly similar" in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. As to the goods and services, the respective identifications in the application and the pleaded registration "reflect a clear and immediate relationship." "Opposer's collective membership mark identifies its organization's focus on PIERCE ARROW automobiles. Applicant Spintek's goods are PIERCE-ARROW automobiles." Notably, the identification in the Society's registration does not specify whether the motor cars in which its members are interested are new or used, and so it encompasses applicant's automobiles.

As to trade channels and classes of consumers, the Board agreed with Applicant Spintek that the trade channels differ, but it found that the consumers of the Society's services overlap with the (potential) purchasers of Spintek's goods:

Members of Opposer’s organization may not own only antique automobiles, they may also own modern automobiles. Thus, once Applicant promotes its automobiles, it is likely that the same individuals will be exposed to both Applicant’s and Opposer’s marks for their respective goods and services.

Finally, as to the conditions of sale, Spintek argued that automobiles are costly and are purchased with care, but the Board noted that the Society's annual membership fee is a mere $45, suggesting less care by consumers in their decisions to join the Society. In any case, even sophisticated purchasers are not necessarily knowledgeable in the field or trademarks and are not immune from source confusion when very similar marks are in use.

The Board concluded that consumers are likely to assume a connection or affiliation with or sponsorship by the Society if Spintek's mark is used for automobiles. Therefore the Board sustained the opposition on the ground of likelihood of confusion under Section 2(d).


Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: Arguably, Pierce-Arrow aficianados will know that Spintek's automobiles are not the originals, and buyers of the new autos will know that the Society is focused on the originals. Won't they?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2019.

Wednesday, August 14, 2019

TTABlog Test: Are These Two Four-Legged Animal Design Marks Confusable for Clothing?

Another test for you. Abercrombie & Fitch opposed an application to register the mark RED DEAR & Design, shown below left, for various clothing items, claiming a likelihood of confusion with its two registered "Moose logo" marks shown below right, for overlapping clothing items. Applicant Shnittger, appearing pro se, stipulated to several facts, including Abercrombie's ownership and the validity of the registrations, and a congruence of consumers. Shnittger also admitted that the marks depict "profiles of full-bodies, four-legged animals with antlers in silhouette form." But what about the words "Red Dear?" Shnittger argued that no one company should be allowed to associate any "antlered" animal with its brand. How do you think this came out? Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co. v. Isabella Elisabeth Shnittger, Opposition No. 91218738 (August 12, 2019) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Michael B. Adlin).


The Board first addressed Abercrombie's claim that its marks are famous. Opposer's evidence, filed under seal, showed that it has been "quite successful" in selling clothing under its marks, but its sales and advertising figures and website visits were not placed in context vis-a-vis other brands of clothing, nor was it clear to what extent consumers were exposed to the pleaded marks as opposed to Abercrombie's various other marks.

Nonetheless, the evidence established that the pleaded marks are "renowned" in the clothing field and are "commercially quite strong."

Of course, the overlapping goods are presumed to travel through the same trade channels to the same classes of consumers. As a result, a lesser degree of similarity between the marks at issue is necessary to support a finding of likely confusion.

Turning to the marks, the Board acknowledged that there are differences between the animals at issue, but the marks are "sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression that clothing consumers who encounter them would be likely to assume a connection between the parties."

Here, at least some consumers familiar with Opposer’s marks who later encounter Applicant’s mark will not remember which direction Opposer’s animal was facing, what its antlers looked like specifically or how its mouth was depicted. Rather, because of the fallibility of memory, they will have the “general rather than a specific impression” that Applicant’s mark, like Opposer’s, features a “full-bodied, four-legged anima[l] with antlers in silhouette form.”

As to the words "Red Dear" in Schnittger's mark, they are dwarfed by the deer design. Moreover, since the word "Dear" is the phonetic equivalent of "deer," it might call to mind Abercrombie's marks, which might also appear to some as a deer. [That's a stretch! - ed.]. For what it's worth, Applicant Schnittger admitted that "a moose is part of the deer family biologically . . . ."

The Board cited several prior cases in which the addition of words to a design was not enough to avoid confusion. For example:


The Board concluded that the differences between Abercrombie's and Schnittger's marks were insufficient to overcome the similarities when these "profiles of full-bodied, four-legged animals in silhouette form" are used on identical goods.

The Board therefore found confusion likely and it sustained the opposition, declining to reach Opposer's dilution claim. [In any event, since Abercrombie failed to prove fame in the likelihood of confusion context, it perforce could not meet the higher standard for dilution fame - ed.].

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: Oh, deer! How prominent must the words RED DEAR be to change the outcome?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2019.

Tuesday, August 13, 2019

TTABlog Test: Are These Two "CANNONBALL" Marks Confusable for Beer?

The USPTO refused to register the mark CANNONBALL CREEK BREWING COMPANY GOLDEN, COLORADO and Design, as shown below, for “beer” [BREWING COMPANY GOLDEN, COLORADO disclaimed], finding the mark likely to cause confusion with the registered mark CANNONBALL DOUBLE IPA for “ale; beer; brewed malt-based alcoholic beverage in the nature of beer” [DOUBLE IPA disclaimed]. The goods are legally identical and the Board must presume that the overlapping goods travel in the same trade channels to the same classes of consumers. What about the marks? Too close? How do you think this came out? In re Hutchinson and Stengl, Serial No. 86809909 (August 9, 2019) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge George C. Pologeorgis).


Of course, when the goods are identical, a lesser degree of similarity between the marks is necessary to support a finding of likely confusion. The Board found the marks to be similar in appearance and sound to the extent that the word CANNONBALL is the first literal element in the marks. Often it is the first part of a mark that is most to be impressed upon the mind of the consumer and remembered. "However, that general rule is not applicable here. In this case, the word CANNONBALL is likely to be read in conjunction with the word CREEK, that word being visually the largest element in Applicant’s mark."

Although applicant's mark contains a prominent design element, it is the verbal portion of the mark that is most likely to indicate the origin of the goods. It is the verbal portion that consumers will use in referring to or ordering the goods.

The disclaimed portion of each mark is less significant because of its descriptive nature. Therefore, the dominant portion of applicant’s mark is CANNONBALL CREEK and the dominant element of the cited is CANNONBALL. Nonetheless, the Board found the connotations and commercial impressions of the marks to be "quite dissimilar" because of the presence of the word CREEK in applicant's mark.

The circumstances of this case are very similar, if not identical, to those in Champagne Louis Roederer S.A. v. Delicato Vineyards, 148 F.3d 1373, 47 USPQ2d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998). In that case, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board’s holding that the second word in applicant’s mark CRYSTAL CREEK served to create a totally different commercial impression from the one created by opposer’s mark CRISTAL when the marks were contemporaneously used on wine.

CANNONBALL CREEK evokes the name of a particular waterway or stream. This "wave" design in applicant's mark reinforces that meaning and commercial impression, as does the relatively larger size of the word CREEK. The cited mark, CANNONBALL, conveys the impression of something fired from a cannon.



The Board concluded that "the differences in connotation and commercial impression between the marks outweigh their similarities and are therefore sufficient to distinguish the marks so that confusion between the marks is not likely."

And so the Board reversed the refusal to register.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: I guess adding the word CREEK is a ticket to registration.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2019.

Monday, August 12, 2019

TTABlog Test: Is "KP QUIK STOP & Design" Confusable With KWIK STOP for Convenience Stores?

The USPTO refused to register the mark KP QUIK STOP & Design for retail convenience stores, finding it likely to cause confusion with the registered mark KWIK STOP for "Retail convenience store services featuring gasoline, other petroleum products and alcoholic beverages." The services are identical, but what about the marks? Applicant PCS Petroleum argued that the registered mark is weak and therefore should be given a limited scope of protection. How do you think this came out? In re PCS Petroleum LLC, Serial No. 87728983 (August 8, 2019) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge George C. Pologeorgis).


Because the involved services overlap, the Board must presume that they travel in the same trade channels to the same classes of consumers. Thus the second and third du Pont factors favored affirmance of the refusal.

The Board next considered the strength of the cited mark under the fifth and sixth du Pont factors. There was no evidence of fame of the cite mark in this ex parte appeal (and the Examining Attorney is under no obligation to demonstrate such fame). The Board therefore found the fifth factor to be neutral.

As to the sixth factor, the number and nature of similar marks for similar services, the Board observed that "third-party registrations and use of similar marks can bear on the strength or weakness of a registrant’s mark in two ways: commercially and conceptually."

First, if a mark, or an element of a mark, is used extensively in commerce by a number of third parties, that could undermine its commercial strength, as the consuming public may have become familiar with a multiplicity of the same or similar marks, and can distinguish them based on minor differences. *** Second, if there is evidence that a mark, or an element of a mark, is commonly adopted by many different registrants, that may indicate that the common element has some non-source identifying significance that undermines its conceptual strength as an indicator of a single source.

Applicant PCS submitted numerous use-based third-party registrations for marks consisting of or containing the term QUICK or its phonetic equivalents, for services similar to those of the cited registration: for example, QUICK STUFF, KWIK BUCKS, and KWICK PANTRY, and KWIK FILL. Although there was no evidence of the extent of use of these marks, they are relevant to show that a particular term "has a normally understood and well-recognized descriptive or suggestive meaning, leading to the conclusion that that segment is relatively weak." Juice Generation, 115 USPQ2d at 1675 (quoting 2 McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 11:90 (4th ed. 2015).

PCS also submitted proffered evidence demonstrating third-party use of the terms QUICK STOP, QUIK STOP, QWICK STOP and KWIK STOP for similar services. Again, this evidence did not establish the extent to which consumers have been exposed to such actual uses, but " the nontrivial amount and geographic extent throughout the United States of such third party uses of the phrase QUICK STOP or its phonetic equivalents demonstrates that the phrase is highly suggestive of such services, leading us to the conclusion that that phrase is weak."

The Board found "a mark comprising, in whole or in part, the phrase “QUICK STOP” or phonetically equivalent variations thereof, used in connection with convenience store services is highly suggestive of such services and therefore, weak. As such, the cited mark is entitled to only a restricted scope of protection."

In other words, Registrant’s KWIK STOP mark is not entitled to such a broad scope of protection that it will bar the registration of every mark comprising, in whole or in part, the term “KWIK STOP” or variations thereof; it is, nevertheless, sufficient to bar the registration of marks “as to which the resemblance to [Registrant’s mark] is striking enough to cause one seeing it to assume that there is some connection, association or sponsorship between the two.”

Turning to the first du Pont factor, the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks, the Board found that although there are differences in appearance and sound, the marks convey the same connotation and commercial impressions. However, in view of the weakness of the cited mark and the limited scope of protection to which it is entitled, the Board found that "the inclusion of the design element, as well as the arbitrary letters KP, in Applicant’s mark are sufficient to distinguish the marks for likelihood of confusion purposes, notwithstanding our finding that the services at issue are identical in part."

The Board therefore reversed the refusal to register.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: Evidence of third-party use and registration is often the make-or-break issue in these 2(d) appeals.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2019.

Friday, August 09, 2019

TTABlog Test: Is "KERRIDGE COMMERCIAL SYSTEMS" Primarily Merely a Surname?

The USPTO refused to register the mark KERRIDGE COMMERCIAL SYSTEMS for various goods and services, all for use in the distribution, wholesale, merchant and retail industries [COMMERCIAL SYSTEMS disclaimed], finding the mark to be primarily merely a surname under Section 2(e)(4). The evidence showed at least 193 results for the surname "Kerridge" from 18 different U.S. states, but Applicant argued that this is an insignificant portion of the U.S. population. How do you think this came out? In re Kerridge Commercial Systems Limited, Application Serial No. 87383302 (August 6, 2019) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Elizabeth A. Dunn).

Kerridge, England

Evidentiary issues: The Examining Attorney submitted a screenshot purporting to show that KERRIDGE is the name of applicant's founder, but because the document lacked a date and a URL, the Board refused to consider it. See In re I-Coat Company, LLC, 126 USPQ2d 1730, 1733 (TTAB 2018) and In re Mueller Sports Medicine, Inc., 126 USPQ2d 1584, 1587 (TTAB 2018). Applicant submitted two webpages to its brief on appeal (one referencing Kerridge, England), but the submission was untimely and the Board ignored it. The Examining Attorney asked the Board to take judicial notice of an online search for the term KERRIDGE and a dictionary excerpt; as to the former, the Board does not take judicial notice of online search results, and as to the latter the Board was "reluctant to exercise this discretion where, as here, Applicant has no opportunity to counter the evidence." [Odd. The Board often takes judicial notice of dictionary definitions - ed.].

Surname Significance: In determining whether the purchasing public would perceive a purported mark as primarily merely a surname, the Board may consider: 1) whether the applicant adopted a principal's name and used it in a way that revealed its surname significance; 2) whether the term has a nonsurname "ordinary language" meaning; and 3) the extent to which the term is used by others as a surname. In re Etablissements Darty et Fils, 759 F.2d 15, 225 USPQ 652, 653 (Fed. Cir. 1985).

The record establishes that the term KERRIDGE is a surname. A search of Whitepages.com revealed at least 193 results for "Kerridge" from 18 different U.S. states. Applicant argued that this is an insignificant portion of the U.S. population of more than 300 million people. The Board observed, however, that "[t[he relative rareness of a name is not necessarily relevant 'given the large number of different surnames in the United States, even the most common surnames would represent but small fractions of such a database.'"

In fact, even surnames less common than KERRIDGE have been found to be primarily merely a surname in certain cases. See In re Beds & Bars Limited, 122 USPQ2d 1546 (TTAB 2017) (5 individuals named BELUSHI); In re Adlon Brand GmbH & Co. KG, 120 USPQ2d 1717, 1720 (TTAB 2016) (75 individuals named ADLON); In re Eximius Coffee, LLC, 120 USPQ2d at 1280 (233 people with the surname ALDECO).

Applicant pointed out that there is no evidence showing that anyone named Kerridge is associated with the company. However, while such a connection would weigh in favor of the refusal, the lack thereof does not reduce the likelihood that relevant consumers would perceived the term as a surname.

Examining Attorney Doritt Carroll asserted that KERRIDGE is similar to other surnames such as BERRIDGE, DERRIDGE, FERRIDGE, and SERRIDGE but the Board noted that these surnames were not shown to "very common." In any event, the question of whether a term has the structure and pronunciation of a surname is a “decidedly subjective” inquiry. In re Eximius Coffee, L.L.C, 120 USPQ2d at 1280. Thus this evidence, "at best, offers some corroboration of the Whitepages.com evidence that the primary significance of KERRIDGE is as a surname."

Applicant urged that KERRIDGE is similar in sound and appearance to such common words as porridge, courage, and carriage, and to geographic terms such as Cambridge and Woodbridge, but the Board rejected the notion that KERRIDGE would be mistaken for these words or would have the same "ordinary word" significance.

As to the additional wording, COMMERCIAL SYSTEMS, the Board recognized that it must determine "whether the primary significance of the mark as a whole in connection with the recited goods and services is that of the surname." Citing Earnhardt v. Kerry Earnhardt, Inc., 123 USPQ2d at 1413. A critical element in the determination is the relative distinctiveness of the second term in the mark. Id.; accord, In re Weiss Watch Co., 123 USPQ2d at 1206.

Where, as here, descriptive wording is appended to a surname, the combination when viewed as a whole in the context of the Applicant's goods will generally be considered to be primarily merely a surname under Section 2(e)(4). See, e.g., Azeka Bldg. Corp. v. Azeka, 122 USPQ2d at 1482 n.9 (TTAB 2017) (AZEKA'S RIBS primarily merely a surname for barbeque sauce).

Noting that applicant disclaimed COMMERCIAL SYSTEMS and did not contest the issue of descriptiveness, the Board concluded that KERRIDGE COMMERCIAL SYSTEMS is primarily merely a surname, and so it affirmed the refusal.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment:Would CARRIAGE COMMERCIAL SYSTEMS be considered confusingly similar?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2019.