Friday, June 28, 2013

TTAB Quarterly Index: April - June 2013

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Section 2(a) - Deceptiveness:
Section 2(a) - False Connection:
Section 2(d) - Likelihood of Confusion:
Section 2(e)(1) - Mere Descriptiveness:
Section 2(e)(2) - Primarily Geographically Descriptive:
Section 2(e)(3) - Primarily Geographically Deceptively Misdescriptive:


Section 2(e)(4) - Primarily Merely a Surname:
Section 2(e)(5) - Functionality:
Failure to Function:
Genericness:
Use in Commerce/Specimen of Use:
Concurrent Use:
Fraud:
Laches:
Lack of Bona Fide Intent:
Discovery/Evidence/Procedure:
CAFC Oral Aguments:
CAFC Decisions:
Recommended Reading:
Other:
Text Copyright John L. Welch 2013.

posted by John L. Welch @ 6/28/2013   0 comments

Thursday, June 27, 2013

Finding Likely Confusion With REGISTERED MAIL, TTAB Cancels Registrations For REGISTERED E-MAIL and (R)EGISTERED E-MAIL

The Board cancelled registrations for the marks REGISTERED E-MAIL and (R)EGISTERED E-MAIL for electronic message delivery services "equivalent to registered mail," finding the marks likely to cause confusion with the common law mark REGISTERED MAIL, owned by the U.S. Postal Service for secure mail delivery services. However, the Board dismissed the USPS's oppositions to registration of (R)ETURN RECEIPT and (R)EGISTERED RECEIPT, finding those two marks neither merely descriptive of the services nor falsely suggestive of a connection with the USPS. United States Postal Service v. RPost International Ltd., Oppositions Nos. 91158431 and 91158514 and Cancellations Nos. 92044260 and 92043665 (June 17, 2013) [not precedential] [affirmed per curiam by the CAFC, April 10, 2015].


Likelihood of confusion: USPS established use of the REGISTERED MAIL mark since 1855 in connection with mail delivery services. Nonetheless, the Board deemed it (without explanation) a "very weak mark." The similarities between REGISTERED MAIL and the two registered marks of RPost International, REGISTERED E-MAIL and (R)EGISTERED E-MAIL, "far outweigh the differences."

Third-party registrations showed that various entities provide paper mail delivery, package delivery, and tracking services, as well as electronic messaging and related proof-of-delivery services. Therefore the Board concluded that the involved services are related. Although the respective services may be marketed in different channels of trade, the consumers are the same. The lack of actual confusion evidence was outweighed by the other duPont factors.

And so the Board sustained the petitions to cancel on the Section 2(d) ground.


Section 2(a): False suggestion of a connection: USPS asserted this ground against all four of Applicant's marks, but the Board noted the lack of explanation as to how RPost's marks are a "close approximation" of USPS's identity, or how they uniquely point to USPS's identity. And USPS "failed to argue or establish that REGISTERED MAIL is synonymous with its identity such that the requisite connection would be presumed."

Mere Descriptiveness: USPS contended that three of RPost's marks are merely descriptive of its services: (R)EGISTERED E-MAIL, (R)ETURN RECEIPT, and (R)EGISTERED RECEIPT. RPost disclaimed the words "Registered E-Mail," "Return Receipt," and "Registered Receipt." [USPS did not claim trademark rights in the phrases "Return Receipt" or "Registered Receipt"].

The evidence indicated that typing “(R)” in the subject header of an email is a method of triggering RPost's services. However, USPS failed to demonstrate how that feature, "viewed in the context of defendant’s involved marks, renders them merely descriptive." Consumers viewing the marks would perceive not just the wording, but the "additional significance of '(R)' and understand the marks to suggest, rather than merely describe, a number of functions or features of the services."

The Board observed that this is not a case where the addition of punctuation does not change the meaning of a word or term. Instead, RPost has placed parentheses around a single letter "in a novel manner that imparts a significance thereto beyond the wording."

And so the Board denied the Section 2(e)(1) claims.

In sum, the Board granted the petitions for cancellation on Section 2(d) grounds, but dismissed the oppositions, which were brought on Section 2(a) and 2(e)(1) grounds.

Read comments and post your comments here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2013.

posted by John L. Welch @ 6/27/2013   1 comments

Wednesday, June 26, 2013

Test Your TTAB Judge-Ability: Are Pet Apparel and Human Clothing Related?

This applicant sought to register the mark PAWS4PEACE in the design form shown below left, for "pet clothing, pet collars, pet leashes, overnight bags/tote bags for pets, [and] pet carriers." The PTO refused registration under Section 2(d) in view of the two registered marks: PAWS FOR PEACE in standard character form and the design mark shown below right, both for "human apparel, namely, shirts, sweat shirts, socks, pajamas, hats; footwear, namely, sneakers and shoes." Was Examining Attorney Zhaleh Delaney barking up the wrong tree? How do you think this came out? In re Paws4Peace, LLC Serial No. 85215720 (May 29, 2013) [not precedential].


The marks:  The Board noted that both designs comprise fanciful paw prints with the metacarpal pad replaced by a peace symbol. Both marks "conjure up a sentiment of integration involving animals and peace." The wording in Applicant's mark, PAWS4PEACE, articulates "the same or a very similar expression created by the registered design mark." Therefore the wording does not outweigh the similarities between the design portion of these two marks.

The record evidence did not show that "paw and peace symbol" designs are commonplace. Applicant pointed to one third-party registration for a similar design for clothing, but that dog wouldn't hunt: there was no evidence as to whether that mark is in use, or whether the consuming public has any familiarity with it.

As to the registered word mark, the wording in the applied-for mark is essentially equivalent. The inclusion of the design in Applicant's mark has lessened significance since it reinforces the commercial impression of the literal portion.

In sum, the Board found applicant's mark to be "very similar" to the two cited marks.

The goods:  Internet evidence showed that pet clothing and human clothing may emanate from a common source, and further that pet owners sometimes purchase pet clothing to match their own.

Ralph Lauren dog polo shirt

The Board found it likely that "consumers, upon encountering both marks being used on the respective goods, would mistakenly believe that the pet and human clothing are intended to be complementary by matching and, therefore, originate from the same source."

Classes of customers: The Board perceptively pointed out that pet owners, not pets, purchase pet clothing, and therefore there is clearly an overlap in customers for human and pet apparel.

And so the Board affirmed the refusal to register.

Read comments and post your comments here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2013.

posted by John L. Welch @ 6/26/2013   4 comments

Tuesday, June 25, 2013

TTAB Affirms Failure-to-Function Refusal of Universal Peace Symbol

Craigslist, Inc. applied to register "a peace symbol" in the color purple, as a service mark for various on-line services, but the PTO refused registration under Sections 1, 2 and 45 of the Trademark Act on the ground that the purported mark is a universal symbol that cannot be registered without the addition  of distinctive matter. The Board agreed with the PTO. In re Craigslist, Inc., Serial Nos. 77956067; 77956069; 779560701 (May 31, 2013) [not precedential].


Evidence submitted by Examining Attorney Marc J. Leipzig demonstrated that the proposed mark "is the universal symbol that conveys the message of supporting peace," and that "the peace symbol is commonly used in virtually any context and always conveys the message of peace." Therefore  "without the addition of distinctive matter, the peace symbol cannot serve a source-indicating function and may not be appropriated by one entity."

Section 1202.17 of the TMEP deals with "universal symbols." A universal symbol fails to function as a mark "because it only imparts information, conveys an informational message, or provides ornamentation,” and its significance is based on the underlying message and not on any source-identifying function.

The Examining Attorney argued that the peace symbol is a "pervasive universally-recognized symbol (and has been for over fifty years) that would not be perceived as belonging to any one party or separating one person’s goods or services from those of another party.…" Instead it is "ubiquitous, non-distinctive icon, instantly recognizable to the general public in any context." The Board agreed.

Applicant Craigslist pointed to several third-party registrations for mark comprising the peace symbol, but in each case the mark included other distinctive elements. For example:


Craigslist also pointed to its prior registration of a peace symbol for downloadable software, arguing that its prior registration "demonstrates secondary source." The Board, however, ruled that the peace symbol is unregistrable and "cannot be considered as a secondary source or acquire distinctiveness based on its prior registration." The prior actions of the PTO in granting a registration are not binding on the Board, since each case must be decided on its own merits.

Addition of the color purple did not help Craigslist because the evidence showed the peace symbol used in the color purple in a variety of contexts. In short "the overall impact and impression of the universally-known peace symbol remains unchanged."


Because the Board found that the standard peace symbol does not function as a mark and is unregistrable, it was unnecessary to address Craigslist's claim of acquired distinctiveness.

And so the Board affirmed the refusal.

Read comments and post your comment here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2013.

posted by John L. Welch @ 6/25/2013   3 comments

Monday, June 24, 2013

CAFC Reverses TTAB Dismissal, Finding No Issue or Claim Preclusion from Levi's Failed "Stitch Design" Lawsuit

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed a TTAB decision (here) that had dismissed, on the ground of issue preclusion, an opposition and a cancellation proceeding brought by Levi Strauss over a stitching design created by Abercrombie & Fitch. After the TTAB proceedings were commenced, Levi sued Abercrombie for trademark infringement and dilution. In 2009, both claims were dismissed in separate judgments, but the dilution ruling was later overturned by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and in 2011 Levi opted to dismiss that claim. The CAFC ruled that neither issue preclusion nor claim preclusion was applicable to the TTAB proceedings. Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., 107 USPQ2d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

Abercrombie & Fitch

In the district court action, the jury found that Abercrombie's design, appearing only on a line of jeans sold in Ruehl stores, did not infringe Levi's trademark, and the district court then ruled against Levi on the dilution claim. Levi appealed only from the dilution ruling, and the Ninth Circuit overturned that ruling on the ground that the district court had applied the wrong standard.

While the Ninth Circuit appeal was pending, Abercrombie shut down the Ruehl brand, but announced that it would use the design on a new brand, Gilley Hicks. After remand to the district court, Abercrombie refused to agree to add the Gilley Hicks line to the lawsuit, and the district court declined to allow Levi to amend its complaint to add that line. Levi then moved to voluntarily dismiss its dilution claim, and judgment was so entered in 2011.

When the proceedings resumed at the TTAB, Abercrombie moved for summary judgment on the grounds of both claim and issue preclusion. The TTAB ruled that claim preclusion was inapplicable because of the "significant differences" between the facts required to establish infringement in court, and those required for cancellation at the TTAB. However, the Board entered summary judgment on the issue preclusion ground.

The CAFC ruled that, as to dilution, because the district court's original 2009 judgment was reversed on appeal it could not support either claim or issue preclusion. The only existing judgments were the court's 2009 ruling of no infringement and its 2011 judgment dismissing the dilution claim on Levi's motion.

Levi Strauss

Issue Preclusion: The 2011 judgment on dilution was "only a voluntary dismissal with prejudice," and therefore has no issue-preclusive effect. It was not dependent on any findings that supported the later-overturned 2009 dilution judgment. It did not decide any issue at all.

So the only possible basis for issue preclusion was the court's 2009 judgment on infringement, "[b]ut that judgment cannot bar Levi Strauss's challenged in the opposition and cancellation proceedings ....The PTO proceedings involve a much broader set of issues than were presented to, or therefore adjudicated in, that court." The district court focused on whether the Ruehl-line of products was likely to cause confusion vis-a-vis Levi's mark. The only findings adverse to Levi "were findings that the specific Ruehl-line uses - on particular products, which Abercrombie sold in particular ways at particular prices - were not infringing."

An opposition or cancellation proceeding "requires consideration not only of what the applicant has already marketed or has stated the intention to market, but of all the items for which registration is sought." Mayer/Berkshire, 424 F.3d at 1233. Because Abercrombie seeks to register a broad class of goods—“clothing, namely, jeans, skirts, shorts, pants and jackets”—without providing further limitations, the scope of the registrations at issue exceeds what the parties litigated in the district court.

Claim preclusion: The CAFC concluded that Board's decision could not be affirmed on the alternative ground of claim preclusion because the TTAB proceedings and the district court action do not involve the same transactional facts, "pragmatically judged."

As to the 2009 infringement judgment, the CAFC's decisions in Jet and Mayer/Berkshire are right on point: both cases held that the "array of differences in transactional facts conclusively demonstrates that claim preclusion cannot serve to bar" the TTAB proceedings. However, the 2011 dilution judgment is not "squarely covered" by those two precedents because they did not involve an earlier dilution claim.

The CAFC observed that, in deciding a dilution claim, a court may consider all relevant factors. "Under that standard, even if (as we need not decide) a dilution case brought in district court might try to cover the same full set of transactional facts relevant to a registration proceeding, a dilution case need not be so broad." In fact, Levi's dilution claim was understood to challenge only the stitching design on the Ruehl line of clothing, not the full range of possible uses that Abercrombie sought to cover in its trademark application and registration.

Just as the "actual confusion" inquiry under Section 2(d) can change as uses change, so can the dilution inquiry, and particularly the "association" and "intent" inquiries required by Section 43(c).

The pragmatic policies of claim preclusion do not support ignoring such differences. Nor do they justify inviting a two-stage strategy by a rival hoping to dilute a famous mark—start with a use that is hardest to prove dilutive, defeat the famous-mark owner’s challenge to that use, and then introduce more obviously dilutive uses of the very same mark with an impunity given by claim preclusion. For such reasons, the judgment on Levi Strauss’s dilution claim in district court does not preclude the PTO challenges any more than the judgment on its infringement claim does.

And so the appellate court reversed the TTAB's decision.

Read comments and post your comments here.

TTABlog note: You may recall that last year, a divided panel of the CAFC affirmed a TTAB dismissal on the ground of issue preclusion, in a case involving ownership of rights in the Winnie-the-Pooh marks. TTABlogged here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2013.

posted by John L. Welch @ 6/24/2013   0 comments

Friday, June 21, 2013

Precedential No. 23: CHEMIN DES PAPES Not Confusable with CHATEAUNEUF-DU-PAPE CONTROLE for Wine, Says TTAB

Deeming the first duPont factor to be dispositive, the Board dismissed this opposition to registration of the mark CHEMIN DES PAPES for "wines, sparkling wines," finding the mark not likely to cause confusion with the registered mark CHATEAUNEUF-DU-PAPE CONTRÔLÉ & Design, shown below, for wine. Furthermore, in a significant ruling, the Board held that the opposed application was not void in its entirety due to Applicant's (admitted) lack of bona fide intent to use the mark on "distilled spirits and liquors." Instead the Board ordered that those goods be stricken from the application. Syndicat Des Proprietaires Viticulteurs De Chateauneuf-Du-Pape v. Pasquier DesVignes, 107 USPQ2d 1930 (TTAB 2013) [precedential].


Likelihood of confusion: As explained more fully in the opinion, Opposer is an association, or syndicate, of winegrowners, and is a member of the Chateauneuf-du-Pape AOC ("appellation d'origine controlee). These wine producers make wine from grapes grown only in the Chateauneuf-du-Pape territory of France. The designation "Chateauneuf-du-Pape" may be used by any producer whose wine has been fermented from grapes of permitted varieties grown in the defined Chateauneuf-du-Pape AOC territory.

Applicant is an independent negociant that sells wine, including wine lawfully labeled "Appellation Cotes du Rhone Controlee." It sells that wine under the opposed mark. Cotes du Rhone is an AOC within the Rhone valley.

Opposer claimed rights in the word mark or designation CHATEAUNEUF-DU-PAPE but the Board concluded that the evidence failed to establish that this term is a common law regional certification mark for wine, or that Opposer is the rightful owner of that mark. The record showed that other organizations act to prevent unauthorized use of the Chateauneuf-du-Pape AOC, and further that the INAO (Institut National Des Appellations D'Origine) controls the use of the AOC "Chateauneuf-du-Pape" designation as a certification of geographic origin and quality and type of grapes grown, cultivated, fermented, and bottled in the territory.

Turning to the registered word-and-design mark shown above, Opposer claimed that the mark is famous. The Board found, however, that although "Chateauneuf-du-Pape" is well-known in this country as a type of wine that comes from a specific territory in France, the evidence of sales and media attention submitted by Opposer did not focus on the registered mark and failed to establish its fame.

As to the marks themselves, the Board concluded that Opposer's registered mark is dominated by its design elements, since "Chateauneuf-du-Pape" is a weak source indicator - at least vis-a-vis Opposer - because it does not identify Opposer or its members as the single source of that wine. The registered mark "is just as likely to be remembered by the design of the papal insignia, which is unique to opposer."

Applicant's mark CHEMIN DES PAPES means, in French, "the way (or road) of the popes." The words in Opposer's mark mean "new castle of the pope." These terms are visually and orally different and evoke very different commercial impressions. "[T]o those familiar with the history of Rhone Valley wine and the road built by or to commemorate the pope, there is an even further attenuation as applicant's mark suggests this historical road, while opposer's does not." And to purchasers who do not know French, there is even less chance of confusion.


Third-party registration and website evidence, along with testimony from Applicant's wine expert, showed that there are other wines sold under marks that include the word "pape" or pope," leading the Board to conclude that "pape" is a weak element, present in many third-party marks.

The Board recognized that the identified goods are identical and the presumed channels of trade and classes of consumers are the same. However, it deemed the dissimilarity between the marks to be dispositive:

When viewed in their entireties, giving due weight to the components of each mark, and taking into account the weakness of the term "Chateauneuf-du-Pape Contrôlé," and the weakness of “pape” due to other uses, the presence of the term “pape” as the only common element in both parties’ marks is an insufficient basis for finding applicant's mark to create a likelihood of confusion. We find instead that confusion is not likely. Indeed, the first du Pont factor outweighs all of the other factors.

Lack of bona fide intent: The Board granted the opposition with respect to "distilled spirits and liquors," since Applicant conceded that it lacked a bona fide intent to use its mark for those goods. However, the Board declined to declare the entire application void, citing The Wet Seal, Inc. v. FD Management, Inc., 82 USPQ2d 1629 (TTAB 2007) ("an application will not be deemed void for lack of a bona fide intention to use absent proof of fraud, or proof of a lack of bona fide intention to use the mark on all of the goods identified in the application, and not just some of them."). It ordered that the identification of goods in the opposed application be amended to delete "distilled spirits and liquors."

Read comments and post your comments here.

TTABlog note: The Board answered the question posed in this TTABlog post: TTABlog Query: What's the Remedy When a Party Proves Lack of Bona Fide Intent?, which noted a conflict between the Wet Seal decision and the Board's ruling in Spirits International, B.V. v. S.S. Taris Zeytin Ve Zeytinyagi Tarim Satis Kooperatifleri Birligi, 99 USPQ2d 1545 (TTAB 2011).

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2013.

posted by John L. Welch @ 6/21/2013   0 comments

Thursday, June 20, 2013

TTAB Reverses 2(d) Refusal of BACIO: Not Confusable with KISS for Restaurant Services

The Board reversed a Section 2(d) refusal to register the mark BACIO for hotel, bar, and restaurant services, finding it not likely to cause confusion with the mark KISS & Design, shown below, for restaurant and coffee house services.  Although the application stated that the English translation of the Italian word "bacio" is "kiss," the Board found dispositive the differences in sound, appearance, and overall commercial impression. In re Tropicana Las Vegas, Inc., Serial No. 85450247 (June 4, 2013) [not precedential].


Applicant argued that its restaurant is "an Italian trattoria in [a] Las Vegas hotel featuring white linens and fresh flowers," whereas the cited mark "signifies the iconic rock band Kiss and is used in connection with Kiss-themed coffeehouses and/or casual restaurants decorated with neon lights and Kiss memorabilia." The Board, however, pointed out for the umpteenth time that it cannot consider such distinctions because they are not reflected in the subject application or cited registration. Therefore, the involved services are considered in part identical, and this duPont factor favored a finding of likely confusion.

As to the marks, they have no visual similarity to each other. The Board noted that Applicant's standard character mark might be used in any font, size, style or color, but "even if applicant’s mark were displayed in a style of lettering highly similar to that of registrant’s mark, the two marks would still not be visually similar." With regard to sound, the Board saw no similarity between the marks, "regardless of whether applicant’s mark is pronounced as an Italian word or in any likely alternative pronunciation."

Applicant argued that "bacio" has other meanings in other languages, such as Portuguese, Croatian, Serbian, Spanish and Latin. But even if true, that does not make the Italian significance irrelevant: those who understand the Italian meaning of BACIO are not immune from confusion by the fact that others may translate BACIO differently.

Applicant also contended that the doctrine of foreign equivalents should not be applied because the PTO failed to show that an appreciable number of consumers would "stop and translate" the mark. The Board noted that it has frequently applied the doctrine to Italian terms with little or no discussion regarding how many Americans speak the language. And even if, as Applicant asserted, only 0.384% percent of the U.S. population speaks Italian at home, that would still amount to more than one million people. The Board therefore saw no reason to ignore the English meaning of BACIO.

The Board, however, perceived a "meaningful distinction" in the overall commercial impressions of the two marks, even though both "bacio"and "kiss" suggest "a loving or affectionate gesture." It observed, however, that the cited mark

contains suggestions that run contrary to the impression of a loving or affectionate gesture. The stylized lettering is jagged, aggressive, and perhaps threatening. The stylized letters SS suggest lightning bolts and the style of the mark creates an impression that, when combined with the standard meaning of "kiss," is incongruous. Such incongruity is absent from applicant’s mark. Accordingly, we find the overall commercial impressions created by the two marks to be quite different.

The Board concluded that the dissimilarities in sound, appearance, and overall commercial impression outweighed the similarity in meaning, and so it reversed the refusal.


 Read comments and post your comments here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2013.

posted by John L. Welch @ 6/20/2013   7 comments

Wednesday, June 19, 2013

Test Your TTAB Judge-Ability: Is "SW3 UK" Geographically Deceptively Misdescriptive of Clothing?

The PTO refused registration of the mark SW3 UK & Design, shown below, for women's clothing, deeming it to be primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive under Section 2(e)(3). Applicant Lankshear admitted that SW3 is a London postal code for the Chelsea district, but denied that relevant consumers would know that fact. How do you think this came out? In re John Lankshear, Serial No. 85239139 (June 6, 2013) [not precedential].


To support a Section 2(e)(3) refusal, the PTO must first show that the place named in the mark is generally known to relevant consumers, and not remote or obscure. Purchasers must readily recognize the designation as the name of a geographical place, and not merely as an arbitrary term being used as a trademark.

The Examining Attorney maintained that the designation SW3 is synonymous with the Chelsea District of London, famous for its shopping and designer clothing boutiques. Therefore, he asserted, consumers would assume that Applicant's goods come from England. He relied on various Internet pages referring to various stores within the SW3 postal area, and to a Wikipedia entry referring to "Swinging Chelsea."

Applicant argued that the general purchasing public is not aware of the fact that SW3 refers to the Chelsea District of London. Furthermore, he pointed to a several registered marks that refer to zip codes or postal codes (SW2, SW3, SW4, BEVERLY HILLS 91210 & design, DR. 90210, and 33139).

The Board focused on the words SW3 and UK, observing that the crown design and the disclaimed word BESPOKE have "less probative significance" in the Section 2(e)(3) analysis.

There was no dispute that SW3 connotes a geographical location. The question was "how many people in the United States would know the geographical significance of SW3? That is, how many American consumers would know that SW3 identifies the district of Chelsea in particular?"

The Board found the PTO's evidence "inadequate to show that an average American consumer purchasing women's clothing would, upon seeing applicant's mark, conclude that it relates to a neighborhood in London, namely, Chelsea." Even if consumers recognized that SW3 is a British postal code, "there is little evidence that they would recognize it as the code for Chelsea." The designation UK, appearing in very small letters, "does nothing to aid prospective consumers in identifying Chelsea." The Board concluded that the geographical significance of SW3 to the average American consumer is so minor or obscure that it must be considered an arbitrary designation for applicant's goods.

Moreover, to the extent that consumers recognize the meaning of SW3, it would connote a "trendy style, viewed more as evoking an attitude of a place. As to the third-party registrations, only one (33139) covered clothing, but the Board saw no reason to deviate from PTO practice of registering such marks, absent a stronger showing by the PTO.

Finally, the Board noted that the evidence was also insufficient to show a goods/place association with Chelsea, i.e., that Chelsea is associated with the production of clothing.

And so the Board reversed the refusal.

 Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog note: for a collection of Section 2(e)(3) cases, go here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2013..

posted by John L. Welch @ 6/19/2013   3 comments

Tuesday, June 18, 2013

Precedential No. 22: WYHA? TTAB Affirms Failure-to-Function Refusal of "No More RINOs!" for Bumper Stickers, T-Shirts, and Buttons

This applicant sought to register the phrase No More RINOs!, in standard character form, for bumper stickers, clothing, and campaign buttons, but the Board affirmed the PTO's refusal to register under Sections 1, 2, and 45 on the ground that the applied-for mark is a merely ornamental or informational political slogan that fails to function as a trademark. Would you have appealed? In re Thomas J. Hulting d/b/a No More RINOs! Enterprises, 107 USPQ2d 1175 (TTAB 2013) [precedential].


The Board observed that "there are certain designations that are inherently incapable of functioning as trademarks to identify and distinguish the source of products in connection with which they are used." Common laudatory phrases ordinarily used in business or in a particular trade or industry are not registrable (E.g., ONCE A MARINE, ALWAYS A MARINE; DRIVE SAFELY; and THINK GREEN). [How about ALWAYS THINK SAFELY LIKE A GREEN MARINE? - ed.].

The key issue, of course, is how the designation in question would be perceived by relevant consumers. In that context, the Board must consider how the proposed mark is displayed on the specimens of use: the size, location, dominance, and significance of the alleged mark are all relevant factors.

Examining Attorney Tricia Sonneborn submitted evidence that "No More RINOs!" is a commonly-used political slogan meaning "No More Republicans In Name Only." The evidence showed that consumers are accustomed to seeing that phrase on bumper stickers, t-shirts, novelty pins, and other items, from a variety of sources. Consequently, they will not perceive this phrase as a source indicator, but rather as a political message or statement.

Moreover, the size, placement, and dominance of the wording on Applicant's specimens of use are consistent with informational or ornamental use, not trademark use. Even though the phrase as displayed on Applicant's t-shirt (above) is smaller than on its other specimens of use, "given the significance of the phrase, it does not have the commercial impression of a source indicator."

Applicant pointed to its substitute specimens of use [see example below], which added the tagline "By Statesman Enterprises." However, the inclusion of that tagline on the specimens made no difference in the Board's analysis, since it is not part of the applied-for mark. Finally, Applicant's intent that the slogan should function as a trademark is likewise irrelevant.


And so the Board affirmed the refusal.

Read comments and post your comment here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2013.

posted by John L. Welch @ 6/18/2013   6 comments

Monday, June 17, 2013

Precedential No. 21: TTAB Dismisses Belatedly-Filed Opposition, Rejects Claim of Privity With Extension Recipient

The Board dismissed this opposition for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of opposition was filed too late. Opposer Renaissance Rialto claimed the benefit of an extension of time to oppose that was obtained by a third-party, Lakeside Cinema, by way of a "Transfer Agreement," but the Board ruled that Opposer failed to show that Lakeside used the mark that it purported to transfer or that Opposer and Lakeside were in the position of parent-subsidiary, licensor-licensee, or any other relationship of privity. Renaissance Rialto Inc. v. Ky Boyd, 107 USPQ2d 1083 (TTAB 2013) [precedential].


Applicant Boyd sought to register the mark RIALTO CINEMAS for movie theaters. Opposer Renaissance Rialto instituted the opposition on November 23, 2010, claiming, inter alia, likelihood of confusion and genericness. The original opposition deadline was October 7, 2010. The third-party, Lakeside Cinema had obtained an extension of time to January 5, 2011 to file an opposition, but Lakeside did not file a notice of opposition. Instead, it executed a "Transfer Agreement" purporting to transfer to Opposer its right to initiate and prosecute this opposition. The question, then, was whether Opposer may claim the benefit of the extension of time granted to Lakeside.

Under Rule 2.102(b), the party filing an opposition during an extended period for filing must have obtained the extension of time in its own name or must be in privity with the person that obtained the extension of time. The concept of "privity" includes, among other things, the relationship of successive ownership of a mark. See TBMP Section 206.02. The Board therefore looked to the terms of the Transfer Agreement to see whether Lakeside effectively transferred its right to oppose (and the benefit of the extension of time to do so). "Typically, the right to go forward with an opposition may be transferred when the opposer, or its pleaded mark and the goodwill associated therewith, has been acquired by another party." SDT Inc. v. Patterson Dental Co., 30 USPQ2d 1707, 1709 (TTAB 1994).

The Transfer Agreement, dated November 1, 2010, recited that Lakeside owned a leasehold interest in a movie theater, that for several years prior to Lakeside obtaining said interest the theater had been operated as "Rialto Cinemas," that Lakeside file a request for extension of time to oppose the instant application, and that Lakeside "has now decided to use a different name." By its terms, the Transfer Agreement assigned to Opposer any right that Lakeside might have to use of the name RIALTO CINEMAS, as well as its right to oppose the subject application pursuant to the extension of time that Lakeside had obtained. [To further complicate matters, the prior leaseholder was Ky Boyd, the applicant here].

The Board, however, found it "not at all clear" from the agreement that Lakeside Cinema ever used the mark or had any goodwill therein to transfer to Opposer Renaissance Rialto. Nothing in the record indicated that Lakeside used the mark in a manner that would create trademark rights that could be transferred to Opposer. Applicant Boyd testified that he did not license use of his mark to Lakeside, nor was he aware of anyone else using the RIALTO CINEMAS mark for movie theaters. Opposer's owner testified that Lakeside had not used that mark, and that the right to oppose that was purportedly transferred was not based on any use of the mark by Lakeside, but rather on "a natural right of a competitor to stop applicant from using what opposer deems to be a generic term."

Therefore, the Board found that the record evidence was insufficient to establish that Lakeside had a proprietary interest in the RIALTO CINEMAS mark. Opposer's acquisition of another's right to oppose, independent of a transfer of trademark rights, is an insufficient basis upon which to assert privity for purposes of claiming the benefit of an extension of time obtained by another person.

Because Opposer's did not timely file its notice of opposition, the Board had no jurisdiction over the matter and it dismissed the opposition, but without prejudice to Opposer's filing a petition for cancellation if and when appropriate.

 Read comments and post your comments here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2013.

posted by John L. Welch @ 6/17/2013   1 comments

Friday, June 14, 2013

Test Your TTAB Judge-Ability: Is “THE ORIGINAL & Oval Design” Merely Descriptive of Kitchen Towels?

The PTO refused registration of the mark shown below under Section 2(e)(1), finding it merely descriptive (laudatory) of “cleaning mitts of cloth and cleaning cloths; dish drying mats made of fabric and foam; gloves for household purposes, namely, dish drying gloves,” and for “kitchen towels and dish cloths.” Moreover, the PTO deemed the stylization of the mark insufficient to support registration on the Principal Register (with the words disclaimed) How do you think this came out? In re Schroeder & Tremayne, Inc., Serial No. 85157275 (May 24, 2013) [not precedential].


Both applicant and Examining Attorney Aretha C. Somerville submitted third-party registrations, some for marsk with the word ORIGINAL disclaimed, some not. This evidence did not reflect any clear PTO policy regarding the word and therefore, although the PTO strives for consistency, in this “battle of the registrations” there is “little persuasive value in the registrations submitted.” See In re Nett Designs Inc., 57 USPQ2d at 1566.

Instead, the Board turned to dictionary definitions to determine whether THE ORIGINAL has a laudatorily descriptive meaning. The Examining Attorney provided definitions of "original" as "new; fresh; inventive; novel: an original way of advertising." The Board also noted the definition "the first and genuine form of something, from which others are derived." The Board concluded that the word "original" "directly conveys the laudatory information that applicant’s goods are new, fresh, novel or the first and genuine form of the goods."

We understand applicant’s argument that it does not claim to be the original maker of kitchen towels and dish cloths, which it says “have certainly existed and been used for as long as kitchens and woven goods have existed.” *** However, it is not necessary that purchasers perceive the mark as describing the originator of the goods in general for ORIGINAL to be found merely descriptive. ORIGINAL is a term that also describes that a product has a new characteristic.

The Board noted, not surprisingly, that the addition of the word THE did not affect the laudatory meaning of ORIGINAL.

Applicant argued in the alternative that the mark as a whole is registrable with a disclaimer of THE ORIGINAL because it has a distinctive stylization and design. The Board referred to its discussion of this issue in In re Sadoru Group Ltd., 105 USPQ2d 1484 (TTAB 2012), in which it extensively analyzed the relevant cases. [TTABlogged here].

The Board found, again not surprisingly, that "the stylization and design elements of applicant’s mark are not sufficient to create a separate and inherently distinctive commercial impression apart from the term itself." The oval background design is common, and the stylized script is in a "rather ordinary font." Furthermore "the 'tildes' on either side of the words are not significant either."

In short, the Board found the subject mark to be "far more similar to the marks in which the stylization/design element was found not to create an inherently distinctive display."

And so the Board affirmed the refusal.

Read comments and post your comments here.



TTABlog comment: This case reminds me that the (ersatz?) rock group Spinal Tap was first called "The Originals," but upon learning of another group that already used that name, they changed to "The New Originals." Do you think THE NEW ORIGINAL would be registrable as inherently distinctive for dish towels? Is it oxymoronic, or merely doubly laudatory?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2013.

posted by John L. Welch @ 6/14/2013   0 comments

Thursday, June 13, 2013

TTAB Enters Summary Judgment: BABY GAGA Confusable With LADY GAGA for Clothing

Lady Gaga put a stop to Adam Swan's attempt to register the mark BABY GAGA for various clothing items, including t-shirts [BABY disclaimed]. The Board granted Opposer's motion for summary judgment, finding the applied-for mark likely to cause confusion with the common law mark LADY GAGA for a number of clothing items, including t-shirts. Ate My Heart Inc. v. Adam Swan, 111 USPQ2d 1564 (TTAB 2014) [not precedential].


The Board first considered the issue of standing, noting that Opposer had failed to properly make its registrations of record. Opposer submitted photocopies of the registrations (rather than certified status-and-title copies, or proper TESS documents), accompanied by a declaration stating only that Opposer owns the registrations: nothing about the status of the registrations. Consequently, Opposer had to rely on its common law rights in the LADY GAGA mark.

A declaration from Opposer's CEO established that Opposer has continuously used the LADY GAGA trademark for clothing since 2008, including at the on-line Lady Gaga official store, a date prior to Applicant Snow's filing date. Snow did not provide any evidence of use of his mark, nor did he contest standing.

Opposer claimed that the LADY GAGA mark is famous, submitting copies of magazine covers and media articles featuring Lady Gaga and pointing out that since 2008, Lady Gaga has sold more than 23 million albums and 64 million singles worldwide, that both Time Magazine and Forbes included Lady Gaga in its annual Time 100 list of most influential people, that Forbes placing her as number seven on their annual list of the World’s 100 Most Powerful Women, that Lady Gaga has received numerous awards and industry acknowledgements, and that she has been featured in several fashion magazines, including Vogue, Vanity Fair, and Elle. Applicant Swan "essentially conceded" that the mark LADY GAGA is famous by acknowledging Opposer’s contention that "so famous is she, when people say 'Gaga'  in 'press and in casual reference,' they mean her."

As to clothing, however, the evidence did not, as required, clearly establish fame, and so the Board could not conclude that there was no genuine dispute as to the fame of LADY GAGA with respect to clothing. However, because the Board did not, in its further analysis, treat the mark as famous, Opposer’s evidence on this factor did not raise a genuine dispute as to a material fact that would preclude the entry of summary judgment.

With regard to channels of trade, the opposed application did not include any limitation or restriction, and so the Board must presume that applicant’s goods will be travel in all normal channels (to all the usual classes of purchasers), which would include sales to the general public via the Internet.

Turning to the marks, because the goods are identical in part (t-shirts), the degree of similarity between the marks necessary to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is decreased. There was no dispute that the marks are similar. "GAGA combined with LADY or BABY does not have any particular meaning that is apparent to us, and applicant has not pointed to any particular meaning for its mark."

Applicant contended that "any determination that there is no genuine dispute that the marks are similar is based on speculation because applicant has not yet sold his 'Baby Gaga clothing.' The Board brushed that aside, since actual use of the marks at issue is not necessary in order to to determine whether there is a genuine dispute as to the similarity of the marks: the test is likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion.

Therefore, the Board found no genuine dispute over the similarity of the marks in terms of appearance, sound, and commercial impression.

Finally, the Board turned to Swan's affirmative defense of "unclean hands." He claimed that Lady Gaga committed copyright infringement by using in her name, a part of the title of a third party’s musical recording ("Radio Ga-Ga/I Go Crazy" as recorded by Queen). The Board, however, observed that the defense of unclean hands must be related to Opposer’s claim and it concluded that Swan's was not related (e.g., Swan did not allege that Opposer is not the owner of the mark LADY GAGA).

The Board therefore entered summary judgment on Opposer's Section 2(d) claim. It declined to reach Opposer false connection (2(a)) and dilution claims, giving Opposer thirty days to decide whether it wished to pursue those claims (after proper re-pleading).

Read comments and post your comment here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2013.

posted by John L. Welch @ 6/13/2013   0 comments

Wednesday, June 12, 2013

TTAB Finds TROPICAL ESCAPE for Soap and Air Fresheners Not Confusable

Despite the identity of the marks and the relatedness of the goods, the Board reversed a Section 2(d) refusal to register TROPICAL ESCAPE for "antibacterial soap; bar soap; bath soaps; deodorant soap; liquid soaps; body washes," finding it not likely to cause confusion vis-a-vis the identical mark for room fragrances and air freshening preparations; room perfume sprays, household and room deodorants, and odor neutralizers. Third-party registrations and uses, along with the 13th duPont factor, allowed this Applicant to escape the Tropic of Unregistrability. In re Pure & Natural Company, Serial No. 77433737 (May 13, 2013) [not precedential].


Applicant maintained that TROPICAL ESCAPE is a very weak mark in view of numerous third-party marks used on similar goods. It submitted 30 third-party registrations for marks that include the term TROPICAL or ESCAPE, which marks are used on personal care products, fragrances, scented sprays, and the like. Applicant also made of record 11 third-party Internet printouts showing use of TROPICAL ESCAPE on a variety air fresheners and scented candles.

The Board, however, saw no reason to decide whether TROPICAL ESCAPE is a weak mark for the relevant goods. Instead it found that "the frequent registration of the terms TROPICAL and/or ESCAPE for their suggestive meaning on soaps and detergents as well as on household fragrances and scented sprays together with the evidence of third-party use of TROPICAL ESCAPE on various types of scented products suggests that consumers are able to distinguish the source of these distinctly different scented products bearing similar or even identical names."

As to the relatedness of the goods, the Examining Attorney made of record 9 third-party registrations (including one owned by the applicant), demonstrating that both applicant’s and registrant’s types of goods are offered under a single mark by third parties as well as by Applicant itself. Consequently, this du Pont factor favored a finding of likely confusion.

Under the thirteenth du Pont factor, the Board may consider any other probative facts. Here, Applicant claimed ownership of a prior registration for the identical mark TROPICAL ESCAPE for "laundry detergents; laundry soap; fabric softeners.”

Thus, we are presented with the unusual situation wherein an applicant's existing registration for the same mark for related goods has coexisted with the cited registration for a number of years. When we consider this fact under the thirteenth du Pont factor, we find in this case that this factor weighs heavily in applicant’s favor against a finding of a likelihood of confusion.

Balancing the relevant du Pont factors, the Board found that there is no likelihood of confusion.

Read comments and post your comments here.

 Text Copyright John L. Welch 2013.

posted by John L. Welch @ 6/12/2013   1 comments

Tuesday, June 11, 2013

MERLO'S MERLOT for Wine is Primarily a Surname, Confusable with LAGO DI MERLO, Says TTAB

Applicant Perry David Merlo tripped over two hurdles in his quest for registration of the mark MERLO'S MERLOT for "grape wine; red wine": Sections 2(e)(4) and 2(d) of the Trademark Act. The Board agreed with Examining Attorney Robert J. Struck that the applied-for mark is primarily merely a surname, and further is confusingly similar to the registered mark LAGO DI MERLO for wines. In re Perry David Merlo, Serial No. 85510114 (May 23, 2013) [not precedential].

Section 2(e)(4): The Board did not find MERLO to be "a particularly rare surname." It appeared 866 times in a national directory of surnames, and 2,697 times in the 2000 census. Of course, Applicant's own name was further evidence that MERLO has surname significance. Negative dictionary evidence showed that MERLO has no other meaning in English. [Applicant belatedly submitted evidence that the Italian word "merlo" means "blackbird" in English, but the Board gave that evidence no consideration.]

Finally, MERLO has the "look and feel" of a surname, as evidenced by the fact that the Merlo family of California produces the wine sold under the cited mark LAGO DI MERLO. Use of the possessive MERLO'S by Applicant reinforced the surname significance.

Applicant argued that MERLO’S MERLOT "has a unique meaning above an[d] beyond merely a surname and a generic term” and "constitutes “a play on two similarly sounding words which sound the same and are interchangeable." The Board, however, was unimpressed by this homophonicity, finding that it did not displace or diminish the surname significance of the phrase "in designating a type of good (merlot wine) offered by applicant (Mr. Merlo)."

Section 2(d): The goods of the application and cited registration are legally identical, and the Board must presume (absent any express limitations) that they travel through the same, normal channels of trade to the usual classes of consumers. These factors strongly support the refusal to register. Moreover, when the goods are identical, a lesser degree of similarity between the marks is necessary to support a finding of likely confusion.

The cited mark LAGO DI MERLO translates into English as “Lake of Merlo.” Because there was no dispute regarding this translation, the Board "must therefore assume that the ordinary U.S. consumer familiar with Italian would 'stop and translate' the foreign wording in registrant’s mark to 'Lake of Merlo.' See Palm Bay Imps. Inc., 73 USPQ2d at 1696."

The Board found MERLO and its possessive form, MERLO’S, to be the dominant portions of the respective marks, and further that consumers are likely to view the subject marks as "creating similar commercial impressions." In the cited mark, the Board concluded,  the phrase "LAGO DI" modifies "MERLO." [Seems more like a unitary phrase to me - ed.]  "Given the structure of applicant’s mark, consumers who are familiar with registrant’s LAGO DI MERLO goods would view the term MERLO’S MERLOT, when used in association with applicant’s goods, as designating a particular varietal of registrant’s wines."

Balancing the relevant duPont factors, the Board found confusion likely and it affirmed the Section 2(d) refusal.

Read comments and post your comments here.

TTABlog comment: I disagree with the 2(d) ruling. I don't think the marks are sufficiently similar. The cited mark identifies a lake. The applied-for mark attaches a name to a type of wine.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2013.

posted by John L. Welch @ 6/11/2013   6 comments

Monday, June 10, 2013

Test Your TTAB Judge-Ability On This Mere Descriptiveness Refusal of THE MOSQUITO PATCH & Design for Insect Repellants

The PTO refused registration of the mark shown below [THE MOSQUITO PATCH disclaimed], finding it to be merely descriptive of "insect-repellants" under Section 2(e)(1). In other words, even the design portion of the mark was merely descriptive, and the mark as a whole was not distinctively stylized. The Applicants appealed. How do you think this came out? In re Ronald Bennett and Jacob Fakouri, Serial No. 85485633 (May 13, 2013) [not precedential].


The Board, of course, must consider the mark as a whole when determining mere descriptiveness. By their disclaimer, Applicants conceded the mere descriptiveness of the phrase THE MOSQUITO PATCH. The question, then, was whether the composite mark was merely descriptive.

Applicants feebly argued that the mosquito logo could be used in connection with a number of products and services, "such as a fly swatter, insecticide for plants, exterminator services," etc. Moreover, urged Applicants, the word "patch" may refer to a garden patch, or a patch on clothing to cover up a stain or a hole in a garment. The Board didn't bite. The applied-for mark is not to be considered in the abstract, but in the context of the identified goods. Clearly, the mark conveys information about Applicants' goods: their function is to repel mosquitoes.

Applicant also pointed to seven third-party registrations for marks incorporating images of an insect and the universal prohibition symbol, for insect repellant and extermination services. Examining Attorney Dawn Han countered with five registrations in which the universal symbol and/or a realistic depiction of a bug are/is disclaimed.

The Board pointed out that prior decisions in other applications are not binding on the Board. However, "third-party registrations featuring the same or similar goods as applicants' goods are probative evidence on the issue of descriptiveness where the relevant word or term is disclaimed." Moreover, the design portion of Applicants' mark is merely descriptive of an important feature of the goods: they repel mosquitoes. The applied-for mark "thus comprises two merely descriptive elements that in combination retain their descriptive significance in relation to the goods."

Finally, the Board concluded that the degree of stylization in the applied-for mark "is not sufficiently striking, unique, or distinctive so as to create a commercial impression separate and apart from the other components of the mark."

And so the Board affirmed the refusal.

Read comments and post your comments here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2013.

posted by John L. Welch @ 6/10/2013   3 comments

Friday, June 07, 2013

Precedential No. 20: Cancellation Respondent Can't Undo Voluntary Surrender of Registration

Respondent International Expeditions, rather than answer Christiane E's petition for cancellation on the ground of abandonment, filed a voluntary surrender of the challenged registration without Petitioner’s consent pursuant to Trademark Rule 2.134(a). In such circumstances, the Rule provides that "judgment shall be entered against the respondent." About four months later, and before the Board had acted on the surrender, Expeditions moved to withdraw the surrender. The Board said no dice. Christiane E, LLC v. International Expeditions, Inc., 106 USPQ2d 2042 (TTAB 2013) [precedential].


Although this case presented an issue of first impression for the Board, it found instructive In re Glaxo Group Ltd., 33 USPQ2d 1535 (Comm’r 1993), involving abandonment of an application during ex parte examination. There, when the applicant petitioned to withdraw the abandonment, the Commissioner denied the petition, "noting that such a withdrawal would be allowed 'only in an extraordinary situation' in view of 'the interests of third parties and the administrative requirements of the Office' and determined that '[n]either the applicant's reevaluation of the importance of the mark, nor the fact that the petition was filed before the Office had formally processed the express abandonment is deemed to be an extraordinary situation.'"

The Board found that the principles underlying Glaxo applied here as well. Expeditions voluntarily relinquished an interest and that relinquishment became part of the public record available for inspection by the public and by employees of the PTO, "some of whom may have relied to their detriment on the filing." Furthermore, the voluntary surrender of the challenged registration during the proceeding "directly implicates the concrete rights of petitioner." The Board saw no reason to apply a less stringent standard than that applied in Glaxo.

Expeditions, in justification of its change-of-mind, stated that "it did not know that Petitioner was … formed by a founder of one of the Registrant's predecessors [and that] Petitioner has hired at least one of the Registrant’s employees." That was, the Board observed, not only irrelevant but unsupported by any evidence.

In short, the Board did not find this to be an "extraordinary situation" that would warrant the granting of Expeditions' request to withdraw its surrender.

Read comments and post your comment here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2013.

posted by John L. Welch @ 6/07/2013   2 comments

Thursday, June 06, 2013

TTABlog Collection of Section 2(a) False Connection Cases

Here is a collection of Section 2(a) false connection cases from the TTABlog. There seems to be a fairly even split between cases in which a false connection is found, and those not. Of course, most of these decisions are not precedential, but we know that even non-precedential decisions may be helpful in framing effective arguments and locating precedential support for them.


Section 2(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless it (a) consists of or comprises . . . matter which may . . . falsely suggest a connection with persons living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols."

Note that, for a Section 2(a) claim of false connection, a party need not allege proprietary rights in its name for purposes of standing. "[A] petitioner may have standing by virtue of who petitioner is, that is, its identity." Petróleos Mexicanos v. Intermix S.A., 97 USPQ2d 1403 (TTAB 2010) [precedential]. [TTABlogged here].

The Board follows the CAFC's decision in University of Notre Dame du Lac v. J.C. Gourmet Food Imports Co., 703 F.2d 1372, 217 USPQ 505 (Fed. Cir.1983), aff’g 213 USPQ 594 (TTAB 1982), by applying a four-part test in determining a "false connection" claim under Section 2(a):

1. The mark is the same as, or a close approximation of, the name of or identity previously used by another person;

2. The mark would be recognized as such because it points uniquely and unmistakably to that person;

3. The person named by the mark is not connected with the activities performed by the applicant under the mark; and,

4. The prior user’s name or identity is of sufficient fame or reputation that a connection with such person would be presumed when applicant’s mark is used on applicant’s goods.

Section 2(a) claims are not barred by the five-year statute of limitations of Section 14 of the Act, and therefore a cancellation petitioner will sometimes resort to a Section 2(a) claim when a Section 2(d) claim is already time-barred.


Section 2(a) False Connection Found:


Section 2(a) False Connection Not Found:


Text Copyright John L. Welch 2013.

posted by John L. Welch @ 6/06/2013   0 comments