Thursday, October 30, 2014

TTAB Dismisses AGENTLINK 2(d) Opposition: No Priority and No Fraud

Section 2(d) decisions are a dime-a-dozen at the TTAB, but here's one that at least includes some interesting issues. Lighthouse opposed an application to register the mark AGENTLINK for certain insurance agency and brokerage services, claiming a likelihood of confusion with its allegedly previously-used mark AGENT LINK for marketing, advertising and consulting services in the insurance industry. Opposer Lighthouse also claimed fraud in the filing of the opposed application. Both claims failed. Lighthouse Sales and Marketing, LLC, v. MedLink, Incorporated, Opposition No. 91200752 (October 21, 2014).


Priority: Applicant MedLink sought to tack on to to its use of the AGENTLINK mark, its earlier use of the mark "MedLink." Of course that didn't fly, because tacking requires that the two marks be "legal equivalents." And so applicant was stuck with its fling date of October 21, 2010 as its priority date.

Opposer Lighthouse, on the other hand, failed to establish technical trademark use of its AGENT LINK mark prior to applicant's filing date. Lighthouse first rendered its services no earlier than October 25, 2010, when it executed a contract for the sale of its services to a single customer. In fact, there was no evidence as to when the services were actually performed, but in any case this lone "sale" occurred after applicant's filing date.

Lighthouse, however, asserted that it had earlier use analogous to trademark use. To establish same, it had to prove that its prior use of AGENT LINK was sufficient to create an association in the minds of consumers between its mark and its services. A direct association need not be shown, but opposer had so show that its activities were "reasonably expected to have a substantial impact on the purchasing public" in order to acquire proprietary rights in the mark.

Here, Lighthouse's evidence was insufficient. It acquisition of a fictitious name certificate, a domain name, and a toll-free number, and its contract with an IT firm regarding the sending of emails were activities in the nature of setting up a business. No potential customers were exposed to opposer's mark. Although opposer's website was up and running by April 2010, there was no evicence as to the impact of the use of AGENT LINK on the website: i.e., there was no evidence that anyone actually visited the website. Nor was there any evidence of the effect of Opposer's email campaigns. Opposer had email exchanges with 15 potential customers, too few to "translate into public exposure of AGENT LINK with Opposer."

The Board concluded that these efforts were insufficient to establish use analogous to trademark use. Since opposer had the burden of proof with respect to its claim of priority and likelihood of confusion, its Section 2(d) claim failed.

Fraud: Opposer's fraud claim hinged on the contention that applicant's CEO had actual knowledge of opposer's prior use of the AGENT LINK mark. Therefore, when the CEO signed the application to register, he could not have believed that applicant was entitled to use the AGENTLINK mark and that no other person had the right to use AGENTLINK or a similar variation thereof.

The Board, however, found that the record evidence did not support opposer's claim. Applicant's CEO testified that he had no knowledge of opposer at the time the application was filed, and there was no reason to doubt his testimony. Opposer's assertion that it mailed promotional material to applicant prior to the filing date did not establish that the CEO received and reviewed the material.

Given that fraud must be proven to the hilt, we find that even if Opposer had shown that Applicant had received the solicitation letter and/or email prior to Applicant's executing the application declaration, receipt alone does not prove that Applicant knew that Opposer had any rights, much less, superior rights in the AGENT LINK mark, or that Applicant believed that its use of its mark would be likely to cause confusion. Moreover, the parties’ services are not substantially identical and, therefore, Applicant's belief that there was no likelihood of confusion resulting from the parties’ concurrent use of their respective marks in connection with their respective services was not unreasonable. Quite simply, Opposer's evidence falls far short of meeting the standard of proof for fraud, and its ground that Applicant committed fraud in executing the application declaration is therefore dismissed.

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TTABlog note: A clearly bogus fraud claim. For a successful fraud claim, the rarest of birds, see last month's Nationstar case TTABlogged here].

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2014.

Wednesday, October 29, 2014

WYHA? TTAB Affirms Mere Descriptiveness Refusal of POLITICS FUNNIEST RAP BATTLES

The USPTO refused registration of the mark POLITICS FUNNIEST RAP BATTLES, deeming it merely descriptive of entertainment services featuring scripted and improvised rap battles between political figures. Examining Attorney Christopher Law relied on dictionary definitions of the constituent words, and pointed to the language of Applicant's recitation of services. Would You Have Appealed? In re Wison, Serial No. 85788703 (October 27, 2014) [not precedential].


A combination of descriptive words is not necessarily merely descriptive. The combination may create a unitary mark with a nondescriptive meaning or a bizarre or incongruous meaning. The examining attorney maintained that the individual words are descriptive and the combination is merely descriptive and laudatory of the services.

Applicant Dan Wison lamely, and rather incoherently, argued as follows:

The characteristics of Applicant’s services are such that they are suggestive and descriptive at the same time. Upon perception of the mark, the consumer may recognize
that [it] is for video content. However, the mark only suggests at the show’s format. The mark suggests that [sic] show involves politics and rap battles, but it does not reveal much about the content, how it is structured, or who is performing.

The Board was understandably unimpressed, and it agreed with the examining attorney: "the phrase POLITICS FUNNIEST RAP BATTLES immediately informs potential consumers of Applicant's entertainment services about the subject matter or content of the material, namely funny rap battles involving politics or in Applicant's words, 'rap battles between political figures.'"

Applicant Wison further asserted that there are "any number of other alternative marks that a competitor could use to describe a similar service." The Board pointed out, however, that the existence of other descriptive terms "does not redeem an otherwise merely descriptive word or phrase."

Finally, Applicant contended that competitors do not need to use the applied-for mark to describe their services, and that he was not aware of any other entity using the same phrase for entertainment services. The Board observed once again, however, that even if applicant were the first and only user of the mark, the mark would still be merely descriptive under Section 2(e)(1).

And so the Board affirmed the refusal.

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TTABlog comment: Well, would you have?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2014.

Tuesday, October 28, 2014

TTAB TEST: Are Bath Salts and Customer Loyalty Programs Related for Section 2(d) Purposes?

Anthropologie and Urban Outfitters opposed an application to register the mark ANTHO in the form shown here, for bath salts, baths soaps, cosmetics, and other personal products, claiming a likelihood of confusion with the common law mark ANTHRO for a customer loyalty program rendered in conjunction with opposers' retail store and Internet services featuring beauty and cosmetic products. The Board, not surprisingly, found the marks to be very similar in sound, appearance, and overall commercial impression. But are the services and goods related? Anthropologie, Inc. and Urban Outfitters Wholesale, Inc. v. Happy Green Company LLC, Opposition No. 91204412 (October 21, 2014) [not precedential].


Opposers contendedt that "Anthro" is used by its customers as a nickname or abbreviation for the store, Anthropologie, and as a reference to opposers' goods (clothing) or services, but the Board was not impressed. Although on rare occasion the Board has stated that even if a company has not itself used a term as a trademark, it still may have a protectable property right in the term [think IBM and BIG BLUE] if the public has come to associate the term with the company or its goods and services.

However, the use by the public of a term to refer to a company and/or its products or services does not mean that the company has obtained rights to exclude others from using the same term for [every] product or service, and it certainly does not mean that the company has obtained rights to register the term as a mark for [every] product or service.

Here, the evidence did not show that opposers sell beauty and cosmetic products under the ANTHROPOLOGIE mark. In short, Opposers failed to establish rights in the word ANTHRO for anything other than their customer loyalty program services.

However, the Board found that Opposer's loyalty program services, rendered in connection with their retail and Internet services featuring beauty and cosmetic products (under third-party marks) "are similar to" Applicant's personal care products. Noting that "it is well recognized" that when the same mark or similar marks are used for goods and for retail services featuring those goods, confusion is likely, the Board concluded that this du Pont factor favored opposers.

Furthermore the involved goods and services are offered through the same type of trade channels, and the purchasers would overlap. The goods and services are subject to "impulse purchase." [Loyalty programs are subject to impulse purchase? - ed.]. And Opposers "have enjoyed success with their loyalty program services under the mark ANTHRO." [So that means it's a strong mark? Or is it just a good program? - ed.]. The record was devoid of any third-party use of the same or similar marks.

Balancing the relevant du Pont factors, the Board found confusion likely and it sustained the opposition.

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TTABlog comment: Well, what do you think?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2014.

Monday, October 27, 2014

TTAB Dismisses Narrowly-Pleaded Section 2(d) Opposition to "Simplicity Hair Oil Blend"

The Board dismissed a Section 2(d) opposition to registration of Simplicity Hair Oil Blend, in standard character form, for "oils for hair conditioning" [HAIR OIL BLEND disclaimed], finding the mark not likely to cause confusion with the registered mark SIMPLICITY for "addin and add-on hair accessories, namely, artificial hair constructed primarily of human hair." Applicant Kelly neither submitted evidence nor filed a brief, and so only the single pleaded registration was considered by the Board.  Emminence, LLC v. Lisa Kelly, Opposition No. 91205286 (October 8, 2014) [not precedential].


Not surprisingly, the Board found the marks to be similar in connotation and  commercial impression, since SIMPLICITY is the first and dominant portion of the applied-for mark.

As for the goods, Opposer claimed to have broader rights that those provided by its registration. Relying on the "zone of natural expansion" doctrine and on its alleged common law rights, Opposer
asserted use of its mark on shampoos, conditioners, and conditioning oils, and urged that applicant's goods are nearly identical, or within opposer's zone of expansion.

Asserting that applicant had acted in bad faith, opposer pointed out that after the opposition was filed, applicant altered her packaging so that the word "Simplicity" in a vertical display, with the words "Hair Oil Display" greatly reduced in size.

The Board was sympathetic to opposer's position, but opposer had relied only on its registration in its notice of opposition. There was no claim of prior common law use of the mark. Applicant had no notice of such and allegation, and "despite Applicant’s non-participation during the trial of this case, we cannot treat the silence of Applicant qua defendant herein the same as finding that the issue was tried by the consent of the parties."

Moreover, opposer failed to provide adequate evidence that the involved goods are related. Opposer provided copies of its own webpages, showing that opposer sells a variety of hair-related products, but that was not enough to establish that consumers would view the involved goods as related.

[I]n addition to an absence of any notice to Applicant that Opposer would be relying upon possible common law usage of the cited mark on disparate goods, there is no factual basis in this record on which to conclude that oils for hair conditioning would be perceived by consumers of hair extensions as falling within the natural zone of expansion of a manufacturer of wigs and hair pieces.

Since the relatedness of the involved goods was not established, the Board say no need to consider "the complexities of the 'natural expansion' doctrine as an end-around this critical du Pont factor."

And so the Board dismissed the opposition.

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TTABlog comment: It's often difficult for a plaintiff when the defendant adopts the rope-a-dope strategy. It means the plaintiff has to do everything right, with no help from the defendant's errors or actions.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2014.

Friday, October 24, 2014

Test Your TTAB Judge-Ability: Which Of These 4 Section 2(d) Refusals Was Reversed?

I once heard a TTAB judge state that the outcomes of most Section 2(d) likelihood of confusion cases can be predicted just by looking at the marks and the identified goods/services, without more. Try your adjudicatory skills on these four recently-decided appeals, keeping in mind that, by my estimate, about 85% of Section 2(d) refusals are affirmed by the Board. [Answer in first comment].


In re Flatiron Partners, LLC, Serial No. 85699903 (October 22, 2014) [not precedential]. [Section 2(d) refusal to register FLATIRON PARTNERS for "managing hedge fund portfolios directed to high wealth, sophisticated individual investors and to sophisticated non-hedge fund corporate entities" in view of the registered mark FLATIRON CAPITAL (standard characters) for"financing and loan services"].


In re Tezio LLC, Serial No. 85769474 (October 22, 2014) [not precedential]. [Refusal to register LOLA for "plastic containers for organizing and storing cosmetic" in view of the registered mark CHARLIE & LOLA and Design for, inter alia, "containers for household and kitchen use"].


In re Citizens Disability, LLC, Serial No. 85887875 (October 22, 2014) [not precedential]. [Refusal to register CITIZENS DISABILITY HELPLINE for "Counseling and assisting others in obtaining medical or disability related benefits, namely, Social Security Disability and Supplemental Security Income benefits" and for "Representing others in obtaining medical or disability related benefits, namely Social Security Disability and Supplemental Security Income benefits" [DISABILITY HELPLINE disclaimed] in view of the mark DISABILITY HELPLINE, registered on the Supplemental Register for "Advertising services; Attorney referrals, namely, forwarding inquiries by potential clients to social security lawyers and advocates"].



In re Mannatech, Incorporated, Serial No. 85558774 (October 22, 2014) [not precedential]. [Section 2(d) refusal to register NUTRIVERUS for dietary and nutritional supplements, on the ground of likelihood of confusion with the registered mark NU VERUS & Design (in the colors shown below) for "liquid nutritional supplement; nutritional supplements; vitamin and mineral supplements"].


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TTABlog Comment: See any WYHAs here?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2014.

Thursday, October 23, 2014

TTAB TEST: Is "BLENDS" Merely Descriptive of Wine Marketing Services?

The USPTO refused registration of the marks BLENDS and BLENDS, INC., in standard character form, for "marketing, advertising and promoting the sale of wine." The word "blends" is descriptive of wine, but does it describe applicant's services? Applicant contended that "blends" has many different meanings. How do you think this came out? In re Ren Acquisition, Inc., Serial Nos. 85787527 and 85787531 (October 3, 2014) [not precedential].


The evidence showed that the term "blend" is used to identify wine made from two or more varieties of grapes. Applicant maintained that "blends" is not descriptive of marketing, selling and promoting wines. It asserted that the PTO's evidence dealt with wine as a product, or with the act of selling wine, but not with marketing services: "Marketing, advertising, and promoting the 'sale' of wine is considerably different than the act of selling wine or producing wine."

The Board found that "the word 'Blends' describes the products that Applicant is marketing, advertising and/or promoting and, as such, it should remain available to any company rendering these services."

Applicant argued that when used in connection with marketing services, the word "blends" could refer to many things, not just wine. However, as the Board has repeatedly pointed out, "the determination of whether a mark is merely descriptive is not considered in the abstract but in connection with the services at issue." Applicant itself stated that it could market, advertise, and promote blended wines. The fact that "blends" may have different meanings in other contexts is simply irrelevant. [Applicant's out-of-context argument is, in my view, one of the Top Ten Losing TTAB Arguments].

And so the Board affirmed both refusals.

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TTABlog comment: Was this a WYHA?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2014.

Wednesday, October 22, 2014

Test Your TTAB Judge-Ability on these Four Mere Descriptiveness Appeals

Here are four recent appeals from mere descriptiveness refusals under Section 2(e)(1). Let's see how you do with them, keeping in mind that, by my estimation, the Board affirms more than 80% of these refusals. [Answers in first comment].


In re Starkist Co,, Serial No. 85765644 (September 23, 2014) [not precedential]. [Mere descriptiveness refusal of INTERNATIONAL SELECTS for "seafood"].


In re Internet Promise Group LLC, Serial No. 85637772 (October 9, 2014) [not precedential]. [Mere descriptiveness refusal of STEP BREATHING for "Instructing others in a specific breathing technique, specifically, instructions in successive short inhalation and holding breath steps and then exhalation to enhance life force energy in the human body as part of teaching Yoga practice"].



In re Birds Eye Foods LLC, Serial Nos. 85729804 and 85729823 (October 14, 2014) [not precedential]. [Mere descriptiveness refusal of SAVORY SKILLETS and requirement for disclaimer of SAVORY SKILLETS in the mark BIRDS EYE SAVORY SKILLETS, both for frozen entrees].


In re DM CTW, LLC, Serial No. 85746575 (October 16, 2014) [not precedential]. [Mere descriptiveness refusal of THE BEST APP TO DATE for "Downloadable software applications for mobile telecommunications devices and handheld computing devices for organizing personal relationships and dating, for providing coupons, rebates, discounts, vouchers or special offerings on goods and services from participating merchants and for receiving information on events, activities and attractions"].


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TTABlog note: See any WYHAs here?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2014.

Tuesday, October 21, 2014

TTAB TEST: Are AirREX and AIRTECH Confusable for Vehicle Suspension Springs?

Turkish company Aktas opposed Taiwan's Pin Hsiu Rubber's application to register the mark AirREX in the design form shown below, for, inter alia, "air springs for vehicle suspension components for cushioning driver's seats and cabs," claiming a likelihood of confusion with its registered mark AIRTECH for "air springs for vehicle suspension and for cushioning driver's seats and cabs." The Board found the goods to be, in part, legally identical. But what about the marks? Isn't AIR a rather weak formative in this field? How do you think this came out? Aktas Hava Suspansiyon Sistemleri Sanayi Ve Ticaret AS v. Pin Hsiu Rubber Co., Ltd., Opposition No. 91204375 (September 26, 2014) [not precedential].


Applicant pointed to ten prior registration for AIR-containing marks for goods related to vehicle suspension - AIR LIFT, AIR RUNNER, AZ AIR-ZENITH, AIRCRUSE, SIMILAIR, AIRPOD, AIRPLOW, AIRHAWK, AIR FORCE, and AIR CHASSIS - but it provided no direct evidence of actual use of these marks. With that lack of proof, the Board could not conclude that the field is so crowded with AIR-formative marks that consumers would distinguish the two marks in question based on small differences in the marks. In other words, the Board could not make any conclusion as to the commercial strength of opposer's mark.

However, as to the conceptual strength of opposer's mark, the third-party registrations, along with the dictionary definition of "air," led the Board to the conclusion that the word AIR "certainly has suggestive significance with respect to both Opposer's, Applicant's, and these third-party goods, namely suspension, cushioning, and wind-protection devices." The third-party registrations "serve as a reference source (much like a dictionary) for the usual connotation of the word 'Air' with respect to the goods in this field."

Because the word "Air" has suggestive significance and the word "Tech" is also suggestive ("of the level of technology incorporated into Opposer's suspension and cushioning components"), opposer's mark is not a strong one. Moreover, "Air" cannot be considered the dominant portion of AIRTECH.

The Board found that, visually and orally, the dissimilarities in the marks outweigh the differences. More importantly, the connotations are quite different. The parties "seem to agree" that applicant's mark connotes "king of the air," or something like that, whereas AIRTECH connotes air springs employing the latest technology.

In view of the relative weakness of opposer's mark, the Board concluded that the dissimilarity of the marks was the decisive factor.

And so the Board dismissed the opposition.

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TTABlog note: Well, what do you think?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2014.

Monday, October 20, 2014

Cheryl S. Goodman Appointed as TTAB Judge

The USPTO has announced the selection of Cheryl S. Goodman as an Administrative Trademark Judge at the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board:


  • Cheryl Goodman has been an Interlocutory Attorney for the TTAB for over fourteen years. Her tenure as an Interlocutory Attorney included a six-month detail with the Office of the USPTO Solicitor, yielding Ms. Goodman additional insight into the USPTO’s interaction with the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the U.S. District Courts, which handle appeals seeking review of TTAB decisions. Before joining the TTAB as an Interlocutory Attorney, Ms. Goodman served the USPTO for more than five years as an Attorney-Advisor in the USPTO’s Trademark Examining Operation. During her tenure as an Examining Attorney, Ms. Goodman completed a work detail as a Staff Attorney at the Department of Commerce, assisting the Department in its preparation of a voluminous response to a Freedom of Information Act request on the Department’s trade missions.

    Ms. Goodman began her lifelong commitment to public service as a Trial Attorney in the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Thrift Supervision. A Magna Cum Laude graduate of the Florida State College of Law, Ms. Goodman earned her bachelor’s degree, Cum Laude, from the University of Illinois.

The complete roster of TTAB judges, now numbering 23, may be found here.
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Test Your TTAB Judge-Ability On These Four Section 2(d) Appeals

I once heard a TTAB judge state that the outcomes of most Section 2(d) likelihood of confusion cases can be predicted just by looking at the marks and the identified goods/services, without more. Try your adjudicatory skills on these four appeals, keeping in mind that, by my estimate, about 85% of Section 2(d) refusals are affirmed by the Board.


In re Holland & Hart LLP, Serial No. 85709248 (October 16, 2014) [not precedential]. [Refusal to register BEYOND THE OBVIOUS for legal services, in view of the registered mark THINKING BEYOND THE OBVIOUS for business consultation services].


In re Joy Industrial Co., Ltd., Serial No. 85677182 (October 16, 2014) [not precedential]. [Refusal to register N NOVATEK & Design for bicycles and bicycle and motorcycle parts and accessories, in view of the registered mark NOVATECK for "tires, pneumatic, semi-pneumatic and solid tires for vehicle wheels, wheels for vehicles, inner tubes, wheel rims, and structural parts for all the aforesaid goods"].


In re Cardeologie, Inc., Serial No. 85826725 (October 16, 2014) [not precedential]. [Refusal to register CARDEOLOGIE for greeting cards, invitation cards, notecards, postcards, etc., and for related retail store services, in view of the registered mark CARDOLOGISTS for, inter alia, greeting cards and invitation cards]. 


In re The Rock Creek Group, LP, Serial No. 85595470 (October 6, 2014) [not precedential]. [Refusal to register THE ROCK CREEK GROUP for, inter alia, "individualized and personalized financial services provided to institutional investors, namely, sovereign wealth funds, state and local pension plans, multinational corporations, foundations and endowments," in view of the registered marks ROCK CREEK PROPERTY GROUP, LLC, in standard character and design form, for "real estate investment, management, and brokerage services" [PROPERTY GROUP, LLC disclaimed]].


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TTABlog Big Hint: They all came out the same way. See any WYHA's here?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2014.

Friday, October 17, 2014

TTAB Finds ARCATA Not Primarily Geographically Deceptively Misdescriptive of Wine

The Board reversed a Section 2(e)(3) refusal of ARCATA for wine, finding the mark not primarily geographically deceptively midescriptive of the goods. The evidence established that Arcata is a city in California that is neither obscure nor remote, and is the locus of several wineries. The question was whether "a consumer's misimpression that Applicant's goods originate in Arcata would be a material factor in his or her decision to purchase the goods." In re D’Andrea Family Limited Partnership, Serial No. 85834204 (October 15, 2014) [not precedential].


A mark is primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive if:

(1) the primary significance of the mark is a generally known geographic location;

(2) the consuming public is likely to believe the place identified indicates the origin of the goods, when in fact the goods do not come from that place; and

(3) the misrepresentation would be a material factor in a consumer's decision to purchase the goods.

Here, the key issue was the third one: materiality. In order to establish materiality, the USPTO must show that "a substantial portion of the relevant consumers would be materially influenced in the decision to purchase the product or service by the geographic meaning of the mark."

Reviewing relevant precedents, the Board considered whether the PTO has shown "that Arcata is 'noted for' wine; that wine is a 'principal product' of Arcata; that wine is a product 'traditionally originating' in Arcada; or that for, any other reason, a substantial portion of customers for wine would be materially influenced in the decision to purchase wine by a misrepresentation that the goods originate in Arcata."

Arcata is a city of 16,000 persons, located in Humboldt County in Northwestern California. It is a college town, the home of Humboldt State University. For many years, timber dominated the economy; today a cannabis economy employs many in the area.

The Examining Attorney contended that Humboldt County is known for its distinctive wine, and that the characteristics of Humboldt County wine would be attributed to wines from Arcata. The Board observed, however, that the evidence did not support the Examining Attorney's argument. Humboldt County is not known for its wine; at most it has one viticultural area where a few dozen wineries are struggling for recognition. The three wineries located in Arcata obtain their grapes from other places. Customers would therefore not be induced to purchase applicant's wine in the belief that it was made with grapes grown in Arcata.

The Board declined to decide whether the name "Humboldt" would induce consumers to purchase wine. But the fact that Arcata is located in Humboldt County "is insufficient to persuade us that the name ARCATA would induce customers to purchase wine."

Having carefully reviewed the record, we see no indication that Arcata is "noted for" wine, that wine is a "principal product" of Arcata, or that wine is a product that customers perceive as “traditionally originating” in Arcata. Arcata does not appear to be a suitable place for growing wine grapes. Although there are three wineries located in Arcata, they acknowledge to the market (or the marketplace takes note) that their wine is made from grapes that are grown elsewhere. Although Arcata is located in Humboldt County, a place with a developing viticultural industry, Arcata itself is known as a university town.

And so the Board reversed the refusal.

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TTABlog comment: For a through discussion of Section 2(e)(3), see Anne Gilson LaLonde's article entitle "You Are Not Going to Believe This! Deception, Misdescription and Materiality in Trademark Law," 102 TMR 883 (May-June 2012) [pdf here].

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2014.