Friday, February 23, 2018

TTAB Test: Are These Two Marks for Fruit Preserves Confusingly Similar?

The USPTO refused registration of the mark PANACHE (in standard characters) for "apple butter; apple purée; processed apples," finding it likely to cause confusion with the registered mark MANGO MANGO MANGO PRESERVES A PANACHE PARTY PRESERVE and design (shown below) for "fruit preserves" [MANGO and MANGO PRESERVES disclaimed]. How do you think this appeal came out? In re Panache LLC, Serial No. 87182253 (February 20, 2018) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Marc A. Bergsman).


Applicant's "processed apples" fall within the ambit of Registrant's "fruit preserves" because fruit includes apples and preserves are processed fruit. Also, apple butter and and fruit preserves are both used as "spreads" and therefore are related products. The evidence revealed that several entities sell apple butter and preserves under the same mark at their respective websites. The Board concluded that the goods are in part identical identical and are offered in the same channels of trade.

As to the marks, the Board found that MANGO MANGO with a mango design is the dominant portion of the cited mark.

They are by far the largest elements of Registrant’s mark and most likely to catch consumers’ eyes. As such, they are that part of the mark consumers use to call for Registrant’s preserves. It stretches credulity that consumers would refer to Registrant’s preserves as “A Panache Party Preserve” or “panache”.

"Mango Preserves" is name of the product and, therefore, has little or no source-identifying significance. The term “A Panache Party Preserve” is an advertising tagline telling consumers that Registrant’s MANGO MANGO preserves are high quality products.

The Trademark Examining Attorney argued that “Panache” is the dominant part of Registrant’s mark because the phrase “A Panache Party Preserve” “gives the general impression of being a house
mark.” However, an excerpt from Registrant’s website showed that Registrant refers to itself as MANGO MANGO, not as a “Panache” company. The tagline “A Panache Party Preserve,” creates the commercial impression that Registrant’s preserves have flair or style.

The Board concluded that the marks are not similar and that the first du Pont factor outweighed the other factors. And so it reversed the refusal.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: Is this a WYHRR? (Would you have refused registration?)

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2018.

Thursday, February 22, 2018

Two Product Configurations Fail to Clear Section 2(f) Hurdle, Says TTAB

Product configurations can never be inherently distinctive trademarks. So says Wal-Mart v. Samara Bros. Moreover, such proposed marks face a heavy burden when the applicant attempts to establish acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f). Here are two recent cases in which the applicants failed to clear the 2(f) hurdle.


In re Kronebusch Industries, LLC, Serial No. 86706847 (February 20, 2018) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christopher Larkin). Kronebusch sought to register as a trademark the pistol-shaped handle of its fire extinguishers. (See drawing above). Applicant asserted that it intended to design a distinctive and recognizable handle (unlike standard nut-cracker type handles), but intent was irrelevant since the question was whether the consuming public perceives the design as a source indicator.

The Board was unimpressed by several form statement from dealers and customers, in part due to their conclusory language, lack of geographical diversity, and missing information. Advertising expenditures were modest, and although the advertising depicted the fire extinguisher, there was nothing to call the attention of the consumer to the shape of the handle: i.e., no "look-for" advertising.


Similarly news articles regarding the products do not mention the handle design as a product feature that serves to identify source. Finally, the fact that Kronebusch's fire extinguishers have enjoyed significant exposure in media and at tradeshows does not mean that consumers have become conditioned to recognize this handle design as a trademark.

And so the Board affirmed the refusal to register under Sections 1, 2, and 45 of the Lanham Act. In other words, the handle design fails to function as a trademark.


In re NuWave, LLC, Serial No. 86761651 (February 20, 2018) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge David K. Heasley). Applicant NuWave sought to register the product design shown immediately above for "electric induction cooktops." Applicant explained that induction cooktops may be placed on kitchen counters and "work without getting hot; rather they generate a magnetic field which causes the pan itself to get hot."

NuWave contended that the rounded shape of its product distinguishes it from competitive products, most of which are rectangular. The examining attorney pointed out, however, that cooktops are commonly offered in a variety of shapes, including round, and so applicant's shape is not particularly exclusive, distinctive, or source-indicating.



Reviews of applicant's product focused on the usefulness of the design or its attractive appearance, but did not equate the shape with a particular source. "Because the applied-for mark in this case is a nondistinctive product configuration, which consumers may appreciate for its utility or appearance rather than its source, a showing of five or more years' use is insufficient."

Applicant's advertising and sales number were "respectable," but its advertising and packaging consistently identify the product by the word mark "Nuwave," and so that evidence did not prove that the product design has consumer recognition. The sales figures may reflect the popularity of the product, not that the public recognizes the shape as a trademark.

NuWave claimed that the copying of its product by Farberware evidenced acquired distinctiveness, but the Board was unmoved. It is more common that competitors copy product designs for desirable qualities or features. Moreover, copying is proof of acquired distinctiveness only if the copier's intent is to confuse customers by passing off its product as the applicant's. Farberware displayed its own mark on the packaging and so was not attempting to pass off its product.

Finally, the Board noted in passing that NuWave's ownership of a design patent does not, without more, "bestow upon said device the aura of distinctiveness or recognition as a trademark."

Concluding that applicant failed to prove acquired distinctiveness, the Board affirmed the refusal to register under Sections 1, 2, and 45 of the Lanham Act.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment:  Of course, the first hurdle to be cleared for a product design is Section 2(e)(5) functionality. I wrote a paper about these hurdles (here) in 2004.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2018.

Wednesday, February 21, 2018

TTAB Grants Summary Judgment Motion, Finding Fusible Link Configuration De Jure Functional

The Board granted Tyco Fire's motion for summary judgment, finding the product configuration marks shown below, for a "heat fusible link for use in fire protection," to be functional under Section 2(e)(5). The mark on the left "consists of a configuration of a copper rectangular heat fusible link with rounded edges with a transparent circle at the top and bottom." The mark on the right is identically described except for the word "copper." Tyco Fire Products LP v. Globe Technologies Corporation, Oppositions Nos. 91212425 and 91220233 (January 22, 2018) [not precedential].


Opposer’s expert explained that the fusible link consists of two plates placed under tension or load. The plates are held together by a fixed heat-sensitive material, which in the event of a fire melts or breaks once the ambient temperature reaches a certain degree, causing the plates to separate. When the plates separate the fire detection or suppression system is activated.

Generally, a product design or product feature is considered to be functional in a trademark sense if it is (1) “essential to the use or purpose of the article,” or if it (2) “affects the cost or quality of the article.” TrafFix, 58 USPQ2d at 1006 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 214 USPQ 1, 4 n.10 (1982)). The Board found no genuine dispute of material fact "that the configuration of Applicant’s goods is essential to the use and purpose of the goods and affects the cost and quality of the article under the standard set forth in Inwood/TrafFix."

The evidence of record, including various utility patents (both applicant's and third-party patents) established that the use of identical, overlying plates serves a utilitarian function. At to the "transparent circles," which are actually holes in the plates, the circular shape depicted in the drawing of the patent "is the most logical and effective choice." The rounded ends are used to avoid sharp edges. As to the straight sides of applicant's device:

As the many patents of record show, we live in a world of straight edges and right angles. The straight parallel sides of Applicant’s goods would be essential to fitting the goods into mechanisms that have limited space. Competitors who are required to eschew the use of straight, parallel sides in order to avoid infringing upon Applicant’s trademark rights would be put to “a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage."

Applicant did not rebut Opposer’s contention that in certain applications, fusible links with straight, parallel edges and circular holes are one of the few available alternatives.

Finally, Applicant contended that the copper-colored design presented in one application is not functional for the additional reason that the application contains a claim to the color copper. However, the evidence showed, and applicant did not dispute, that the color is the result of the natural coloring of the commercial bronze, and that commercial bronze has utilitarian function in a fusible link. The Board concluded that "[c]ompetitors who are required to eschew the use of copper, bronze, or other metals having a copper-like color in order to avoid infringing upon Applicant’s trademark rights would be put to 'a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage.'" Nor should competitors have to paint their links to mask the copper color.

Therefore, the Board found no genuine dispute of material fact that the copper color of Applicant’s mark is dictated by a functional feature of the goods.

And so the Board entered judgment summarily in opposer's favor.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: The Board is a bit fuzzy at times on the difference between utilitarian functionality [de facto functionality] and trademark functionality [de jure functionality]. Many configurations and features may have the former, but not necessarily the latter. E.g., the scoring on a Hershey bar.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2018.

Tuesday, February 20, 2018

TTAB Affirms Failure-to-Function Refusal of Ribbon/Banner Background Design for Horse Tail Cleaners

The Board affirmed a refusal to register the design shown below, for "Non-medicated cleaning preparations for livestock, horses, and domestic animals, ...." and various other products for said animals, agreeing with Examining Attorney Barbara A. Gaynor that the design fails to function as a trademarks. Said the Board: "Applicant’s applied-for design fails to emerge out of the background of the specimens and hit the prospective buyer in the eye, and [we] find that Applicant’s ribbon-shaped banner is a background design that does not create a commercial impression separate and apart from the word mark in conjunction with which it is used." In re W.F. Young, Inc., Serial No. 86454618 (February 14, 2018) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Albert Zervas).


The Examining Attorney maintained that the applied-for mark "is merely a background design that functions as part of a composite mark that incorporates additional designs or wording." (see excerpt from specimen of use, below).


The Board observed that when an applicant seeks to register a background design, the design must create a commercial impression separate and apart from the word mark with which it is used. Professor McCarthy has commented that "the more fanciful and distinctive the background design, the more likely it is to 'hit the buyer in the eye' and hence be more than background. In such a case, the so-called 'background' comes out into the spotlight of real trademark significance."

The Board noted that none of the specimens of use showed the ribbon-shaped banner alone; all have the word ABSORBINE superimposed thereon. The word ABSORBINE covers much of the design and follows the incline of the banner. This arrangement of wording and geometry suggests that they are part of the same mark. The color yellow is irrelevant since color is not claimed as part of the mark.

Ribbon-shaped designs are not uncommon for these type of goods, as evidence by the two registrations cited by the Examining Attorney. The applied-for design appears to be nothing more than a refinement of a basic background design and would be regarded as such by consumers.

And so the Board affirmed the refusal under Sections 1, 2, and 45 of the Lanham Act.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: Even if applicant had claimed the color yellow, I doubt that it would have made any difference. No look-for advertising, no use of the banner with words other than ABSORBINE. Is this a WYHA?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2018.

Friday, February 16, 2018

TTAB Test: Which of These Three Section 2(d) Refusals Was Reversed?

A TTAB judge once stated that one can predict the outcome of a Section 2(d) appeal 95% of the time just by looking at the marks and the goods or services. Presented for your perusal are three recent TTAB decisions in Section 2(d) appeals. One was reversed. Which one? [Answer in first comment].


In re CID Resources, Inc., Serial No. 86828751 (February 13, 2018) [not precedential] [Section 2(d) refusal to register the mark GRACE (in standard character form) for "Medical wearing apparel, namely, scrub tops and bottoms; medical wearing apparel, namely, pants for emergency medical personnel" in Class 10; and "Nurse’s apparel, namely, tops and bottoms, uniforms, lab coats; scrubs not for medical purposes" in Class 25, in view of the identical mark registered for "women’s sportswear, namely, jackets, pants, skirts, blouses, dresses, shirts, and knit tops, but excluding pantyhose and hose"].


In re Advanced Total Marketing Systems, Inc., Serial No. 86860062 (February 14, 2018) [not precedential] [Section 2(d) refusal of the mark shown immediately below, for "Latin American style food products, namely, processed flavored plantains slices, processed flavored yucca chips; Latin American Style food products, namely, fired flavored peanuts and baked flavored peanuts"


in view of the registered mark shown below left for "candy for consumption on and off the premises" and "retail candy and gift store services," the registered mark shown below right for "Dairy-based snack foods excluding ice cream, ice milk and frozen yogurt; Fruit-based food beverage; Oils and fats for food; Snack food dips; Vegetable-based snack foods," and the registered mark YUMMYS in standard character form for "Vegetable-based snack foods; Fruit-based snack foods; Vegetable chips; Fruit chips; Milk products excluding ice cream, ice milk and frozen yogurt"].


In re Spartan Detective Agency, Inc., Serial No. 87172299 (February 9, 2018) [not precedential] [Section 2(d) refusal of WE DO IT ALL! for "detective agency services" in view of the registered marks JUST CALL – WE DO IT ALL! for "legal services" and MAKE THE CALL WE DO IT ALL! for "legal services; providing legal services in the field of injury law, workers' compensation law, and social security disability law"].


Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: How did you do?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2018.

Thursday, February 15, 2018

TTAB Test: Is TWEEDS Generic for Shirts and Sweaters?

The USPTO refused registration of TWEEDS for "shirts; sweaters" on the Supplemental Register, deeming the term to be generic for the goods. Applicant argued that "[t]weed is a fabric, not a shirt or sweater," and that "tweeds" is "merely descriptive of a type of sweater or shirt." How do you think this appeal came out? In re Branded LLC, Serial No. 86529647 (February 13, 2018) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christopher Larkin).


Applicant first pointed to its ownership of a now-expired registration for TWEEDS for the same goods. The Board shrugged that off, pointing out that each application must be examined on its own merits, and citing In re Cordua Rests., Inc., 118 USPQ2d 1632 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (CHURRASCOS in stylized form found generic for restaurant services despite subsisting "incontestable" registration for the word mark for the same services).

As evidence of the public's understanding of the word "tweeds," Examining Attorney John C. Boone relied on dictionary definitions ("Tweed" is defined as a rough, woolen cloth woven with different colored threads), webpages referring to various types of tweed fabric, webpages showing use of the words "tweed" and "tweeds" in connection with various items of woolen clothing, websites displaying shirts referred to as "tweed" shirts and "tweed" shirt jackets; and webpages and Google search results for "tweed sweaters

The Board observed that the USPTO must show more than that "tweeds" refers to other items of clothing. It must show that "tweeds" refers to a category of shirts or sweaters.

The evidence included multiple webpages offering "tweed" shirts and "tweed" sweaters. Many of the items were not made of wool. Applicant agreed that "it is possible to find shirts and sweaters that are made of tweed," and that the "examples given by the examining attorney use the word 'tweed' to indicate the type of sweater or shirt being offered." [Emphasis by the Board].

The Board pointed out that the use of "tweed" to indicate the type of shirt or sweater is use in adjectival form, rather than in noun form to identify a fabric. However, generic adjectives "are just as unprotectable as generic nouns:" for example, "footlong" for sandwiches excluding hot dogs. Sheets of Del., Inc. v. Doctor's Assocs. Inc., 108 USPQ2d 1341 (TTAB 2013).

Applicant effectively conceded that TWEEDS identifies a category of sweaters or shirts included within the relevant genus. The pluralization of the word "tweed" as TWEEDS does not alter its meaning as referring to categories of shirts and sweaters.

On the basis of the record as a whole, we find that the Examining Attorney has established, by clear evidence of generic use, that Applicant’s claimed mark TWEEDS is understood by the relevant purchasing public to refer to categories of shirts and sweaters that are made of tweed fabric, or that have the appearance, look, or style of tweed fabric. The proposed mark is thus incapable of distinguishing Applicant’s goods, making it ineligible for registration on the Supplemental Register.

And so the Board affirmed the refusal.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: If the evidence showed use of "tweed" only with shirts and sweater made of wool, would "tweed" be merely descriptive but not generic?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2018.

Wednesday, February 14, 2018

Precedential No. 4: TTAB Reverses Rejection of Downloadable Software Specimen Showing Mark in On-Screen Display

The TTAB reversed a refusal to register the mark AWLVIEW for, inter alia, warehouse inventory management software, overturning the USPTO's rejection of applicant's specimen of use. Because the mark appears on the login and search screens of Applicant’s downloadable software when the software is in use, the Board concluded that the specimen "shows the applied-for mark used in connection with the goods ... and would be perceived as a trademark identifying the source of those goods." In re Minerva Associates, Inc., Serial No. 86430215 (February 12, 2018) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Linda A. Kuczma).

(Click on photo for larger version)

The first page of applicant's two-page specimen (the login screen shot shown above) displays the wording "AWLview WMS for Sterling Jewelers" appearing above "AWL Logon WS 202" shown in the title bar of the login page. The second page (the SKU search query page shown below) contains the wording "AWLview WMS for Sterling Jewelers WS 202 - LCM" appearing above "Inventory By SKU Report-WS 202" shown in the title bar of the SKU search query window.

(Click on photo for larger version)

The Board observed that, according to Section 904.03(e) of the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (Oct. 2017), an acceptable specimen for software "might be a photograph or printout of a display screen projecting the identifying trademark for a computer program."

Because software providers have adopted the practice of applying trademarks that are visible only when the software programs are displayed on a screen, see TMEP § 904.03(e), an acceptable specimen might be a photograph or screenshot of a computer screen displaying the identifying trademark while the computer program is in use. The second substitute specimen features screenshots of Applicant’s mark appearing on the log-in and search screens viewable by Applicant’s customers utilizing the downloaded software. Because the mark appears on the login and search screens of Applicant’s downloadable software when the software is in use, we find that the second substitute specimen shows the applied-for mark used in connection with the goods in Class 9 and would be perceived as a trademark identifying the source of those goods.

Finally, the Board noted that, again according to Section 904.03(e) of the TMEP, "[i]t is not necessary that purchasers see the mark prior to purchasing the goods, as long as the mark is applied to the goods or their containers, or to a display associated with the goods, and the goods are sold or transported in commerce. See, e.g., In re Brown Jordan Co., 219 USPQ 375 (TTAB 1983) (holding that stamping the mark after purchase of the goods, on a tag attached to the goods that are later transported in commerce, is sufficient use)."

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: AWL set, in my VIEW.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2018.

Tuesday, February 13, 2018

TTAB Will Hold Two Final Hearings at Tulane Law School - February 28th

The TTAB, in a combined program with the PTAB, will take its "Stadium Tour" to Tulane University Law School in New Orleans on February 28th. The TTAB panel will hear oral argument in the two cases summarized below. The day-long program will include an "Overview of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board" by Chief Judge Gerard F. Rogers, and a panel discussion on advocacy, featuring judges from both the TTAB and the PTAB. Full agenda may be found here.


February 28, 2018 - 11 AM: In re David Copeland-Smith, Serial Nos. 85498107 [Section 2(d) refusal of BEAST MODE SOCCER for "T-shirts" and "Sporting goods and equipment for soccer training, namely, balls. " in view of the registered mark BEAST MODE, for "t-shirts" and "Men's, women's and children's clothing, namely, shirts, sweatshirts; headwear, namely, hats, caps"].


February 28, 2018 - 1 PM: Larr Pitt & Associates, P.C. v. Lundy Law, LLP, Opposition No. 91210158 [Opposition to registration of the slogan REMEMBER THIS NAME for legal services on the ground that the applied-for mark does not function as a mark and cannot be perceived by consumers as a source identifier].


Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: Looking forward to full reports from attendees.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2018.

Recommended Reading: Prof. Ouellette, "Does Running Out Of (Some) Trademarks Matter?"

Lisa Larimore Ouellette, Associate Professor of Law at Stanford Law School, responds to the article posted here yesterday, in a note entitled, Does Running Out Of (Some) Trademarks Matter?, 131 Harv. Law. Rev. Forum 116 (2018) [pdf here]. While praising the work of Professors Beebe and Fromer, Professor Ouellette suggests further avenues of research regarding the actual costs or the countervailing benefits of either depletion or congestion, before recommending any change in the current trademark system.


In this short space, I wish to laud the remarkable descriptive contribution of Are We Running Out of Trademarks? while sounding a note of caution on the normative implications. Beebe and Fromer’s data convincingly demonstrate that short, common word marks are becoming depleted and congested, and they present a number of plausible hypotheses about the negative welfare impact of this trend. Their findings suggest that trademark policy has been based on false assumptions and should be closely reexamined. But their data cannot elucidate the actual costs of depletion or congestion — particularly without noting how the market will adapt to reduce these costs — and cannot reveal if there are countervailing benefits. Generating concrete evidence of these costs and benefits seems like a necessary next step before recommending any significant changes to the current trademark system. After offering a laudatory evaluation of the value of Beebe and Fromer’s descriptive work, I explore why reforms in reaction to their research should proceed cautiously, and I suggest important avenues for future empirical work to build on these results.

Read comments and post your comment here.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2018.

Monday, February 12, 2018

Recommended Reading: Professors Beebe and Fromer, "Are We Running Out of Trademarks?"

"Conventional wisdom" says that the number of available trademarks is infinite, or nearly so. Professors Barton Beebe and Jeanne C. Fromer of New York University School of Law challenge that assertion in their enlightening article: Are We Running Out Of Trademarks: An Empirical Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 Harv. Law Rev. 948 (February 2018). [pdf here].


American trademark law has long operated on the assumption that there exists an inexhaustible supply of unclaimed trademarks that are at least as competitively effective as those already claimed. This core empirical assumption underpins nearly every aspect of trademark law and policy. This Article presents empirical evidence showing that this conventional wisdom is wrong. The supply of competitively effective trademarks is, in fact, exhaustible and has already reached severe levels of what we term trademark depletion and trademark congestion.  * * *  These data show that rates of word-mark depletion and congestion are increasing and have reached chronic levels, particularly in certain important economic sectors. The data further show that new trademark applicants are increasingly being forced to resort to second-best, less competitively effective marks. Yet registration refusal rates continue to rise. The result is that the ecology of the trademark system is breaking down, with mounting barriers to entry, increasing consumer search costs, and an eroding public domain. In light of our empirical findings, we propose a mix of reforms to trademark law that will help to preserve the proper functioning of the trademark system and further its core purposes of promoting competition and enhancing consumer welfare.

Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: Should we take some small comfort from the fact that Matal v. Tam and In re Brunetti have freed up more words for registration as trademarks? On the other hand, Bayer v. Belmora says that one need not own a trademark in the United States to bring a Section 43(a) claim (Bayer owned the mark FLANAX in Mexico). Does that further narrow (slightly) the number of marks available in this country?

P.S. I'm sorry to see the Professors use the terms "trademark" and "trademarking" as verbs, instead of "register" and "registering."

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2018.

Friday, February 09, 2018

Applying Claim Preclusion, TTAB Summarily Dismisses Petition for Cancellation of "THE EBONYS" Registration Despite Added Claim

The Board granted respondent's motion for summary judgment, dismissing this petition for cancellation of a registration for the mark THE EBONYS for entertainment services by a musical group. The Board ruled that claim preclusion barred petitioner's fraud and likelihood-of-confusion claims in light of a prior Board decision (here) dismissing petitioner's closely similar fraud claim. David S. Beasley v. William H. Howard DBA The Ebonys, Cancellation No. 92066369 (January 19, 2018) [not precedential].


In the prior cancellation proceeding, Petitioner Beasley alleged that Respondent Howard knowingly made false statement regarding his (Howard's) use of the mark THE EBONYS. Beasley, however, failed to submit evidence to support the fraud claim, and so the Board dismissed the proceeding.

In this, the second proceeding, Beasley provided more detailed allegations regarding the alleged fraud, but the Board found that "the core transactional facts in each proceeding are the same." Therefore it concluded that Beasley's renewed fraud claim is barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion.

As to Petitioner Beasley's likelihood-of-confusion claim, the Board observed that claim preclusion bars "a subsequent assertion of the same transactional facts in the form of a different cause of action or theory of relief." A party cannot avoid claim preclusion merely by bringing additional claims in a second proceeding based on the same transactional facts as the first proceeding.

We find that there is no genuine dispute that Petitioner’s likelihood of confusion claim in this proceeding is based on the same transactional facts as, and should have been litigated in, the Prior Action. Specifically, Petitioner has alleged in both proceedings prior use and ownership of THE EBONYS mark for a vocal music group. In addition, with respect to the involved registration in each proceeding, Respondent had alleged use of THE EBONYS mark for the same or similar services to those offered by Petitioner. In view thereof, Petitioner could (and should) have asserted his likelihood of confusion claim in the earlier case.

And so the Board granted respondent's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the proceeding.


Read comments and post your comment here.

TTABlog comment: I never heard of THE EBONYS.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2018.