Professor Curtin Files Petition for Certiorari in RAPUNZEL Consumer Standing Case

Professor Rebecca Curtin had filed a petition for writ of certiorari, seeking Supreme Court review of the Federal Circuit's ruling in Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc., 2025 USPQ2d 784 (Fed. Cir. 2025) [precedential]. [TTABlogged here]. The CAFC affirmed the Board's holding that "only commercial actors affected by the mark’s registration fall within the zone of interests to oppose the registration as generic, descriptive, or [failing to function as a trademark]," and it upheld the Board's dismissal of mere consumer Curtin's opposition to registration of the mark RAPUNZEL for dolls and toy figures on the ground of lack of statutory standing. [Petition for certiorari here: Curtin v. United Trademark Holdings, Inc., No. 25-435 (October 3, 2025)].

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether a party desiring to participate in an administrative agency proceeding, including a trademark opposition proceeding at the United States Patent and Trademark Office, must satisfy the zone-of-interests and proximate-causation tests set forth in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014), for causes of action in federal court.

INTRODUCTION

In the decision below, the Federal Circuit held that to participate in an opposition to the registration of a trademark before the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), the petitioner must satisfy the framework for statutory causes of action set forth in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014)—namely, the petitioner must satisfy the zone-of-interests and proximate-causation tests. The Federal Circuit’s holding directly conflicts with the decisions of the Third, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits, which hold that the zone-of-interests and similar tests do not apply to administrative agencies. It also conflicts with decisions of this Court. The Court has long held that there are wide differences between administrative agencies and courts and that the standards applicable to one should not necessarily be applied to the other. In Lexmark, the Court addressed only the standards applicable to a plaintiff bringing a cause of action in federal court. The notion that an agency proceeding could be a “cause of action” conflicts with this Court’s explanation that “[t]he concept of a ‘cause of action’ is employed specifically to determine who may judicially enforce the statutory rights or obligations.” Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979) (emphasis added). The Federal Circuit’s imposition of the standards applicable to plaintiffs in federal court on agency petitioners flies in the face of the basic fact that agencies are not courts, and the standards for participating in agency proceedings differ from those for participating in district court litigation.

The Court’s immediate review is warranted to correct the Federal Circuit’s recent break from well established principles enshrined in numerous decisions of the Circuit Courts and this Court. The Court should also grant review to prevent the Federal Circuit’s decisions from affecting numerous other agencies. This case arises from a trademark opposition proceeding before the PTO. However, the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction to review decisions from numerous other federal agencies. If left unchecked, the Federal Circuit’s decisions could have far reaching consequences for various administrative schemes. As it stands, the Federal Circuit’s decisions cut off administrative participation by consumers in trademark registration and cancellation proceedings. Consumers are now wholly dependent on marketplace sellers to challenge deficient trademarks before the PTO. This is so even though a core purpose of the Lanham Act is “to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers.” Park’n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (emphasis added) (citing S. Rep. No. 1333, at 3, 5), and even though Congress permits “[a]ny person who believes that he would be damaged” to participate in a proceeding. 15 U.S.C. § 1063; see id., § 1064.

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TTABlogger comment: I think the Court might take this one up. BTW: I also think the USPTO should have pulled back this application for further examination on the ground of mere descriptiveness or (dare I say it?), genericness.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.