The Top Ten TTAB Decisions of 2025 (Part One)

The TTABlogger has once again gone out on a limb to chose the ten TTAB (Tee-Tee-Ā-Bee) decisions that he considers to be the most important and/or interesting from the previous calendar year (2025). Note that six of the opinions are precedential and four are not (there were only eleven precedential opinions in 2025). This is the first of two posts; the first five selections are set out below. Additional commentary on each case may be found at the linked TTABlog post. The cases are not necessarily listed in order of importance (whatever that means).

Plumrose Holding Ltd. v. USA Ham LLC, 2025 USPQ2d 116 (TTAB 2025) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande) [TTABlogged here]. Ruling that the potential harm to Opposer Plumrose Holding's reputation in the United States was alone sufficient to provide “standing” despite lack of use of its marks in this country, the Board sustained an opposition to registration of the mark LA MONTSERRATINA (shown first below) for ham, sausage, and other meat products, on the ground of misrepresentation of source under Section 14(3) of the Trademark Act. Opposer’s Venezuelan company has sold meat products in Venezuela since 1949 under the LA MONTSERRATINA mark, and since 2011 under the mark shown second below. “[T]he multiple consumer inquiries about the availability of Opposer’s products in the U.S., and especially the instances of actual confusion . . . show quite clearly that Opposer’s reputation for products under its mark extends to the U.S.” and that “Applicant’s copying capitalizes on that reputation.” The Board firmly rejected USA Ham’s argument that there can be no reputational injury unless there is evidence that consumers had “negative experiences” with its products and associate those negative experiences with Plumrose. “[T]he harm generated by loss of control over one’s reputation falls within the purview of the Lanham Act. Section 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127.”

CandyVerse, LLC v. Zeeth Ltd., 2025 USPQ2d 1402 (TTAB 2025) [precedential] [TTABlogged here]. In this opposition to registration of the mark CANDYVERSE for confectionary products, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the only contested issue: priority. Applicant Zeeth Ltd., a British Virgin Islands company, relied on the filing date of its European Union application as the basis for its Section 44(d) priority claim. The dispute boiled down to whether the British Virgin Islands, a self-governing British overseas territory, “extends reciprocal rights to nationals of the United States by law[.]” Zeeth conceded that the British Virgin Islands is not a party to a relevant treaty or agreement with the United States, but it argued that the Virgin Islands Trade Marks Act (“VITMA”) extends reciprocal priority rights to U.S. nationals and thus enables Zeeth to enjoy a right to priority under Section 44(d). The Board observed that “[w]hether a foreign nation extends reciprocal rights of priority to U.S. nationals pursuant to Section 44(b) is an issue of first impression.” Reviewing the VITMA, the Board concluded that it does extend reciprocal rights, and so the Board granted Zeeth’s motion for summary judgment, contingent upon Zeeth’s establishment of constructive use - i.e., subject to the issuance of a registration to Zeeth. [Note that Zeeth cannot rely on a registration issuing from the EU application as a Section 44(e) basis for registration because the EU is not its home country. Nor can it rely on a BVI registration because BVI is not a party to an agreement with the U.S. It will have to rely on use in commerce as a basis for registration].

In re Jimenez, 2025 USPQ2d 1355 (TTAB 2025) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Angela Lykos) [TTABlogged here]. The Board reversed a Section 2(d) refusal to register the mark GASPER ROOFING [ROOFING disclaimed], finding confusion unlikely with the registered mark JASPER CONTRACTORS [CONTRACTORS disclaimed], both for roofing services. The Board rejected the examining attorney’s argument that GASPER and JASPER might be pronounced the same: “Because neither GASPER or JASPER is a coined term, case law . . . does not require us to find that these two terms may be pronounced in an identical manner.” The evidence established that “Gasper” is a surname that begins with the letter strings “G-a-s” and “G-a-s-p,” each of which forms the words “gas” and “gasp,” recognized in U.S. English, and pronounced with a hard letter “g” sound. The dictionary entry for “jasper” further showed that it is pronounced with the soft letter “j.” Moreover, the evidence supported a finding that “roofing service purchases may involve multiple steps and may be complex. As a result, even the least sophisticated consumer is likely to exercise an elevated level of care.” The Board concluded that “the dissimilarity of the marks in sound, appearance, meaning and commercial impression is sufficiently great that, coupled with an elevated level of purchaser care, [it] outweighs the identical nature of the services, trade channels and classes of consumers.”

In re Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, 2025 USPQ2d 1291 (TTAB 2025) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Elizabeth K. Brock) [TTABlogged here]. Consent agreements “may carry great weight” in the Section 2(d) analysis, but not this time. The Board affirmed a refusal to register the mark GASPARILLA, finding confusion likely with the registered mark GASPARILLA TREASURES, both for beverageware and clothing. Applicant contested only one of the DuPont factors, maintaining that, under the 10th factor, its consent agreement with the cited registrant sufficed to fend off the refusal. Not so, said the Board. Consent agreements play a significant role in the DuPont analysis, since the parties to the agreement are in a “better position to know the real life situation than bureaucrats or judges.” Here, the involved marks are “highly similar” and the goods overlapping. There was “no indication that the goods will travel in separate trade channels, nor any agreement that the parties will sell in separate trade channels or otherwise restrict their fields of use.” Furthermore, the Consent Agreement contains no provision regarding display of the marks. The marks would have been in concurrent use for only about one year at the time the Consent Agreement was executed. The Board concluded that “the Consent Agreement simply does not rise to the level of one of the 'more detailed agreements' to be given 'substantial' weight."

SawStop, LLC v. Felder KG, 2025 USPQ2d 1063 (TTAB 2025) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Robert Lavache) [TTABlogged here]. In a fact-intensive ruling, the Board rendered a split decision in this opposition to registration of the mark PCS for woodworking stations that include table saws and other components. Opposer SawStop alleged lack of bona fide intent and likelihood of confusion with its identical common law mark for table saws. The Board dismissed the Section 2(d) claim for failure to prove priority and sustained in part the lack-of-bona-fide-intent claim. SawStop’s common law mark, used primarily as a model designation, was not inherently distinctive and SawStop failed to establish that the mark had acquired distinctiveness prior to Felder’s priority date, and so the Section 2(d) claim was dismissed. As for the lack-of-bona-fide intent claim, SawStop made a prima facie case based on the absence of documentary evidence of Felder’s intent to use the mark. However, Felder’s witness testified that, after it filed the subject application, its saws were shown at a trade show, it accepted sales deposits, it produced a Facebook video displaying the PCS mark, and it took some orders for its systems. The Board, noting that actions taken after the filing of an application may corroborate the applicant’s bona fide intent as of its filing date, ruled that Felder “had the requisite bona fide intent, at least as to table saws, at the time [it] filed its application.”

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Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.