TTAB Upholds Three Refusals Because Applicant Provided its Counsel's Address, not its Domicile Address

The Board affirmed refusals to register the mark shown below, along with two similar marks, for film production and streaming services, on the ground that Applicant Solace Cine LLC failed to provide its domicile address as required by Section 1(a)(2) of the Lanham Act and by Rule 2.189. Solace provided the address of its counsel’s law firm, but with no statement that the law firm address was Solace’s principal place of business. That was unacceptable. In re Solace Cine LLC, Serial Nos. 98558485, 98558583, and 98558650 (December 18, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Elizabeth A. Dunn).

In an office action response, Solace stated its address as 10261 4th Street North, Saint Petersburg, Florida 33716. The response was signed by Cameron W. Brumbelow, its counsel of record, at the mailing address of Brumbelow Morales, P.A., 10261 4th Street North, Saint Petersburg, Florida 33716.

Section 1(a)(2) of the Lanham Act provides that "[t]he application shall include specification of the applicant’s domicile ...." Trademark Rule 2.189 requires that "[a]n applicant or registrant must provide and keep current the address of its domicile, as defined in Rule 2.2(o)," which states that "[t]he term domicile as used in this part means the permanent legal place of residence of a natural person or the principal place of business of a juristic entity." Rule 2.2(p) states: "[t]he term principal place of business as used in this part means the location of a juristic entity’s headquarters where the entity’s senior executives or officers ordinarily direct and control the entity’s activities and is usually the center from where other locations are controlled."

During prosecution of its application, Solace was asked to provide its domicile address, i.e., the principal place of business for its video streaming and film production services. "Despite being given ample opportunity to do so, or to petition for a waiver of the requirement, Applicant did not provide its domicile address or seek such a waiver. Counsel’s law firm address, with no statement that the law firm address was Applicant’s principal place of business, was insufficient."

Furthermore, Solace did not state that it lacks a fixed physical address. If that were the case, Solace had various response options. TMEP § 601.01(c)(iv)(a). "However, none of these options include listing a law firm."

Applicant’s contention in its brief that “attorney Cameron Brumbelow is an executive with the applicant LLC and works in a separate non-legal capacity for the company,” even if timely raised would not satisfy the domicile address requirement. The requirement is for the address for Applicant’s principal place of business, not the address for another business where Applicant’s executive works.

Solace asked for a remand to the USPTO so it could file a petition to the Director asking for a waiver. However, Solace failed to show good cause for the remand, and in any case, it was too late to seek a waiver because such a petition would be untimely under Rule 2.146(d)(1), which requires filing of the petition within two months of the office action.

The Board concluded that the three applications were properly refused for failure to provide the required domicile address. "Because this is a sufficient basis for affirming the refusal to register each of Applicant’s marks, we do not reach the refusal based on Applicant’s failure to provide the mark description and color statement."

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TTABlogger comment: These applications were based on intent-to-use. So, it seems that the law firm address could also be the principal place of a business that was still in the ITU phase. Solace should have said that.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.