Tuesday, January 13, 2026

The Top Ten TTAB Decisions of 2025 (Part One)

The TTABlogger has once again gone out on a limb to chose the ten TTAB (Tee-Tee-Ā-Bee) decisions that he considers to be the most important and/or interesting from the previous calendar year (2025). Note that six of the opinions are precedential and four are not (there were only eleven precedential opinions in 2025). This is the first of two posts; the first five selections are set out below. Additional commentary on each case may be found at the linked TTABlog post. The cases are not necessarily listed in order of importance (whatever that means).

Plumrose Holding Ltd. v. USA Ham LLC, 2025 USPQ2d 116 (TTAB 2025) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas L. Casagrande) [TTABlogged here]. Ruling that the potential harm to Opposer Plumrose Holding's reputation in the United States was alone sufficient to provide “standing” despite lack of use of its marks in this country, the Board sustained an opposition to registration of the mark LA MONTSERRATINA (shown first below) for ham, sausage, and other meat products, on the ground of misrepresentation of source under Section 14(3) of the Trademark Act. Opposer’s Venezuelan company has sold meat products in Venezuela since 1949 under the LA MONTSERRATINA mark, and since 2011 under the mark shown second below. “[T]he multiple consumer inquiries about the availability of Opposer’s products in the U.S., and especially the instances of actual confusion . . . show quite clearly that Opposer’s reputation for products under its mark extends to the U.S.” and that “Applicant’s copying capitalizes on that reputation.” The Board firmly rejected USA Ham’s argument that there can be no reputational injury unless there is evidence that consumers had “negative experiences” with its products and associate those negative experiences with Plumrose. “[T]he harm generated by loss of control over one’s reputation falls within the purview of the Lanham Act. Section 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127.”

CandyVerse, LLC v. Zeeth Ltd., 2025 USPQ2d 1402 (TTAB 2025) [precedential] [TTABlogged here]. In this opposition to registration of the mark CANDYVERSE for confectionary products, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the only contested issue: priority. Applicant Zeeth Ltd., a British Virgin Islands company, relied on the filing date of its European Union application as the basis for its Section 44(d) priority claim. The dispute boiled down to whether the British Virgin Islands, a self-governing British overseas territory, “extends reciprocal rights to nationals of the United States by law[.]” Zeeth conceded that the British Virgin Islands is not a party to a relevant treaty or agreement with the United States, but it argued that the Virgin Islands Trade Marks Act (“VITMA”) extends reciprocal priority rights to U.S. nationals and thus enables Zeeth to enjoy a right to priority under Section 44(d). The Board observed that “[w]hether a foreign nation extends reciprocal rights of priority to U.S. nationals pursuant to Section 44(b) is an issue of first impression.” Reviewing the VITMA, the Board concluded that it does extend reciprocal rights, and so the Board granted Zeeth’s motion for summary judgment, contingent upon Zeeth’s establishment of constructive use - i.e., subject to the issuance of a registration to Zeeth. [Note that Zeeth cannot rely on a registration issuing from the EU application as a Section 44(e) basis for registration because the EU is not its home country. Nor can it rely on a BVI registration because BVI is not a party to an agreement with the U.S. It will have to rely on use in commerce as a basis for registration].

In re Jimenez, 2025 USPQ2d 1355 (TTAB 2025) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Angela Lykos) [TTABlogged here]. The Board reversed a Section 2(d) refusal to register the mark GASPER ROOFING [ROOFING disclaimed], finding confusion unlikely with the registered mark JASPER CONTRACTORS [CONTRACTORS disclaimed], both for roofing services. The Board rejected the examining attorney’s argument that GASPER and JASPER might be pronounced the same: “Because neither GASPER or JASPER is a coined term, case law . . . does not require us to find that these two terms may be pronounced in an identical manner.” The evidence established that “Gasper” is a surname that begins with the letter strings “G-a-s” and “G-a-s-p,” each of which forms the words “gas” and “gasp,” recognized in U.S. English, and pronounced with a hard letter “g” sound. The dictionary entry for “jasper” further showed that it is pronounced with the soft letter “j.” Moreover, the evidence supported a finding that “roofing service purchases may involve multiple steps and may be complex. As a result, even the least sophisticated consumer is likely to exercise an elevated level of care.” The Board concluded that “the dissimilarity of the marks in sound, appearance, meaning and commercial impression is sufficiently great that, coupled with an elevated level of purchaser care, [it] outweighs the identical nature of the services, trade channels and classes of consumers.”

In re Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, 2025 USPQ2d 1291 (TTAB 2025) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Elizabeth K. Brock) [TTABlogged here]. Consent agreements “may carry great weight” in the Section 2(d) analysis, but not this time. The Board affirmed a refusal to register the mark GASPARILLA, finding confusion likely with the registered mark GASPARILLA TREASURES, both for beverageware and clothing. Applicant contested only one of the DuPont factors, maintaining that, under the 10th factor, its consent agreement with the cited registrant sufficed to fend off the refusal. Not so, said the Board. Consent agreements play a significant role in the DuPont analysis, since the parties to the agreement are in a “better position to know the real life situation than bureaucrats or judges.” Here, the involved marks are “highly similar” and the goods overlapping. There was “no indication that the goods will travel in separate trade channels, nor any agreement that the parties will sell in separate trade channels or otherwise restrict their fields of use.” Furthermore, the Consent Agreement contains no provision regarding display of the marks. The marks would have been in concurrent use for only about one year at the time the Consent Agreement was executed. The Board concluded that “the Consent Agreement simply does not rise to the level of one of the 'more detailed agreements' to be given 'substantial' weight."

SawStop, LLC v. Felder KG, 2025 USPQ2d 1063 (TTAB 2025) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Robert Lavache) [TTABlogged here]. In a fact-intensive ruling, the Board rendered a split decision in this opposition to registration of the mark PCS for woodworking stations that include table saws and other components. Opposer SawStop alleged lack of bona fide intent and likelihood of confusion with its identical common law mark for table saws. The Board dismissed the Section 2(d) claim for failure to prove priority and sustained in part the lack-of-bona-fide-intent claim. SawStop’s common law mark, used primarily as a model designation, was not inherently distinctive and SawStop failed to establish that the mark had acquired distinctiveness prior to Felder’s priority date, and so the Section 2(d) claim was dismissed. As for the lack-of-bona-fide intent claim, SawStop made a prima facie case based on the absence of documentary evidence of Felder’s intent to use the mark. However, Felder’s witness testified that, after it filed the subject application, its saws were shown at a trade show, it accepted sales deposits, it produced a Facebook video displaying the PCS mark, and it took some orders for its systems. The Board, noting that actions taken after the filing of an application may corroborate the applicant’s bona fide intent as of its filing date, ruled that Felder “had the requisite bona fide intent, at least as to table saws, at the time [it] filed its application.”


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Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

Monday, January 12, 2026

CAFC Affirms TTAB's HERE COMES THE JUDGE Section 2(d) Decision

Michael P. Chisena struck out again in this appeal from the Board's April 2023 decision [TTABlogged here] sustaining an opposition to his applications to register the word marks ALL RISE and HERE COMES THE JUDGE and the design mark shown below, for "clothing, namely, t-shirts, shirts, shorts, pants, sweatshirts, sweatpants, jackets, jerseys, athletic uniforms, and caps." The Board found the proposed marks to be confusingly similar to the opposers' previously used marks for overlapping goods, and so it sustained the opposition under Section 2(d). The CAFC concluded that substantial evidence supported the Board's finding of priority, and it rejected Chisena's claim that the word marks fail to function as source indicators. Chisena v. Major League Baseball Players Association, Aaron Judge, Appeal No. 23-2073 (Fed. Cir. January 8, 2026) [not precedential].

The Board first noted that Chisena, as a pro se litigant, "is afforded a liberal reading of his filings." However, testimony and documents considered by the Board established that "multiple officially licensed products bearing Justice's personal indicia and judicial phrases or symbols" were available before Chisena's first used date (his filing dates).

Chisena argued that the opposers did not adequately "plead" their marks, but the court concluded that Chisena was given "fair notice of the claimed marks and the basis of [their] priority claims." He contended that the marks ALL RISE and HERE COME THE JUDGE are not inherently distinctive and therefore ineligible for protection, but the court agreed with the Board that the marks are distinctive: they are arbitrary and are not merely surnames or "nicknames."



Finally, Chisena maintained that the word marks fail to function as trademarks. However, opposer submitted substantial evidence [media articles, the formation of "Judge's Chambers" in right field at Yankee Stadium, and "judicially-themed" apparel indicating a connection with Judge] that the marks served as source indicators, "as customers who would encounter those marks on apparel would associate them with Judge."

And so, the CAFC upheld the Board's decision.

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TTABlogger comment: Bronx bummer?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Friday, January 09, 2026

In 2025, How Often Did the TTAB Affirm Section 2(e)(1) Mere Descriptiveness/Disclaimer Refusals?

By my count, in 2025 the Board issued final decisions in 57 appeals from Section 2(e)(1) mere descriptiveness refusals or from disclaimer requirements based on mere descriptiveness. The Board affirmed 53 of the refusals and reversed four. That's an affirmance rate of about 93%. None of the opinions were deemed precedential.

Set out below is a bar chart showing the recent history of Section 2(e)(1) mere descriptiveness appeals. Affirmances continue to hover around 90%. Why so many failures? I suspect some or many of these doomed applications are driven by marketing types looking for an edge.

Click on image for larger picture

The four reversals were for the terms BAKERY and GROOMING (SN 97750068), ATELIER (SN 98044168), NATIVE NATIONS CANNABIS (SN 97419333), and GHOSTWRITTEN (SN 98199104).

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Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

Thursday, January 08, 2026

In 2025, What Was The Rate of TTAB Affirmance of Section 2(d) Refusals to Register?

The TTABlogger once again has taken a stab at estimating the percentage of Section 2(d) likelihood-of-confusion refusals that were affirmed by the Board in the past calendar year. I counted 206 decisions, of which 186 were affirmances and 20 were reversals. That's an affirmance rate of 90%. Two of the decisions (discussed briefly below) were deemed precedential.

Set out immediately below is a bar chart showing the history of Section 2(d) appeals over the last dozen or so years. Given the way the Section 2(d) cards are stacked against the applicant, it's not surprising that the percentage tends to stay near 90%. The "heavy weight" given the first DuPont factor when the involved marks are identical or nearly so, the lowering of the standard for the first factor when the goods or services are identical, the presumptions regarding channels of trade and classes of consumers, the frequent discarding of third-party registration and use evidence, the "least sophisticated purchaser" test, and the registrant's benefit-of-the-doubt often frustrate these appeals.

Click on image for larger picture

The two precedential rulings were the following:

In In re Jimenez, 2025 USPQ2d 1355 (TTAB 2025) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Angela Lykos) [TTABlogged here], the Board reversed a refusal to register the mark GASPER ROOFING [ROOFING disclaimed], finding confusion unlikely with the registered mark JASPER CONTRACTORS [CONTRACTORS disclaimed], both for roofing services. The Board rejected the examining attorney’s argument that GASPER and JASPER might be pronounced the same: “Because neither GASPER or JASPER is a coined term, case law . . . does not require us to find that these two terms may be pronounced in an identical manner.” The evidence established that “Gasper” is a surname that begins with the letter strings “G-a-s” and “G-a-s-p,” each of which forms the words “gas” and “gasp,” recognized in U.S. English, and pronounced with a hard letter “g” sound. The dictionary entry for “jasper” further showed that it is pronounced with the soft letter “j.” Moreover, the evidence supported a finding that “roofing service purchases may involve multiple steps and may be complex. As a result, even the least sophisticated consumer is likely to exercise an elevated level of care.” The Board concluded that “the dissimilarity of the marks in sound, appearance, meaning and commercial impression is sufficiently great that, coupled with an elevated level of purchaser care, [it] outweighs the identical nature of the services, trade channels and classes of consumers.”

In In re Ye Mystic Krewe of Gasparilla, 2025 USPQ2d 1291 (TTAB 2025) [precedential] (Opinion by Judge Elizabeth K. Brock). [TTABlogged here]. Consent agreements “may carry great weight” in the Section 2(d) analysis, but not this time. The Board affirmed a refusal to register the mark GASPARILLA, finding confusion likely with the registered mark GASPARILLA TREASURES, both for beverageware and clothing. Applicant contested only one of the DuPont factors, maintaining that, under the 10th factor, its consent agreement with the cited registrant sufficed to fend off the refusal. Not so, said the Board. Consent agreements play a significant role in the DuPont analysis, since the parties to the agreement are in a “better position to know the real life situation than bureaucrats or judges.” Here, the involved marks are “highly similar” and the goods overlapping. There was “no indication that the goods will travel in separate trade channels, nor any agreement that the parties will sell in separate trade channels or otherwise restrict their fields of use.” Furthermore, the Consent Agreement contains no provision regarding display of the marks. The marks would have been in concurrent use for only about one year at the time the Consent Agreement was executed. The Board concluded that “the Consent Agreement simply does not rise to the level of one of the 'more detailed agreements' to be given 'substantial' weight."

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Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

Wednesday, January 07, 2026

The TTAB Issued 11 Precedential Opinions in 2025

Over the past four years, the Board has issued between 30 and 38 precedential rulings per year. In 2025, the Board issued 11. One might ask, why the drop-off?


Section 2(d) - Likelihood of Confusion:
Lack of Bona Fide Intent:
Entitlement to a Statutory Cause of Action: Discovery/Evidence/Procedure:
Prosecution Issues:

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Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

Tuesday, January 06, 2026

TTAB Posts January 2026 Hearing Schedule

The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (Tee-Tee-Ā-Bee) has scheduled three oral hearings for the month of January 2026. The first two will be held virtually; the third will be in-person at the Madison East Building, 600 Dulany Street 9th Floor (Hearing Room C), Alexandria, VA. Briefs and other papers for the case may be found at TTABVUE via the links provided.


January 8, 2026 - 10 AM [Virtual]: In re Spotlight Oral Care Limited, Serial Nos. 79380381 et al. [Refusals to register the mark shown immediately below, along with four other similar word-plus-design marks, absent a disclaimer of MADE BY DENTISTS, for mouthwash, teeth-whitening products, dental cleaning tools, toothbrushes, and the like.]

January 22, 2026 - 11 AM [Virtual]: NHDNC LLC v. Velcro BVBA and Velcro IP Holdings LLC, Cancellation No. 92074468 [Hearing on the issue of petitioner's entitlement to a statutory cause of action (a/k/a statutory standing) in the first phase of this proceeding seeking cancellation of a 50-year-old registration for the mark VELCRO for hook-and-loop fasteners, on the ground of genericness].

January 29, 2026 - 10 AM [In-Person]: Skechers U.S.A. Inc. and Skechers U.S.A. Inc., II v. Golden Goose S.p.A., Opposition No. 91242446 [Opposition to registration of the mark shown below, for footwear and bags, on the grounds of ornamentality without secondary meaning, and aesthetic functionality.]

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Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Monday, January 05, 2026

TTABlog Quarterly Index: October - December 2025

E-mail subscriptions to the TTABlog are available. Just enter your e-mail address in the box on the right to receive a daily update via Feedblitz. Please report any broken or inoperative links, as well as any errors and omissions, to the TTABlogger at jwelch at wolfgreenfield.com.

Section 2(d) - Likelihood of Confusion:

Section 2(e)(1) - Mere Descriptiveness:
Section 2(e)(2) - Primarily Geographically Descriptive: Section 2(e)(4) - Primarily Merely a Surname: Section 2(f) - Acquired Distinctiveness: Abandonment: Genericness: Nonownership:
Nonuse: Request for Information: Statutory Standing: Discovery/Evidence/Procedure:
CAFC Decisions: Recommended Reading: Other:

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2026.

Wednesday, December 31, 2025

TTABlog Test: Is LA PACHANGA MARGARITAS Y FIESTA Confusable with PACHANGA MEXICAN GRILL for Restaurant Services?

The USPTO refused to register the proposed mark LA PACHANGA MARGARITAS Y FIESTA in the word-and-design form shown below, for "providing of food and drink via a mobile truck; restaurant services" [MARGARITAS disclaimed], finding confusion likely with the registered mark PACHANGA MEXICAN GRILL (in standard characters with a disclaimer of MEXICAN GRILL) for “restaurant services." Applicant argued that the term PACHANGA, which means "a (lively) party" in Spanish, is a weak formative, further evidenced by third-party use of that word and of the English word PARTY in connection with restaurant services. How do you think this appeal came out? In re O&R Franchise Group LLC, Serial No. 98134084 (December 30, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Thomas W. Wellington).

The Board first considered the strength of the cited mark. Applicant submitted four third-party registrations for marks containing the word PACHANGA, but none were for restaurant services. It also provided seven third-party websites showing use of PACHANGA in connection with restaurant services, but those were "not so plentiful to make a meaningful impact in terms of demonstrating commercial weakness."

Finally, Applicant pointed to 10 third-party registrations for marks incorporating the term PARTY in connection with food and restaurant services, arguing that these marks are relevant because, under the doctrine of foreign equivalents, PACHANGA is "the Spanish equivalent of PARTY and [thus is] similarly weak." The Board was unmoved: "Applicant does not cite to any authority to support the application of the doctrine of foreign equivalents in the manner it seeks, i.e., for purposes of using third-party registrations containing the English equivalent of an allegedly weak foreign term." Nonetheless, the third-party registrations and uses of PACHANGA-formative marks confirmed the suggestive connotation of the word.

The Board concluded that PACHANGA is "somewhat conceptually weak in that it is plainly suggestive in connection with restaurant services" [i.e., a "festive dining atmosphere."] "But the fact that it is suggestive does not mean its scope of protection shrinks substantially," and so this sixth DuPont factor weighed "somewhat" in applicant's favor.

Turning to the marks, the Board found them to be "quite similar in appearance and sound because the dominant element of each mark is the term PACHANGA," attributing no significance to the word "LA." Both marks "are suggestive of a festive Mexican-themed or cuisine establishment."

In sum, we conclude that the marks are overall very similar. Consumers are likely to call for the respective services by using the nearly identical terms LA PACHANGA or PACHANGA. The marks also have similar connotations and convey similar commercial impressions. Accordingly, the first DuPont factor weighs in favor of a conclusion that confusion is likely.

Since the involved services are identical, the Board must presume that they are offered in the same trade channels to the same classes of consumers, and so the second and third DuPont factors weighed "heavily" in favor of affirmance of the refusal.

Though the shared term, PACHANGA, is plainly suggestive and thus has some conceptual weakness and a minimal showing of third-party use, which tend to favor a finding that confusion is not likely, this is far outweighed by the other aforementioned factors. We thus conclude on this record that Applicant’s mark is likely to cause confusion with the registered mark.

Ands so, the Board affirmed the refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: How did you do? Would you dub this a WYHA? What do you think about the doctrine of equivalents issue?

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Tuesday, December 30, 2025

TTAB Reverses Two Section 2(d) Refusals: Cited Third-Party Websites Failed to Show Relatedness of Charitable Food Distribution and Fundraising Services

In a lengthy, detailed opinion, the Board reversed Section 2(d) refusals of the mark POTS in standard character and logo form (shown below) for food distribution and charitable services, in view of the mark POTS for fundraising software and services. Relying on the Board's OSF Healthcare decision [pdf here] in analyzing the relatedness issue, the Board found that the differences in the goods and services, channels of trade, and classes of consumers outweighed the identity and similarity of the marks, making confusion unlikely. In re Part of the Solution, Serial Nos. 97791804 and 97791806 (December 18, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Christopher C. Larkin).

In seeking to prove the relatedness of the involved goods and services, the Examining Attorney relied  solely on extrinsic evidence in the form of eight third-party websites of charitable organizations. The Board found that evidence "insufficient in quantity and quality to establish relatedness." 

In view of the number of charitable organizations in United States that provide goods and render services to those in need, "eight websites strike us as too few in number to show that 'the same entity commonly manufactures, produces, or provides the relevant goods and/or services and markets the goods and/or services under the same mark,' 10 TTABVUE 5 (emphasis added), even if the websites were probative of that issue." Moreover, ....

The websites here are not probative of that issue, however, because they do not show that the same entities offer both the services actually identified in the ’804 and ’806 Applications and the goods or services actually identified in the ’860 Registration. As the Board explained in OSF Healthcare, under the second DuPont factor, examining attorneys must focus on the actual language in the identification of goods or services in an application, rather than on broadened or generalized descriptions of the identified goods or services. OSF Healthcare, 2023 WL 6140427, at *12. (emphasis supplied).

In OSF Healthcare, the Board explained that “[w]ith respect to Internet evidence, in determining exactly what services are offered through the respective websites, we acknowledge that services may not be explicitly described at all, or may be described in colloquial language that does not track the technical language of acceptable identifications of goods and services in applications and registrations, including those involved here.” OSF Healthcare, 2023 WL 6140427, at *10 (citation omitted). “In such instances, we must determine the nature of the services that are offered, and decide whether they fall within the full scope of the language in the involved identifications.”

The Examining Attorney did not follow OSF Healthcare because "she quotes only snippets of the Class 36 identification in the ’860 Registration, and otherwise paraphrases the involved identifications of goods and services."

We agree with the Examining Attorney that the evidence shows that charitable organizations such as Applicant engage in fundraising; indeed, money or in-kind donations raised through such efforts are the lifeblood of those organizations. But unlike the fundraising-related goods and services identified in the ’860 Registration, which are necessarily provided to, and for the benefit of, entities other than Registrant, the fundraising activities of Applicant and other charitable organizations are for the benefit of the organizations themselves and are not provided to, and for the benefit of, other entities. As a result, those fundraising activities are not “services” for purposes of the second DuPont factor.

The Board concluded that the goods and services identified in the cited registration and the services identified in the subject applications are not related, and "the second DuPont factor strongly supports a conclusion that confusion is not likely...."

Furthermore, the evidence "also does not establish that the channels of trade or classes of consumers for these [goods and] services overlap."

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TTABlogger comment: Judge Larkin also wrote the opinion in OSF Healthcare.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.

Monday, December 29, 2025

BOWENS for Guitars is Primarily Merely a Surname, Says TTAB

The Board affirmed a Section 2(e)(4) refusal to register the proposed mark BOWENS for guitar and audio equipment, finding the mark to be primarily merely a surname and therefore barred from registration (absent a showing of acquired distinctiveness). The Board observed that BOWENS is neither a rare surname nor a common one, but it is the surname of tens of thousands of individuals. There was "some evidence that this term has surname significance in some other established contexts," and no evidence of any other established meaning of BOWENS. In re The Hoist Group Inc., Serial No. 98444366 (December 22, 2025) [not precedential] (Opinion by Judge Mark A. Thurmon).

In determining whether the mark BOWENS is primarily merely a surname, the Board considered the following four Benthin factors:

  1. Whether the surname is rare; 
  2. Whether anyone connected with the applicant has that surname; 
  3. Whether the term has any recognized meaning other than as a surname e.g., an “ordinary language” meaning; and, 
  4. Whether the term has the structure and pronunciation of a surname.

As to the first factor, the LEXIS/NEXIS surname database included more than 23,000 individuals with the Bowens surname, located across the United States. Examining Attorney Komal Vo provided evidence from ancestry.com showing more than 72,000 persons with the Bowens surname.

Applicant argues BOWENS is not a common surname, as it accounts for a tiny fraction of the individuals in the United States. Both the Trademark Examining Attorney and the Applicant are correct here, as BOWENS is not a rare or common surname. It rests somewhere between these two points on the range of surnames in the United States. The standard, however, asks whether the BOWENS surname is rare. We find it is not rare, though it is not particularly common either. The first factor supports the refusal, but is not conclusive of the primary significance of the applied-for mark.

The second factor was neutral: there was no evidence that the surname BOWENS is connected to anyone associated with Applicant Hoist Group.

As to the third, Hoist argued that BOWENS has other meanings - for example, BOWENS ISLAND, near San Antonio, Texas. However, the evidence showed that the area was named after John Bowen and thus this evidence supported the Section 2(e)(4) refusal. The same was true of other examples provided by Hoist, including a disease named for a person who identified it. "None of the evidence Applicant submitted shows an established non-surname meaning of Bowens."

Examining Attorney Komal Vo also submitted evidence showing that BOWENS does not have a dictionary definition, as well as evidence from ancestry.com about the family history of the Bowens surname - it originated in Dutch as the name Bouwens and later became Bowens in Welsh-Irish and English. The Board concluded that the third factor supported the refusal.

The fourth factor presented "something of a conundrum, because we have no clear guidance on what structure or pronunciation is typical of a surname. Indeed, surnames can be found with many different structures and pronunciations, making it difficult to apply this factor in a consistent and meaningful way."

The Examining Attorney pointed to three other surnames—BOWEN, BOUWENS and BAUWENS—and argued that BOWENS is similar in structure and pronunciation. But there was "no evidence of what it is about these names that would lead consumers to understand them as surnames." "This evidence doesn’t tell us much about whether consumers will understand BOWENS as primarily merely a surname."

Applicant Hoist referred to several registrations for Bowen-variant marks that were registered without a showing of acquired distinctiveness, but it also submitted evidence of Bowen-variant marks that were registered with a showing of acquired distinctiveness. This evidence "do[es]not help us determine whether BOWENS has the structure and pronunciation of a surname." Finding the evidence "equivocal as to the import of the structure and pronunciation of BOWENS," the Board deemed this factor neutral.

In conclusion, the Board affirmed the refusal.

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TTABlogger comment: BOWENS certainly seems to have to structure and pronunciation of BOWEN.

Text Copyright John L. Welch 2025.